Contemporary Review

121st YEAR OF PUBLICATION

2.18

JULY 1986

THE GROWING PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT: A PRACTICAL SOLUTION

Ralph Howell, M.P.

THE FRENCH ELECTIONS, MARCH 1986: INNOVATIONS AND TRADITIONS

Peter Savigear

THE MANDELSTAM EXPERIENCE

A. L. Rowse

THE ORIGINS OF SCOTTISH TORYISM

J. T. Ward

and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement.

£1.10

CUK-H06558-218-P3978

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

July 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1446 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

The Growing Problem of Unemployment: A Practical Solution	Ralph Howell, M P	1
South Asia After Afghanistan	A. Ehteshami	8
The French Elections, March 1986: Innovations and Traditions	Peter Savigear	13
The Mandelstam Experience	A. L. Rowse	21
Korean Journey	Philip Towle	27
With Accent on Youth and Animals	Ted Cox	30
Poems: The Starcross Ferry **Remembering Nature**	William Oxley	34
The Origins of Scottish Toryism	J. T. Ward	35
A New Assessment of Denton Welch: Part IV: Shells and Fishbones	Richard Whittington-Egan	41
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		
Quarterly Fiction Review	Rosalind Wade	45
Non-fiction Reviews Frank Longford, Esmond Wright, Lawrence Tanner, Betty Abel, Richard Mullen, Arnold de Montmorency, Richard Whittington-Egan.		49
SHORTER REVIEWS		56

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE, O.B.E.
Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL
Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY
Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON
Finance Director.
LEONARD SKIPP

P 3978

© 1986 Published monthly by the Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG, England; and printed in England by Brazier & Nalsh Ltd., 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD U S. Mailing Agent: Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc., 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N.J 07001. Second Class postage paid at Rahway N J Annual subscription (including postage). U.K. £16 00, U S A and Canada $55 00 Rates for all other countries on application Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S and Canada. extra costs given on request U S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc., 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J 07001. Contemporary Review.
(ISSN/0010/7565)

P 3978

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

July 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1446

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE, O.B.E.

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP



THE GROWING PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT: A PRACTICAL SOLUTION

by Ralph Howell, MP

IN recent years it has become increasingly obvious that there is no conventional cure for the ever-growing problem of unemployment that has bedevilled this and other western countries ever since the late 1950's. Consequently a radical solution — the elimination of unemployment by the establishment of a nationwide work-for-welfare system — Workfare — seems to be the only way out.

It is now over forty years since the first postwar government took office and began to lay the foundations of the modern welfare state, adopting as its basis the Beveridge Report. Unfortunately, however, only the generous recommendations (thought likely to be popular) were implemented. The tougher restrictions and counterbalances were ignored then as they have consistently been ignored by all governments since.

Over the ensuing years the range and size of benefits have been steadily increased, many of them separately means-tested, with the result that the system today is out of control. Expenditure on benefits and the numbers of officials employed to administer them have grown to unacceptable levels, while the imposition of layer upon layer of separate and uncoordinated employment, taxation and welfare measures has created unfathomable complexity and a jungle of anomalies.

For years the phoney debate has been the order of the day with Conservatives blaming Labour Governments and Labour Oppositions blaming Conservative Governments. The Liberals and now the Liberal/SDP Alliance have throughout blamed both and have suggested nothing more than that which the two governing Parties have been doing — i.e.

spending more and more taxpayers' money on a multitude of job creation measures — futile attempts to hold the figures in check in order to get the best possible result at the next General Election. For the last seven years the Conservative Government has told us that when inflation is brought under control unemployment will fall. This myth has been exploded and the Government now recognises that, vital though the control of inflation is, it has little effect on the relentless increase in unemployment.

The present Government has done more and spent more money on trying to alleviate the unemployment problem than any previous Government and those who attack the Government, either the Opposition parties or the Conservative One Nation Group, have so far produced no feasible alternative measures that would achieve better results. All have one thing in common — their schemes all necessitate increased government expenditure.

However, the more money we throw at this problem the worse the problem becomes. The reason is simple — the Government can only spend more money if it taxes the working population, industrialists and manufacturers — the wealth creators — more heavily, thus making our goods and services less competitive and so putting more firms out of business and completing the vicious circle of adding to unemployment.

Now Government and Opposition parties alike have ceased to talk of a return to full employment and seem resigned to accept that the best that can be achieved in the foreseeable future is to stop further increases or at the very best, make a small reduction of one or two hundred thousand.

It is against this background that we should ask some fundamental questions and examine a radical solution.

1. Is unemployment necessary in a free enterprise society?
2. Is the establishment of the Right to Work feasible?
3. Would a nationwide Workfare system work?
4. Could unemployment be eliminated?

Before answering these fundamental questions an examination should be made of:—

1. Why unemployment has risen to such high levels.
2. What is known and not known of the real extent of unemployment.
3. The present cost of support for those classified as unemployed together with all measures aimed at reducing unemployment.

The welfare state has seriously distorted the labour market. Many people receive tax free benefits which give net incomes equal to and, in some cases, better than they could hope to achieve by finding work. The difference between income in and out of work is so small that the incentive to work has been greatly diminished for a large sector of the workforce. It is possible that six or seven million people fall into this category. The 'Why Work' problem is very real.

In earlier years most people were too proud to accept state support. Memories of national assistance and the stigma of the workhouse lingered on. In recent years that sort of pride has been worn down. Now governments encourage all those who are eligible for benefits of any kind to

claim them. The stigma has been removed. Benefit qualifications range, in some cases, well above the national average wage. Housing benefits are available to 40% of householders. Other benefits like child benefits are universal — the richest people getting the same as the poorest — and the value of the benefits to the richest is greater than to the poorest after taking taxation into account.

Furthermore, the growth of modern technology, which since time began has meant that machines replace people, has added to the problem as microchips and robots become more numerous. Fewer people are employed in everyday concerns — more and more self-service petrol pumps, supermarkets replacing small shops, etc.— all adding to the reduction of jobs.

The average level of unemployment in Britain throughout the 1950's was 370,000. The average for the 1960s was 483,000 — an increase of 31%. The average for the 1970s was 1,048,000 — an increase of 117%. 2,773,000 — an increase of no less than 165% above that of the 1970. Who can possibly believe that unemployment is about to level out, let alone decline.

While the general public may have few economic indicators on the tip of their tongue, almost everybody knows that the present level of unemployment is 3.3 million. Although this figure bears no relationship to the true unemployment figure — i.e. the number of persons without work who are actively seeking work — it is not surprising that the figure published each month by the Government is taken on its face value. Why should it be challenged? Who could believe that month after month the Government would publish this embarrassingly high figure when the true figure is probably less than half 3.3 million?

The term unemployment for government statistical purposes warrants close scrutiny. The precise definition of 'unemployment' is as follows:—

'People claiming benefit (i.e. national insurance, unemployment benefit, supplementary benefits or national insurance credits) at Unemployment Benefit Offices on the day of the monthly count, who on that day were unemployed and able and willing to do any suitable work.'

However, the unemployment figure is made up of individuals who are unable to work because of long-term sickness and severe disability, individuals looking after the home who do not want to work, one-parent families who do not have the time to work, those who have retired early, many in receipt of maternity benefits, those holding part-time jobs but claiming supplementary benefits and, most appalling of all, those claiming benefits while at the same time engaging in the black economy.

The unemployment figures are false, bear no relationship to the number of persons actively seeking work and amount to nothing more than the total number of claimants of unemployment benefit, supplementary benefit and other selective benefits.

In order to study the feasibility of eliminating unemployment it is necessary to find out how much we are actually spending on unemployment now.

Professor Adrian Shinfield of the University of Edinburgh has stated that the real cost of unemployment is over £20 billion and to arrive at this figure he includes a notional sum of almost £12 billion for tax and national insurance contributions foregone. It is doubtful whether this can be fully substantiated. However, the real overall cost of unemployment should include all benefits paid to the unemployed, the cost of job creation measures, plus aid to industry, inner cities, regional aid, etc., all of which are designed to reduce unemployment.

Figures for 1984/85 are as follows:—

Benefits to the unemployed	7.1
Redundancy fund payments	0.3
Job creation	2.3
Regional & industrial assistance ...	1.3
Urban programme	0.3
Welfare milk and school meals ...	0.3
Support to public sector industries ...	2.9
	£14.5

However, no official attempt to arrive at the overall cost of unemployment is made. Forecasts of unemployment levels and costs are a most sensitive political issue from which all governments shy away.

Loss of revenue due to the Black Economy should also be brought into the equation. There is ample anecdotal evidence of the growth of the unofficial economy. Recent newspaper articles have illuminated the widespread abuse of the welfare system through concurrent participation in the black economy and authoritative bodies such as the Inland Revenue have stated that it is likely to amount to around 7½% of GDP — more than £20 billion. Whatever the scale, it is common experience that, despite the fact that over 3 million people have no employment, it is often very difficult to find anybody to do everyday jobs such as plumbing, bricklaying, gardening, housework, etc., except by paying cash and thus participating in the hidden economy also. Employers throughout the country report difficulties in recruiting workers.

However, there is a strange absence of protest at the present very high levels of unemployment. In 1972, when unemployment reached 1 million, huge marches and violent protests ensued. When in December 1980 unemployment reached 2 million, protests were still common and as late as 1982 marches took place. Since then there has been a minimum of protest. The Left will say that this is because the unemployed are so impoverished and demoralised that they can no longer protest. Not true. While recognising that most people who are unemployed would like to work, and appreciating how wasteful and soul-destroying unemployment is, the reason why even the extremists can no longer organise a march from one side of Parliament Square to the other is that many of the unemployed have discovered that our present welfare system has trapped

them into a situation where they can no longer afford to work — a situation where hundreds of thousands of the unemployed can never hope to find a job as profitable as relying on unemployment benefits, having rent and rates or mortgage interest paid and qualifying for all the automatic passport benefits.

What has gone wrong? The answer can be found in the first place in the fact that the Beveridge Plan was never put fully into operation.

Beveridge knew that if the State established an effective safety net, whereby everybody would be entitled to food, clothing and shelter, without the necessary counter-balances of the work test after a period of time, many people would learn to lean too heavily on the State and the burden on the remaining wealth creators would become unbearable.

Beveridge said:—

> The danger of providing benefits, which are both adequate in amount and indefinite in duration, is that men, as creatures who adapt themselves to circumstances, may settle down to them . . . Men and women in receipt of unemployment benefit cannot be allowed to hold out indefinitely for work of the type to which they are used or in their present place of residence, if there is work which they could do available at the standard wage for that work. Men and women who have been unemployed for a certain period should be required as a condition of continued benefit to attend a work or training centre . . . The period after which attendance should be required need not be the same at all times or for all persons. It might be extended in times of high unemployment and reduced in times of good employment; six months for adults would perhaps be a reasonable average period of benefit without conditions.
>
> (Cmd. 6404, paras 130-131)

As far as young people were concerned, Beveridge declared that school leavers should never be allowed to leave school and immediately join the dole queue. In his words:—

> But for young persons who have not yet the habit of continuous work the period should be shorter; for boys and girls there should ideally be no unconditional benefit at all — their enforced abstention from work should be made an occasion of further training.

The question then arises — could work for all who wish to work, the establishment of the Right to Work for all fit and able people, be provided at a lower overall figure? Work could be offered at a reasonable rate of pay for less than the £14.5 billion we are currently spending.

To put the Beveridge Plan fully into operation now would mean replacing the discredited Job Centres with Work Centres. These Centres would be located so that nobody would be more than five miles from a Centre except in the very extremities and most sparsely populated areas. Unemployment benefit would cease after three or six months. Anybody without a normal job would be guaranteed the Right to Work. The Work Centre would organise environmental work.

In every locality there is much low-cost labour intensive work that needs to be done. Old decaying buildings could be demolished, railway stations and other public places could be tidied, disused gravel pits on the approaches to our cities and other waste areas could be turned into

boating lakes, fish ponds or gardens.

In the countryside roadsides could be trimmed again and the coastline could be better defended. Instead of being demoralised by the shabbiness all around we would be generally uplifted and proud of the improvements we had set in motion.

The pay, to fit in with today's values, could be:—

Age	*£ per hour.*	*Max. £ per week—*
16	1.00	40.00
17	1.25	50.00
18	1.50	60.00
19	1.75	70.00
adults	2.00	80.00

This would compare favourably with the net take-home pay of a great number of the lower paid.

Community work should be provided for all fit and able persons who have been unemployed for more than six months. Work at £2 per hour, up to a maximum of 40 hours, should be offered as of right to replace benefit. This would need to be phased in. The first stage could be to offer such work to all who had been unemployed for over two years. Exemption could be made for the over 60s. When this group had been fully deployed, those who had been unemployed for 1½ years could be offered work in the same way and thus gradually we could absorb all who had been unemployed for more than six months.

By so doing we would have completed the original Beveridge proposals. The work test would be established.

The first six months of unemployment could be looked upon as the redeployment period and fully covered by insurance.

A Youth Work and Training Service should be instituted on the basis of the National Service system. Practically all other European countries have National Service whereby young people leave their home district, receive disciplined training and learn at least one trade. The implementation of this system would mean that our young people, some of whom are the children of unmotivated parents, particularly in the most deprived areas, would be involved in this general training and working programme, thus putting them on a par, as far as training and basic discipline are concerned, with practically all other young people in Europe.

The Government admits that social benefits to the unemployed amount to about £7 billion, to which must be added the £2 billion which will be spent this year on Youth Training Schemes, etc., plus the cost of passported benefits and special payments to the unemployed which cannot be separately quantified.

To summarise, both the Workfare Programme and the Youth Work and Training Scheme could be linked into an Agricultural Set-Aside Afforestation programme. By so doing, work would be available all over the Country.

Work in and around large Cities could be found by imposing a derelict

property tax which could be waived if owners allows the Workfare personnel to demolish or improve their property.

Suggested areas of work

1. Set-Aside Afforestation — planting, weeding, thinning, etc.
2. Demolishing or improving decaying building.
3. Renovation of railway stations and other public places.
4. Conversion of disused gravel pits and other waste areas into boating lakes, fish ponds or gardens.
5. Trimming roadsides and clearing pathways.
6. Coastal defence and beaches.
7. Care of elderly, disabled, sick, etc. within the community.

Thus the total cost of employing all the unemployed would be less than £13 billion or £11 billion, after deductions of tax and national insurance. If only two-thirds of the unemployed accepted work the cost would be less than £8 billion and if only one-half took up the offer of work — probably a more realistic estimate — the cost would be under £6 billion.

If estimates of the extent of the black economy are anything like accurate, very considerable further revenue would accrue as the Black Economy activities became more difficult. The savings in public expenditure could be used to reduce the tax burden generally.

All this would mean that we would have replaced our 'something for nothing' society with a 'something for something' society. We would have replaced our decrepit and idleness-encouraging welfare system with a modern system in which it was always worthwhile to work.

Such a new system would be able to build on the experience of the Community Programme, the Youth Training Scheme, and some of the other job-creating initiatives taken in recent years. They would be able to draw on limited experience from overseas in countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and United States.

The advantages of such a scheme would be enormous. Nobody would ever have to fear enforced unemployment, nobody would need to lose the motivation to work, and the Right to Work, that has for years been asked for, would be a reality. Involuntary unemployment would be abolished, decay and untidiness, which is demoralising the Nation would be a thing of the past and the irritation and frustration of the millions of low-paid and over-taxed people, who have had to bear the burden of our ridiculous 'something for nothing' system would be ended. In every case, it would be more profitable to work than to be unemployed. This must be the first requirement to restore the incentive to work and the first real step back to sustained prosperity.

[Ralph Howell, is Conservative member for North Norfolk.]

SOUTH ASIA AFTER AFGHANISTAN

by A. Ehteshami

IN the summer of 1853 Karl Marx put forward a view about the non-industrialised and colonised world seemingly in total opposition to his contribution to liberating radical movements and thought in Europe. Writing at the height of the British Empire, Marx argued that the only possible way for India's social development was through the continued rule of the British. For the last 133 years, then and beyond the reality of political independence in the former colonies, an intellectual marriage seems to have been consummated over the treatment of the Third World between the powerful proponents of industrial capitalism and its radical opponents at home. The only difference is that the radical opponents of capitalism at home now feel more comfortable if the Soviet Union is leading where the British left off.

For the last 40 years — and perhaps for the first time in recent history — we have lived in an essentially bipolar international system where the two contrary major modern ideologies of our time — Capitalism and Communism — have both found expression in two simultaneously rising global powers. In more than one instance they have mobilised to maintain or expand their regional and/or global interests in either ideological terms, or in terms of their 'national interests' or, as is usually the case, in a combination of the two.

In bipolar terms, therefore, the two super powers will project their so-called 'national interests' halfway across the world and vice versa; where Vietnam becomes, in the pursuit of its own development, a major threat to the security of the United States, and a threat to its 'vital' national interests, or where events inside Afghanistan pose a threat to the Soviet Union's stability and its global objectives. We have come to live in a world where liberation has become a zero-sum game, where change is translated into net gains and losses for the global chess board of the two super powers. We live in a world where the world's two greatest enemies sit side-by-side by the fireplace in Geneva and amicably divide Nicaragua and Afghanistan between themselves, pledging not to intervene in each others' 'headaches'. No-one protests that neither Afghanistan nor Nicaragua is theirs to bargain with.

The lack of interest of the United States in Afghanistan in the decade after the Second World War facilitated a movement by the Afghan government towards the Soviet Union after 1955, which in turn coincided with the fundamental change in the Soviet Union's own perception of the Third World, and the advancement of her interests in the Middle East and South Asia after Stalin's death. From the mid-1950s training of most Afghan military officers was undertaken by the Soviets, and the Soviet Union became Afghanistan's major foreign trader and aid supplier.

But the present turmoil in Afghanistan can be dated back to 1973, in which year the monarchy was overthrown and M. Daud, the King's

cousin, declared a Republic with the full support of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the support of Amin, Taraki and Babrak Karmal, who was deposed in May 1986 in favour of Mr. J. Najibullah, a member of the Politbureau and head of Khad Secret Police.

In April of 1978, Amin and Taraki seized power through a coup which had at least tacit support from the Soviet Union. The Afghan Communist Party headed by Taraki came to power. But this action merely brought the hitherto internal feuding of the different factions within the Communist Party into the open. The Soviet Union put all its support behind Taraki at this time, and when their joint plan to dispose of Amin backfired, and in September 1979 Amin had Taraki liquidated, the Soviet Union had radically to assess its position in Afghanistan. It would seem that Amin was not a reliable ally for the Soviet Union as he believed in more independence from the Soviet Union and improvement in ties with the West, particularly the United States.

Furthermore, as the American and Chinese-backed rebellion against the central government gathered momentum, the Soviet Union appraised that the best way to maintain its control would require direct intervention in Afghanistan.

With the Iranian revolution in full swing, and increased Islamic activity in Soviet Asia, the prospect of an anti-Soviet and pro-Islamic Afghanistan must have seemed like a nightmare for the Kremlin. Therefore the Soviet invasion of December 1979 may be interpreted as a defensive move to preserve her gains of 1955 and particularly since the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan.

The large-scale Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although instigated by the local situation, has had far-reaching regional and global implications. And after assessing the response of different international forces to the invasion we shall turn to the specific implications.

1. The Soviet Union's own official explanations do not stand the test of logic for they imply a ludicrous situation in which the Afghani head of state (Amin) invited Soviet troops in for his own execution and replacement by Babrak Karmal.

   In a TASS report dated 3rd January 1980, the Soviet Union argued that their presence in Afghanistan is legitimate because it is based on Article 51 of the UN Charter and the December 1978 signed 'Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation' between the two states.

   Furthermore, both Karmal and the Soviets argue that Amin was not the legitimate president because he had overthrown Taraki in September 1979, and that Amin and the United States pursued the same objective policies of 'strangling the Afghan revolution'; but the unassailable fact is that Amin was the head of state at the time, and no answers are forthcoming to the question as to why he should invite the hangman to his own funeral.
2. The United States and the People's Republic of China became strange bedfellows in this affair as they both condemned the Soviet move in

similar terms.

Washington argued that the invasion amounts to the violation of international law and the UN Charter. As President Carter put it on January 4 1980: 'It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people'. (A contention in total contradiction to his administration's position on the Shah of Iran and his eventual overthrow only a year earlier). The US declared its apprehension of a Soviet-occupied Afghanistan over the internal stability of both Iran and Pakistan.

The Chinese went further, arguing that the Soviet move amounts to nothing less than a southward thrust to the Indian Ocean, control of sea lanes, seizure of oil rich areas and outflanking Europe so as to gain World hegemony, and on its way it has violated the UN Charter and international law.

3. The move may have helped to alienate the Soviet Union further in the Third World as a whole and in the strategically important Middle East in particular, and will of course have unwittingly strengthened the radical Islamic forces in the region — from Afghanistan itself to Indonesia and Tunis.

In terms of Soviet strategy, their interest in Afghanistan is indirect, linked only to Moscow's important strategic correlations elsewhere. The Soviet Union's interests in South Asia may be punctuated by three rather general Soviet considerations:

1. the actual or potential strategic importance of the country to the Soviet Union;
2. the importance of a country as a potential market for Soviet manufactured goods and as a source of raw materials or of relatively inexpensive consumer goods imports;
3. the possibility of disrupting influence patterns of either the United States or China in a particular region.[1]

And as the US has until recently been largely absent from the area, the Soviet inertia in South Asia is engendered by a long standing Sino-Soviet conflict; but as a consequence of the invasion, Moscow has provided the basis for Chinese-US-Pakistani ties developing which may not only affect the Afghani equation, but will go further in posing a threat to the Soviet Union's internal security.

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has caused the renewal of the US-Pakistani military ties, which in turn affects the strategic balance between India and Pakistan. Under an agreement signed between the US and Pakistan, the former is providing $3.2 billion worth of economic aid and military assistance, as well as the separate sale of 40 advanced F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. The invasion has also strengthened the Sino-Pakistani ties, as the Chinese provide aid both to the Pakistani government and the Pakistani-based Afghan Majahidins.

The spectre of a Chinese-Pakistani alliance against Soviet Central Asia

in alliance with the United States is increasingly becoming a reality for the Kremlin to cope with.

On the Indian front, the Soviet invasion — by contributing to Pakistan's rearmament — had the somewhat paradoxical result of increasing India's reliance on the Soviet Union for arms. India since 1980 has concluded three major weapons deals with the Soviet Union which includes the sale of Mig-23, Mig-27 and 40 Mig-29 aircraft fighters. The Soviet Union now supplies 70% of India's arms imports worth $1 billion or more per year.

Also, since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, India's closeness to the Soviet Union has exerted considerable pressure over the normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. While the two countries are on friendly terms for the moment, India and the Soviet Union are the two strongest and potentially most threatening countries that have land borders with mainland China. The close alliance of India and the Soviet Union therefore could translate into a military alliance against China, if the Chinese are perceived by the Indians to be strengthening and expanding Pakistan's military capabilities which may be used against India.

The invasion has unwittingly strengthened the position of the United States in the area. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Afghanistan invasion the United States' military presence has increased out of all proportion. The Indian Ocean is now policed by the US's Seventh Fleet and support for the US's naval presence here is augmented with the two US military bases in the Philippines, the facilities on the Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean and of course AWAC's and other equipment and facilities in the Arab side of the Gulf.

Deterring the perceived Soviet intentions of gaining access to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean has provided the pretext for the large American military force in the area which itself serves to consolidate the United States' own interests in the Middle East and South Asia.

The Soviet invasion has also helped to bring revolutionary Iran closer to the conservative states of Pakistan and Turkey. The economic and military ties between the three states are developing with the approval of the United States, thus giving substance to America's original intentions of engulfing the Soviet Union with hostile and pro-US regimes. Iran, along with Pakistan, shares a long border with Afghanistan and has been accepting huge numbers of Afghani refugees. Furthermore, despite its own war with Iraq, Iran has also been clandestinely supplying weapons and providing training for the Afghan Majahidins. The development of stronger ties between Iran and China as well as between Iran and Pakistan could, under US auspices, provide a yet further threat against Soviet-occupied Afghanistan as well as in connection with the Soviet Union's Central Asia dilemma.

Beyond the strategic interests so far considered, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan also has fringe economic benefits. What Marx prescribed for India under British rule over 100 years ago, pro-Soviet Communist parties around the world prescribe for Afghanistan under Soviet rule. Although qualitatively different, the essence of the arguments is the same. What

British Imperialism was expected, unconsciously and unwittingly, to achieve over a hundred years ago, the Soviet Union is expected to accomplish consciously today.

It is true that a land reform has been introduced, and that certain infrastructural industries have been developed with Soviet financial assistance and personnel. The Soviets are building factories, constructing apartment blocks, facilitating the provision of electricity and energy sources for commercial and household needs. They are expanding the Afghani grid-system by tying it to their own national grid. Massive irrigation systems are planned for Northern Afghanistan.

In exchange the Soviets have had unhindered access to Afghanistan's vast gas reserves. As far back as 1978. Afghanistan exported 250 million cubic feet of natural gas to the Soviet Union per day at a price one fifth of what the United States pays for Mexican gas exports. Since the stoppage of Iranian gas exports to the Soviet Union, one can deduce that the rate of exploitation of this commodity will have increased.

Under the Soviet plans, the Afghani farmers are only allowed to produce cotton, rather than wheat. The wheat supplies will be imported from Soviet Central Asia which will in turn diversify its production away from cotton and towards wheat and foodstuffs, thus helping to reduce Soviet dependence on Western imported grain and increase Afghanistan's dependence on imported Soviet foodstuffs.

It is now clear that the 1981 Five-Year Plan of the Babrak Karmal government had as its central objective the accelerated organic and structural dependence of the Afghani economy on the Soviet Central Asia. And it is the progress in the consolidation of this objective that may hold the key to a Soviet withdrawal.

In conclusion, almost 40 years after the following State Department policy issue, the Soviet Union may have, by its invasion of Afghanistan, accelerated the long-term American strategic interests of instigating '. . . a regional pact among Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan (as) a reasonable possibility. If US assistance were extended to include the countries in this arc, it would cost relatively little to create a Muslim cordon which would be a considerable factor in any future struggle with Soviet Russia'. (1948).

But as events show they might have missed this chance forever. The final outcome must depend on the negotiations in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Senor Diego Cordovez.

NOTES

1. Roger E. Kanet — 'The Soviet Union & the developing countries: policy or politics.' *The World Today*, August 1975.

[A. Ehteshami is a doctoral candidate at the University of Exeter doing research on the theoretical and empirical impact and role of the multinational corporations in the developing countries, with special reference to Brazil, Iran and Korea. He has published articles on a wide range of Third World issues.]

THE FRENCH ELECTIONS, MARCH 1986: INNOVATIONS AND TRADITIONS

by Peter Savigear

THE result of the French legislative elections held on 16th March, 1986, was the fall of a socialist government. The resignation of prime minister, M. Laurent Fabius, and the return of the socialist party to the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, was very much a trend of the times. Since the victory of the French 'left' in 1981, the socialists and other parties of the 'left' have been in decline or removed from office in many West European states. There were so many special elements in these elections in France that the conformity to a wider trend was in danger of being lost or neglected. Yet the peculiarities of this election were remarkable. It was an event for the experts, the connoisseurs of such occasions. Above all it was the long-awaited moment when the French head of state, the president, would be obliged to appoint a prime minister and a government from political parties with which he had no natural sympathy or common ideology. With the fall of the socialist government following the voting on 16th March, President Mitterrand called upon M. Jacques Chirac to form a new cabinet, dependent on the support of the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) and *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF). These two parties held 277 seats between them.

The arrival of 'cohabitation', as the French have suggestively termed this political disjuncture between president and the governing majority in the Chamber of Deputies, was both anticipated and the test of the constitution of the Fifth French Republic. The possibility had been expected at every moment since the death of President Pompidou and the revival of the socialist party in the nineteen-seventies. Speculation among the experts had been a feature of all the subsequent elections, but the confrontation had not occurred. Thus when M. Chirac was invited to become prime minister, there was little that was truly surprising; the implications and constitutional aspects had all been explored. The political outcome of the 1986 elections was therefore something of an anti-climax. Other states have experienced a similar division of principle at the heart of government, notably in the United States of America, but the relationship between president and government in contemporary France has been delicate and the burdens on President Mitterrand and his premier are clearly considerable. Not only does the president hold important powers and stand as the guardian of constitution and popular sovereignty, but he also has a direct mandate from the people. Since 1962, the French presidents have been directly elected, and therefore given an immense personal authority. However the expected clash has not been vicious; it has been cautiously and sensitively managed by both men.

The element of 'cohabitation' was widely regarded as the crucial result of the March election. This has not really been the case. M. Chirac respected the request that no ministers who had 'insulted' the president should be appointed. The president has been firm on the first political decisions taken by the new government. He refused the 'privatisation' of businesses nationalised before his presidency in 1981. M. Chirac has respected such interventions, and stressed that although the situation was new, the constitution contained provisions adequate for the continuation of stable government. The prerogatives and competences of the presidency, as defined in the constitution, 'are untouchable' was his view stated in his first public comment on 20th March. Moreover key ministries were given to men not known as party politicians. M. André Giraud, minister of defence, and M. Jean-Bernard Raimond, foreign minister, were described as 'more technical experts than politicians'. The minister of state for the economy, finances and privatisation, M. Edouard Balladur, also emphasised the need for finding 'the possibilities of a certain common existence.'[1] These were appointments designed to assist 'cohabitation'. The significance of the election of a centre-right majority and the appointment of a prime minister from that parliamentary coalition, working with a socialist president, has been less than anticipated.

The prospect of a political drama between president and the majority in the legislative assembly was only one of the unusual elements in the elections of March 1986. For the first time at national level voting was by a system of proportional representation, with seats allocated by departments to those political party lists which gained more than 5% of the votes. In addition, the electorate voted for both deputies to sit in the National Assembly and for their regional assemblies. The socialists had introduced the change in the voting procedures and the application of proportional representation to regional administration which was given greater competence than before. These elections were therefore a major departure, more dramatic than anything in French national politics since the introduction of direct elections for the presidency.

The return to a system of proportional representation was a bold move. France had experienced such systems before and many thought that the political instability of the Fourth Republic had been encouraged by such a system. The dangers were the proliferation of parties and the weakening of strong party groups, and the opening of the chamber to extreme political parties which would be unlikely to obtain seats under the former single-member system. Despite the 5% hurdle there was apparently some justification for the fear of proportional representation. General agreement was given to the view that the right-wing party, the *Front National*, was able to obtain 35 seats principally as a result of the new voting system. But this theory requires some qualification.

The *Front National* was in effect the only new party to receive seats. The previous assembly, like those of other years, had included a small number of independent or dissident deputies. These were normally described as *'divers gauche'* and *'divers droite'* — the latter had previously

included extreme right-wing candidates. The 1986 assembly contained no significant growth in parties or in extremes, apart from the group of 35 deputies of the *Front National.* Indeed one of the surprises of the elections was the strength of the major parties of the political centre, ranging from the RPR and UDF to the socialist party itself. Three major blocks appeared in the centre of the new Chamber of Deputies. The socialists, with 207 seats plus some five associated deputies, were the largest of these. The UDF and related centre parties obtained 131 seats and the RPR-UDF union, with their associated members, mustered 155 seats. The remaining deputies in the total of 577 who were elected, were communists or *Front National,* with nine deputies not associated with any of the principal groups.[2]

The grip of the established political parties was probably enhanced by another change in French political practice. It was no longer permissable to hold any number of mandates. The notorious *cumul des mandats* had been ended by the socialist government. Henceforth only two mandates were allowed. However this meant not only that new faces might inevitably appear at elections for all representative institutions, from the level of the commune, with the powerful position of the mayor at its head, canton, departmental and regional levels, to that of deputy. The change also meant that the existing organisations, in particular the major political parties, would provide the surest method of entry into political life for the aspirants. The ending of the accumulation of several mandates, at communal, regional and national levels, did not necessarily prevent the extension of party influence. On the contrary it invited an expansion of the political clientele through the many tiers of administration. The elections of March 1986 saw the leading figures of French politics claiming the most important mandates. Their clients and supporters would fill the remaining levels of government and administration, and perpetuate the strong position held by the principal parties.

The immediate result of the election may have been the fall of the socialist government, but the support for the party was strong. The socialists emerged as the largest single party group, with 207 seats. Their vote had held firmly in most departments of France. Where the socialist vote dropped badly was often in departments where the party had done particularly well in 1981, often obtaining 40-50% of the vote at that election. Foremost among the areas where the socialists lost significant support, and perhaps enough to have prevented a socialist majority in 1986, were the departments in the East of France, Mayenne (a fall from 34.8% to 10.2%), Meurthe-et-Moselle (from 40.8% to 32.6%), Moselle (from 40.7% to 27.3%), Bas-Rhin (from 30% to 18.8%). But in general, the socialist lists were successful and the national total of their votes was 8,703,734, 31.04%. In constrast the small, newer parties which contested this election did not manage to cross the 5% hurdle. Thus no ecologists were able to take seats, nor were the furthest 'left' of the parties nor the *Ligue communiste révolutionnaire* and *Lutte ouvrière.* The election revealed little sign of a loosening grip by the major parties over national

representation despite the arrival of the *Front National.*

Moreover the appearance of the *Front National* was not totally attributable to the changed system. The successful growth of support had begun long before March 1986. It had occurred consistently in the South-East departments where good results had been obtained in the European elections in 1984, especially in the Bouches-du-Rhône and the Alpes-Maritimes. There was a concentration of *pieds-noirs,* former residents of French North Africa, particularly Algeria who had come to France after the independence of those territories. The leader of the *Front,* M. Le Pen, was familiar to such families whose memories and attitudes were passed on to younger generations. The presence of North African workers, often in appartment blocks in towns which had experienced a recent rapid expansion of population and a deterioration in standards of public order, did much to explain the appeal of the 'law and order' message of the *Front National,* with its stress on traditional family values. The *Front* possessed the potential for drawing votes whatever the electoral system. The party drew votes from all other lists, although in some departments where the *Front National* did particularly well, the French Communist party suffered a serious drop in support. In the Bouches-du-Rhône and the Alpes-Maritimes the communist vote was halved, whereas the *Front* obtained more than 20% in both. A similar pattern was recorded in the department of the Aude. But generalisations are ill-advised; in the Tarn the communist vote held, more or less, and the *Front* also reached 10%. Any definitive tendency for parties to grow in number and the extremes to develop was not evident in 1986. The communist party continued its gradual and stumbling decline in popularity, managing only 35 seats with less than 10% of the votes.

Matters were different for the regional assembly elections, held simultaneously and also by the proportional system used for the legislative assembly. The results for the twenty-two metropolitan regions showed more parties competing and more parties represented in the assemblies. In five regions the *Front National* held the balance between right and left-wing coalitions, namely in Aquitaine, Languedoc-Roussillon, Franche-Comté, Picardie and Haute-Normandie. Various smaller party lists from the left and right obtained seats in several regions, thus seven groups sat in the regional assembly of Alsace, six in the Nord, and seven in the Centre. Thirteen different lists were successful in crossing the 5% hurdle in the two departments of Corsica. Among these many smaller groups, the ecologists were successful in Alsace (two seats) and in Basse-Normandie (one seat), and the Alternative party in the Pays de la Loire. The conventional wisdom which had expected more parties and extreme parties rather than middle of the road groups to be successful, was therefore proved sounder in the regional elections than in the case of the legislative elections.

The future of the regions was not clear despite the satisfactory procedure of linking the regional and legislative elections. As might be expected, there were similar abstention rates for both. However, the

political coalitions of the right, usually RPR and UDF, held a majority in fifteen of the twenty-two assemblies. This is significant because the RPR in particular had been opposed to decentralisation when this was proposed by the socialists and passed in 1982 and 1983. The only region to have already received a measure of autonomy and to have elected a first assembly on the basis of proportional representation in 1982 (a second election was held in 1984 as a result of a 'hung' assembly) was Corsica. Here the RPR which had just managed to gain office in 1984, had been accused of a lack of enthusiasm for any further extension of regional autonomy. The out-going president of the Corsican assembly, M. Jean-Paul de Rocca Serra, had in fact voted against the legislation creating a special statute for Corsica in 1982. He was also the leader of the new majority elected in 1986. Thus the French regions were generally closer to government in their attitude towards decentralisation and the relationship between regional policies and the preferred policies of central government, after the March 1986 election. In Corsica it has not been forgotten that M. Chirac was the prime minister at the time of the tragic and violent explosion of autonomist feeling which brought nationalists and the forces of the unitary state into conflict in August 1975. He had not emerged then as a champion of regional powers, although he had urged caution, in contrast to the minister of the interior, Prince Poniatowski.[3] The pace of decentralisation and the effective political determination to use the competences transferred to the regions are both in greater doubt after the elections of 1986.

If the RPR has been associated with the strong central state, the preference of the party has been also for single member electoral systems, not the proportional method adopted in 1986. French traditions associated such methods of representation with the weak governments and powerful parliaments of the Third and Fourth Republics. However the newly elected parliament does not have the extensive authority and control of those bodies that brought down governments in the years before 1958. Government draws up the agenda and controls debates. Motions of censure are limited by the constitution of the Fifth Republic and not a frequent and sudden procedure as was the case in the previous regimes. Therefore the combination of many parties, strong groups on the extremes of right and left, and decisive controls in the hands of the deputies themselves, have not appeared in the wake of the change to proportional representation. In many respects the greater possibility lies in the direction of a weakening of the role of the Chamber of Deputies.

M. Chirac has already favoured the use of ordinances, as described in article 38 of the constitution of 1958. The ordinance has a limited duration and requires the initial approval of the Chamber. The procedure has enabled the new government's programme to be started without undue delay, but the president, as the chairman of the cabinet or council of ministers, is inevitably involved in this process of rule by ordinance. Ultimately laws must be passed in the normal way, through the parliamentary procedure, but initiative lies with government rather than with the

Chamber of Deputies. In addition, M. Chirac has produced a strong and coherent government. Whilst there are approximately equal numbers of ministers from the two main partners in the majority coalition, the RPR and UDF, there is no serious rival for his position. The former president M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, has not been given office. M. Barre, the forceful former prime minister of the Giscardian period, suffered a serious set-back at the March elections. He was unable, as leader of the UDF list in the department of the Rhône, to get more than 22.9% of the votes cast. He was beaten by none other than M. Charles Hernu, formerly minister of defence until his resignation over the Greenpeace affair, the sinking of the ship by French agents in New Zealand. M. Hernu and the socialists gained 29.3% of the votes in the department. The RPR candidate, M. Noir, almost defeated M. Barre; he obtained 21.8%. The result has been that M. Chirac emerged relatively more powerful than anticipated. The effect of 'cohabitation' has at least been confined to the manoeuvres of two great politicians, M. Mitterrand and M. Chirac; there has not been a *ménage à trois* or even a *quatre.*

Furthermore, the remote possibility of a revitalised parliament as a result of the introduction of proportional representation on the model of the Third and Fourth Republics, has not been likely. Since 1958, and especially since 1962, presidential power and authority, has been vastly greater than any possessed by the other two parliamentary republican regimes, certainly since the crisis of 1877 when President MacMahon challenged the French parliament without success. The specific provisions of the 1959 constitution had redressed the balance as between government and parliament. The nub of politics after March 16th 1986 remains the determination of policies by the executive. Even the clash between president and prime minister is not a new phenomenon. There have been notable conflicts in the past, between President de Gaulle and his first prime minister after 1958, M. Michel Debré, on the issue of Algerian independence, between de Gaulle and M. Pompidou in 1968, and between President Giscard d'Estaing and M. Chirac who left the premiership in 1976. These previous encounters place the present tensions, if tensions they really are, in a broader perspective. The appearance, after years of anticipation, of the fact of 'cohabitation' may not be the most significant aspect of the 1986 legislative and regional elections. The constitution is both clear and flexible on the relationship between prime minister and president. Moreover the socialist policies had been considerably modified since the electoral successes of 1981, and especially since the change of prime minister in 1984. Economic policies and social policies had moved nearer to those advocated by the centre parties — perhaps this was the most important factor in the defection of voters from the socialists in so far as this occurred. If the key ministries were firmly in the hands of RPR men, these were men of established political skill or well-known youthful dynamism. A ministerial team which included the former close partner of Charles de Gaulle, M. Jacques Foccart, responsible for African affairs, M. Madelin (Industry, post & telecommunications, and tourism) as well as

M. Philippe Séguin (Employment and social questions — an *énararque*, articulate, sensitive and intelligent — was likely to retain the initiative over the newly elected parliament.

Two other factors made the immediate prospect of 'cohabitation' less vicious. There was general agreement on issues in foreign and defence policy. There had long been jibes that M. Mitterrand was essentially Gaullist in these matters. Such agreement was also one of the conditions for 'cohabitation' laid down by the president. Secondly, the appointment of a respected and senior personality as president of the Chamber, M. Chaban Delmas, brought further stability to the delicate relations between deputies, government and president. In two years a new president must be elected, and none of the leading contenders can afford to be seen to act irresponsibily in the coming months before the presidential campaigning begins.

A more serious factor emerged also from the elections in March. The constitution itself, at least in its electoral provisions, was in danger of becoming involved in the political interplay between the socialists, the strongest party on the left, and the RPR. Not only were there clearly stated differences of policy on regional matters and decentralisation, but also on the electoral system. The socialists were suspected of favouring proportional representation partly on the grounds of minimising their losses. The former system would have left them with the likelihood of fewer seats than the 207 that the party finally obtained. The RPR wish to revert to the former system of voting which might well favour the political coalition of the right. Whatever the truth of this proposition, the manipulation of the details of the constitution for apparently political advantage cannot be encouraged. The resilience of the 1958 constitution had been remarkable. Despite the predictions, the stability of the form of government had survived the departure of de Gaulle and the arrival of 'cohabitation'. The fear or suspicion that the major parties were using the electoral system to their advantage perhaps explained some of the relatively higher level of abstentions recorded in March 1986. Whilst the political scientists awaited the elections with interest because of the curious and long-expected outcome, the French public showed a degree of apathy. The legislative elections of June 1981 revealed a higher abstention rate, almost 30% abstained, but the new features of the election in March might have been expected to attract considerable enthusiasm. In fact the abstention rate, almost 22%, was the highest since the legislative elections in 1962 — apart from those in 1981. There had been higher rates in other elections, for example the referendum on the expansion of the European Community in 1972 and the European parliamentary elections, but not in legislative elections.

The French elections of March 1986 therefore were both something of an anti-climax and held much of importance for the future. Economic and social policies for handling the deficits and the difficulties in the weaker sectors of French industry, like the motor industry, are likely to be more in line with those in other European Community states, especially

in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. The more profound impact is to be felt in constitutional rather than political matters and party programmes. 'Cohabitation' has begun less dramatically than many had feared. The deeper effect of the change of government and attitude comes with the reassertion of the unitary nature of the French state and the strength of executive control.

NOTES

1. These comments were made in an article from *Le Monde* 22nd March, 1986. M. Balladur's phrase was *'les possibilités d'une certaine vie en commun'*.
2. There are different ways of presenting the final figures for the 577 seats, according to party group or electoral lists. A more detailed break-down is as follows, taken from the figures given by the ministry of the interior, 18th March, 1986:

Communist party	35 seats
Socialist party	207 seats
Union of the Left	2 seats
Movement of the Left Radicals	2 seats
Various left	5 seats
R.P.R.	77 seats
UDF	53 seats
UDF-RPR union	147 seats
National Front	35 seats
Various right	14 seats

   Some deputies from the smaller lists associated themselves with the larger grouping. Thus the Socialist Party group in the Chamber could call on 212 deputies. Only 9 deputies remained independent of the major groups, in contrast to the 10 in the parliament elected in 1981.
3. M. Chirac had advised against the outlawing of the autonomist party in August 1975, but was still widely regarded as hostile to regional aspirations. Despite the desire of the president, M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to find a complete solution to the Corsican difficulties the prime minister was seen as the champion of the national state. See Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber writing in *L'Express*, 8-14th September, 1975, p.35, and P. Savigear 'Corsica 1975: politics and violence', *The World Today*, November 1975, p.462f.

[Dr Peter Savigear is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Leicester.]

THE MANDELSTAM EXPERIENCE

by A. L. Rowse

IT is a revealing experience to read Mrs Mandelstam's Memoirs of life in Soviet Russia. Of course one knew about the mass-murders, the purges, the killings of a million peasants in the collectivisation of agriculture, the deportations, the liquidation of whole classes — Yiddish writers, theosophists, engineers, technicians, Old Bolsheviks, relics of the St Petersburg upper classes, etc, etc — in the aim to achieve socialist unanimity. But her book is a revelation of the inner terror, the systematic attempt at killing the individual soul. Akhmatova, greatest poet of her time, expressed it: she lived 'in holy terror'. Shostakovich, greatest composer of the time, similarly: 'it has been nothing but thirty years of tyranny.' Mrs Mandelstam from her experience is able to sum up the purpose in a phrase: The aim of terror is intimidation; the objective, to break the spirit.

The message of her book is ultimately optimistic: the human spirit is unbreakable. Or, rather, with *some* humans it is unbreakable. Humanity keeps breaking in again, surfacing — but out of what depths, what suffering! And this was to be the New Jerusalem of the October Revolution of 1917.

She writes, 'the secret police always knew what they were doing and they went about it systematically. Among their many aims were the destruction of witnesses who might remember certain things, and the creation of the unanimity needed to prepare the way for the millenium.' Think of the childishness of expecting a millenium — like the idiocy of similar expectations among the Puritans of the English Civil War — the infantilism of aiming at a Utopia! Years ago, even when I was on the Left, I saw the absurdity, even the evil, of inflicting concrete suffering upon people for the sake of hypothetical gains. One could not call back again the millions of lives destroyed. The losses were indubitable, the gains doubtful. And think of the cruel irony of rehabilitating the names of those deliberately destroyed in the Purges, stating that they were innocent after all. Many of those who had made charges against them afterwards retracted their 'evidence'; some even committed suicide when they realised the criminality of their lies. For some years the word 'conscience' was stamped out of vocabulary and usage but has come back, apparently ineradicable from human consciousness.

After 1937 the objective of the Secret Police was attained. Intelligent people ceased to meet each other. Everybody was spying on each other, friends on friends, children on parents, young people specially given to delating people, as well as being trained to it. People willingly volunteered to denounce, inform and spy — and as willingly confessed to impossible crimes when charged.

Mrs Mandelstam diagnoses that even the intelligentsia was smitten by the disease; first mesmerised by the word 'Revolution', after which every-

P 3978

thing was 'different now'; accepting it all and defending it. Conscience entirely suppressed — except in prison and in the labour camps.

Still — 'weren't the first microbes already lurking in the pre-Revolutionary age with all its false hopes and prophecies?' But of course.

People were led to believe that this was the New Era, there would never be any change, it was for foreigners abroad to follow. And they believed it. Insulated within the enormous concentration camp of USSR, not allowed to travel abroad or make any contacts outside their Socialist paradise, they would believe anything they were told about abroad. 'What must it be like in the capitalist countries?', asked a neighbour; 'I suppose you can just starve to death there.' In London or Paris would a 'residence permit' be given to an airman invalided out of the service? Residence permits were obligatory for Moscow. The credulity of it all! But then, humans will believe anything. Even the Mandelstams, intelligent as they were, in their insulation, believed some incredible things and entertained some impossible hopes.

The whole structure was based on lies and the propaganda of lies. 'We were brought up from childhood to believe that lies and hypocrisy are universal.' This is an old Russian disease, endemic in their history, as anyone who knows it realises. But now everybody lied in order to survive; Mrs Mandelstam confesses that she had to. Her husband, the poet, wouldn't: he did not survive.

Even the great Akhmatova was forced to write a few poems in praise of Stalin — Saviour of mankind — to save the life of her imprisoned son. This did not prevent the Party mentor of culture, Zhdanov, hounding her as 'half-nun, half-whore'. 'You have nowhere to hide, you are always under surveillance, we are always with you.' We see that George Orwell was not wrong in *1984*.

'The one purpose of terror is intimidation.' Result: 'Soviet citizens have achieved a high degree of mental blindness, with devastating consequences for their whole psychological make-up.' Naturally only an *élite* can be free of credulity and tell the truth. Poets of genius like Akhmatova and Mandelstam, writers like Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn, a composer like Shostakovich ('every one of my symphonies is a tombstone'), knew and could speak the truth. Ordinary human fools gladly cooperated with the interrogators, volunteered confessions, told their lies; there were hosts of volunteer denunciators. 'The people who were making history in those days had all the cruelty and inconsistency of the children they were. Why is it so easy to turn young people into killers? Why do they look on human life with such criminal frivolity? We were set on our fellow men like dogs, and the whole pack of us licked the hunter's hand.'

The answer is that the masses are mostly idiots. Stalin and Hitler knew this to their finger tips, took advantage of it and built their power on that unshakable foundation — the idiocy of the people. If these were not such idiots the Stalins and Hitlers would not have got away with it.

Bukharin — whom I remember meeting at the Russian Embassy in London in his more prosperous days — provides an interesting case. An

educated man, he tried to help Mandelstam. 'Until 1928 he would shout, "Idiots!", and pick up the phone; but after 1930 he just frowned and said, "We must think whom to approach".' Why did Bukharin react like this? He was, after all, a proponent of terror. But he saw clearly that the new world he was so actively helping to build was horrifyingly unlike the original concept. Lenin came to glimpse something of that too before the end. However, they had been responsible. 'Life was deviating from the blueprints, but the blueprints had been declared sacrosanct and it was forbidden to compare them with what was actually coming into being.' And Bukharin knew. He would say, 'We Bolsheviks have a simple approach to these things; we each know that it could happen to him as well. There's no point in swearing that it can't.' And, in fact, it did.

It even happened to Trotsky, at six thousand miles distance: they got him in spite of his guards, in his home with an ice pick.

Public opinion was always conditioned to support the strong against the weak. That was characteristic of Germans no less than of Russians. What was new was the suppression of humanity. In old Tsarist days people gave alms to prisoners, now they were shunned, people turned away from them, did not dare to look at the hordes being marched off to labour camps and death. In old bad Tsarist days the intelligentsia spoke up for the persecuted. Now the intellectuals not only accepted the terror but defended it. Mandelstam said of them: 'They've sold out.' They supported the Revolution, so they asked for what they got.

'The enthusiasm for the resulting dictatorship was quite strong — a dictator is only strong if his followers blindly believe in him.' This was no less true for Hitler — and there were plenty of intellectuals and academics ready to go whoring after him: 'the pornography of power', as it has been called. What angered them in Mandelstam was his uncompromising directness.

Imagine the idiocy of a society that prohibits a classic like Pasternak's *Dr Zhivago* from being published. Really, because it is practically the *only* novel to come up to the standards of the great novels of Tsarist Russia — Gogol, Tolstoy, Turgeniev, Dostoievsky. Years ago I took the measure of a society that set store by, and its standards from, Gladkov's *Cement*. It is now corroborated from a recent survey of Soviet literature that this third-rate work was indeed made the model for other, better writers. For what is characteristic of demotic society everywhere and in every field is the primacy of the third-rate.

For standing out against it Mandelstam was discountenanced by the tribe of his fellow-writers, who turned their backs on him and kept quiet about the outstanding writer who did not conform.

Caring was a weakness in these writers who needed contact. And of course the one thing never permitted to them was normal freedom of thought. As early as 1930 Stalin uttered a trumpet call for the complete prohibition of unconforming works. Imagine such a vulgar, lower-class Philistine preventing Shostakovich from composing any operas after *The Lady Macbeth of Mschensk!* The impudence of it, like some low-grade

Trade Unionist laying down the law as to how I should write my poetry or my books on Elizabethan history.

A recent reporter on the literary scene in Russia describes the 'hatchet-men', as he calls the writers and pseudo-writers who 'administer' literature — a shocking word, to 'administer' the free creations of mind and spirit! 'The formidably repressive system of censorship and political control makes it uncommonly difficult to attain to a standard higher than tedious mediocrity.' The literary bureaucrats who 'adminster' literature are 'most of them, though not quite all, third-rate writers at best.'

Similarly, with the 'hatchet-men' of criticism in the West — whether of literature, music, or art — operated by those who mostly can create nothing themselves but live on the liver and guts of those who can. Far too much criticism by the third-rate everywhere in modern society, and similiar phenomena appear, beneath the political divergences, in both East and West.

In Soviet Russia the system is organised. (Here there is a comparable conformism, if more voluntary and partially unaware of itself, exemplifying similar fashions, trends, trendiness or ways of being 'with it'.) The system is administered by a vast Writers' Union — think of the horror of belonging to it — but if one did not, one would just starve. Trade Unionise everything, is the *mot d'ordre* of modern society. The Soviet writers union under Stalin was run by Fadeyev, as General Secretary. When the 'thaw' came with Krushchev he conformed anew, with the proclamation 'I thought I was guarding a temple, but it turned out to have been a latrine.' He should have known before. Fadeyev, caught out by the new turn of events, shot himself.

Paradoxically, the Soviet system allows no nonsense about people being equal: egalitarianism is a bourgeois error. In their childish way, it has to be 'the fight against egalitarianism'. When Mrs Mandelstam said to a Soviet doctor that medicine was something everybody needed, he replied, 'What do you mean, everybody? Do you expect me to get the same treatment as a cleaning woman?' Mrs Mandelstam comments, 'he was a kind and decent person; but nobody was unaffected by the "fight against egalitarianism". Even in the supply of bread there was no egalitarianism — some got next to nothing and others more than enough.' Naturally, those who played the Party game were favoured by it and treated with favouritism. Larisa, for instance, the Secret Police agent's daughter, with her husband 'lived a life of luxury in hungry Moscow, keeping a town house and magnificently served meals. Larisa and her husband justified themselves by saying that, as people engaged in building a new order, it would have been sheer hypocrisy for them to deny themselves their due as incumbents of power. Larisa was ahead of her time in fighting "egalitarianism" even before it was denounced.'

What would Communist mentors like Brecht, Lukács, Aragon, Sartre and all those deluded by their illusions say to that? I know what the historian, observer of actual human behaviour and reporter of truth, would say: ordinary normal human nature will come breaking through in spite

of revolution. In England, when the Puritans had succeeded in ousting the bishops and deans and canons, they grabbed their places, their houses and belongings.

I notice some characteristic parallels with what is happening under the social revolution in Britain. The Mandelstams' intellectual outlook, their respect for pre-revolutionary values of truth, decency, justice, had been formed under the old Tsarist educational system, with its room for variety and freedom of thought. 'Teaching in Soviet teacher-training colleges, I often thought how catastrophic the destruction of the old secondary school system had been. I doubt whether Mandelstam or I would ever have been able to get through a Soviet school — if we had, we would certainly not have equipped ourselves for life with the straightforward and unforced learning given us by the pre-Revolutionary Russian grammar school.' It reminds one of the destruction of the admirable grammar schools in Britain for the cumbersome and inefficient comprehensive school system, pushed forward not in the interest of education but of egalitarianism.

The consequences are comparable. All the reading the students did was their lecture notes and 'the standard Soviet *Philosophical Dictionary*, a compendium of potted ideology.' Mrs Mandelstam, with her old-fashioned values formed in a better world, need not have been surprised: it is just like the ordinary low-grade student everywhere — no interest in original reading and thinking for themselves. In endeavouring to qualify for a teaching post, after the death of her husband, there was whispering against her as someone not to be trusted — 'on the part of the young instructors who didn't want to admit an outsider into the privileged caste of persons qualified to teach in the universities and entitled to be paid accordingly.' An older academic person, a survivor from better times, 'knew how hard it was for a helpless person to keep afloat among these younger people with all their intrigues and jealousies.'

One recognises similar symptoms in universities in Britain today.

'We both believed that our respective values were indestructible'— oddly enough, in spite of all disillusionments, I believe that too. The underground literature Mrs Mandelstam had read in her youth had been canonised by the new State, i.e. the original 19th century Marxist classics.

Resurgam! Paradoxically enough, improbably, against the evidence of my own writings, optimism — like cheerfulness — keeps breaking in upon the dismal scene. I too believe that the eternal values revealed in history are ultimately indestructible.

Meanwhile, the suffering recorded by these witnesses — not only Mrs Mandelstam but Shostakovich, Akhmatova, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, all the best creative spirits, seemed endless: part of 'the systematic destruction of the country's intellectual and spiritual resources.' She comments pointedly of the apostles of Marxist Communism outside — the Aragons, Brechts, Lukács, the Sartres — 'when I see books by the Aragons of this world who are so keen to induce their fellow countrymen to live as we do, I feel I have a duty to tell my own experience. For the sake of what idea

was it necessary to send those countless trainloads of prisoners to forced labour in eastern Siberia? Mandelstam always said that they knew what they were doing: the aim was to destroy not only people but the intellect itself.'

Poor Mandelstam! At last the revelation came to him that 'if ever there was a Golden Age, it was the 19th century. Only we didn't know it.' It was the people of the 1920's who were responsible for building, or inflicting, 'this unprecedented experiment. The people who made the Revolution sprang from an intelligentsia which had given up one set of values in favour of others regarded as supreme. The result was a plunge into self-destruction.' The aim was the complete making-over of a great people — at the cost of sacrificing whole classes and groups and communities, millions of concrete lives in the interest of a Utopian idea, marching to the millenium (like the fanatics of the Puritan Revolution). The whole effort was a fundamental interference with, and deflection of, natural processes.

Cocksure Marxists thought that, on the basis of Marxist 'science', they could foresee the future. 'All my friends had the "classics of Marxism-Leninism" on their bookshelves — they were by now a standard feature of any intellectual's apartment.' Even Stalin, with his limited education and intellectual outlook, 'genuinely believed that if the intellectuals read these works properly, they would be convinced by their irresistible logic.'

The basic character of Marxism, its fatal premise, is its superficial rationalism: the assumption that all the processes of history as well as of nature are in accordance with laws of which Marxism holds the key, the consequences of which Marxists can rationally predict. Whereas, as all scientists know, though there are large areas in nature where there are laws and regularity, even a measure of predictability, ultimately the universe is a mystery. The more astronomers and physicists know about it, and the more philosophy reflects that knowledge, the more mysterious and incomprehensible, beyond the grasp of human minds, it becomes.

[Dr A. L. Rowse is at present editing *The Contemporary Shakespeare* and writing a new introduction for each play. After lecturing on Shakespeare in Venice he has been touring the USA to attend performances of his modernised *Hamlet* at Stratford, Connecticut and Florida. His new book is *Reflections on the Puritan Revolution* (Methuen).]

Mrs. Mandelstam's Memoir, *Hope Against Hope,* is published in paperback by Penguin Books.

KOREAN JOURNEY

by Philip Towle

THE first immigration officer at Seoul airport who examined my passport called over his colleague from the next booth. Together they studied my documents murmuring unintelligibly. Then the second officer asked me if I taught at 'Gombridge'. I confirmed that this was indeed the case. Did we have Koreans or Japanese on our courses? I said that we did occasionally. 'Koreans work harder than Japanese,' he announced challengingly. I agreed; the officers grinned appreciatively; my passport was stamped with a three months visa and I was bowed through. I had also had a useful reminder of many Koreans' feelings about the 40 years they spent under Japanese domination and their belief in the prime value of work.

How dictatorial was the regime? The most obvious sign of the power of the army was the presence of armed soldiers rather than normal traffic police on duty at crossroads. They peered out from under metal helmets that always seemed some sizes too large and very occasionally looked in the back of the car. Certainly there was little evidence that the Koreans were frightened to criticise the regime in private, although this might have been because I was a foreigner and from a democratic country. If there were inhibitions they were the result of patriotism rather than fear. Thus I found it difficult to persuade them to talk about the shooting down of the Korean airliner in September 1983 partly I suspected because they were embarrassed by the revelations about the short cuts taken by the Korean airline to save fuel. The only man who looked really uneasy was a fellow guest at a dinner who had been telling me about his Marxist convictions and then asked me what I thought of Margaret Thatcher. I replied that there was something to be said for some of her policies and our conversation ceased abruptly. The English language newspapers published in Seoul did not appear excessively obsequious but it was difficult to decide what had been excluded by the censors. Some of the university students disbelieved anything that the government said and conversely gave credence to all sorts of conspiracy theories. One insisted that the US CIA had been behind the assassination of the previous president. When I suggested that this appeared surprising as he was a good friend of the USA, the student simply explained that he had been planning to build Korean nuclear weapons and that the Americans were determined to prevent this happening. There was also a good deal of scepticism about the threat from North Korea. Some students felt that the government exaggerated the threat simply to justify its repressive politics. They were allowed to demonstrate against the government and did so almost daily. I was told that the police would have arrested them had they attempted to do so outside the university but I never saw any brave or foolhardy enough to attempt this.

Whatever the views of the students on the threat from the North, evi-

dence of preparations to meet it was everywhere. The sound of distant (practice) artillery fire can occasionally be heard even above the noise of Seoul's traffic. Measures had evidently been taken to destroy bridges; and concrete blocks lay beside the roads to the north ready to try to prevent the passage of enemy tanks. Nor have I ever before walked along a beach guarded by machine gunners dug in every 50 yards. There were large signs nearby which warned people against going on the beach at night as North Korean commandos have apparently infiltrated in this way. It would need a brave man to ignore the notices and take a midnight swim.

Many foreigners visit the tunnels allegedly cut under the demilitarised zone separating the two Koreas by the Northern forces in preparation for invasion. One member of our group was irreverent enough to suggest (quietly) that they might have been built by the Seoul government as a tourist attraction or to emphasise the Northern threat, though the size of the effort involved weighs against this theory. The tunnels are cut through hundreds of feet of solid rock and are large enough for a man to stand almost upright and for two people to walk side by side. There are said to be other undiscovered passages beneath the zone, ominous warnings of the dangers the area still presents to Asian and indeed world peace. If the North were ever to attack, the USA could hardly fail to be involved, given its military bases in South Korea. On the other side China and the USSR would probably at least provide arms and technical assistance.

It is difficult to imagine living in a country which has been so completely and catastrophically divided by a political event only a few decades old. If England were suddenly divided at the Trent so that all living to the north were unable to have any contact at all with those living to the south the effect would be the same. Families would be divided, friends parted to such an extent that for years they would not know whether their loved ones were alive or dead. The reunion of a tiny number of families last year only underlined the extent of the breach. I watched the weather forecasts on the television for the first two weeks without noticing that there was something peculiar about them; they forecast the weather for the country as a whole as if anyone from Seoul or Pusan might be caught in a shower or scorched by the sun in Pyongyang.

In the meantime the Koreans rely on the Americans for their protection. When Washington showed signs of withdrawing American forces the Koreans began to prepare their own nuclear weapons. US policy hurriedly went into reverse. When I was visiting Korea the annual 'Team Spirit' exercises by the Korean and American armies were taking place. Many of the villages had signs welcoming the American forces though in one of those linguistic mistakes which frequently occur when East meets West the banners were welcoming 'Team Spirits' or perhaps it was a sly reference to the drinking habits of the Trans-Pacific guardians? What the Koreans really feel about the American station occupying the first of their television channels, the American tanks rumbling through their villages or the soldiers' wives filling their shops in parts of Seoul is less clear from

their impassive oriental faces.

The certainty is that all Koreans are revisionists, all want to see their country reunited — as who would not? And not a few would be prepared to use force to achieve this aim if modern circumstances did not make it impossible. The older generation in particular have a very real understanding of what modern war is like. Those who stayed in Seoul whilst it changed hands four times or those who fled with the remnants of the South Korean and later UN armies need no reminding of the horrors.

In the meantime they work — as the Germans and Japanese have worked before them — to increase their security and to overcome the past. Already they have far surpassed the north Koreans economically, the aim — as the immigration official made clear — is now to follow in the steps of Japan. The young and articulate soldier who conducted our party through the tunnel near the demilitarised zone beamed at us brightly towards the end of his concluding speech, then calmly announced that the next century would belong to the Pacific and that Korea would lead the way.

The relationship with Japan is thus an ambiguous one. It is still very firmly remembered as the colonial power which for much of this century dominated, exploited and terrorised Koreans. It was only in 1984 that some of the wounds began to heal with President Chun's visit to Tokyo, and even then the Japanese Emperor's apology was far less fulsome than most Koreans expected. Yet Japan is the model for Korea's exported growth. Koreans are both proud of this growth and worried that it might provoke the North to attack before the South can become so strong that such aggression will be out of the question.

At the airport on the way home, I was stopped once again by the immigration officers. Would I mind checking the documents handed out to passengers to see whether the English could be improved? But there was nothing I could do to better it. I came away from Korea impressed by the beauty of its countryside, the distinctive character of its food and music and the determination and friendliness of its people. I also came away certain that we pay far too little attention to north Asia, its economic potential and the threats which its tense political environment represents.

[Dr Philip Towle is Tutor for Graduate Students at Queens College, Cambridge.]

WITH ACCENT ON YOUTH AND ANIMALS

by Ted Cox

WHEN invited to write an article which portrayed the work of Animals' Vigilantes I was tempted to look back over my past. For many years I have had a great interest in animals and their welfare but it has not always been so. As a young lad I thought it great fun to tie a tin can on to a cat's tail. At the time I would not wish you to think I hated the cat; I was rather fond of Tommy.

When I witnessed the distress caused to the animal I immediately had a feeling of remorse and shame. I could not catch the cat but he soon lost the tin can. Later, when he came back, he showed no ill feeling and the way he rubbed around my legs increased my shame and I vowed I would never again ill-treat any animal but rather would for the rest of my life do all I could for the benefit of animals. That was over a half a century ago.

Since that time I have worked voluntarily for the welfare of animals and been involved with five different organisations. It has been my privilege to serve in a voluntary capacity for the past forty years, the last twenty-one as a Trustee and founder of Animals' Vigilantes.

I have had the support of many valuable friends. I refer to the late James Mason, the celebrated film star and his wife Clarissa who became the joint presidents of Animals' Vigilantes. Mrs Mason still holds the presidential office. Then there is another friend, Spike Milligan who was a former president. It is these people and many others who have assisted me through the years and to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. There are patrons — some now dead — the Trustees and last but certainly not least, the young people and the adult supporters plus the staff, past and present of James Mason House. I also owe a great deal to those members of Parliament who have upheld the aims and objects which have been the cornerstone of my beliefs.

Twenty-one years ago it was realised that there was a need for an animal welfare group which would concentrate on the education of young people in the care and welfare of animals — wild, domestic and pets — and to encourage youth to respect all forms of life.

In those days some people asked: 'Why another animal welfare organisation?' The answer was that whilst many organisations had their 'junior' section, Animals' Vigilantes had as an aim that young people would not be the 'poor relations' but rather the main theme of the Animals' Vigilantes campaign.

Throughout two decades this has been the aim of those entrusted to spread the message of compassion for all creatures great and small and it is with a feeling of pride over that period that they have seen the Animals' Vigilantes introduced in over forty countries.

It was two years after the founding in 1965 of the organisation that it was felt something should be done to embrace the adults — fathers,

mothers, uncles and aunts, etc — who wished to support the young people in their efforts to bring about a better world for animals. So, it was decided to form an adult section known as 'Friends of Animals' Vigilantes'. It is their help in many ways other than finance which keeps our work going in schools and youth clubs. Education, as we all know, is costly and the young people's subscriptions do not cover the cost of the on-going campaign.

The aim of the organisation which was made a Trust in 1971 is to pledge support to fight all cruelty and in its special appeal to the young it realises this is the only path to a successful future generation.

Members of all age groups are concerned over the exploitation of animals, whether it be cruelty to a domestic pet, factory farming, or hunting. The Trust also campaigns against the use of animals in circuses, not only because they are trained by cruel methods but also the conditions in which they live. The aims and campaigns are continuous, for example the Trust believes that the hunting of wild life should be outlawed, for they claim that if man ceases tampering with nature there will be no imbalance. They stress the loss to the world of so many hundreds of species which have become extinct, due to the hunter who has so 'enjoyed' his pursuits that he forgot to stop in time. Animals' Vigilantes claim that if the toll on our wild life continues, the balance of nature will be so far destroyed that man will eventually destroy himself.

Animals' Vigilantes also campaign against experiments on living animals but they are not content merely to say this is wrong. They strongly support research into the use of alternative methods and whilst the number af animals used in the laboratories last year was less than at any time during the past twenty years they press for and support total abolition of all animal experiments. Successive governments have given millions of pounds to the drug industries to finance research through animal experiments but no thought is given to making grants towards alternative methods.

There is no need to ask where the millions of pounds come from, for readers will realise it is their money raised by taxes which finances this evil form of research. As more and more money is poured into the coffers of the big businesses more animals are put upon the altar of mans' greed. Animals' Vigilantes aim to see the end of these huge government grants which are being given in support of animal experiments but would uphold any safe research which does not use animals. Many scientists agree with the aims of the Trust and this is not only on moral and ethical grounds but because of the horrors they have witnessed. During the last quarter of a century the climax was the thalidomide tragedy, where drugs were tested on animals and found 'safe' only to result in thousands of deformed babies. Those who survived are handicapped adults today. While the scientists who worked on the drug declared it safe others, including Professor Aygun of Ankara, Turkey pleaded with them to ban the drugs. He had already found from his research on cell and tissue cultures a very dangerous answer. In a short while Professor Aygun produced, through

safe alternative research, the result which sent him speeding across Europe to make a plea for the thalidomide project to be cancelled. That plea fell on deaf ears although when the first deformed babies were born the drug was re-called. Animal research is not the answer. In the same week that drug was declared unsafe no less than 274 similar drugs were withdrawn from the market.

The Trust stresses that even though some say research into the cause and cure of diseases by experiments on living animals is justified there can be no justification for more than fifty per cent being used in the production of cosmetics and a further large number being used for warfare, weapons and industry. The young female members of the Trust are turning away from cosmetics produced by cruelty and instead are using only those products which are not tested on animals and in which no animal matter is used.

As already stated, it is to these young people we look to build hopes for a better understanding between man and animals. There have been many outstanding achievements in the twenty-one years of the life of Animals' Vigilantes. In many campaigns they have led the way and other organisations have joined in to press for that better world. It was Animals' Vigilantes who pioneered the campaign to end the killing of baby seals in Canada. At first it was a lone battle but when the campaign brought forth international headlines they found support coming from organisations throughout the world. The campaign publicity also brought news of fur dealers losing money on the falling price of pelts. Still, Canada and the Norwegian contractors continued to club the baby seals to death and still Animals' Vigilantes and other organisations campaigned. The final blow to the seal-skin business came when the European Common Market banned the import of sealskins to the member countries. Thus, Animals' Vigilantes have seen the killings reduced from 500,000 to 250,000, then 117,000. It was suggested in the early days of our campaign that to stop killing the seals would upset the country's economy but since the contract killers have found the return was not worth their while we have noticed no instability in the Canadian economy. It was also suggested the fisherman would suffer as the seals would eat all the fish. How can this be believed when the adults seals are only in Canadian waters for two or three weeks when they come south to give birth to their pups on the ice? Within four weeks the adults and babies start their 2000 miles journey back to northern waters.

Much could be written of other campaigns, some have been won but others are ongoing until they reach the day when this world will be a place where animal life is protected and respected and this is the aim of the young and adult members of Animals' Vigilantes.

To name some of the efforts of Animals' Vigilantes and their international work — one will remember the support for Spanish members who are trying to get bull-fighting banned. Many tourists have heeded the call to stop supporting this cruel spectacle. Another active campaign is to save the whales and dolphins, two species which will join the long

list of extinct creatures if steps are not taken soon.

In Britain the Trust was instrumental in bringing, through one of their supporting Members of Parliament, the Bill which saw the end of otter hunting. This was a great success welcomed by animal welfare workers but bitterly regretted by the otter hunters throughout the country. Had this effort failed the otter would probably have been extinct today.

The activities of the Trust have done much to save the badger and whilst the protection by law is very loose they still look to the day when the badger will be fully protected.

The Trust is not a militant organisation. The name 'Vigilantes' has been so distorted by the media that some people wrongly think the Animals' Vigilantes are law breakers. Nothing is farther from the truth for they believe that to change the law which allows such evils as now exist cannot be done by breaking the law. The recent spate of hooliganism and vandalism by so-called animal welfare people will never achieve anything. Compassion cannot be found by violence and it leaves one in doubt as to the sincerity of these people.

Animals' Vigilantes seek by peaceful means to ring the world with right-thinking people to bring about that better world, a world to be enjoyed by all living things.

[Ted Cox is Founder Chairman of Animals' Vigilantes (founded 1965).]

The European Community's directive requiring animals to be slaughtered humanely does not apply to the bull ring, Britain's Euro-MP, Richard Cottrell, has been told by the European Commission. (*Eurofocus* 15/86).

Like several other Euro-MPs, mostly British, Mr Cottrell doubts whether the rules governing *corridas*, especially in Spain, conform to the Community's regulations on animal protection. The fact is a 1974 European Council directive requires animals destined for slaughter to be first stunned. But matadors, the Commission has pointed out, are not in the business of slaughtering bulls. *Editor.*

POEMS

THE STARCROSS FERRY

It plies across the sound
in the summer months, across
the blue and buckling waters
between Exmouth and Starcross

from a precarious jetty
acrostic of tyres and slimy struts
by the finite curve of Brunel's railway,
pushes out through liquid guts

to skirt the brindled sandbar
that serious seabirds in their hundreds glean
by the sands of Dawlish Warren
where currents twist and gleam

before turning to the breeze-burned shore
of Exmouth, its miles of level sand:
guided there by buoys the ferry
goes hobbling over waves to land.

REMEMBERING NATURE (ESSEX/DEVON)

The long hot fields of furrowed gold
That burned away to Suffolk
Unblighted elms of two decades ago
Like gnarled old fathers of the fields
The piled-up palaces of sugar cloud
Orchestras of insects in hawthorn hedges
Tassled sedges of summer pools
Where bright trout leapt for little flies
Plump grouse policing narrow lanes
The whistling bouquet of a lark
Lost in the lawless blue
And the crazy grace of tumbling butterflies —
From sea-smitten dusks of Devon
To brooding twilights of rural Essex
The sharp recall of simple things
That leave their dew upon the heart.

WILLIAM OXLEY

THE ORIGINS OF SCOTTISH TORYISM

by J. T. Ward

SCOTTISH Toryism has for long cherished its own traditions and characteristics. Its devotees argued in the eighteenth century over the succession to the Crown, and some — from labourers to peers — gave their lives for the Stewart cause. In the nineteenth century, they fought the most extreme exponents of Liberal *laisser-faire* — those 'Scotch Feelosofers' against whom Cobbett railed. And in the twentieth century they battled against the most extreme socialists and the strongest of British separatists.

From controversies over Jacobitism to current concern over the future of Scottish industry, Scots Tories have held and expounded distinctive views. They were foremost in creating the machinery of governmental devolution, from the establishment of the Scottish Office under a Scottish Secretary in 1885 and the Secretaryship of State in 1924 to the appointment of a Minister of State in 1951. They have their own Central Office in Edinburgh and their own Party Chairman, their own national organisation with its own elected officers and annual conference. Although the Scottish Party, as befits a Unionist organisation, inevitably works closely with English Conservatives, it retains and cherishes a distinctive outlook and philosophy.

The most courageous of Scottish Toryism's founding fathers were the largely Episcopalian and Roman Catholic Jacobites who supported the Legitimist cause of the Stewarts from 1688. Some faithfully served the exiled court of James VII and 'James VIII' on the Continent, while others fought at home, 'bonnie' Dundee of Claverhouse heading the list of dead at Killiecrankie in 1689. They made little impact in the Whiggish convention of estates in the same year, which restored Presbyterianism, but were initially stronger under Queen Anne. Their sometimes enormous sacrifices were largely made in vain, however, as the Campbells increasingly established their power. Among the commissioners for the Act of Union in 1707 only the Jacobite George Lockhart of Carnwath was resolutely hostile.

Another, largely Presbyterian, form of Toryism developed in the principal burghs, far removed from clan loyalties, Catholic tradition or all but vestigial feudalism. Many merchants could visualise virtues in and benefits from a 'common market' with the old enemy, even if it involved breaching the 'auld alliance' with France. No doubt, Scottish commercial failures abroad and what Lockhart regarded as 'scandalous and infamous' bribery played their part. In 1707 Scotland's ancient Parliament was ended by its own vote; its 159 constituencies were reduced to 45 (which involved over-representation at Westminster); and its peerage was to elect 16 representatives to the House of Lords.

At the first 'rigged' elections in 1708 the Campbellites had 27 MP's, the equally aristocrat-dominated *squadrone volante* nine and the Tories

under Lord Balmerino nine. Not for the last time Scottish Tories (along with others) were disappointed by the insensitivity of English Tories' policies (as promoted by Robert Harley). And from 1715 they were ruined. Eighteen aristocratic leaders were attainted after the Earl of Mar's rising, and 'Tory' MP's fell to six against 39 'Whigs'. The punishment for Jacobitism was severe. 'Nothing but an entire desolation (was created) from Stirling to Inverness', and Episcopacy was further harassed. Walpole effectively destroyed Scottish Toryism, except as a latent, sentimental, 'underground' tradition, which was helpless against Campbell manipulation. In 1745 'Charles III's' last great Jacobite rising led to the final butchery of peers and commoners alike. The 'bonnie' Prince's brother, Cardinal 'Henry IX', succeeded to an empty title in 1788 and died, a Hanoverian pensioner, in 1807. One phase of traditionalist, militant, persecuted Scottish Toryism had already ended.

As Scotland's industry and trade generally benefited from the Union, Edinburgh experienced an intellectual 'renaissance', Glasgow produced its 'tobacco lords' and manufacturing entrepreneurs and the Lothians pioneered new agricultural techniques, aristocratic Whiggery remained dominant. But political change developed under George III, when the impecunious 3rd Earl of Bute (founder of a vastly-wealthy dynasty) was briefly 'prime minister' in 1762-3 and the 8th Lord North an ultimately unsuccessful one in 1770-1783. But it was when the King turned to young William Pitt in 1783 that a new 'Toryism' started to grow.

Pitt's Scottish manager, Henry Dundas of Arniston — 'King Henry IX' — was not only an able head of several departments but also an astute electoral manipulator, who had learned every Campbell technique. Of course, the task (as his Whig nephew Henry Cockburn put it) of 'laying 45 Scottish members at the feet of the government' was not too onerous in a Scotland with only 2662 county electors and where burgh contests were resolved by handfuls of council delegates. Cockburn's colleague Francis Jeffrey with typical Whig *hauteur*, was to describe the electorate as

> a most insignificant oligarchy, not very high in rank or station and of which the majority was not even connected with the great landed interests.

Ultra-Radical militancy was countered by the uncouthly redoubtable Lord Braxfield — who affirmed that some criminals would be 'nane the waur o' a hanging' — and his fellow judges. The more serious challenge posed by Whiggish Edinburgh intellectuals was answered by convivial literary and discussion clubs among the capital's wynds. The *doyen* of Tory *literateurs* was, inevitably, Sir Walter Scott, who was followed by his son-in-law, Gibson Lockhart. The rumbustuous Professor John Wilson ('Christopher North'), the sardonic Ayrshire novelist John Galt, Boswell's satirical son Sir Alexander, Lord Advocate Sir William Rae, James Hogg ('The Ettrick Shepherd'), the publisher William Blackwood and such lawyers as Sheriff John Cay of Linlithgowshire formed a formidable Tory intelligentsia. They could turn their pens to 'Gothick' novels or folk poetry, to witty sarcasm or mordant social commentary, to the scurrility of *The Beacon* or the argued polemics of the *Scots Magazine* and *Black-*

wood's Magazine.

In the unreformed burghs some remarkable 'characters' emerged from the old mercantile elites. Provost Alexander Riddoch dominated Dundee council for three decades; the silk mercer bailie Thomas Blackwood battled against virtually every change in Edinburgh; a line of anti-reform provosts (interspersed with equally-manipulating Whigs) ran Glasgow; a tightly-knit merchant caucus long dominated Rutherglen, becoming famous for an elongated drinking session during the 1831 election. But if many small merchants shared old-style 'Tory' attitudes, the new entrepreneurs of the Industrial Revolution were principally liberal challengers of the *ancien regime.* Among cotton manufacturers the Anglo-(later Roman) Catholic social reformer Robert Monteith of Carstairs and among ironmasters William Baird of Gartsherrie were rare Tories. In the countryside Tory strength lay with the lairds and the Kirk, though it was buttressed by the power and wealth of the Duke of Buccleuch, Scotland's (and Britain's) second largest landowner.

The Scottish Reform Act of 1832 was wretchedly contrived by Whigs determined to grant power to rank and property, rather than to landless 'parchment barons' and nepotic bailies. Sir James Graham's comment against a proposal to merge the sparsely-populated counties of Selkirk and Peebles was typical:

> If the D. of Buccleuch has in Selkirkshire so large an Estate, I cannot think it unreasonable that he should exercise a commanding influence in the return of the County Members.

But the major consequence of Reform was a Whig-Liberal domination which lasted through the rest of the century. Scottish seats rose from 45 to 53, of which only eight returned certain Tories in 1832. Scottish Toryism was driven back to a handful of rural fastnesses. As the old tiny electorate lost power, new corruptions developed, notably the creation of 'faggot votes'.

Initially, there was little thought of organisation. *Ad hoc* committees would raise funds and hire lawyers to arrange matters in the registration courts. Such a group was that headed by Sir John Hope, 11th baronet of Craighall, in Midlothian — which was well endowed with Tory Edinburgh lawyers. But a new type of organisation emerged in Glasgow in 1836, with the foundation of the Operative Conservative Association (on a model set by Leeds in March 1835). It was primarily established to congratulate Sir Robert Peel on his election as Lord Rector of the University. Such contests were still regarded as important indicators of middle-class opinion: when Graham was returned in 1838 he saw his victory as 'a proof that the rising generation entertains sound and decided principles'.

The Operative Conservatives — despite local radical sneers about 'the pitiful Glasgow Tories' and 'this abominable gang, the Orange Tories' — flourished, under the presidency of Hugh Hamilton. They were

> warmly attached from principle to our glorious Constitution in Church and State, under which the nation had been elevated to a pitch of unexampled prosperity.

Peel cordially agreed, telling the 2000 signatories of his Memorial that

> no portion of society (was) more deeply interested in the maintenance of peace and order, in the protection of property, in the respect for constitutional privileges, than the working and industrious classes.

The Society adopted the motto 'Fear God; honour the King; and meddle not with those who are given to change'. It aimed

> to maintain . . . the British Constitution as established at the era of the Revolution in 1688; . . . to defend the interests of the Ecclesiastical and Educational Establishments of Scotland . . . and . . . to promote the purity of administration . . .

Earnest and religious, it had a subscriptios of 6d. *p.a.*, a lecture programme, a reading room, a committee of up to 45 working men and an active canvassing and registration role.

To Robert Sowler, a Manchester barrister-journalist who patronised such groups in Lancashire, for Operative Conservatives

> active employment is highly necessary to their prosperity, if not to their future existence. Like a giant machine, they must be kept continually in motion . . .

The Glasgow men followed this counsel. But their deep religious involvement proved fatal. 'Sir', they told Peel in 1836,

> we love the Church of Scotland, for all it has suffered, and all it has done, to provide the poor with religious instruction, and to afford their children a Bible education in its Parish Schools; and we long for the time when its boundaries shall be so enlarged as to become again commensurate with the wants of the population.

When their beloved Kirk was divided by the great Disruption of 1843, the Glasgow Society and other similar groups fell apart. Three years later the rest of Scottish Toryism was bitterly divided over Peel's move to Free Trade. When the Yorkshire Tory factory reformer Richard Oastler addressed burgh rallies in the winter of 1846 he had few political allies.

The electoral returns long remained meagre: between 1832 and 1868 Scottish Tories' greatest success was in Peel's victorious year of 1841, when they gained 22 seats; in 1868 they were back to eight. The capital and most burghs were 'nigh hopeless', lamented the whip, Sir Graham Graham-Montgomery, 3rd baronet, in 1867. Tories were driven to look for conversions, even to family alliances. Thus in 1839 Buccleuch's astute agent Donald Horne reported of Renfrewshire that

> It is said that Mr. (George) Houston is *paying attention* to Miss Shaw Stewart, the late Sir Michael's Daughter. If there be any truth in this report it will remove all doubt about this County.

Alas, the Tory Houston died unmarried. And family loyalties were not immutable. Sir Michael Shaw Stewart, 6th baronet, had sat as a Whig; his son and grandson both sat as Tories. In the same county one Colonel William Mure was Tory MP in 1846-1855 and another (his son) a Liberal in 1874-1880. Elsewhere, the 7th and 8th Maxwell baronets of Pollock sat as Whigs and the 9th and 10th as Tories.

'Gothick' enthusiasm as evinced by the 13th Earl of Eglinton's 'Tournament' of 1839 was scarcely appropriate in industrialised Victorian Scotland. William Baird's victory at Falkirk burghs in 1841 was a rare Tory success in the 'central belt'. An attempted General Conservative Association of Scotland in 1835 was premature. Consequently a long succession of Scots, both candidates and organisers, sought their political

fortunes in England. Scottish Conservatism, it seemed by 1868, could rely only upon such peripheral areas as Bute, Elgin & Nairn, Haddington, Inverness, Peebles & Selkirk and Wigtown.

It was against this dismal background that Disraeli sought to revitalise his Party in North Britain. Graham-Montgomery gloomily but honestly painted the picture. Before 1832, he explained, 'Scotland had no real representation... This state of things has never been forgotten', and electors 'can't tolerate the supremacy of a Party that opposed the Reform Bill of '32...' Secondly, Presbyterianism was 'democratic in its tendencies', and the 'very numerous and powerful' dissenters bitterly opposed Tory support for the established Kirk. Furthermore, 'most of the newspapers', including 'the best conducted & clearest written' were Liberal. There was also 'some soreness' over game preservation — though Liberals were 'quite as great transgressors in this matter...'

Disraeli was undeterred. 'The Scotch shall have no favours from me', he told 'Monty' Corry in 1866,

> until they return more Tory members to the H. of C., and of all parts of Scotland the most odious are the Universities. They have always been our bitterest and most insulting foes...

But in October 1867, despite Party cautions, he delivered his famous Edinburgh speech on the need for sensible change, received an honorary degree and was 'so delighted with our reception' that 'we actually danced a jig...'. He inspired the formation of the Scottish National Conservative Association of 1867. In the following year his Scottish Reform Act not only extended the franchise to many urban workers but raised Scottish representation to 60 — including two seats for the four Universities.

The short-term consequences were disappointing: while Lancashire turned resoundingly Tory, Scotland remained impervious to the blandishments of the able London-based Aberdonian agent Charles Keith-Falconer. But the powerful Glasgow Working Men's Conservative Association of January 1869 heralded a new upsurge of working-class Toryism. Disraeli's election as the University's Lord Rector in 1871 presaged further support. New organisations mushroomed and new candidates were adopted. In 1874 Scottish Tories took 20 seats, most notably gaining a Glasgow seat for the Bairds' partner, Alexander Whitelaw, great-grandfather of the Viscount and husband of Disraeli's niece. These were years of 'break-through'.

Euphoria was short-lived, however. In 1876 London researchers thought that Scottish Tories 'seem to have lost hope... (and) much of their political power solely through their supineness'. Organisation deteriorated, and in 1880 representation fell to seven. Years of effort had apparently been destroyed by Gladstone's Midlothian campaigns against the Buccleuch influence. Yet new men were appearing — including that strange Glaswegian Maltman Barry, friend of Marx, official of the 'International' and four times Tory candidate. And in November 1882, 58 local bodies formed the National Union of Conservative Associations for Scotland — which took over the rival SNCAs 57 affiliates to become (as it announced in June 1885)

> the only Conservative Organisation representative of the whole country . . . essentially popular in constitution and (promoting) in every way the thorough popular and representative organisation of all Scottish Conservatives.

Scottish Tories had at last created a 'modern' political machine. There were flaws to be 'ironed out', constitutional arrangements to be amended, relationships with the English Party to be settled; but in essence Scotland's largest political organisation was established in 1882 (15 years after its English ally). As the long-hostile *Scotsman* sarcastically noted (in September 1885), the early results were 'extremely scanty'; but

> The Tories in Scotland, as in the sister kingdom, have a prodigious faith in the virtue of organisation. They have been organising with untiring energy for the past twenty years. Since the election of 1874, more particularly, Conservative Clubs and Working Men's Associations have sprung up like mushrooms in all parts of the country . . . Nor is this the only form of Conservative industry in Scotland. A series of 26 political tracts or 'leaflets' has been issued.

Within a year, the political situation in Scotland (and, indeed, *The Scotsman's* attitudes to it) changed dramatically and fundamentally. But that is another story.

[J. T. Ward is Professor of Modern History at the University of Strathclyde.]

A NEW ASSESSMENT OF DENTON WELCH: PART IV: SHELLS AND FISH-BONES

by Richard Whittington-Egan

'I HAVE been writing poetry since I was nine years old,' Denton told Henry Treece in a letter of May 14th, 1943, 'but I still don't know what it's really about. As a child I used to think that it was a rather pleasant magic process; but now I seem to have the greatest distaste for what I produce "in that line".'

In fact, over the years he had written literally hundreds of poems, and had had a dozen or so published in respectable journals such as the *Adelphi*, the *Spectator*, and *Life and Letters*, and had had one accepted by C. Day Lewis for publication in *Orion*.

Critical judgments have been harsh. Michael De-la-Noy writes of his poems, 'By and large they are trite and poorly finished.' Denton himself wrote: 'I can't make out what is wrong with my poetry — something is.'

A selection of sixty-seven of his poems was published in *A Last Sheaf* — thirteen of which were reprinted in *Denton Welch: Extracts From His Published Works*. Introducing the thirteen, Jocelyn Brooke wrote: 'He will be remembered, of course, mainly for his prose . . . Verse was not his *métier*, and one imagines that he realized it: his poems are more or less on a par with his paintings — essays in a form which he found too demanding and too difficult. Yet his brief lyrics have an odd, freakish charm; they are amateurish and slipshod, for the most part, but at any rate they are vividly and abundantly *alive*, and the best of them, I think, recall Lawrence's "Pansies".'

A further fifty-eight previously unpublished poems, selected by Jean-Louis Chevalier from the Welch archives in the library of the Humanities Research Centre of the State University of Texas at Austin, were published under the title *Dumb Instrument*, in an edition limited to 600 copies, in 1976.

With this new material in hand, one is constrained to give further consideration to Denton Welch's poetry and reach a rather different conclusion. It was Alan Ross who, thirty-five years ago, offered the thought that 'Welch had the poet's ability to see things in terms of other things,' adding that it made his prose 'a rich, exciting tapestry of feeling, a varying barometer of vivid, secret pleasure.' Let us view his poetry as the shorthand of his mind, examine it for intellectual and aesthetic content, reserve judgment on the occasional fault of ear, the odd plummet into bathos. There are good things. Felicities of thought and expression. And there are echoes — of Edith Sitwell's 'Aubade' *(Bucolic Comedies)* for instance, in his 'Jane Allen', and an echo of Housman in 'Poem'.

It is not possible here to do more than offer a few specimen lines to give the taste.

Very much his own is 'At Midnight in the Fields'

Soft conies hide between the stones
And through their little razor bones
The moonlight pierces to their hearts
Where crimson blood its dancing starts;
Its pumping and perpetual motion,
Like the crazy flooding ocean.
— Soft noses sensitised by lust,
They smell their lovers in the dust.

So is 'A Dead Man's Poem'

Mouth can shout no more songs;
My violin has no gut.
And where my heart belongs,
The door is shut.
Eyeballs shall cry no tears
For ducts are turned to stone,
Now, where the flesh told lies,
Speaks only truthful bone.

Denton did not extend his ego-boundaries very far into the world around him. His use of imagery, given his lack of philosophical bite and weight, is as effective as that of his contemporaries. The modern mode of the Forties suited him perfectly. When he wished, he had a completely adequate command of metre. He is at his best as a poet of personal pain, loss and longing. And at that best he achieves a metaphysical tone, wit and intensity, as in:

In my dreams I'm bought and sold
Devils swop me for their gold.

and

Praying for vengeance and for power
Willing God's gift of my true dower.

Chevalier's is an extremely good selection. He has winnowed out some startlingly individual, rich material. Downright incandescent, some of it. There really *must* be a full edition of his poetry — if only to make the full criticism possible.

It has been observed, notably by the anonymous critic writing in *The Times Literary Supplement* in June 1951, that for Denton Welch 'painting and writing went hand in hand: in this sense — and it is not a derogatory one — his paintings are "literary" in that they illustrate the themes that crop up in his stories and reveal that same blend of fantasy and realistic observation from which all his work derives its highly individual flavour'. And it is *The Times Literary Supplement* which, in November 1952, identifies a macabre quality in the mind of Welch the writer which 'comes out most clearly in his strange and frightening paintings, thick with the phantasmagoria of toadstools, distorted cats, sardonic cows and grotesque rabbits', although the critic is careful to add that 'in those paintings there is also much delicate recording of beauty, sea-shells strewn about, a china hand holding a bunch of flowers, tiny insects lovingly observed.'

Jocelyn Brooke commented: 'The earliest canvases I have seen — painted during his student days, or soon after — are unremarkable; he was never a very good draughtsman, and seems to have possessed little natural facility in the handling of paint. In his later pictures, however, he has at least developed a recognizable style of his own; significantly, these paintings are exceedingly "literary", as often as not they tell a story, or have

such titles as "Now I have only my dog", or "The Animal-Doctor should put you to sleep".'

Following the exhibition of his work put on by Abbott and Holder in Barnes in November 1984, and its exposure of some sixty drawings and water-colours, plus a group of important pictures — including 'Now I have only my dog', 'The Animal-Doctor should put you to sleep', 'A Beauty waiting in the Fields', 'A Lion and a Pilgrim', and 'Portrait of Lord Berners as a boy dressed as Robinson Crusoe' — there has been a new evaluation of his paintings. The *Burlington Magazine* observed:

> His books were decorated with memorable covers and designs in a manner that lies happily alongside the achievements of Craxton, Minton, Vaughan and others. He brought to them the same detailed observation of nature introduced into Arcadian scenes peopled by lazily sensual or nervously alert male figures. . . . One of the best, 'Lion and Pilgrim', strays into the visionary world of Cecil Collins but is given a more jocular inflection.

Another critic spoke of 'an element of *fin de siècle*' and noted, 'Some of the portraits have a strength which probably derived from the artist's admiration for his subject; self-portraits . . . veer towards caricature'.

Alan Hollinghurst, writing perceptively in *The Times Literary Supplement* (21.12.84), makes a number of luminous points.

> It is as if his reification of people has turned on him, and his possessions have taken on the autonomy he himself has lost. Many of his pictures occupy this world of paradoxical animation and petrifaction. His subjects often exist uncertainly on the margin of still life, living creatures are juxtaposed with china figures . . . Shells and fish-bones are eerily recurrent. Welch knew Haddon and Hardwick Halls as a child and his decorations often display the anthropomorphism of Elizabethan strapwork, where abstract forms terminate in animal or human features. He disparaged his own portrait work — 'I can only contrive and tickle fantastically' — and his most interesting figures are not the inept renderings of Tom the Woodman or a professional wrestler, but people like broken lay-figures or period toys with wire arms which gesture at his own physical distress.

Denton was being trained at the Goldsmith School to be a commercial artist, and it is interesting in this context to see the posters which he was subsequently commissioned to execute for Shell. There is one advertising the charms of Bath and another, much more striking, of the Faringdon Folly, in Berkshire. He contributed also, with John Minton, decorations for a Condé-Nast publication, *Contemporary Cooking* by Doris Lytton Toye (1947), and did work as an illustrator for *Vogue*.

There is over practically all Denton Welch's drawings and paintings a patina of grotesquerie. They are, as it were, 'architected gothick' and 'Gormenghastly', which is not to say that they *resemble* the actual drawings of Mervyn Peake (who, incidentally, was also born in China — Kuling, 1911) any more than Denton's prose resembles Peake's prose, although one feels that Denton sometimes wrote baroque as the denizens of Gormenghast would have if they could — 'I am a little boy wandering down ever-lengthening picture galleries where the pictures lean out from the wall at a sharp angle, with their worn and dirt-encrusted gilt weakly gleaming in the late afternoon light. I am alone by the great high feather-crested bed, rubbing my cheek on the darned and brittle silver-thread hangings, running my finger along the tortoise-shell and ebony cabinet which has cockled in the damp. I am by the withered oak of the window-

sill where the rust of the latch seems to grow like an orange lichen'.

But with brush or pen in hand he does not invariably permit himself bizarre indulgences. There are conventional landscapes and still-life studies and portraitures as well as the 'wild life' originals! One endorses the current majority verdict — a painter of whimsical, decorative charm, highly original, belonging to no school, but possessed of a small but undeniably authentic gift — adding that, providing they are to your taste, it is most desirable to acquire one of the extremely finite number of his works.

As with the paintings, the renaissance or restoration period of 1984 has led to an interesting re-evaluation of Denton Welch, man and writer. In fact, there had been a number of presignificatory flickers. In 1958 private editions of *I Left My Grandfather's House;* in 1963 Jocelyn Brooke's *Selection;* in 1966 a reprint of *A Voice Through a Cloud;* in 1973 reprints of *Maiden Voyage* and the Brooke edition of the *Journals;* in 1976 the advent of *Dumb Instrument;* in 1982 a reprint of *In Youth is Pleasure;* in 1983 reprints of *Maiden Voyage* and *A Voice Through a Cloud.* But it was the shrewd entrepreneurship of Michael De-la-Noy which really engineered the revival.

[The concluding article in Richard Whittington-Egan's *New Assessment of Denton Welch* 'The Dancing Mouse', will be published in the September issue.]

The August issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Perspectives on Spain 1986* by Richard Robinson, *International Banking* by B. Narpati, *The Psychology of the Child Murderer* by L. F. Lowenstein and *Parental Government* by William Petty.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

The Perfect Spy. John Le Carré. Hodder. £9.95. *The Endless Game.* Bryan Forbes. Collins. £10.85. *The Fisher King.* Anthony Powell. Heinemann. £9.95. *Tin Toys.* Ursula Holden. Methuen. £8.95. *The Bridge.* Maggie Hemingway. Cape. £9.95. *Tennis and the Masai.* Nicholas Best. Hutchinson. £8.95.

At a time when spy stories have proliferated it may seem strange that the *genre* continues to be explored. The tight-lipped, usually male PM, the facetious police officers and the shady purveyors of the nation's 'secrets' would seem by now to be *vieux jeux.* It requires a Master to give the theme a new twist and this is the present achievement of John Le Carré. In *The Perfect Spy,* a long and often maddeningly complex novel, he has contrived to make the familiar seem unexpected and the well worn trail of the traitor different from all previous tracks downhill; for interwoven with the well known ploys are interesting psychological case histories, marital tensions and one of the strangest and most poignant father and on relationships on record.

Magnus Pym disappears while holding a responsible MI6 post in Czechoslovakia. The opening pages of the novel reveal the means by which he has done so. A small Devonshire private hotel, fortuitously discovered while on holiday, provides the perfect hide-away for 'Mr. Canterbury'. Here, pampered by the adoring Miss Dubber, he is protected from the pressures of international diplomacy while ostensibly writing a book. It seems the safest possible retreat yet on this occasion the circumstances are different because much is at stake in the international situation at the particular moment. Soon, the hunt is on for the man now deemed to be a double agent. Pointers, however trivial, must be followed up and soon lead to the traitor; and indeed, for those involved in the chase, his capture becomes an article of faith.

Yet even as the drama intensifies, the reader is gently disengaged: for in the Devon home-from-home Magnus is writing his life story in the guise of letters to his only son, Tom, who may unwittingly hold some of the clues as to his father's whereabouts. Yet it is not the boy or Pym's distraught wife, Mary, who are destined to straddle the narrative, but Magnus Pym's own father, Rick Pym, who becomes the dominating theme of the Memoirs. Pym senior was a charlatan of the most unsavoury kind, calculated to cause immense damage to the psychology of a sensitive child. His story is conveyed in a tapestry of interwoven sections, switching from past to present with bewildering speed. The effect of a powerful father-figure would seem to be all-important; yet John Le Carré is equally concerned to analyse and discuss the motives which turn a secret agent into a double one. The disentangling of the two themes, the sifting of much detail will require considerable concentration; well worth-while in exposing a 'grey' world firmly established in our midst.

In *The Endless Game,* spying also plays a leading role in a more straightforward manner. Bryan Forbes enhances his reputation as a political thriller writer with the ability to foresee events before they happen and to re-interpret past events which have been misunderstood or consistently grassed over by the powers-that-be. The novel opens with a chillingly simple murder. The supposedly elderly though in fact quite youthful Mrs Caroline Nicolson is assas-

sinated in her bedroom at a private nursing home. To unravel how and why the killing was accomplished would be sufficient substance for the average whodunnit. But of course, there is much more to it than that. The audacious killer is a link in the chain of international espionage and Caroline, by her very presence in the world, even though reduced by ill-treatment to a semi-vegetable, threatens the pursuits of those who are gambling for the highest stakes. Soon, suspicions are aroused. The redoubtable UK agent, Alec Hillsden, is called to investigate the mystery, an assignment made more poignant because he once enjoyed a passionate love affair with Caroline Oates, as she then was, when they were partners in particularly ruthless undercover work, full of idealism and confidence in their country's future. Caroline was no ordinary woman, with a sublime disregard for her own personal safety. Yet did she, under the most brutal pressure, reveal vital secrets to the 'enemy' which would have resulted in many deaths? It seemed possible, and the requirement here is to cut a way through sub-plots, numerous characters, tight lipped officials and changes of scene in a long, complicated novel with many ramifications. Much that is shocking and unsavoury is uncovered, sometimes blurring the vital issues. The finale, almost thrown away, is something everyone will hope 'cannot happen here'. The incumbent Home Secretary, Toby Bayldon, pin-pointed as the ultimate traitor, who has haunted the narrative as a background figure, emerges after various cabinet upsets as the man who as Prime Minister, is most likely to 'unite the nation'.

A new novel by Anthony Powell is a literary event by any standards, particularly after his long silence since the *Dance to the Music of Time*. As so often is the case with Anthony Powell's novels, the background matter of *The Fisher King* might as first glance seem rather simplistic. It concerns a group of disparate people on a cruise round the northern half of the British Isles in search of historical and archaeological remains. Such a chill and windswept venue might seem an unlikely one for people who appear to be comfort-loving. Yet there they are, imprisoned on a liner surrounded by a mounting ocean swell. It is Anthony Powell's objective to discover how they develop during the strange incarceration.

Once they have been duly presented, no doubt remains that they are far from a stereo-type group of holiday makers. There is Saul Henchman, a noted photographer and amateur fisherman, troubled by the responsibilities of his interpretiative art; a cripple in a wheel chair and far from engaging, he is nevertheless cared for by a beautiful ballet dancer, Barberini, who has abandoned her career to companion him. There is a nervous, mother-fixated young man who despite his psychological handicaps, aspires to annex Barberina, and among others Valentine Beals, a successful author of unacclaimed novels who as an intermittent narrator, brings clarity to the motives and aspirations of the group. Dialogue, though scintillating, is often more enigmatic than real. The deeper profundities of these characters and their utterances will take much, though well rewarded, concentration to assimilate. However, that will not be all, for the underlying purpose of *The Fisher King* is to explore the long lost legend of a little known figure of Arthurian legend who — like Henchman — enjoyed fishing and was also crippled. This fable, little recorded or researched, provides the more erudite of the passengers with an absorbing and illuminating debate.

Writing about childhood is always difficult. So many brilliant writers have attempted to recreate the world of the very young that it might seem nothing remains to be revealed. Yet novelists continue to make the attempt and do

occasionally contrive to be different. One of these is Ursula Holden who, in *Tin Toys*, sets out to follow the reactions of one very unattractive little girl, Ula, growing up between the Wars.

The widowed mother of three daughters and an infant son cares little for her fatherless brood, beyond providing them with food and shelter; for she aspires to be an actress and so lives in London near to the bright lights while the children are looked after in the country, by Nurse (really a great-aunt), Gov and Maggie, the cook. Ula is odd man out in this domestic *ensemble*. The climax of her week is the dancing class, where she encounters a sophisticated little Irish girl named Lucy; but for day to day comfort Ula turns to Maggie who, though choosing to earn her living in England, still owes allegiance to her native Ireland. When, just before Christmas, the baby boy dies of bronchitis, Ula is sent to stay with Maggie's family in Dublin. The promised land turns out to be a slum, with a demented mother, ne'er-do-well brother and ineffectual father. When Ula flees from the horror of sluttishness and raised voices, she strays into a more salubrious district of the city and finds herself conveniently and somewhat incredibly, outside Lucy's Irish home. Lucy's father takes Ula in hand and she goes with him and Lucy to spend Christmas at the grandmother's country mansion. But again, all is not what it might have been, for Lucy is a vicious, jealous young creature and conflict between the two children ends in the disaster of Lucy's accidental death. Whereupon, although neighbours and relatives bear Ula no ill will it seems likely that the tragedy might haunt her for the rest of her life. Yet the final sentence of the novel suggests either that she has forgotten or that it never really happened. So much is good and sharply perceptive in the first two thirds of *Tin Toys* that it is unfortunate if the final pages strike an artificial and improbable note. But even so, the skill and polish of this short work dispel criticism, making it one of the more interesting and unusual stories of childhood and family relationships.

Childhood also plays a part in Maggie Hemingway's *The Bridge* although another precocious little girl, Emma, does not have the leading role. Here, we have a serious theme to explore, far removed from the traumas and tantrums of an observant ten-year old. The Hetheringtons are spending their summer vacation at Walberswick, on the Suffolk coast, in a commodious villa loaned to them for the season. There are three children, Emma, Maria and Sophie; Isabel, the mother and Aunt Jude; the father, Reginald, remaining for most of the time in London. It is the year of Queen Victoria's jubilee; a world of carriages, servants and neighbours 'calling'. It is well known that for several years the artist, Philip Wilson Steer, stayed for a while each summer in Walberswick, inspired by the unique effects of light and colour on the sands and dunes, developing his particular skills on an unspectacular though variable landscape. He stayed at the village inn. The social circle was not large, but adequate. And then, suddenly, the visits ceased after only one more with his friend, Walter Sickert. What was the reason for this sudden alteration of routine? Maggie Hemingway sets out to supply a purely fictional explanation. This is that a chaste, though deeply felt romance between Isabel Hetherington and Philip Steer was to become an obsession for both of them. It would have remained their closely guarded secret but for Emma's intuition that something untoward was going on, and during a childish delirium she reveals to Aunt Jude her suspicions and her fears. Whereupon Aunt Jude makes a firm stand. The family returns with unseemly haste to London and it is assumed that after one brief, final encounter Isabel and Philip Steer never met again. There is not, there never can be, proof that any of this occurred, for when Philip Steer

died at the age of 82 no letters or records were found to confirm that he had ever been deeply attracted to a woman. And yet the posibilities and the clues are intriguing, set against Maggie Heminway's breathtaking descriptions of the scenic back-drop.

And finally, to end on a lighter note. *Tennis and the Masai* is intended to raise a laugh about the continent of Africa and certainly not before time. Nicholas Best's opinion of both blacks and whites is impartial and irreverent, as may be judged from the truly comic opening in which some dignified and carewarn Africans view with contempt a party of uninhibited German tourists bathing naked on a sandy beach. That is by way of being a curtain raiser, for the real purpose of the novel is to follow the experiences of young Martin Riddle in search of a deeper experience of life. The almost incredibly naive young man has already brushed with failure in his attempt to make a favourable impact on a board of Army examiners. What better way to toughen his approach than a few months teaching in a remote African public school? Once free of his fussy mother and tongue-tied father, he makes rapid strides. From the moment of his arrival in Kenya, when he joins in a helicopter hunt for a run-a-way pupil, Martin is consistently out of his depth with the flamboyant head-master, the riding instructress Lady Bullivant — a left over from Colonial days — the chaplain and native staff. On several occasions the story could have edged towards tragedy; instead, it narrowly misses farce. Against a background of some of the finest scenery in Kenya, close to Lake Naivisha and dominated by Mount Longonot, the massive folly of a mansion, Haggard Hall (it is Rider Haggard country) provides a valuable stamping ground for Martin's self-imposed exile. It could be argued that his change of style and outlook is somewhat hurried: that the end result is too casually and predictably achieved and that the major characters at the Hall should have been more realistically dissected. Yet what counts more is Nicholas Best's detailed knowledge of that area of Kenya once known to white 'settlers' as 'Happy Valley' and his acceptance that the present generation of both races is motivated more by a cheerful desire to take what it wants from life than a continual monitoring of one minority group by another.

Also Received

Going Home. Freny Olbrich. Sidgwick and Jackson. £9.95.

This rewarding saga of family life in India has a richly authentic flavour. Unlike many fictional interpretations of personal situations set against a factual background *Going Home* does not irritate with imagined dialogue and points of view. It opens with Cyrus, a son of the present generation, on his way home from London to rediscover the lost scenes of his childhood: and then, in a long throw-back in time, follows a course from 1910 onwards. Freny Olbrich is never prejudiced and always lucid.

Marie. Dorrit Willumsen. The Bodley Head. £6.95.

In *Marie,* Dorrit Willumsen, a Danish writer author of many novels, plays and short stories has taken for her present theme the life and historical background of Marie Tussaud, founder of the famous waxworks, an enterprise still thriving and expanding today. Its emergence from humble origins before and during the French Revolution is a curious success story. The macabre slant on the persecution and execution of many innocent people is not for the squeamish.

Joint winner of the 1986 Betty Trask £17,000 award is Tim Parks for *Tongues of Flame* (Heinemann 1985).

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

THE QUALITY OF DUFF COOPER

Duff Cooper. John Charmley. George Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £12.95.

It is easy to admire Duff Cooper; not so easy to approve of him. In this absorbing book Mr. John Charmley, a notable addition to the ranks of biographers, gives us excellent materials for forming judgments. (I myself knew Duff Cooper very slightly; I once stayed with him briefly in Paris.)

In his prologue Mr. Charmley quotes a sentence from *The Times* which he finds distasteful: 'The reason why Duff Cooper failed on the whole to realize the high hopes entertained for him can probably be found in a streak of dilettantism which made him good at many things, but not in the first rank of anything.' *The Times* it seems was overwhelmed with protests from Duff Cooper's friends. To quote Charmley: 'Of his wit, courage, urbanity and intelligence much that was eloquent was said; on these virtues there was unanimity. The *Daily Mail* spoke for many when commenting that he had been 'the epitome of the civilized man. He was a lover of wine and good company and talk. He was a scholar, a wit and a poet.' And much more to the same effect.

At this point I feared that we were in for a straight hagiography. But my fears were groundless. As we proceed, Duff Cooper is candidly revealed as a man who drank and gambled immoderately. He found life insupportable without one love affair after another, though always retaining the devoted love of his wonderful wife. His habit of losing his temper until the veins stood out on his forehead was unattractive, to say the least, though his friends appear to have regarded his 'veiners' as rather charming.

It is difficult to pass a general verdict on Duff Cooper without introducing categories of moral value. Mr. Charmley wisely tells the story dead-pan. Duff Cooper, I would submit, is the only Cabinet Minister since John Morley who was a man of letters of first class quality. His love of great literature, especially of French literature, was profound. When still a boy at Eton, his poetry was published in the *Saturday Review*. In later life he continued to win verse competitions. His public speaking style was a shade pompous though the absence of notes was impressive, but he wrote very well indeed for public or private circulation, if not quite a well as Lady Diana.

The mention of her brings up the question discussed so often how he would have prospered without her support, financially indispensable in the early years. She was obviously invaluable to him in his relations with Churchill and later Bevin. No public man of our time owed as much as he did to his wife. We must pay proper respect to the qualities in him which inspired her love and faith.

Duff Cooper, in my recollection, was regarded as a somewhat ineffective and not very hard-working minister in the various offices he occupied. As a subordinate member, however, of the Attlee government, I was always assured that he was doing a fine job as Ambassador in Paris (1944-48). That opinion is confirmed here, though it was as well that he left the Embassy when he did.

His detestation of the Germans would have become increasingly inappropriate.

Each of us may think himself entitled to one great opportunity in life. Duff Cooper had two supreme chances — to marry Lady Diana Manners and to be the first British Ambassador in Paris after the war. He seized both to the full. *The Times* has been quoted above as saying that Duff Cooper failed on the whole to realize the high hopes entertained for him. From the edge of politics before the war, I was never aware that anyone expected him to reach the highest positions in politics. But taking his life as a whole, not forgetting his decoration for valour in the first war, we must regard him as a happy and successful man, and one who aroused much lasting loyalty.

FRANK LONGFORD

JUDGMENTS BY MICHAEL FOOT

Michael Foot: *Loyalists and Loners* (Collins) £15.

It would be easy, as it is tempting, to review this book by quoting the barbed comments its author offers on his Parliamentary colleagues past and present. Let me try to resist the temptation, except to say that this genial and eloquent essayist, who from 1980 to 1983 was Leader of the Labour Party, gives yet further evidence of the extent to which brother can hate brother in his astonishingly divided party — pointed up even more sharply by his introductory overture on the theme of transcendent value of party loyalty. Loyalty in Mr Foot does not exclude venom. He gives a devastating indictment of some of his former colleagues, especially George Thomas, now Viscount Tonypandy, 'who loved to be loved and would do almost anything to secure it'; the late (Lord) George Brown, with his 'irrepressible, prancing egotism'; the late Hugh Gaitskell, with his 'pride and obstinacy and pedantry'; ex-brother David Owen, with his 'stony, ferocious eye fixed on the main chance'; and — more by side-swipes than by such direct attacks, Jim Callaghan, John Strachey, and the late Desmond Donnelly, to name only three among the others. For Wedgwood Benn there is a more serious, sustained and deadly analysis.

If there is a central theme to explain the treacheries of these 'comrades', it is that they had at one point or another been critical of (disloyal to the sacred memory of?) Aneurin Bevan. "Nye" emerges as the hero of the book; and any who crossed him has anathema pronounced upon him. And for Jennie Lee there is, for the same reason, a tribute, which, by contrast with so much else, is positively cloying. He can, in other words, be warm as well as withering; the flames of the old pamphleteer (of *'Guilty Men*, or the Cassius of *The Trial of Mussolini*) still burn bright.

There are, however, at least two other Michael Foots. One of them reprints here a number of essays or extended book reviews on some truly great men of the recent past whom he had known in he long-ago, and he writes of them with obvious affection and insight: Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, George Orwell and — if it is not inappropriate to include him here — Enoch Powell, who lost his way in 1968 as the 'race' question began to hit British politics, and who — Mr Foot contends — moved to that curious and unexpected identification with Ulster that marked for him — presumably — a final break with Heathite Conservatism. Ulster gives this leader, who never came to lead, what Michael Foot calls 'a kind of life after death, an uncovenanted bonus'. And he offers some vignettes that become tributes to Arthur Koestler, Nancy Astor, and Harold Nicolson 'our drawing-room D'Artagnan'.

But there is another Foot: not the pamphleteer but the essayist-historian. He reprints here some — too short — pieces on those he regards as the True Prophets: Heinrich Heine, William Lovell the Chartist, Stendhal, Lytton Strachey, Dorothy Wadham, Alexander Herzen — and others. Here the writing is altogether warmer. And in all the varied moods of these essays and reviews, in their range from invective and bitterness to hero-worship and idolatry, he writes throughout with sparkle and zest. For he has yet another hero: Dean Swift, who, as one of England's greatest prose writers, was also George Orwell's model.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE IRISH CATHOLIC UNIONIST TRADITION

The Cross of St. Patrick. John Biggs-Davison and George Chowdharay-Best. The Kensal Press. £14.95.

There is a danger that people in Britain, exasperated by the tangled web of Irish history and repelled by the violence, will get bored with the problems of Northern Ireland. Consequently it is a good thing when they are made to think again and be jerked out of settled attitudes. The situation is so often simplified into a division of Catholics (Republicans) and Protestants (Unionists). The theme of this book is to condemn the lie of equalising Catholic with Republican. Without denying the reality of sectarian bitterness, of which the treatment of mixed marriages is ample evidence, the book is dedicated to those many Catholics who have been faithful to the Crown in troubles and wars.

Sir John Biggs-Davison is a Catholic and a well-known member of Parliament with great sympathy for Ireland. His research assistant was George Chowdharay-Best. The book is detailed and admirably annotated, suitable for student and general reader. For the latter, however, some maps would have been helpful. Geography is an important factor. Scotland can be seen from Antrim, and Ulster is separated from the rest of Ireland by forests, bogs and loughs. In addition, Ulster, unlike the rest of Ireland, shared industrialisation with the Clyde and Merseyside. Ulster, it is claimed, always was separate. It was the last of the old provinces to be coerced into England's united Ireland. Partition, far from being artificial, was a recognition of an identity which had always existed.

The book is divided into two. Part I concerns the Union and its aftermath, though included here is Irish history up to the Act of the Union. Some interesting facts appear. For example, before the reign of Henry VIII, Popes had not been universally popular in Ireland. Opposition to the 1542 Act was caused not so much by the required allegiance to Henry VIII as the attempts to impose new Church services. In addition, of course, in a poor country the dissolution of religious houses caused hardship. Then again, in the eighteenth century lawless violence was as much directed against Catholics as Protestants.

Part II entitled 'The Assault on the Union'. The first chapters deal with the circumstances of the three Home Rule Bills, and then we are brought up-to-date. Numerous Catholics have always supported the Union, sometimes silently, sometimes vocally. Of those a percentage have considered themselves British rather than Irish. The effect of direct rule that replaced Stormont was to make many Catholics more warmly in support of the British Connexion. Even before this a number of Catholics had been prepared to support the Unionist party and some had been candidates for election. Generally, however,

it was thought that the party was founded on sectarian lines and it would have to be reconstituted to make Catholic membership a possibility.

Across the border there are cultural, athletic and religious bonds but the author's conclusion is this — 'United Ireland is a non-starter unless, which is unlikely, the South were to end its recession from the United Kingdom. United Islands make sense.'

The authors make no attempt to cover up or minimise the baneful effects of violence, but the general picture is encouraging. The book can be warmly recommended. Its argument deserves to be widely known.

LAURENCE TANNER

LABOR LAW DURING THE CARTER REGIME

Labor Law Reform in U.S. Industrial Relations. Barbara Townley. Gower Publishing. £18 50.

The subject of this book is not, as the title suggests, a survey of American labor law, but a study of the attempt and, in the end, the failure to pass a labor law during the Carter presidency. It is to this that most of the book is devoted, and as a detailed description of the preliminary negotiations with the Administration, of the drafting of legislation, of the lobbying by the business community to block it, and of its final narrow defeat in Congress, it has some interest. Many officials were interviewed by the author as she researched her material and there is a detailed bibliography.

The book is, however, handicapped by a scene-setting chapter discussing the place of law in labor relations that draws heavily on its L.S.E. background, in which trade union activities are seen as the norm, and in which the concept of law as being binding on all subjects and all sectors in society is seen as itself a topic for discussion, for controversy,— and for much repetition. In this section, the book suffers from verbosity, from a sociologist's prose that requires frequent translation into understandable English, and from frequent splitting of infinitives. When it breathes an American air, and recounts the tale of the bill's legislative history, it is more sharply written and less addicted to jargon. Even here, however, the totally different attitude that obtains towards trades unions in the U.S. is minimised, and the reason for it are never analysed. 'It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the nature of the employment relationship characterising what essentially amounts to four-fifths of the American work force.' Difficult of course,— but, one would think — important. Phrases recur like 'union substitution strategies' and 'union suppression'; whereas the reality is that America is a free, mobile and non-statist economy, with a steadily growing service (and largely female) sector, a large MidWest farm belt and a largely rural South, with many small businesses and small towns In all of these, unions are still seen as alien, and — as the author recognises — they have a legacy of avoiding permanent commitment to any one party; they act in essence as massive political/economic lobbies, not as an alternative Labour Party. Some other lobbies, notably the N.A.M., are much more professional. Union membership is declining steadily. Twenty-one states have 'Right to Work' legislation. The author knows these things, but refers to them as if they were asides, whereas they are basic to American economic life. Students may find this careful study of one piece of abortive labor legislation useful; but the book is too narrowly-focussed to appeal to the general reader, and much of its prose is heavy going.

ESMOND WRIGHT

PORTRAIT OF A FABIAN

Margaret Cole 1893-1980. Betty D. Vernon. Croom Helm. £19.95.

Betty Vernon has written a lively, accurately researched and lucid account of the life of Margaret Cole and of her services to the Labour Movement and the cause of socialism in general. Mrs. Cole wrote the definitive biography of her illustrious husband, G. D. H. Cole; and the story told here of Margaret herself is a fitting companion to it.

For seventy years Mrs. Cole was active in the Fabian cause, not as a contemplator of revolution, as her husband was, but as one whose genuine desire was to change rather than simply ameliorate the lot of the labouring poor. Her deepest commitment was to the extension of their educational provision and this she treated, during her membership of the LCC Education Committee, as at least the political equivalent of women's franchise. A new policy for education should rightly, she thought, be worked out through the fullest possible public discussion. Any other way of shaping policy would necessarily be elitist, imposed from above and would therefore perpetuate the class system. Her views throughout were more like a desire for what Sidney Webb had, in another context, summarised as 'the inevitability of gradualness', hardly to be disproved and certainly not the creed of a revolutionary.

And yet, in her life with G. D. H. Cole she appreciated his more fervid beliefs and only regretted that he was forced, after the second world war, to lead a retired life in his Oxford retreat,—'retired', that is, from any political contact with the very working class whose interests both he and Margaret held chiefly in mind. The contrast between this state of affairs and his wife's energetic activity caused some loss of strength in their partnership, as when she wrote to him in 1947, of 'political differences with you and the way your disappointment with the world and others has fallen on me'. It is not clear in the biography reviewed here how far they drew apart in philosophy or how much the 'rift' affected Margaret's work. But certainly Douglas retained the red tie, red flag attitude to Labour, whilst his wife associated herself with the party's orthodox periodical, *Socialist Commentary,* the journal of Labour's reactionary right wing.

It is, indeed, as an historian of the party that Margaret Cole will be best remembered. A gifted journalist and writer herself, she generously assisted other scholars in their research. Her articles on current conditions appeared in many of the seriously political periodicals of the fifties, sixties and seventies, not excluding the *Contemporary Review.* Margaret Cole emerges from Betty Vernon's account as a worthy successor to Beatrice Webb, equally beloved and at least as autocratic.

BETTY ABEL

AN IMPRESSIVE ASSESSMENT OF HENRY BROUGHAM

Henry Brougham 1778-1868: His Public Career. Robert Stewart. The Bodley Head. £18.

Henry Brougham was one of the most famous characters of the early nineteenth century. In addition to his political and cultural achievements, he gave his name to the famous carriage and to a style of shoes. Yet today this important politician is virtually forgotten. If he survives at all in the public imagination it is as the ludicrous figure in *Punch* cartoons or as the hero of the numerous anecdotes still current about him. Perhaps the most famous of these is the oft-told tale about how he faked his own death so he could read his obituary in the *Times.*



We have never had a satisfactory life of Brougham. He left behind him some memoirs which are not trustworthy. The late Professor Aspinall did a very interesting work about Brougham's relations with the Whig Party. Chester New started a life of Brougham but unfortunately he only lived to complete the first volume. Dr. Stewart attempts to cover all of Brougham's public life in some 300 pages. Naturally at times he has to compress complicated issues into a few paragraphs but he still manages to give us a most useful account of Brougham's life.

One of the great strong-points of the book is the emphasis given to Brougham's early years in Scotland. Dr. Stewart rightly gives Brougham a much more important role than many other historians have in the creation of *The Edinburgh Review* which, as he says, started the Victorian tradition of the great reviews. (Of this great tradition only *The Contemporary Review* survives.)

In his first three decades of public life, Brougham mixed the roles of writer, barrister, and politician. He was a man of tremendous learning. He had an interest in almost every aspect of human knowledge. He was filled with a passion to share this with others. Brougham's greatest claim to fame is the work he did for education. Perhaps no other politician has worked as long and as hard in the cause of popular education. Indeed he has a claim to be considered as the man who virtually invented the idea of popular education. He was the driving force behind a series of 'penny publications' that carried the essential facts about every conceivable subject in a way to inform ordinary people.

Brougham's career in office was a very short one. He became Lord Chancellor in 1830 and played a crucial role in forcing through the Reform Act of 1832. After that he never held office again. He had himself to blame for this failure. Brougham never inspired trust with his fellow politicians. They knew that he had a passion for intrigue and he never really was a good party man. Nor did the serious opinion of Victorian England — an opinion he had done so much to create — regard him as a serious public figure.

Dr. Stewart's biography is certainly the best introduction to Brougham's public career and achievements. Unfortunately like many recent academic biographies it neglects the man's private life and with a man as colourful as Brougham, that is a definite loss. The publishers should correct the caption under the picture of Brougham's early ally, the inimitable Sydney Smith.

RICHARD MULLEN

A GREAT SPIRITUAL LEADER

Basil Hume: A Portrait. Collins. £9.95.

Ten years ago, Basil Hume the Benedictine Abbot of Ampleforth was, surprisingly to many Catholics, appointed Archbishop of Westminster and then made a Cardinal by Pope Paul VI. The anniversary provides the occasion for this volume of tributes to Cardinal Hume by eight contributors, under the editorship of Tony Castle. It can only be an interim assessment since at the age of 63, the Cardinal has years of service before him. Nonetheless he has become a Christian leader in this country widely recognised for his influence, matched perhaps only by the Anglican Archbishop Temple of Canterbury before and during the last war years.

The eight essays cover his life and background. Mary Craig writes of his early years. In 1963 Basil Hume was elected Abbot of Ampleforth at the time

of the Second Vatican Council, and Father Columba Cary-Elwes, a monk at Ampleforth, refers to 'the staggering blows' that hit the religious orders after the Council, for change and reform and how Abbot Hume with understanding and some sympathy 'saved the traditions of the House of Ampleforth from disintegration'. It was his recognition of the need for renewal that caused and has justified his leadership of the English Catholics. In assessing his ten years at Westminster, Clifford Longley points to his relaunch of the Catholic Church. He associated himself with new thinking and new organisation, but not as a forceful leader. 'It would not be true of him to say that his leadership had made things happen; more subtly, however, he has certainly by his presence *enabled* things to be done.'

The catholic laity have been encouraged to take more interest in their church affairs. Indeed following the Liverpool Conference the Cardinal and Archbishop Worlock sought to persuade the International Synod of Bishops, albeit without success, 'for some easement of church discipline towards Catholics who remarried after divorce' and for some rethinking on the question of birth control. Nonetheless he has always accepted the authority of the Pope.

Bishop Victor Guazzelli discusses Hume's pastoral leadership and the reorganisation of the vast Westminster diocese. Douglas Brown writes of his work for ecumenism and the inevitable limitations for re-union. In 1979 Hume was elected President of the Council of European Bishops' Conferences; Chris Civic deals with his work outside Britain. The spiritual side of the Cardinal's life and work is emphasised by all the contributors, including John Harriot who writes on 'A Benedictine Spirituality'. Hugo Young concludes the volume with a portrait of Hume as 'a national figure'; indeed as a world spiritual leader. 'He is one of the most powerful churchmen in the world — but one with large reserves of his moral authority unexpended. Some people find this very frustrating. Nonetheless he has made spirituality real'.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

SIR ARTHUR, KNIGHT OF THE WRITING-TABLE

The Unknown Conan Doyle: Letters to the Press. Edited and Introduced by John Michael Gibson and Richard Lancelyn Green. (Secker & Warburg. £15).

The pen of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was mighty like a sword — wielded in noble knightly fashion for the common weal, as he saw it. And let it be said once and for all, he was exceedingly straight and true, dipping his nib in a deep inkwell of wisdom and common sense. He tilted his quill-pointed lance at a number of windmills, but he battled with faith and courage against those injustices, great and small, which he perceived. He may not always have been right, but he was never, morally, wrong. He was right about poor Oscar Slater, who languished for eighteen years in a Scottish prison for a murder which he never committed. Conan Doyle got him out. Whether he was right about George Edalji, convicted of the Great Wyrley horse maimings, is not quite so clear-cut. But Doyle thought that Edalji was innocent and fought heroically for his character restoration and rehabilitation.

The letters, culled from the magazine and newspaper columns of half a century, spread over a wide field of topics — matters medical, political, legal, military, religious, sporting, and, of course, spiritualistic. They are, like everything that Doyle ever wrote, immensely vivid and readable. Such is their atmosphere and tone, that one cannot but feel that they bear the immortal address of the sage of 221B. Excellent value.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

At the Sign of the Swan (Harrap. Hardback £9.95. Paperback £5.95.) The opening of the Swan theatre at Stratford for the performance of plays by playwrights other than Shakespeare in the Elizabethan and Jacobean period and until 1750 has been the occasion for this study by Judith Cook. She is primarily concerned with Shakespeare's contemporaries in the theatre. She has a useful chapter on theatre companies, the theatres and their management. There are separate chapters on Ben Jonson and Christopher Marlowe and their plays. She also discusses tragedy, comedy and drama documentaries, and the place of women in the theatre. She also gives sketches of many less well known contemporary playwrights. The book covers such a wide field that she has had to be very selective, and thereby at times controversial. It is not intended as a treatise in depth but rather to give a concise general introduction to this great period in the history of English drama. She has included a useful bibliography for further reading. Trevor Nunn provides a brief foreword.

Follies. (Jonathan Cape. £15.00.) This is a fascinating National Trust Guide covering nearly 500 pages of architectural fantasies without any purpose other than to satisfy the whim of the owner and builder. The authors, Gwyn Headley and Wim Meulenkamp, cover county by county the vast number of follies, having inspected many of them. They point out in their Introduction that the heyday of the folly was between 1730 and 1820, consisting in general of two categories, the garden folly and the 'squire folly' less concerned with the garden and more with the building extravagance. 'It tends to belong more to the late Georgian period than to the Rococo'. The volume contains a large number of excellent photographs in monochrome and colour illustrating some 150 of the buildings. This is an excellent book to study before starting a holiday.

Thomas More (Collins £7.95.) The publication in Fount Paperbacks of this biography by Dr. Richard Marius should attract a wider readership of this outstanding and in places controversial study. For many years he taught Reformation history at Tennessee University and has also studied a vast amount of material relating to Thomas More, past and present. He concedes that in some matters he takes a minority view, as for example the depth of More's friendship with Erasmus. He is concerned to 'fit the desperate pieces together to provide a coherent picture of the man and his times,' warts as well as virtues. 'He endured a lifelong inner torment because of the contradiction in his character and experience'.

The Illustrated Naked Ape (Jonathan Cape. £12.50.) This "Zoologist's Study of the Human Animal" by the former Curator of the London Zoo, Desmond Morris, and written for the general public, was first published as *The Naked Ape* in 1967. A controversial comparative study achieved great success, having sold over eight million copies around the world. It is now republished with 56 pages of colour, designed to implement the facts and argument presented in this remarkable volume.

Artorivs Rex Discovered

'History is a discussion between gentlemen, over a glass of wine'
(an Oxford Don . . . ?)

WOULD HENRY VII have smiled enigmatically at that quote?

COULD RICHARD III have happily painted out his hump, even if he still lost his Crown and life?

PERHAPS WILSON AND BLACKETT, authors of *Artorivs Rex*, Discovered having wiped away their blood, sweat and tears, used, some finely chosen expletives to show dissent at the Don's quotation.

Artorivs Rex Discovered

An abrasive investigative history, that brings to the forefront much information that has previously been missed or ignored.

The book is surely destined to become a memorial to the authors' dogged persistence (for many years as a leisure activity) and during the last decade —working frequently more than fifteen hours a day. This has brought the historians a bounty of achievement, which should, as a result of the great bulk of supportive evidence — both documentary and physical — eventually propel them into a pre-eminent position on Arthurian matters.

Future confirmation of Artorivs Rex will not diminish the importance of their work in establishing Uthyr Pendragon (King Arthur II) as being a Silurian King of Morgannwg and Gwent (South-East Wales) and that many of the romantic characters of Mallory were, in fact, based on real and identifiable persons, who lived in specifiable locations during the Arthurian era.

The physical and tangible proof presented by Wilson and Blackett has been made available to **Pendragon Tours** — a company formed to arrange guided tours to a number of the most important historical sites.

Sources:	**Manuscripts**	**Maps**	**Antiquarian Books**	**Documents**
	Inscribed Stones	**Churches**	**Cathedrals**	**Forts**
	Dynastic Charts	**Gnostic Datings**	**Founder's Tombs**	**etc.**

For further information:

Publications: **King Arthur Research** 3 Ty Draw Place, Penylan, Cardiff CF2 5HP
Tel: (0222) 486405 Telex: 497712 KAR

Tours: **Pendragon Tours** 14a Market Street, Pontypridd, Mid Glam CF37 2ST
Tel: (0443) 408442 Telex: 497712 CELTIC G

THE BEST HOLIDAY CAR RENTAL DEAL IN EUROPE.

Only Budget lets you book and pre-pay at a guaranteed sterling rate in any of 26 countries – with nothing more than petrol to pay when you get there. That means unlimited kilometres, collision damage waiver, personal accident insurance and all local taxes are included

Ask your travel agent about Budget's Super Sterling Deal or ring our toll free phone number 0800-181-181

Budget rent a car

Printed by BRAZIER & NAISH LTD , 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD, and published by th CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD , 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG Tel 01-242 3215. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers

Contemporary Review

121st YEAR OF PUBLICATION

AUGUST 1986

PERSPECTIVES ON SPAIN, 1986

Richard Robinson

THE LIBYAN FLAP: A WATERSHED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION

Godwin Okebaram Uwah

COMMITMENT AS A FORM OF PRIVILEGE

John Elsom

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE YOUNG MURDERER

L. F. Lowenstein

and other articles together with an eight-page Literary Supplement.

£1.10

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

August 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1447 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

Perspectives on Spain, 1986 Richard Robinson 57

The Libyan Flap: A Watershed in the South African Situation Godwin Okebaram Uwah 64

Parental Government William Petty 71

The Panama Canal and Panama's National Interests Oydén Ortega Durán 74

From Rule-Book to Realpolitik: France's Constitutional Challenge James G. Shields 78

Commitment as a Form of Privilege John Elsom 83

Reflections on a Tour Made in Scotland: August 1803 Sheila Huftel 89

I Remember, I Remember Desmond Hawkins 94

The Psychology of the Young Murderer L. F. Lowenstein 97

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT 105

Frank Longford, Mark Cook, James Munson, David Shipman, Molly Tibbs, Kenneth Lindsay, Richard Whittington-Egan

SHORTER REVIEWS

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE, O.B.E.

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1986. Published monthly by the Contemporary Review Co. Ltd, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG, England, and printed in England by Brazier & Naish Ltd, 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD U S Mailing Agent: Mercury Airfreight International Ltd. Inc., 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J 07001. Second Class postage paid at Rahway N.J Annual subscription (including postage): U K £16 00, U.S A. and Canada $55 00 Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S and Canada: extra costs given on request. U S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc, 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J 07001. Contemporary Review (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

August 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1447

PERSPECTIVES ON SPAIN, 1986

by Richard Robinson

THE last twelve months have witnessed changes of historic proportions in Spain's international position. On 12 June 1985 her leaders signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Community and Spain formally became its twelfth member on 1 January 1986. The Catalan surrealist Salvador Dalì remarked that it was Europe entering Spain, not Spain entering Europe. This cryptic paradox evoked the complicated historical relationship of Spain with the lands to its north and the great longing, after nearly half a century of political separation, for symbiosis. All the major national and regional parties welcomed the final achievement of entry, as they had supported the application to join the Community in 1977. The unanimity — like the lack of public debate about the issues at stake — has been truly remarkable. The glowing rhetoric of the Spanish political establishment in their enthusiasm for the European project has sometimes seemed curiously to contrast with the rather weary repetition of old slogans by leaders of member-States of longer standing; and some of this enthusiasm for building the European union of the twenty-first century found its echo in the speeches of King Juan Carlos on his state visit to Britain in April this year.

Another milestone, at least in the eyes of some, on Spain's road to full integration into the democratic West was passed on 12 March this year, with a popular verdict in favour of the country remaining within the Atlantic Alliance. Unlike entry into the EEC, entry into NATO proved a divisive political issue. When the Centrist government of Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo proposed Spanish membership in 1981 and got parliamentary approval for it, the Socialists, then the main opposition party, were firmly against the move. Spain formally became a member in May 1982, but in the election campaign of October that year the Socialist chief, Felipe González, promised a referendum on the question in the context of his party's hostility to membership. After the Socialist victory in those elections, however, González quickly and mysteriously became convinced of the need to stay in the Alliance and brought his party round to this view, though its left wing felt betrayed.

The referendum campaign was hard fought between the government party and elements to its left who united in favour of withdrawal. The advice proffered by the main opposition leader, the pro-NATO Manuel

Fraga, was to abstain from what he claimed was a party-political manoeuvre; but many of his followers ignored this advice. The outcome was victory for González and continued membership, albeit with the provisos that Spain would not participate in the 'integrated military structure' of the Organisation, would not allow nuclear weapons on its territory and would progressively reduce the size of the American military presence originating with General Franco's agreement to make bases available to the USA in 1953. The government's victory was a strange one: 52.5% voted 'yes' in a 60% poll, or, to put it another way, one in three Spanish electors was for staying in, one in four was definitely for withdrawal, while nine out of twenty did not express an opinion. Be that as it may, the referendum has removed one of the most divisive items from the political agenda of the young democracy and it served to demonstrate how far the Socialist Party has shifted its ground — from advocating 'active neutrality insofar as it contributes to the cause of socialism' in 1976 to circumscribed integration into the NATO power bloc in 1986.

There are, however, outposts of Spanish territory which NATO has made it clear are not guaranteed by Spanish membership of the Alliance, namely Ceuta and Melilla, enclaves on the north Moroccan coast. Although belonging to NATO and the EEC is likely to strengthen Spain's diplomatic position in any confrontation over them, the two cities remain major headaches for Spanish rulers.

In the Spanish view, the enclaves are integral parts of Spain which just happen to be situated on the other shore of the Mediterranean. Ceuta, it is pointed out, has been Spanish since 1580 (and Portuguese for 165 years before that) and Melilla since 1497; they are, simply, Spanish cities, albeit with free-port status like the Canary Islands since 1863, a status maintained in relation to the EEC. Nevertheless Spanish governments have been nervous about them ever since 1956, when the contiguous Spanish Protectorate became part of the new Kingdom of Morocco. Fears for their safety increased in 1975 when King Hassan organised his 'Green March' for the acquisition of the Western Sahara. Spanish military planning is still very firmly focussed on the defence of the 'Balearic-Canaries axis', which passes between the Pillars of Hercules, of which Ceuta is one and Gibraltar the other.

Although King Hassan is generally considered a conservative and stabilising influence, Moroccan policy in fact remains unpredictable. Since 1976 the monarch has espoused the theory that Ceuta and Melilla must return to Morocco when Gibraltar returns to Spain. This, together with the assurance of no more 'green marches', was the message put out from Rabat when King Juan Carlos was the guest of this descendant of the Prophet in March this year. This did something to allay Spain's short-term worries over Morocco's surprising (but, as it has proved, meaningless) conclusion of a pact of union with Gadaffi's Libya in August 1984 and its campaign for support among African States. It also calmed Spanish nerves a little with regard to the increasingly troubled situation within the two enclaves, particularly in Melilla, brought on by the introduction of a

new aliens' law last year.

Spanish regulations had for some time prevented an influx of Moroccan residents, but a stateless (and therefore voteless) population of around 20,000 Muslims exists in a total population for Melilla given as 53,593 in the 1981 census, but now thought to be over 70,000. Naturalisation and registration of this ghetto population as voters could produce a Muslim majority for the transfer of sovereignty — a demand loudly voiced just across the frontier by more militant Moroccan nationalists than King Hassan and by Islamic fundamentalists. Fear that arbitrary expulsions and continued discrimination would be the policies adopted by the Spanish authorities led to the remarkable mobilisation of the Muslim community last autumn by Aomar Mohamedi Dudu, a young leader expelled from the Spanish Socialist Party who proclaims Gandhi his model. The Spanish government responded to an increasingly ugly situation by making concessions in the application of its new law, but the Muslim population of the enclaves has now found its political voice.

Spanish loyalties have up to now been with the European population, which seems to be adopting an increasingly intransigent attitude. Only the Spanish Communist Party has come out for decolonisation of these garrison towns. Although the situation regarding the enclaves may be less tense than late last year, these relics of the crusading past can still cause nightmares in Madrid, despite the presence of the Spanish Foreign Legion and air and maritime superiority in the Straits. Even if King Hassan resists the temptation to distract his opposition and subjects generally from their economic ills by changing his tack again, Spaniards are still mindful that there have been attempted *coups* in Morocco in the past, that nationalists there still dream of 'the Great Maghreb' and that fanatical Islamic fundamentalism could soon gain more adherents across the Straits of Gibraltar.

Contiguous with the Spanish mainland is the British dependent territory of Gibraltar which, in Spanish eyes, remains a colony that has outlived the imperial era and ought to be handed over. Unlike King Hassan, Spain is officially blind to any parallels between Gibraltar and Ceuta or Melilla. Britain took Gibraltar by conquest (as Spain took Melilla) and it has been British *de jure* since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. This means that the Rock has now been British for longer than it was ever Spanish. Under the Treaty of Utrecht Britain cannot transfer sovereignty to anyone other than Spain. Though there has been no transfer of sovereignty, the Constitution of 1969, granted two years after a massive rejection of a Spanish future by the Gibraltarian community in a referendum, gave a large measure of internal self-government to the colony. The Labour government, in the person of Roy Hattersley, killed off any hopes of full integration into the United Kingdom in 1976 and the Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher accepted, by the Brussels Agreement of 1984, that the issue of sovereignty could be raised in Anglo-Spanish talks in exchange for the reopening of the frontier (closed by General Franco in 1969) in February last year.

In his historic address to the British Parliament on St. George's Day

this year, King Juan Carlos expressed the hope that the politicians of both Crowns would give high priority to the resolution of this last obstacle in the way of a close Anglo-Spanish relationship. In the House of Commons the next day Mrs. Thatcher reaffirmed the undertaking, enshrined in the Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969, that sovereignty will not be transferred without the consent of the Gibraltarian population. As Gibraltar's Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, has opined, future generations of Gibraltarians may have different ideas from the present ones, whose views have probably been indelibly coloured by the experience of the siege of 1969-85. The city has had a tourist boom since the border reopened, though the fate of the privatised dockyard has been less happy. Although the wily veteran Chief Minister is always willing to talk to and negotiate with the Spaniards as part of a British team, it is by no means clear that this outward flexibility would ever be matched by real concessions on vital issues. In any case, he has little room for manoeuvre for in domestic politics he and his Gibraltar Labour Party are hard pressed by the spirited opposition intransigence of Joe Bossano and his Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party which, one suspects, really aspires to an internationally-guaranteed independent Gibraltar.

Journalists and politicians may fly the perennial kites of condominium, leaseback, or treaty guarantees for autonomy within Spain, but progress on the Gibraltar question seems unlikely. Gibraltarians need to be wooed by Madrid for a long time if it is to earn forgiveness for the last, counter-productive, siege. However, as visitors to Spain can easily discover, Spaniards who rejoice at their recently restored right to decide their own political future are astonishingly reluctant to extend this right to 20,000 Gibraltarians. Sometimes one feels that, among the citizens of Spain, only the more ardent Catalan or Basque nationalists really grasp the nature of the Gibraltar 'problem'. Contrary to the wishful musings of some British politicians, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 does not, in its present form, provide the framework within which present Gibraltarian aspirations could be realised, even though it defines Spain as composed of nationalities as well as regions.

The 'State of the Autonomies', as the Spanish polity is now characterised, is not a federation, nor has any of the seventeen Autonomous Communities a federal relationship with central government; rather is it an ungainly construction erected *ad hoc* in response to the demands and pressures of the period 1977-82. First, the then premier, Adolfo Suárez, had to buy off the Catalans, who had a government-in-exile left over from the 1930s, before the more ardent among them were tempted in significant numbers to follow the Basque radical path. Then the moderate Basque nationalists (who also had a government-in-exile) had to be won over with more concessions than they had been given in the Republican Statute of Autonomy of 1936. It seemed logical that the principle of autonomy be extended to the third 'historic nationality', the Gallegos of the north-west, for they had voted on the issue in 1936, and that the local rights of Navarre, kept alive through the Franco regime, be updated. But

the process of devolution had by now gathered its own momentum and autonomy had to be bestowed in lesser and varying degrees on other historic regions such as Andalusia, Aragón and Valencia, Asturias, the Canaries and the Balearics, as well as on areas with less well-defined personalities such as Madrid, Castile-la Mancha, and Cantabria. In the wake of the attempted *coup* of 23 February 1981 the Centrist government and Socialist opposition agreed to try and 'harmonise' (i.e. rein in) the autonomies' process. This has irritated Basques and Catalans: Euskadi and Catalonia are the only two Communities where nationalist parties hold power.

Since their victory in the elections of October 1982 the Socialists, who also hold power in all the Autonomous Communities except Cantabria, Catalonia, Euskadi and Galicia, have tried to accentuate uniformity in their dealings with the regions and have used retrenchment as the weapon with which to embarrass and curb over-ambitious regional authorities. Paradoxically, one consequence of simultaneous Socialist control of national and most regional governments has been to turn some staunch defenders of 'the unity of Spain into regionalist enthusiasts, or even in some places 'nationalists', in opposition to 'Socialist centralism'. The 'State of the Autonomies' has not yet attained its mature form, but it is with thinly-disguised relish that Socialist leaders point out that EEC rules will diminish the decision-making powers of Autonomous Communities. Catalan and Basque political visionaries, however, look further into the future to a time when the 'Europe of the Peoples' will take precedence over the Europe of existing States.

In the medium term the challenge of 'the Autonomies', or how to organise the structures of government within the Spanish State, may well prove less important than the country's adaptation, socially and economically, to entry into the EEC. The problems of adaptation, however, have regional dimensions. The fishing and dairy interests of the northern coastal zone will be adversely affected and, in addition, Euskadi and Galicia are homes to the declining metallurgical and shipbuilding industries and Asturias to coal-mines that are collapsing in every sense. Catalonia's depressed textiles may well face final humiliation at the hands of Portuguese competition, while the agriculture of the Canary Islands (subject neither to the Common External Tariff nor to the Common Agricultural Policy) is already experiencing serious difficulties with its exports. In the longer run Spanish wine, fruit and vegetable exports should prosper, though French insistence on continuing favourable terms of entry for rival North African produce — a condition of ratification of Spanish accession in Paris — is a disappointment. Meanwhile the car industry remains the most important exporter.

Under the Socialists the level of foreign investment has stayed healthy, no doubt in part because the Socialist government elected in 1982 did not shirk the administration of the monetarist measures seemingly demanded by the evolution of contemporary capitalism. The large loss-making public sector has been slashed back and parts of it sold off. In

his 1982 election campaign González promised the creation of 800,000 jobs, but the human and statistical reality has been an increase of 700,000 in the numbers of unemployed to the end of 1985, keeping Spain at the top of the European table with a rate of 22% (but 31% in Andalusia). On the other hand the rate of inflation fell from 14% in 1982 to 9% in 1985. Exports increased in the same period to give 81 rather than 65% coverage of imports. The balance of payments, however, remains in surplus, thanks in part to tourism: in 1985 38 million Spaniards were hosts to over 43 million foreigners who spent 7,592 million dollars. The Madrid Stock-Exchange index has soared to surpass its high-point of 1974 and the fall in oil prices, music to the ears of a country having to import over 60% of its energy, should further stimulate growth, currently forecast at 2.8% this year.

With optimism in the air and to clear the political decks before budget-making, Felipe González decided on an early general election to coincide with the Andalusian regional poll on 22 June, despite the distractions of the World Cup. The elections were called in the wake of government victory in the referendum on NATO and at a moment when the Socialist Party (PSOE) of González, preaching nothing more radical than 'modernisation' and 'the deepening of democracy', seemed the most credible political force. To the PSOE's left, the Communist camp had not recovered from its three-way split following on its miserable performance in the 1982 elections (4.1% of the vote, instead of 10.7% in 1979), nor had the anti-NATO groups had time to perfect their organisational co-ordination.

The victors of 1982 were the PSOE, whose vote doubled from 1979, giving it 48.4% of the poll and 202 out of 350 seats, and Manuel Fraga's People's Coalition which advanced from 9 to 106 seats, from 6% of the poll in 1979 to 26.2 in 1982, when (as now) it included the Christian Democrats of the PDP and some right-wing Liberals. In 1982 the PSOE and Fraga's conservatives benefited from the collapse of the Centrist UCD, formed around Suárez to win the election of 1977 and his instrument for making the transition to European-style democracy. The UCD won only 7.1% of the vote in 1982 (compared with 35% in 1979) and went into liquidation. Ex-premier Suárez and his CDS party won a mere 2.9% of the vote in 1982 and in November 1984 another contestant for the centre ground between the Socialists and Fraga arose in the form of the Liberal PRD of Miquel Roca and Antonio Garrigues Walker. When González called an early election, the forces to his right were even more fragmented than those to his left. Furthermore, Fraga's People's Alliance party was suffering from internal tensions, while the leader of the Catalan nationalist coalition CiU, Jordi Pujol, still laboured under the shadow of a banking scandal and the leadership of the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ/PNV) was engaged in a bout of internecine feuding.

What is surprising about the Spain of 1986 is how different it is from the Spains of 1976, just after Franco's death, or 1936, which saw the outbreak of the civil war that led to his dictatorship. Although there is

now high unemployment and considerable social distress, there is not the pre-revolutionary atmosphere of fifty years ago. The Anarchists have disappeared as a force of any significance, and the other trade unions (apart from the Basque ELA/STV) have no strike funds and are numerically rather weak. The Socialist Party talks no more of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as in 1936, nor of the transition from capitalism to self-managing socialism, as in 1976. The Church, beleaguered yet triumphalist in 1936, has stayed in the political wings over the past decade but protested over divorce, abortion and aspects of educational reforms. The officer corps, divided and rebellious in 1936, generally loyal to Francoist ideas in 1976, has, with some notorious exceptions, followed the lead of the King, its commander-in-chief, and accepted political change. Officers collaborate with a Catalan Socialist in reforming the armed services and may note that, with a Socialist Minister of the Interior, the 'dirty war' against the terrorist remnants of ETA is prosecuted with renewed vigour and much more co-operation from the French authorities.

If stability, consensus and even maturity are terms which may fairly be applied to Spain and its democracy in 1986, this is principally because so few in 1976 were prepared to repeat the horrors and atrocities of the civil war of 1936. The politicians of the major political groups had learned this lesson, though the monarch proved the essential element in the process of sweeping political change without major upset. No doubt the social effects of the economic development of the 1960s, such as increased prosperity, and a more balanced class structure, have played their roles in this, as has the international political climate in the West. Politics is more a matter of marketing than ideology in 1986, in contrast to the rhetoric of 1976 and the violent activism of 1936. The world recession failed to sink the nascent democracy, which may now be entering calmer waters. Fortunately the helmsmen are skilled and the ship should avoid the rocks in the straits and endure the long haul of adaptation to the European Community.

[Dr Richard Robinson is Reader in Iberian History at the University of Birmingham, where he has lectured for 20 years. His major published works have been *The Origins of Franco's Spain* and *Contemporary Portugal,* and he is currently researching for a book on politics in the Iberian Peninsula.]

On the 22nd of June the PSOE of Felipe Gonzalez was returned to power with its majority reduced by 18 seats. The voter turn-out was 71 per cent. Ex-Premier Suarez's CDS won 19 seats with 9 per cent of the vote. Further advances were made by the CiU in Catalonia and the Nationalist forces in the Basque country. In Melilla a right-wing candidate was returned. In the Andalusian regional elections the PSOE retained power though it lost 3 seats, while the Communist 'United Left' gained 10 seats. *R.R.*

THE LIBYAN FLAP: A WATERSHED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION

by Godwin Okebaram Uwah

THE vigorous and forceful reaction of the US against what it considers a crime against humanity — the wanton slaughtering of defenceless people — has opened a new vista in the Black struggle for justice in South Africa. The US reaction demonstrates that a superpower does in fact care about moral principles. The apparent reluctance of America's European allies to go along with the US strike against the Libyans is said to stem from a lack of conclusive evidence to prove Gaddafi's complicity in the Rome and Vienna carnage. But the Europeans know as much as Americans do that looking for 'conclusive' evidence to legally implicate Gaddafi, or arguing about the workability or non-workability of sanctions, is a mere exercise in sophistry to mask partial economic dependence on that North African country. Put differently, the US European allies were in a way doing what the US administration appeared to be doing in South Africa, namely, trying to compromise moral principles in favour of economic considerations.

In the present instance at least, the US is riding a moral high ground. The overwhelming bipartisan and popular support the President's action has received in his own country once more underscores the American people's deep aversion to reckless and senseless butchering of innocent lives. Conclusive evidence or not, the mere appearance that Gaddafi endorses the activities of the Abdul Nidah group is enough to provoke retribution. The campaign is still on and the US is trying to convince its allies that moral considerations and economic interest are not after all mutually exclusive. The US is telling allies that action against Libya is not only right but, in the long run, advantageous. The US ambassador to Bonn reminded his unconvinced host that the civilised world should not condone criminal activities because of material rewards and benefits.

In effect, the US is saying that economic interest is important, but that the time comes when higher moral considerations supersede economic advantages. Although George Kennan, a veteran foreign policy expert, has cautioned against accentuating morality in the conduct of foreign policy, conniving at or supporting a blatant violation of civilised norms can make nonsense of the very concept of civilization and make it difficult for the civilized world to enjoy the fruits of civilization.

A great country born out of a bloody revolution and tempered by a fratricidal civil war has known many deaths. There are always deaths, some accidental, others through natural causes; but the sense of outrage against the Rome and Vienna attacks and others springs not so much from either the actual number of people killed or the national origin of the victims as from the whole concept of harrassing, hounding, and senselessly butchering innocent and defenceless people.

The kind of crime the world condemned in Rome and Vienna in some way repeats itself almost daily in P.W. Botha's South Africa. No

terrorist's argument can ever justify his bloody tactics. But in the case of South Africa the argument for permitting the slaughter defies a decent man's logic. Against the backdrop of the events of the last few months the world reasonably expects the US to reassess its stand in the South African situation. Forceful action is needed against Botha and his apartheid system.

Cynics might say that in the case of Libya, instead of isolating Gaddafi, the US appeared to isolate itself. Although the Libyan situation tended to underscore the paradox of superpowerdom in military terms, the economic, diplomatic and psychological clout of the United States of America cannot and should not be underestimated. We know that when Washington speaks the world listens. Britain has not only listened but has acted. Other allied countries have in some measure started to listen and Gorbachev who desperately needs a *quid pro quo* from Washington cannot afford, as the African saying goes, to let Gaddafi 'put sand in his *garri*.' But supposing the allies fail to listen, supposing Gorbachev does not discipline Gaddafi, does that fact diminish the justness and the moral strength of the cause the US is championing? Certainly the US is fighting a moral battle and is on the right side of history. But, as the battle rages on, the South African situation re-emerges as a new moral challenge.

The US cannot morally and even politically be on the right side of history in the North of Africa and at the same time on the wrong side of history in Southern Africa. It is however disturbing that even after the new moral stance of the US in the face of immoral acts, some elements in the American press and even among the population do not still know exactly which is the right side of history in the South African struggle. Some observers even analogise the events in South Africa with the Iranian hostage situation. This school of thought is suggesting that the US should not repeat what it calls the 'Iranian mistake.'

It is pertinent to comment on the Iranian analogy. The fractured argument is based on the assumption that if the US had stayed with the Shah, the world would have been spared Ayatollah Khomeni. It is true that the Ayatollah equation is a sad chapter in that area of the world, but it is equally true that it could have been foolhardy to fight against a mass uprising to oust a discredited monarch. As later became clear, what was building up at the time was an irreversible internal revolution. In retrospect, it is unlikely that it could have been halted; nor would it have been prudent or desirable for a responsible and self-respecting democracy to attempt to stop it. Iran is still in a history-in-the-making situation, whose final chapter is yet to be written, but it is left for historians to determine what policy option could have served the US interest better. Botha is not the Shah and South Africa is not Iran. But if it might have been tactically wrong to support the Shah against his people's wishes, it is not only tactically wrong but also morally repugnant to try to prop up P W. Botha's oppressive apartheid system. Supporters of Reagan's South African policy insist that the US should continue to support an ally (like

the Shah!) who is a bulwark against communist incursion in the Cape of Good Hope. If the US fails to support Botha, they argue, it would be repeating the 'Iranian mistake'.

The case for Botha runs this way: What is happening in South Africa is evil, it is immoral, it is unjust, but so long as Botha appears to stem the wave of communist agression, he should continue to count on the US support. This reasoning may have been politically partially tenable in the pro-Vienna and Rome world, but given the stand the President has taken against the murder of civilians in Rome and Vienna by terrorists and their supporters, this argument can no longer stand up.

The murderous activities of Pretoria have been widely documented. The terrorism and murder of Botha's security police have been regularly shown on the television screen. The butchery of unarmed, helpless and starving men, women, and children, and the firing of live bullets into crowds of mourners have become familiar television scenes. Botha's terrorists have not been implicated in any terrorist activities outside Southern Africa because they have enough people to terrorise and kill in and around South Africa. Since the state of emergency was imposed some months ago, South African security forces have killed unarmed Blacks to an average of 3.3 victims daily and, according to published reports over the past twenty months, Botha's forces have murdered over 1,028 Blacks. His politics of murder have been widely condemned by the world community, and in America, by conservatives and liberals alike. What has not been sufficiently documented is the fact that Pretoria trains and dispatches gunmen and terrorists to infiltrate the neighbouring states to commit murder, arson, and other morally revolting activities. Evidence has been made public of white farmers in Zimbabwe murdered by South African trained and armed terrorists. The murder is a part of the campaign to destabilise neighbouring countries for propaganda scores. Obviously, terrorising white farmers in Zimbabwe is aimed at frightening away from the country a potent economic force that helps to sustain the state. In Angola, Pretorian trained terrorists infiltrate the country through UNITA to disrupt economic activities. There have been reports of harrassment of Western business interests operating in Angola. If South Africa is trying to clear the region of communist influence so that capitalism and free enterprise can flourish, what logic explains harrassing and terrorising western businessmen, happily and freely working in neighbouring countries? Of course, no logic ever explains terrorist activities either in the North of Africa or in the South.

Libya, it is understood, transports terrorism, destabilises neighbouring countries and involves poor countries in huge financial losses and unnecessary defence build-up. P. W. Botha pursues the Gaddafian tactics in Southern Africa. According to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), neighbouring Southern African countries in the last few years have spent $3 billion for extra defence, $2 billion in lost economic growth, and $1.6 billion in direct war damage. The direct war damage involves major attacks on non-military targets

in Zimbabwe, the oil refinery in Luana, and the oil storage depot in Beira. It also includes destruction of hundreds of houses, schools, farms and trucks. South Africa outscores Gaddafi in one non-military tactic: undermining investment. Pretoria mounts massive propaganda programmes to ferment unrest in adjoining countries — all aimed to distort the true position of events in the regions. Surveys show that multinational companies tend to believe the distorted perception of events Pretoria dishes out through the mouths of trained and well paid professionals. Companies that choose to ignore South Africa's propaganda are scared by its destabilising activities. The net result is low economic growth, near-absence of investment and a continuous state of seige.

On moral grounds at least and for the sake of consistency of policy, yes, the US should punish South Africa. The US believes that the overthrow of Ortega's regime should end what it considers to be the unacceptable activities of Nicaragua. The US is currently punishing Libya in hopes that Gaddafi's regime would eventually collapse. Whether or not the US has the capability of achieving these two objectives is not as important as a superpower taking strong and committed positions against what it considers to be unacceptable or morally wrong. It must be stressed that what is considered wrong in Central America, and is wrong in North Africa, has to be equally wrong in South Africa. From newspaper reports, the US South African envoy and the author of the policy, *Constructive Engagement,* Mr Chester Crocker, has ruled out further US action against Pretoria. In his view, more punishment will spell economic crisis which the US does not want. It is hoped he is speaking for himself, otherwise an appearance of embracing and endorsing a man at the head of terrorist forces would be a difficult policy to sell to the decent and fair-minded American public.

The main difference between Tripoli and Pretoria is in salesmanship. Compared to Botha, Gaddafi is a poor, clumsy and tactless salesman. He commits his alleged crimes but proves inept in explaining his position to western reporters or even to control what his press agency conveys out to the world. Instead, he stumbles from praising murderers to condemning them. In the case of Pretoria, Botha will send his murderous security men to kill civilians while his Public Relations firm in the US tries to euphemise his actions by calling them 'clashes with police' or 'this unfortunate violence'. Neither Botha nor his PR firms openly support or applaud murder, yet license to kill continues to be issued for the asking and apartheid as a system thrives. P. W. Botha's Public Relations machinery has adopted a fairly consistent theme wrapped in a language palatable to any western audience: Blacks are threatening to destroy a civilised way of life; they are inviting chaos; giving them political power will spell doom for the vital mineral resources which South Africa has in store for the west because these blacks are communist agents; black takeover in South Africa means the communist takeover of a strategic spot in the Southern hemisphere. This message although false is popular but the

Libyan-type slaughter that sustains it is not. The US-based Pretoria's Public Relations firms go further to assert that problems in independent African countries are an indication that blacks are still way behind in managing their own affairs. Of course, the argument that recalling the over 300 US companies in South Africa with investments totalling $3 billion will hurt blacks as much as anyone else is all too familiar.

Those who support the immoral regime of P. W. Botha pretend that Africans and Moscow are bed fellows. They know, of course, that they are wrong but it serves their propaganda purposes to spread that impression. Spiritually minded Africans abhor communist ideology rooted in irreligion as much they abhor dictatorship and totalitarianism. There are pockets of marxist regimes here and there in Africa, but western observers know that rather than ideology *per se,* a Marxist government in Africa is a reaction against irresponsible leaderships that syphon the lean resources of the people to foreign banks for personal use instead of distributing the scarce resources to many hungry mouths. These governments are as transitional as the state of the continent itself. Africa has had its bad chapters; it gave the world Idi Amin. The British government helped to bring Idi Amin to power but it was an African head of state who dethroned him and sent him packing. Mussolini, Franco and Hitler were all Europeans but neither their policies nor their personalities defined or typified the people they ruled. At one time or another, dictators emerge in the world scene and Africa is a part of that world. It is significant that dictatorship does not always endure in Africa, the one exception being the case of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, the world's most affluent living head of state who is in power at the behest of Western governments.

Africa is passing through a difficult and uncertain time in its checkered existence. The exigencies and pressures of a computer-cum-technological world exerts its tolls on the African continent. Adjusting to a fast-moving world, a world that cannot wait for Africa to catch up, is not an easy experience. If there is internal strife and political instability in some countries, it is not a valid argument to deny a people their inalienable right to be free. The Western industrialised communities have passed through hard times in the past and some are still unsure of their destination. It is therefore utterly unfair to buy Botha's argument that a just and acceptable settlement in South Africa would destroy South Africa. It is the absence of democracy in South Africa which has the potential of spelling real danger — politically, military, and diplomatically — and may force the west into a new agonising redefinition of its traditional values of democracy, decency, moral choice and fair play, a redefinition that will be fraught with antagonistically painful ambiguities.

The danger of P. W. Botha's marketing strategy comes when influential public figures buy his commodity. Patrick J. Buchanan who is now a top policy adviser to the President and a one-time syndicated columnist, maintains that since (according to his figures) 150,000,000 Africans are 'dying' of malnutrition, hunger and starvation, no mistakes should ever

be made again to give a colonised African people independence. In his view, Botha's apartheid system (which he does not think is immoral) should continue to guarantee food to Africans. It is possible that Pat Buchanan is sincere in his conviction and it is possible that he 'loves' Africa so well, but he needs to be told that African can do without his love. He claims that independent African countries embrace socialism which in turn destroys their economies. He is unaware that there are many independent African countries that operate a capitalist economy of free enterprise and still have economic problems. It is intriguing that an adviser to a modern US president believes that the answer to the African problem lies in recolonisation, servitude and bondage.

So much has been said and written about the African man's inclination to go communist yet figures are lacking to show precisely how many African countries really have gone communist, nor is there any conclusive proof of a single African country, marxist or not, where Moscow is *really* calling the tune. In Ethiopia, where Moscow has established some foothold, the country is still pretty well independent. Angola is still independent enough to pursue its national goals and interests which include retaining the services and expertise of Western investors. It is true that the one-party system is one of the sad commentaries on our ambiguous experience, but as Dr Julius Nyerere has said, when African states have achieved what the US has achieved — two major parties and both of them conservative enough to preserve the basic capitalist system — then they can try their hands at a multi-party system! There are reports that ethnic conflicts persist in independent Zimbabwe, but so are reports of a reasonably healthy economy and attempts at reconciliation in spite of the blackness of the leadership.

It is interesting that Mugabe's successes have been acknowledged by no less a personality than Chester A. Crocker, President Reagan's man in South Africa. Mr Crocker recently admitted that Zimbabwe is the showcase of economic growth and political moderation in Southern Africa. According to published reports, more than four fifths of the 220,000 whites in 1980 who left voluntarily have now returned. The apparent irony is that an avowed marxist, who by the way is Catholic, has seen the sense in creating and maintaining a congenial ambiance for the full accommodation of a productive sector whose experience, wealth, and expertise can sustain the country. Morethan four years after the Lancaster House settlement, Zimbabwe is still not a communist state.

Granted that the ANC gets military support from Moscow, is that really significant in terms of the struggle to be free in one's own land? Before Zimbabwe was liberated, arms were coming from Moscow, Eastern Europe, and China, yet after independence Mugabe established good ties with the West. Even the Reagan administration provides Zimbabwe with between $40 billion and $75 billion annually in aid. Obviously, South Africa has a communist party which happens to work against apartheid but so also are other parties both inside and outside South Africa working to end apartheid. It pleases Botha to call

Mozambique a socialist or communist state but, as Julius Nyerere once enquired, what has Mozambique nationalised? The business enterprises that the Portuguese abandoned were nationalised, but those businesses which were not abandoned were never nationalised.

The time has come to find ways to oppose the evil regime of apartheid. If Africa is regarded as a geopolitical entity, the war crime should be the same in the North and South of Africa: *A bas le terrorisme!* Gaddafi in the North and P. W. Botha in the South represent one and the same thing. Checking terrorism in the North and supporting its perpetrators in the South is difficult to comprehend, more so when the US is urging European allies to consider values other than economic interest. But if it is true that Moscow likes to fish in troubled waters we may be playing into Russian hands by inadvertently encouraging a radicalisation of the black opposition wing which, in frustration and desperation, may be forced to ride the tiger at least in the short run. A clearer definition of US interest in the region calls for a new appraisal of the South African situation in light of the Libyan flap. The Nobel Peace winner, Bishop Tutu, has been warning of late that time is slipping from our hands. It may not be necessary to tell the United States what to do, but it is in order to remind it of what it ought not to do. When and if Botha's intransigence leads to the eruption of further and widespread violence, there is no telling how long it will last and what variable would be operating to determine its course and outcome. This ominous scenerio is a reason enough for the US to be on the right side of history.

Not all whites in South Africa support apartheid and in fact many of them are fighting alongside blacks to overthrow Botha's evil regime. It would be tragic and unfair to drag them needlessly into Botha's terrorist quagmire.

Pat Buchannan once lamented the 'mistake' the west made in granting political independence to their former African possessions, stating unequivocally that the west should not repeat that 'mistake'. He went further to question how and why a Bishop's (meaning Bishop Tutu) 'Christian conscience' can advocate disinvestment that will put a man out of work for a high moral principle. In the present Libyan equation, the respected former syndicated columnist must be uncomfortably isolated in the wake of the US action against Libya — action based on 'high moral principle'. This sort of isolation awaits those who seek to contradict history by supporting an immoral, oppressive, and apartheid regime. P. W. Botha has caused enough embarrassment to his Western sympathisers and supporters. The Gaddafi flap has widened the moral dimension of the African cause and may yet be a means of averting a needless bloodbath in Southern Africa.

[Dr Godwin Okebaram Uwah is Assistant Professor of French at the College of Charleston, USA.]

PARENTAL GOVERNMENT

by William Petty

NO-ONE in the education service in his or her right (or left) mind attacks parental influence in the running of schools. There is a consequential difficulty in saying anything critical about measures which purport to increase it, such as the proposals of Sir Keith Joseph, formerly Secretary of State for Education, to increase the number of parents on the Governing Bodies of schools.

The issue is, nevertheless, one in which confusion, misunderstanding and naivety can easily appear.

There can be, for example, an assumption that parental choice of a school is the same as parental involvement in the running of a school. But choice and involvement are very different. A parent can choose to send a child to an independent school, if it will accept him, and a parent has the right to withdraw the child from that school, if dissatisfied (although this can be more easily said than done, as vital examinations approach). But how high a proportion of parental governors do independent schools tend to have? And, if you ask Heads of independent schools, in private, for their views on this matter, their response is not usually Josephian. The fact is that very substantial powers of choice can be given without any parents at all being on Governing Bodies.

To have served as Chief Education Officer of an Education Authority which strongly favoured both parental choice and parental involvement did provide experience in scrutinising schemes for parental involvement and in seeing potential dangers in them.

One of the dangers of his new scheme had already been hinted at by Sir Keith. It is that the number of parents willing — or able — to devote the time to serving as a governor is limited. And, as this difficulty increases with the demand for more parent governors, a situation could arise under which quite unrepresentative parent governors appeared on Governing Bodies. Even now Mr. X and Mrs. Y are not always at all happy about Mr. A and Mrs. B putting forward views on their behalf.

Other potential difficulties have, however, received less publicity. In particular, hopes and ambitions can be stimulated which are bound to be disappointed. Governors, now, press for what to them are totally reasonable things such as more books, another teacher, or a coat of paint on the woodwork. What is dangerous is to encourage the view that to put more parents on Governing Bodies is to increase the chances of getting them. As anyone who has battled in these fields knows only too well, life is not like that. Local Education Authorities are now in a financial position which makes it much more difficult for them to respond to such pressures, whether parents are governors or not. Parents have in fact much more power as electors of politicians than as electors of other parents on to Governing Bodies.

Nor will accompanying the creation of more parent governors with the

giving to Governing Bodies of more power to spend money within the total sum allocated to them by the Local Education Authority solve this problem, although it may well have other advantages. Many Heads have pointed out to me the danger, in this context, of greater freedom in the spending of allocated money. In their view it would enable the Local Education Authority to say to a Governing Body what Central Government says to Local Authorities: 'Short of money for X? The remedy is in your hands. Spend less on Y and Z — and then you can spend more on X' — when the real problem is a total shortage.

There could be another basic difficulty. There is one development which the vast majority of parents loathe above all. That is the closure of the school which their children attend. Yet closure of school accommodation is fundamental to current assumptions about the financing of the education service — although the role of Central Government in this is masked by the fact that it is the Local Education Authority which has to propose the closure. Of course there is often a clear educational case in favour of closure, apart from reasons of economy: the children's educational opportunities will in many instances be expanded in a school with a greater choice of subjects and a larger number of teachers. But this is not what parental wishes are about. The parents can — and usually do — say bluntly what they feel about the educational advantages compared with what they see as the fundamental disadvantage, the closure of 'their school'.

Linked with these difficulties is the danger of increased conflict. The local politicians — those whose power another politician, Sir Keith was so eager to reduce — are people who have been democratically elected, not just by current parents but by the whole community. Parent governors may be viewed as responsible to other parents. But they are not responsible in the same sense as an elected Member of Parliament or a local authority. They do not, for example, have to busy themselves with matters such as fixing a rate. They are not trammelled by the current bizarre vagaries of local government financing. They do not have to decide on the respective demands of various major services, all of which claim to be — and probably are — short of resources. Parent governors tend to focus, understandably, on the problems of the individual school. And, if the demands of the individual Governing Bodies are added together, they will certainly not be able to be accommodated within a budget produced under the present system of local government financing. Increased tension is inevitable in these circumstances — and it is not creative tension.

A further area of conflict could involve Central Government more directly. Education is not simply about meeting the wishes of individual parents: compulsory education to the age of 16 seriously interferes with the wishes of some parents. It is also about meeting general national requirements. That is why the Central Government have started major new programmes such as the Technical and Vocational Education Initiative and the Certificate of Pre-vocational Education. All is well as long as the views of parent governors on such Government initiatives coincide

with those of the Government. But what if they fail to coincide? What if the opinion expressed by parent representatives on Governing Bodies is: 'We don't want time spent on this kind of thing. What we want from the school is concentration on the GCSE — or at least on those parts of it which can be made to resemble good old "O" levels.'? Centralist policies and power to parent governors can sit uneasily together in this area of education.

The third field of potential conflict involves the Head and teaching staff of the school. One of the two great educational myths is that Governing Bodies have not had powers in the past (the other is that bad teachers cannot be dismissed). In fact their powers have always been substantial, and many Local Education Authorities have taken great trouble to point this out. Most Governing Bodies, however, while being aware of their powers, have tended not to interfere continually and positively in the running of the school but to leave matters with the Head, who would be expected to keep them informed, and the staff. If, on the other hand, there were signs that all was not well with the school, they could then become very active indeed.

Heads and teachers worth their salt, whether in the maintained or in the independent sectors, value the views of individual parents about their children. They also value the views of parents as a whole about major innovations in a school. What they tend not to welcome quite so much, however, are the parents who try to do their jobs — and particularly when such parents are on Governing Bodies. The accusation is sometimes made that such parents are not really representing the views of the parents as a whole but are pursuing a line closely connected with the position of their own children in the school. There are usually two sides to a question of this kind when it arises. In this context one can only say that such an issue is more likely to arise under the current proposals and that, although a Local Education Authority may well be able to adjudicate, tensions can continue and ill-will can fester.

To list these dangers and difficulties does not, of course, imply that the position of parents in the education system should not be strongly supported. But it might help in showing that few real problems will be solved by the appointment of more parent governors and that some problems could be made worse. Continued concentration on parental choice, on the right of individual parents to be able to discuss the education of their own children and on the need for the parental body as a whole to be regularly informed and consulted about policy changes proposed for the school are likely to be far more fruitful. In particular, an increased number of parent governors should never be seen as a substitute for the further improvement of the parental position in these areas.

[Until 1984 Dr. Petty, CBE, D.Litt., was Chief Education Officer of Kent. He is now Consultant at Elizabeth House.]

THE PANAMA CANAL AND PANAMA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

by Oyden Ortega Duran

THE many unsolved problems facing the world, the exacerbation of the crisis of international relations and an explosive economic situation in the developing countries oblige us to consider national problems in the context of the prevailing international circumstances. However, it is our firm conviction that in the present situation Latin America can and must find common solutions to all the most important political and economic problems confronting it; in other words, it should take its destiny into its own hands.

Panama, a country with outlets to two oceans, entered the international community at an early date. During three centuries of Spanish domination over a large portion of the American continent the Isthmus of Panama, thanks to its geographical position, was a transit route between the metropolis and its overseas possessions. In his prophetic *Letter from Jamaica,* in 1815, Simón Bolivár said in reference to the mission of the Isthmus of Panama:

> The countries of the Isthmus of Panama, as far as Guatemala, will perhaps form an association. Their extraordinary position between two large seas could in the course of time become the centre of the world. Its canals will shorten the distances in the world and strengthen commercial links between Europe, America and Asia.

The Panama Canal, the work of a French engineer of genius, Fernando de Lesseps, and subsequently of the US Government which bought the stocks of the French Company of the Panama Canal and completed this undertaking of universal importance, was inaugurated in 1914.

In 1903, as soon as the Republic of Panama gained independence from Colombia with which it had voluntarily united after acquiring independence from Spain in 1821, a treaty was concluded with the USA concerning the Panama Canal. Under this treaty, Panama granted in perpetuity to the United States of America the use, possession and control of a strip of land and contiguous waters for the construction, maintenance, use and protection of the Canal. The 1903 treaty transferred to the US Government jurisdiction over part of Panamanian territory. At the same time Panama granted in perpetuity to the USA the monopoly over the construction of any other system of communications across its territory. On the basis of this treaty, which is often referred to as the Isthmial Convention on the Panama Canal, it was agreed that the US government pay a sum of ten million dollars to Panama on behalf of the rights and privileges granted to it and annunities to the amount of 250,000 dollars payable as from the end of the ninth year after ratification of the Convention.

Beginning from the signing of the Treaty in 1903 the people and most governments of Panama have conducted an historical struggle for regaining their sovereign rights over the Canal. The question of the Panama

Canal has become the most important national problem; various political and social groups have endeavoured, under the banner of nationalism and national sovereignty, to regain control of the Canal, to nationalise it and to guarantee its neutrality in peace and wartime.

On March 2, 1936, Panama and the USA signed a General Treaty which contained more equitable clauses than the one signed in 1903. The First Clause of the 1903 Treaty, by which the USA guaranteed the independence of the Republic of Panama, was erased. Similar amendments to the 1903 Treaty were made again in 1955 when Panama and the USA partly revised the text of the treaty primarily with a view to equalising the rights and opportunities of US and Panamanian citizens employed in the Canal zone. There were frequent public protests at that time because of discrimination against Panamanian workers in the Canal zone, who were virtually treated as second-class citizens.

At that time the US Government maintained an intransigent attitude to Panama's legitimate claims in the Canal zone and also to its demands for an end to the discriminatory treatment of Panamanians employed in the Canal Zone. Whereas Panama ratified the 1955 Treaty without delay, in spite of the fact that it had not eliminated the main causes of the dispute between Panama and Washington, the US Senate only ratified it three years later. Moreover, the United States refused to let the Panamanian flag be hoisted in the area of the Canal. This led to the national demonstrations of 1959, the so-called 'Sovereignty Operation' or 'Flag-Hoisting Action'.

In 1959, Panamanian nationalists penetrated in force the area under US jurisdiction and hoisted a large number of flags throughout the region. In 1964, while a group of students was preparing to hoist the Panamanian flag in front of a US high school in Balboa, US policemen and a group of US citizens seized the flag and tore it up. This act infuriated the people who stormed the Canal zone and provoked an attack by the US soldiers encamped in the area. The toll was 22 dead and 500 wounded. As a sign of protest, the Government of Roberto Chiari broke off diplomatic relations with Washington.

Beginning from January 9, 1964, the Panamanian people demanded the complete abrogation of the 1903 treaty and its replacement with a new convention. This idea was endorsed by General Omar Torrijos Herrera, who in 1969 promised the nation that he would begin negotiations for the conclusion of a new treaty. The UN Security Council met in Panama in May 1973. This was the second meeting the Council had held outside its headquarters in New York. It was preceded by a major diplomatic and political offensive launched by General Torrijos in an attempt to settle a very nearly explosive situation. On that historic occasion, General Torrijos said *inter alia:* 'Panama never was, is not, and never will be an associate state, a colony or a protectorate, and neither have we any intention of adding another star to the flag of the United States of America.'

The Security Council then voted a resolution in favour of Panama, but

it was vetoed by the United States. However, a year later, Panama's Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a declaration which laid the foundations for new negotiations between Panama and the United States for the abrogation of the 1903 Treaty and the conclusion of a new convention on the Panama Canal.

In September 1977, the Prime Minister of Panama, General Omar Torrijos Herrera, and the President of the USA, Jimmy Carter, signed a new Treaty on the Panama Canal known as the Torrijos-Carter Treaty. This treaty, consisting of several agreements, has shown that a colonial dispute between a small developing country and a big power can be settled by persistent negotiations provided both sides demonstrate a political will to make reasonable mutual concessions and to respect each other's sovereignty.

As distinct from the 1903 Treaty, these new treatises took into account the interests of Panama as a soveign state and its territorial integrity by stipulating that the Republic of Panama should temporarily grant to the United States of America the necessary rights for the use, maintenance, improvement, protection and defence of the Canal. This concession took effect on October 10, 1979, and will remain effective until the year 2000. Under the Torrijos-Carter Treaty, Panama and the USA set up a joint administration and joint defences of the Canal. Until 1989 the Administrator of the Canal will be a North American, but on January 10, 1990, his position will be taken over by his Panamanian assistant.

The Canal and its surroundings, together with the facilities for its operation, are now under the Joint Administration's bi-national regime. In accordance with the new Treaty, the North American police and tribunals have disappeared, and Panama has assumed full jurisdiction over its entire territory. Panama's share of the proceeds from the operation of the Canal has greatly increased compared with the 76 years prior to the conclusion of the new Treaty. Thus, while its revenue for the whole of that period was 69.9 million dollars, during the five years the Torrijos-Carter Treaty has been in force Panama has been credited with a sum of more than 403 million dollars, although this amount is incomparably smaller than that which the United States has collected over the same period.

Let us begin with the premise that the Panama Canal belongs to the Panamanian people and should therefore serve the Republic of Panama. The Torrijos-Carter Treaty, which regulates the administration and defence of the Canal until the year 2000 should guarantee Panamanians a growing share of the labour force of the Canal. At present, about 80 percent of the total of nearly 8,000 workers are Panamanians. Gradually, by the year 2000, Panama will have taken over the administration, maintenance and defence of the Canal in accordance with the spirit and provisions of the Treaty.

The Panamanian Government and the Panamanians employed in the bi-national bodies created under the Treaty must ensure the implementa-

tion of an adequate programme for improving the Canal so that it will be in good repair when the moment comes for it to be handed over to Panama. For this purpose it is necessary to conduct an appropriate investment policy, allowing for repairs and the replacement of installations.

However, the 96-70 Act ignores and violates some important provisions of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty, especially those concerning the regulations pertaining to the staff of the Commission of the Panama Canal, which prevent Panamanian citizens from having priority in filling vacancies in the Commission. The same act also prevents Panama from deriving an adequate share of the proceeds from the operation of the Canal, in spite of the clearly-defined relevant provisions of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty. On the basis of the clauses of this US law, a large portion of the costs of operation, which should in fact be covered by the US Government, are transferred to the Commission of the Panama Canal at the expense of Panama's revenue. The US Congress will need to amend this law as soon as possible so that the spirit of co-operation between the two countries can be preserved.

For security reasons and in the interests of Panama the Canal should be neutral both in peace and in war and in fact a protocol was signed together with the Torrijos-Carter Treaty under which both sides recognised the neutrality of the Panama Canal. This protocol is open to the signatures of all countries, and it comes into force for each separate country as soon as the relevant ratification documents are deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States.

In view of the present international situation all countries should join the Protocol on Neutrality. Panama is a member of the movement of non-aligned countries; it is a member of the developing countries' Group 77 and has a fine tradition as a country committed to peace, negotiation and political understanding. The non-aligned countries should support the neutrality of the Panama Canal in accordance with the stand adopted at the First Conference of Heads of Government of the non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade in 1961.

The 1977 Treaty on the Panama Canal extended the presence of US military bases on Panamanian territory until the year 2000 for the exclusive purpose of contributing to the protection of the Canal. Any activity by these troops beyond their mission of protecting the Canal is in direct contradiction of the Treaty. The Panamanian people have protested about the United States' military activities on Panamanian territory directed against other states with which Panama maintains economic relations. Such actions not only violate the Treaty and the national sovereignty of Panama; they also harm Panamanian national interest and the interests of other nations using the Canal.

[Ex-Minister of External Affairs of the Republic of Panama, Oydén Ortega Durán is one of eight members of the Panamanian section of the Commission of the Panama Canal.]

FROM RULE-BOOK TO REALPOLITIK: FRANCE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

by James G. Shields

THE legislative elections of March 1986 have cast France into a period of political uncertainty that is testing as never before the constitutional mettle of the Fifth Republic. For the first time since General de Gaulle fashioned the present Constitution to his specifications in 1958, France has a President and a Prime Minister drawn from opposing sides of the political divide. Though there is nothing that precludes such a diarchy in the terms of the Constitution itself, this radical departure from precedent has left the French body politic confronted with a number of perplexing questions. Chief amongst them is that of determining the exact parameters of the power to which a Socialist Head of State and a conservative Prime Minister can respectively — and rightfully — lay claim. For de Gaulle and his immediate successors, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, the issue never arose: all three Presidents enjoyed the untrammelled support of parliamentary majorities and Prime Ministers who reflected, in broad political terms at least, the presidential will. François Mitterrand himself, from 1981 to 1986, has been no stranger to the advantages that a French President may derive from a sympathetic majority in the legislature. With two years of his mandate left to run, and no intention of relinquishing his hold on France's highest public office, the Socialist President Mitterrand must now forge an uneasy *modus vivendi* with the newly nominated Premier, Jacques Chirac, leader of the neo-Gaullist RPR *(Rassemblement pour la République)* and chief beneficiary of the slender conservative majority which emerged from the ballot-box on 16 March 1986. With neither prepared to settle for second, France is bracing itself for a clash of political wills that could radically alter the balance of power between the twin pillars of its executive apparatus.

It is just such a prospect that has exercised the French political imagination since the Socialists' fall from grace in 1983. As it became clear that nothing short of a Mitterandist miracle could salvage the Government's majority intact for a second term, the notion of power-sharing, or *cohabitation,* between Left and Right came to hold an increasingly privileged place on the political agenda. By the time the legislative campaign was underway, the only question was whether the victory for the Right would be sufficiently decisive to wrench the political initiative from a disavowed President and provoke a constitutional crisis that would oblige Mitterrand to *se soumettre ou se démettre* — to submit unreservedly to the implementation of the Right's platform, or to stand down himself.

That such a crisis has not — in the short term at least — occurred is testament to the skill of France's shrewdest political tactician. In the style that has earned him an unrivalled reputation for Florentine intrigue, Mitterrand changed the rules of the game at just the right time and in

just the right measure to prevent a crushing defeat for the ruling Socialist majority. By pushing through a bill to implement proportional representation on a departmental basis, he effectively put paid to the Right's expectations of a landslide victory, while preserving inviolate his own and his Socialist Party's political credentials. Under the two-round majority voting system that has been a hallmark of French elections for almost thirty years, the RPR and centre-right UDF *(Union pour la Démocratie Française)* parties could have hoped to secure an emphatic victory, comparable in scale to that which swept the Left to power in 1981. Instead, their alliance scraped home by the narrowest of margins. With some 291 seats in an Assembly of 577, the conservatives can boast only two deputies above the 289 required for an absolute majority. This slender advantage, moreover, hinges on a handful of independent rightwing deputies who have, as expected, thrown their lot in with the RPR and UDF but who do not submit to regular party discipline. The discomfiture of the mainstream Right is further compounded by the presence on its flank of an embarrassingly strong body of *Front National* representatives — 35 in all — who are in the National Assembly for the first time by dint of the electoral reform, but whom moderate conservatives refuse to countenance as a parliamentary ally. Given the relative strength of the Socialists — who remain France's largest single party, with over 200 deputies in the House — and the relative fragility of the centre-right coalition, Mitterrand may feel that time is on his side. Though conservatives of every stripe have for the moment closed ranks around their Prime Minister, the President will wait for the cracks to appear in a majority that can afford not the slightest dissidence but which may prove as bedevilled in government as it has been in opposition by the rivalries and conflicting aspirations of its Gaullists, Giscardians, Barrists, *et al.*

It is against this parliamentary setting that the drama of *cohabitation* between President and Premier is being staged. Such a balance of forces within the Assembly, by heading off the political chaos that might have issued from a resounding plebiscite in favour of the Right, has made power-sharing all the more feasible in principle; yet, by restricting the extent to which either President or Prime Minister may feel at liberty to assert himself, it further clouds the issue of their respective authority in practice. Mitterrand and Chirac have alike called for the scrupulous respect of French political institutions and for the subordination of all else to the national interest. Such lofty sentiments, however, disguise the almost boundless potential for Machiavellian manoeuvre which the experiment in *cohabitation* has opened up to its two foremost protagonists.

The fact is that, while the Constitution of the Fifth Republic leaves executive power divided between the Elysée and Matignon, it is singularly cryptic on the precise line of demarcation. Under its author, Charles de Gaulle, the Constitution was perceived — and implemented — as something of a presidential charter. By bolstering the office of a Head of State who (from 1962 onwards) was to be elected no longer by Parliament but by the French voting public at large, de Gaulle effectively took the Presi-

dent out of the National Assembly and set him up as a centre of political power not apart from, but in many senses above, the legislature. Within the terms of the Constitution, the President is the guarantor of France's institutional stability. He nominates the Prime Minister and approves proposed members of the Cabinet, which he chairs. He can dissolve the National Assembly and call new elections once a year. Should he consider France's institutions to be under threat, he has the ultimate power to declare a state of emergency and rule by decree. He is the guardian of national independence and commander-in-chief of the armed forces; he it is, and he alone, who holds the key to France's nuclear *force de frappe.*

In addition to such prerogatives, the Constitution leaves a great deal of scope for presidential influence — an influence which is enshrined in French political practice and which Presidents have hitherto been able fully to exploit by virtue of the backing in the Assembly. There, however, lies the rub. For if Articles 5 to 19 of the Constitution make it clear that the President is the 'arbiter' of the body politic and its resolutions, Article 20 states no less plainly that 'the Government determines and conducts the politics of the nation.' It is upon this point that much of the debate — and not a little of the ambiguity — centres. With regard to the role of the Prime Minister, the Constitution is again as problematic as it is categorical. 'The Prime Minister', states Article 21, 'directs the action of the Government. He is responsible for national defence. He assures the execution of the laws.'

On these and other items, the exegetes have had a field day. What is clear, however, is that the document drafted by Premier Michel Debré for his President in 1958 leaves considerably more room for negotiation and manoeuvre than has previously been explored. With the 'rule-book' yielding only partial solutions, Mitterrand and Chirac have contrived to thrash out a broad understanding of their respective functions as they themselves perceive them. The sabre-rattling that preceded the elections has given way — *cohabitation oblige* — to a studied observance of protocol. Mitterrand has recognised the existence of the new majority, without harping on its evident fragility. He bowed to the most obvious choice of Premier in Chirac, when he might have held out for a more conciliatory partner in Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Simone Veil, or even Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Chirac, for his part, accepted Mitterrand's veto on his proposed Foreign and Defence Ministers, Jean Lecanuet and François Léotard, thereby acknowledging the President's much vaunted (though constitutionally contestable) pre-eminence in defence and foreign affairs. His insistence upon attending the Tokyo economic summit in May was not so much a challenge to Mitterrand's authority in this sphere as an attempt to demonstrate that he, Chirac, would not be excluded from this or any crucial area of French political involvement. Coming as something of an embarrassment to the summit organisers, the appearance of the French duo served to dramatise on the world stage a debate which had thus far been confined to the corridors of the Hôtel Matignon and the Elysée Palace.

Such gestures, however, are but so many preliminaries to the real issues that confront France's new leadership. For *cohabitation* will stand or fall on one thing alone: the implementation of the political programme for which the Centre-Right was mandated on March 16. Here the *bonhomie*, such as it is, stops. At the first full meeting of the new Cabinet, Mitterrand made it clear that he would not serve as a rubber-stamp to Chirac's Government. The Prime Minister's plans to by-pass Parliament and introduce a series of economic measures by decree met with a statement from the President that he would lend his signature (required under the Constitution) only to a limited number of decrees on certain issues, and that he would not countenance signing a proposed document to facilitate redundancy procedures for employers. This refusal was in line with Mitterrand's insistence that, in the field of social reform, he would ratify only those ordinances which represented an advance on existing legislation. The proposals to lift redundancy restrictions will now, as a result, be put to the House in the form of a conventional draft bill.

This first *passe d'armes* was seen as an early point for Mitterrand in an economic debate which promises to be the most crucial item on the new political agenda. The joint RPR-UDF platform calls, amid other things, for an extensive programme of privatisation (involving banks, insurance companies and industrial groups nationalised by the Socialists in 1981), a cut-back in public expenditure, the lifting of price and exchange controls, a reduction in upper-bracket income taxes, and the abolition of a Socialist-levied wealth tax. Yet, for all the deep-seated differences that continue to separate Left and Right on key issues such as these, a gradual *rapprochement* of Socialist pragmatism and conservative free-market philosophy has precluded the prospect of an all-out ideological conflict. Ever since the Socialist Government abandoned an ill-starred reflationary programme for a move towards economic austerity in 1983, there has been a growing area of unspoken consensus between the political camps. The break with the Communist Party and the appointment of the young technocrat Laurent Fabius as Prime Minister in 1984 were further landmarks in a new political and economic realism that contrasted starkly with the heady days of 1981. Three years of this new-style Socialism have witnessed a remarkable reduction in inflation, an improvement in the balance of trade, higher company profits, and a new premium on productivity and private enterprise. What Chirac is offering, many argue, is not an alternative but more of the same. Though Mitterrand will contest the hardline elements of the Government's programme, there is room now for a broad accommodation on economic policy which would have been inconceivable five years ago. In the first of what may prove to be a series of *quid pro quo* moves, Chirac is constrained to respect a number of important Socialist welfare reforms, such as retirement at 60, a reduced working week of 39 hours, and a fifth week of annually paid vacation for all workers. Conservatives may argue that such measures, by pushing up wage costs, increase the burden of unemployment; but they have more political sense than to introduce any bill to revoke them now.

Such political considerations apart, there is one overriding reason why Mitterrand and Chirac are likely to stake all on a period of stable *cohabitation*. In 1988, the President's office will come up for re-election. If power-sharing can be made to work until then, it will place its two main architects in commanding positions as the foremost presidential candidates. With a much improved economic outlook, due to the late-flowering of the Socialists' austerity measures and the drop in oil prices, the auguries are good. What Chirac in particular will now be anxious to avoid is any show-down that would precipitate an early presidential election and rebound to the advantage of his main rival, ex-Premier Raymond Barre, whose standing in the opinion polls over the past year makes him a formidable challenger for France's highest political trophy. Barre has consistently refused to support the experiment in *cohabitation*, gambling instead that power-sharing is fated to collapse and that, when it does, he will emerge as the most credible candidate to pull France from the political wreckage.

Mitterrand's major advantage in all of this is his undisputed control of the electoral calendar. He can at any time dissolve the Assembly or resign himself and provoke an early presidential race. If Chirac moves too slowly in implementing the Right's reforms, he runs the risk of antagonising part of his own conservative support. If, on the other hand, he gives way to impulse and pushes Mitterrand too hard, the President may wield his resignation as a threat to keep his Prime Minister in check. With figures such as Raymond Barre and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing waiting in the wings, the margin for error in the Hôtel Matignon is slim indeed.

The ultimate verdict on *cohabitation* will be delivered, however, not by the political establishment but by the French electorate at large. The Socialist experience in Government has brought a new sense of political reality in its wake. Above all, it has exposed the failure of panacean politics, of sweeping text-book solutions, when applied to a country as complex as the France of the mid-1980s. With the Communist Party relegated to near-marginal status and the Socialists transformed into social democrats in all but name, the division between Left and Right is no longer to be presented or perceived as a Manichaean choice between two fundamentally irreconcilable models of society. Dogma is out of fashion; pragmatism is at a premium. Mitterrand and Chirac are currently neck and neck in the ratings, enjoying the favour of a public opinion which clearly endorses the new consensual image of its political class. Though the same public opinion does not seriously expect the experiment to last, it will reserve little sympathy for whoever is held responsible if and when the machinery of state breaks down.

[James G. Shields is Lecturer in French at the University of Aston in Birmingham. He is the author of a number of articles on contemporary French politics and on early nineteenth century French literature.]

COMMITMENT AS A FORM OF PRIVILEGE

by John Elsom

'The intellectual's problem is not vision, it's commitment'. Tagg: *The Party*:, by Trevor Griffiths.

'COMMITTED' is a word which has changed in its usage over the past thirty years. It has grown much closer to the French word, *engagé*, and if you describe someone as committed it almost always means that he or she is a left-winger, probably a Marxist or a Trotskyist. You can talk about a committed Tory, but the phrase has a whiff of paradox to it, as if those who drive on the wrong side of the road have no real right to the term. There are, or were, other meanings. My father used it for almost any kind of compelled or compulsive behaviour, such as being committed to an asylum, and a friend of mine who nearly went to prison, said when he was acquitted, 'Thank God, nobody can call me a committed writer!'

Commitment, in short, used to be an ideologically neutral word. It referred to the strength of an allegiance, not the nature of it. If you were a Catholic living in Dublin, you wouldn't expect to be called committed, however firm your beliefs. But if you were a Catholic living in a Protestant district of Belfast, and proclaimed that fact, thus risking your job and perhaps being beaten up on the way to the pub, then you might well be called committed, and with good reason. Commitment was something which had to be tested in fire. A self-proclaimed left-winger in Hollywood in the early 1950s had to be brave and therefore committed; but he would not have to be committed in this sense to be a left-winger in Castro's Cuba. The word in the old days would have been deemed inappropriate. It implied a courage that it was not necessary to possess.

When British writers call themselves committed, stirrings of that old usage trouble my mind and I start to feel sceptical. I know roughly what they mean, that they have strong convictions and probably act on them, and perhaps that they are trying to separate themselves on the hard left from the soggy socialism of Kinnock and Hattersley. But instinctively I want to know what they have endured to deserve such an adjective. Britain, of course, is not a socialist country and anybody who defies a government like Mrs. Thatcher's runs a risk, as the miners and the Militant councillors in Liverpool have found to their cost. Unemployment is another form of bad treatment and writers are always unemployed, unemployable or, like Trevor Griffiths, overworked; but for me it doesn't rate as persecution. Before Mrs. Thatcher, Labour governments were in power for much of the 1960s and '70s, and while I am sure that Trevor Griffiths did not like Harold Wilson any more than I did, at least under his government stage censorship was abolished, grants were greatly increased to the arts and an infrastructure was left behind of civil servants working through the local authorities who were, and are, generally sympathetic to the left.

In the narrower world of British theatre, left-wing dramatists have not had to battle to make their voices heard against a background of hostility and neglect. On the contrary, they have been favoured. If you look through the lists of those who choose plays for our subsidised theatres (where most new plays get put on), they are full to the brim with left-wingers — on the level of the Royal Shakespeare Company, with Colin Chambers, David Edgar and Barry Kyle on its New Plays Committee, and at the National Theatre with David Hare and Peter Gill, down to the little Bush Theatre, with Simon Stokes, Bash Born and Dusty Hughes in attendance.

The only subsidised, 'new plays' theatre in London which could be regarded as politically neutral is Hampstead Theatre Club; and if we go back twenty years, the situation is not substantially different, with Kenneth Tynan at the National Theatre, Ronald Bryden at the RSC and Bill Gaskill at the Royal Court. We have to go back another ten years, to the mid-1950s, before we find that the major 'new plays' management in London is one which can firmly be dubbed 'right-wing', H. M. Tennent Ltd., that ancient pillar of the theatrical establishment which incidentally had two formidable old dogs, Joan Littlewood and George Devine, doing to it what most dogs do to most pillars. The commercial managements during this period were not, of course, biased to the left. One has proved remarkably perceptive over the years; Michael Codron, who put on the first plays of Harold Pinter, Peter Shaffer, Alan Ayckbourn, Joe Orton, Michael Frayn and Simon Gray, our agnostic or right-wing contingent; and at least three of these writers would probably not have been staged without his help. But Codron produces fewer new plays on average every year than the Bush Theatre, although he collaborates in West End transfers from the subsidised sector.

Left-wing dramatists, in short, have had better opportunities to get their plays on than their right-wing counterparts, or than agnostics, middle-of-the-roaders, heretics and other deviants. And they have been helped in other ways. I have mentioned the left-inclined local bureaucracies which we have inherited from the Labour years, and by this I mean that if you live in a Labour ward (but not a Tory or Liberal one) of a Labour borough, you usually get your rubbish moved more quickly and derive greater benefit from other social services as well; and sometimes this preferential treatment continues even when the council changes political hands, for the civil servants stay. This positive discrimination has its good side, for the Labour wards are usually the poorer ones, and more in need, but it can also amount to something suspiciously similar to what the Russians call *blat,* (favours to friends). This is one reason why Mrs. Thatcher is now trying to break up the power of the local authorities, abolishing the Metropolitan Authorities and rate-capping the boroughs. It is not a cost-cutting exercise, but a political one. In her view, all civil servants should be neutral and simply serve the incoming administrations — and to curb one abuse, as she sees it, she is prepared to risk a much greater one, that of destroying the independence of the local auth-

orities altogether.

Left-inclined arts organisations have tended to benefit from this British *blat*. When the Metropolitan Authorities are abolished, the government has promised to make up the short-fall in funding to the arts caused by the loss of their patronage. It won't exactly do so, but in any case, nobody believes that the additional money, which will be given to the Arts Council now led by two Tories, William Rees-Mogg and Luke Rittner, will then be handed over to the same companies as were sponsored through, for example, a Greater London Council led by Ken Livingstone and with Peter Pitt and the Labour MP, Tony Banks, on its Arts Committee. The *blat*, if *blat* it is, will go in a different direction.

I do not want to prolong this parochial travelogue much further before arriving at my destination, which is to explain why I do not think that the left has taken advantage of its recent luck and may in the long run bitterly regret its lost opportunities; but before doing so, I would like to pour some cold water on the idea that the 'events' of 1968 'politicised' an entire generation of young writers and that the rise of left-wing drama was caused by a spontaneous welling up of political outrage. 1968, it is true, concentrated our minds wonderfully. But there have been other events in our history of equal importance which did not leave their marks on our theatre — and we were not exactly un-political in 1956 either, nor in the 1930s, when Joan Littlewood and Ewan McColl were battling around the suburbs of Manchester in an old van and the Unity Theatre was staging plays by Brecht, Toller and Mayakovsky in a tatty hall in Islington.

What had changed were the circumstances through which political feelings could be expressed. We no longer had to submit plays to the Lord Chamberlain and if the Royal Court wanted to put on plays like Frank Wedekind's *Spring's Awakening* or Edward Bond's *Saved*, it was no longer subject to harassment from the police who wanted to find out, by purchasing a pint of lager, whether or not it could be legally defined as a club theatre, where the Lord Chamberlain's writ did not run. The growth in subsidies meant that grant-aided managements could cut their seat prices to enable less well-off people to come to the theatre and that they were in any case not so dependent on box-office income and could afford to take more risks. And more companies received grants. In 1968/69, the Arts Council established its 'New Activities' Committee, which helped a lot of fringe and alternative theatre companies, not with big sums of money but with small ones that nevertheless made all the difference.

For the next six or seven years, these groups provided an excellent springboard from which new dramatists could leap into the mainstream subsidised theatres, Trevor Griffiths from the little Stables Theatre Club in Manchester to the Royal Shakespeare Company in one easy bound; Stephen Poliakoff from the Bush to the National. I can vividly remember the early days of Portable Theatre, founded by David Hare among others, which seemed to be performing to friends in my sitting room one month — and running Nottingham Playhouse, the Royal Court and parts of the National Theatre a few months later. The rate of advancement for left-

wing writers in particular was very rapid; and the two national companies seemed to scoop them up with a shrimping net, as it to prove that despite the growing gap between their resources and those of every other theatre in the country, their hearts were really on the side of the workers.

Some writers stood out against this absorption, or 'strategic penetration', into the British theatrical establishment, John Arden and John McGrath among them; but most agreed with David Hare and Trevor Griffiths that it was a kind of reverse élitism to choose to perform plays to audiences of a couple of hundred or so in small halls around the country, when you could preach to a thousand or more a night at the National Theatre — or millions on television. Nor did Hare, Brenton, Bond and others neglect the small theatres when they had time and could afford not to do so. The National Theatre's smallerscale touring version of Trevor Griffith's *The Party,* directed by Hare, was generally recognised to be more effective than its lush première production at the Old Vic. The debate about the propriety of this choice for left-wing writers between large and small continued for much of the 1970s, but bearing in mind a longer span of British theatrical history which has not been sympathetic to the left, how lucky these writers were to have the alternative.

But luck can be double edged. The suddenly favourable climate for left-wing writers led to many hothouse blossoms, exotic to look at, but shallowly rooted. I exempt the plays of Trevor Griffiths, which are usually sustained by a healthy dialectic and a dour Northern naturalism; but his good sense was in danger of being overrun by others who were politically immature and technically facile. Self-styled commitment was part of the *curriculum vitae* of these young writers; and to be called 'committed" by a magazine like *Time Out* in the old days or *City Limits* today was like a *Good Housekeeping* seal of approval.

This led writers to believe that theatrical craftsmanship simply means finding the right package in which you can sell your message, and also that it was no longer possible to conduct a political debate in anything other than socialist terms, and that even to acknowledge other points of view except sardonically or scornfully amounted to a betrayal of the cause. Monetarism, for example, which provided the kind of intellectual mainspring to Mrs. Thatcher's rise to power was barely mentioned in the theatre. 'How can you write a play about monetarism?' one playwright asked me; and the answer of course was that he had to find a way if he wanted to take part in the actual political debates which were happening in Britain at the time. It is all very well for Trevor Griffiths to state, as he once did for *Theatre Quarterly* that 'morally, capitalism was exhausted fifty to one hundred years ago, certainly fifty', but he has to convince his audiences that this is so, and (although he may hate the word) subtly, not didactically, for like the Californian light bulb, the world has really got to *want* to change.

Part of this subtlety involves not telling the audience too far in advance what you believe, for then they stop listening. When writers label themselves 'committed', they throw away many theatrical techniques of

suspense and discovery. To begin with, they are most likely to attract audiences who feel equally committed, thus neglecting the chance of convincing those who are uncommitted. But in any case, and despite what Brecht said, the urge to know what will happen next and what conclusions, morally and otherwise, will be drawn, is a powerful motive for listening attentively in the theatre. This is why the thoughtful, searching and to some extent open ended arguments that Griffiths presented in *Occupations* and *Comedians* were more theatrically effective for me than the discussions of *The Party,* conducted by socialists for socialists, wondering where they had gone wrong. It was like an autopsy.

There was yet another area of decline in the theatre itself. Despite the fact that the National Theatre and the RSC moved into plush new premises, despite the fact that grants rose to the theatre from about £¼ million in 1964 to more than £50 million today, the theatre has declined by almost any criterion we choose to name: in the number of new productions, in the size of audiences and, although this is harder to measure, its 'clout', its power to seize centrestage in our social discussions. The story of this decline has been well researched and documented in John Pick's *The Theatre Industry,* and I do not think that his overall conclusions can be challenged. Among the failures has been the inability to reach new proletarian audiences and the young. The class and age composition of the audiences has remained much the same since the days before the war, with this exception, that we have lost the music halls.

There are many reasons for this decline, the spread of television among them, and, of course, you can also say that more people are in touch with more drama productions than ever before, through radio and television. But the choice of these plays rests in very few hands, and the kind of bubbling up of new ideas and fresh theatrical approaches which we briefly saw at the end of the 1960s is inherently impossible in television today . . . and we have tragically lost it in the theatre. In one grimy Christmas not so long ago, 32 small companies lost their grants in a cost-cutting exercise, from which, as it happened, the increasingly expensive National Theatre benefitted.

This left the major subsidised companies in an exposed position, having to generate their own fringe in order to discover those talents which will keep them alive in the future. And I do not envy those established left-wing writers who can command a place on their stages. As I see it, their position is full of awkward moral dilemmas. They have lived, even thrived, on licences granted by governments such as Harold Wilson's and confirmed, or at least not revoked, by governments such as Mrs. Thatcher's. Ultimately, they depend on the goodwill of the state, protected a little by the 'arm's length' principle, which is supposed to detach governments from the Arts Council and the Arts Council from its 'clients'. But that, too, is a kind of state license, which can be revoked in the event of a real threat to the system.

Howard Brenton used to talk about 'disrupting the spectacle', a phrase borrowed from the French Situationists who described Western democ-



racies as being sustained by a facade of false choices which conceals the realities of capitalistic power and the lack of genuine choice. Their point is precisely illustrated by the presence on our major subsidised stages of plays which sound very revolutionary and shock the bourgeoisie and startle the horses, but never hit any precise political target. Brenton's *The Romans in Britain* would be a case in point. I do not know anybody who knows the history of Ireland who is much impressed by his analogy between the Roman conquest of Britain and the presence of British troops in Ulster. Arden and D'Arcy's *The Ballygombeen Bequest* was much nearer the mark. But in any case what caused the furore was the sight of Roman soldiers assaulting three naked Celts. By inflaming the nerve of British sexual puritanism, Brenton effectively nullified whatever message his play may have had. The political point which he actually made was to prove how broadminded, radical but tolerant the British theatre establishment is, a sentiment enhanced rather than weakened by the outrage of minor Tory leaders like Horace Cutler and the court case by Mary Whitehouse which was subsequently withdrawn. I do not doubt Brenton's motives, only his sophistication. Far from disrupting the spectacle, he was helping to sustain it.

This is the dilemma faced by all radical writers every where, how to avoid being used by the establishment. It is not essentially different in Moscow, Vienna or London, although London still provides a more tolerant climate. You may seem to be more free, if you are not asking for money from the state, but money usually has to come from somewhere, and it rarely comes without strings. The best protection for a dramatist is when there is a ground swell of popular support for his or her work, so that it becomes embarrassing for governments to interfere and financially shortsighted for commercial managements to ignore. This happy state of affairs has been achieved by very few leftwing writers in Britain and I sometimes even wonder whether they have chosen the right medium. The theatre is not a good place for instruction or handing on messages for one reason, that the audience knows it is not 'real life'. Every stage production is enclosed by the inverted commas, 'Let's pretend'. This makes it a good medium for myth, by which I do not mean something which is necessarily untrue but which does not have to carry factual conviction to make its mark. A myth is like sliding another programme into our mental computers. It helps us to contemplate reality from a different set of assumptions which we may, or may not, wish to retain after we have left the theatre. Its effect is to leave our minds more flexible, more ready to contemplate alternatives which may lead to genuinely radical results but is in that sense less committed.

This is why I accept Tagg's remark in *The Party* on its most literal level; not the one he meant. Commitment is a problem for intellectuals who write for the theatre, not because they haven't got any, but because they proclaim it too easily and think that that is enough.

REFLECTIONS ON A TOUR MADE IN SCOTLAND: AUGUST 1803

by Sheila Huftel

ON August 15, 1803, Coleridge and the Wordsworths left Keswick for a Tour in Scotland, at twenty minutes past eleven on a hot day. That holiday is the first intimation of their changing friendship; the reasons can be traced through Dorothy's *Recollections of a Tour Made in Scotland. A.D. 1803,* and Coleridge's Letters and Notebooks.

The holiday began badly for all three. The day before leaving Coleridge wrote to Southey: 'I never yet commenced a Journey with such inauspicious Heaviness of Heart before.' He was ill, but trying to reduce his opium dose, and had been advised that the exercise and excitement of the tour would be healthful. The tour had been postponed for a few days as Dorothy was ill; and Robert Gittings, in his excellent *Dorothy Wordsworth,* suggests that William's health was the mainspring of the holiday. For such travellers comfort should have been essential: but this was an unreachable luxury. They had never travelled in comfort, and for the Scottish tour had bought an aged but stout and spirited horse and a Jaunting car. Wordsworth was to drive. The Jaunting car was open to the sky, had room for three on each side, hanging seats, a box for the driver and space for luggage. Coleridge explained to Southey; 'It is like half a long Coach, only those in the one seat sit with their *back* to those in the other / instead of face to face. Your feet are not above a foot — scarcely so much — from the ground . . .'

Reading Dorothy's *Recollections of a Tour Made in Scotland* is to tour with them; and setting the book beside Coleridge's Letters and Notebooks contradictions and cross-lights emerge. They crossed the river Sark and entered Scotland on August 17. Dorothy found Scotland 'the country above all others . . . in which a man of imagination may carve out his own pleasures. There are so many *inhabited* solitudes, and the employments of the people are so immediately connected with the places where you find them . . .' On August 20th they were on their way to the village of Crawfordjohn. 'After some time we descended towards a broad vale, passed one farm-house, sheltered by fir trees, with a burn close to it; children playing, linen bleaching.'

Coleridge was often ill and is seldom mentioned. At Lanerk: 'Poor Coleridge was unwell, and could not go' . . . to see the Falls of the Clyde the day they arrived. Dorothy writes constantly of 'William and I'. It is often uncertain whether Coleridge was with them, except that he could hardly have left. On August 21 they went together to see the Falls. Dorothy was much affected by the first sight of it, and Coleridge described the Cora Lynn in his notebook: 'The Pool ample & almost round harmonizes very well with the broad *flight-of-stairs* fall / the water runs in a slant direction, & the *Screen* of rock close beside it on the right is beautifully

fringed with trees, which shade & *lattice* the third part of the lower fall . . .' He adds; 'The little Girl sent to *dog* & guide us, yawning with stretching limbs a droll dissonance with Dorothy's Raptures.'

On August 24 they reached Luss and entered the Highlands. One of the difficulties of the journey was the dirty and uncomfortable Scottish inns. At Luss the inn was deceptive. 'On seeing the outside of the inn, we were glad that we were to have such pleasant quarters. It is a nice-looking white house by the road-side; but there was not much promise of hospitality when we stopped at the door.' She adds that the house was clean for a Scotch inn. 'Coleridge was not well, so he did not stir out.' In a letter to Mrs. Coleridge on September 2, Coleridge wrote of the 'horrible Inhospitality & a fiend of a Landlady!' When the Wordsworths returned from their walk they ordered tea and asked the girl to light the fire. 'She replied: "I dinna ken whether she'll gie fire," meaning her mistress. We told her we did not wish her mistress to give fire, we only desired her to let *her* make it and we would pay for it.' The landlady stayed unwilling, but by insisting, the fire was lighted.

On August 25, Coleridge in his notebook described 'Ben Lomond from the Lake rises up, & goes *bounding* down, its outline divided into six great Segments, scolloped like many Leaves . . .' The vividness and energy recall his old self. But he remained unwittingly excluded. A later note reads: 'What? tho' the World praise me, I have no dear Heart that loves my Verses — I never hear them in snatches from a beloved Voice, fitted to some sweet occasion, of natural Prospect, in Winds at Night — ' Dorothy over-quoting William? She had been reciting *Ruth.*

That day Coleridge joined them and they were rowed to Inch-ta-vanach island. Dorothy wrote: 'We had not climbed far before we were stopped by a sudden burst of prospect, so singular and beautiful that it was like a flash of images from another world.' This is the Dorothy of the Alfoxden and Grasmere Journals; simple, direct, vivid and imaginative in one.

On the 26, they made their way from Tarbet to Loch Ketterine. They followed a mountain horse-track and came to a corner of what seemed to be the head of the lake, 'and there we sate down completely tired, and hopeless as to the rest of our journey.' There were no houses on the opposite shore, except for a few scattered huts, and 'on the near side a trackless heath . . . Coleridge and I were faint with hunger, and could go no further till we had refreshed ourselves, so we ate up one of our fowls, and drank of the water of Loch Ketterine.' William left to explore and walk along the moor and across the head of the lake. 'When I had swallowed my dinner I hastened after William, and Coleridge followed me.' Dorothy obviously wanted to be with William and one can sense her eagerness, William's silence and Coleridge's isolation between them. While they were debating whether to go on or return to Tarbet, they saw a Highlander in complete Highland dress which so impressed Dorothy that she forgot why they had hailed him. He directed them to a gentleman's house and they spent the night on a Highland Farm.

Dorothy made no notes but began her *Recollections* when she got home

to Grasmere six weeks later. She worked until 20 December and broke off to nurse Coleridge when he was ill at Dove Cottage on his way to London and Malta. She took up the Tour in Scotland again on 2 February 1804, and left it to copy Wordsworth's poems for Coleridge to take to Malta. Dorothy did not return to the Scottish Tour until April, 1805, and finished on May 31. She wrote it for her friends and not for publication; it was not published until 1874. It is remarkable in that she seems to have remembered every tree and details of landscape and weather. She also remembered the detail and delight of breakfast at the Highland Farm.

They left with regret, and found a ferryman working in the field above his hut who agreed to row them across the lake. They were cold and hungry and begged him to let them sit by his fire. Again and again Dorothy's eagerness and enthusiasm for all she sees lights the narrative. 'This was the first genuine Highland hut we had been in . . . The woman was distressed that she had a bad fire, but she heaped up some dry peats and heather, and blowing it with her breath, in a short time raised a blaze that scorched us into comfortable feelings.'

Coleridge took it up in his notebook. 'We came to the Ferry House, where W & D took boat — I declined it — lost my road, clambered among woods almost to the top of the Fells — but regained it in about a mile / — the road a most delightful one, all along by the Side of the Lake, now open, now inclosed, now a brown pathway thro' a green Lane / . . .' As he walked he regained his spirits and his vitality. He was at home with the vast. 'Again from the Right a high Headland falling down steep & high as far as the Tower / & in the far distance & exact Centre of the View a small Sugar Loaf Hill — all these in exquisite Harmony, every ridge branch out, every intervening Distance softened by the rainy Air / — Still as I went on, the view varied & improved in distinctness / Promontories that could not be distinguished from Islands / Island mistaken for Promontory / till I arrived at the Foot in the Heart of the Trossachs / I exclaimed Galilaee vicisti —'

Dorothy described the lake in her immaculate detail, but its beauty half defeated her. She wrote, as if in a letter to Mrs. Clarkson: 'Here I ought to rest, as we rested, and attempt to give utterance to our pleasure; but indeed I can impart but little of what we felt . . . We had a longing desire to row to the outlet and look up into the narrow passage through which the river went; but the point where we were to land was on the other side, so we bent our course right across, and just as we came in sight of two huts . . . Coleridge hailed us with a shout of triumph from the door of one of them, exulting in the glory of Scotland.' That is the first time he reached an elated happiness, as the Wordsworths' felt a pin-prick disappointment.

They returned the same way; again Coleridge chose to walk, and the Wordsworths crossed the lake in the darkening evening and the driving rain. 'I was sick with cold,' wrote Dorothy. The good woman provided a better fire than in the morning 'and indeed when I sate down in the chimney-corner of her smoky biggin' I thought I had never been more

comfortable in my life. Coleridge had been there long enough to have a pan of coffee boiling for us, and having put our clothes in the way of drying, we all sate down, thankful for a shelter.'

The widest difference in the two accounts is in their view of the ferryman's hut. To Dorothy it was magical; to Coleridge it was a hovel. Dorothy wrote of the cheerful supper: 'We caroused our cups of coffee, laughing like children at the strange atmosphere in which we were: the smoke came in gusts, and spread along the walls and above our heads in the chimney, where the hens were roosting like light clouds in the sky. We laughed and laughed again, in spite of the smarting of our eyes, yet had a quieter pleasure in observing the beauty of the beams and rafters gleaming between the clouds of smoke. They had been crusted over and varnished by many winters, till, where the firelight fell upon them, they were as glossy as black rocks on a sunny day cased in ice.'

Not a bit of it, said Coleridge, in effect in his notebook. 'We had a merry meal in the Hovel black & varnished & glistering with peat smoak, the Fowls roosting in the Chimney amid the cloud of smoke / we slept in the Barn upon the Hay / My Friend . . . & the Artist had a sort of Hay Bed with Blankets on the Ground / but I preferred the Hay Rick, & was right / the Brook ran as if running under my Hay pillow.' He wrote more fully to Mrs. Coleridge on September 2. 'It rained all the way — all the long, long day — we slept in a hay loft, that is Wordsworth, I, and a young man who came in at the Trossachs & joined us — Dorothy had a bed in the Hovel (the colours of the varnish in the moonlight were 'like melted gems', wrote Dorothy) which was varnished *so rich* with peat smoke, an apartment of highly polished (oak) would have been poor to it: it would have wanted the *metallic* Lustre of the smoke-varnished Rafters. — This was (the pleasantest) Evening, I had spent since my Tour: for (Wordsworth's) Hypochondriacal Feelings keep him silent, & (self)-centred —.'

The next day they returned to East Tarbet. 'It still was rain & rain', wrote Coleridge. They had to wait at the Ferry House at Loch Lomond. 'O such a wretched Hovel!' Coleridge's notebook records; 'The Sight of the Boat full of Highland Men & Women and Children, from the Preaching, exquisitely fine / — we soon reached E. Tarbet — all the while had Rain. / Never, never let me forget that small Herd boy, in his Tartan Plaid, dim-seen on the hilly field, & long heard ere seen, a melancholy *Voice*, calling to his Cattle! / — nor the beautiful Harmony of the Heath, the dancing Fern & the ever-moving Birches — / — That of itself enough to make Scotland visitable, its fields of Heath (those not subject to yearly Burning) giving a sort of feeling of Shot silk and ribbon *Finery.*'

On Monday August 29, Dorothy recorded the heavy rain which they had no hope would be over in less than three weeks at least. 'So poor Coleridge, being very unwell, determined to send his clothes to Edinburgh and make the best of his way thither, being afraid to face much wet weather in an open carriage.' Coleridge's letter to Mrs. Coleridge has a contradiction. 'We returned to E. Tarbet, I with rheumatism in my head / and now William proposed to me to leave them, & make my way on foot,

to Loch Ketterin, the Trossachs, whence it is only 20 miles to Stirling, where the Coach runs thro' for Edinburgh — He & Dorothy resolved to fight it out — I eagerly caught at the Proposal: for the *sitting* in an open Carriage in the Rain is Death to me, and somehow or other I had not been quite comfortable.' He accompanied them to Arrochar — '& there I parted with them ... The worst thing was the money — they took 29 Guineas, and I six — all our remaining cash!' Coleridge apparently was going home.

The Wordsworths left Arrochar 'at about four o'clock in the afternoon. Coleridge accompanied us a little way; we portioned out the contents of our purse before our parting; and, after we had lost sight of him, drove heavily along.' Coleridge returned to E. Tarbet and slept there that night. He found himself 'so happy alone — such a blessing is there in perfect Liberty'; that he walked 263 miles in 8 days.

The Tour in Scotland is little more than a hint of the changing friendship, like seeing something by a flickering candle — until it is confirmed by Coleridge's letter to Poole. There had been no quarrel; but there had been a weariness with each other that blew over once they returned home, and the friendship established itself on the old footing; except that Coleridge became critical of Wordsworth. He wrote to Poole on October 14th, and begged him to destroy the letter. 'I now see very little of Wordsworth: my own Health makes it inconvenient & unfit for me to go thither one third as often, as I used to do — and Wordsworth's Indolence, &c keeps him at home. Indeed were I an irritable man, and an unthinking one, I should probably consider myself as having been very unkindly used by him in this respect — for I was at one time confined for two months, & he never came to see me / me, who had ever paid such unremitting attentions to him.... Indeed, I owe it to Truth & Justice as well as to myself to say, that the concern which I have felt in this instance, and one or two other more *crying* instances, of Self-involution in Wordsworth, has been almost wholly a Feeling of friendly Regret, & disinterested Apprehension — I saw him more & more benetted in hypochondriacal Fancies, living wholly among *Devotees* — having every the minutest Thing, almost his very Eating & Drinking, done for him, by his Sister, or Wife —'.

In Scotland, Wordsworth might have been doing Coleridge a kindness in suggesting he leave. It matters little who first suggested they separate: it is clear they were equally pleased to do so. Coleridge delighted in his freedom; Dorothy could be with William; and perhaps William became less silent.

NOTES

Recollections of a Tour Made in Scotland. A.D. 1803, by Dorothy Wordsworth. 1874.
Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Vol. 2. Edited by Earl Leslie Griggs. (Oxford University Press. 1956.)
The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Vol. 1. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. (Pantheon Books. New York. 1957.)
Dorothy Wordsworth by Robert Gittings and Jo Manton. (OUP 1985).

I REMEMBER, I REMEMBER . . .

by Desmond Hawkins

DURING the Peninsular War a young English Hussar officer arrived at San Sebastian to join the Army, bringing with him his own horses, waggons and grooms to transport whatever forage and baggage he required. Assigned to outpost duty he found himself deprived of the comforts to which he was accustomed and declared that 'campaigning was not intended for a gentleman'. He therefore instructed his servants to pack up immediately. Before he could be stopped he hired a vessel to convey himself and his private expeditionary force back to England, where he immediately sold his commission.

This odd little anecdote adds nothing to our comprehension of the causes and conduct of the Peninsular War, and yet it has the vitality of a still breathing sort of history. If the broad pattern of events in expertly calculated order and design is the architecture of history, then gossip and anecdote are the unpredictable ornament and bouquet within the building. And who is not grateful for the freshness and savour they give to the weighty scene? In commenting on the gossip of a village worthy Thomas Hardy described his anecdotes as 'neither true nor false but a sort of "Not Proven" compound that is very relishable'. It is this 'very relishable' quality that draws us to the reminiscences and anecdotes of Aubrey, Pepys, Fanny Burney, Walpole, Charles Greville and their fellows.

The story of the Hussar's sudden departure from Spain comes from an author less illustrious than those just named but one who is too good to be neglected. He also was a young officer in Spain in 1813, with however a distinct vocation for soldiering and a retentive memory. He was Rees Howell Gronow, a Welshman who had been at Eton with Shelley before becoming an ensign in the Grenadier Guards. In his account of a formally conducted fight at Eton he describes Shelley stalking round the ring and declaiming 'one of the defiant addresses usual with Homer's heroes when about to commence a single combat; the young poet, being a first-rate classical scholar, actually delivered the speech in the original Greek'. To no avail, unfortunately — he was defeated.

The credit traditionally given to the playing-fields of Eton for the victory at Waterloo must be grounded in the fact that young Etonian officers like Gronow had no further education. There were in England no military schools in which to learn the arts of warfare. The qualification for an officer's commission was not proficiency but private means and 'blood' — the latter rated highly by the Duke of Wellington. Gronow comments candidly that 'the excellence of our non-commissioned officers alone prevented us from meeting with the most fatal disasters in the face of the enemy'. At the age of eighteen he was mounting guard at St. James's Palace and within a few months was on active service in Spain where his hero, Wellington, was a familiar sight. On one occasion, return-

ing from outpost duty, he met the general riding out to hunt with his pack of hounds. Wellington 'was dressed in a light-blue frock-coat (the colour of the Hatfield hunt) which had been sent out to him as a present from Lady Salisbury'.

Very different is the image of the Commander-in-Chief at Waterloo. Gronow's description of the climax of the battle begins with a sudden silence as the French bombardment ceased and the cuirassiers began to move —

> Not a man present who survived could have forgotten in after life the awful grandeur of that charge. You perceived at a distance what appeared to be an overwhelming, long moving line, which, ever advancing, glittered like a stormy wave on the sea when it catches the sunlight. On came the mounted host until they got near enough, whilst the very earth seemed to vibrate beneath their thundering tramp. One might suppose that nothing could have resisted the shock of this terrible moving mass.

In the British square the command 'Prepare to receive cavalry' was given, the men in the front ranks knelt and a wall bristling with steel was presented. Within the square the watchful figure of Wellington had appeared shortly before the charge began. He was accompanied only by one aide-de-camp; all the rest of his staff being either killed or wounded. Gronow continues —

> Our Commander-in-Chief, as far as I could judge, appeared perfectly composed; but looked very thoughtful and pale. He was dressed in a grey great-coat with a cape, white cravat, leather pantaloons, hessian boots, and a large cocked hat *à la Russe*.
>
> The charge of the French cavalry was gallantly executed; but our well-directed fire brought men and horses down, and ere long the utmost confusion arose in their ranks. The Duke sat unmoved, mounted on his favourite charger. I recollect his asking Colonel Stanhope what o'clock it was, upon which Stanhope took out his watch and said it was twenty minutes past four. The Duke replied 'The battle is mine; and if the Prussians arrive soon, there will be an end of the war'.

It is characteristic of Gronow that his epic narrative pauses to describe the Duke's dress. In all his recollections he is preternaturally conscious of clothes, style, deportment, fashion — as one who was himself a dandy in the great epoch of dandies. It was said of him that he would rather have blown out his brains than have gone to the opera in morning costume. In the pride of his early manhood before and after Waterloo he had the entrée to the most exalted and exclusive circles, where he could observe Sir Lumley Skeffington 'who used to paint his face, so that he looked like a French toy' and Lord Petersham who had a fresh snuff-box for every day of the year. Although so young and junior in rank he was admitted to Almack's where even Wellington was turned away on one occasion because he was wearing trousers instead of the required knee-breeches. It is in such scenes and in his detailed account of the fashionable preoccupation with gambling and duelling that Gronow shines as a raconteur. His description of Crockford's has the authenticity of an habitué. He seems not to have been challenged to a duel himself — perhaps because he was renowned for his accuracy with a pistol — but he acted as a second and shared the confidences of others. There was, for instance, the Count D'Orsay, 'beautiful as the Apollo Belvedere', who said to his second 'I am not on a par with my antagonist: he is a very

ugly fellow, and if I wound him in the face, he won't look much the worse for it; but on my side it ought to be agreed that he should not aim higher than my chest'.

Gronow married twice, taking each time a Frenchwoman as his wife. He had a professional esteem for the French as soldiers and a keen appreciation of the Parisian way of life. His later years were spent in Paris where a journalist described him sitting in the window of the club he helped to found, with his gold-topped cane pressed to his lips, watching the world go by. Here he looked back to his salad days in London and the hour of valour at Waterloo, commenting —

> I have lived through a period characterised by sanguinary wars and huge national debts, and have remained in this world long enough to calculate their results. I am afraid we must often be content with that empty glory which lives only in the pages of history. A battle fought fifty years ago appears very often of no more utility than the splendid tomb of a necropolis.

Gronow was in his late sixties when he began to publish his reminiscences. They have the imperfections of a memory ripened without a factual audit, but it is within the licence of a good raconteur to improve his tale in the telling. He spoke from first-hand experience of stirring events from the Peninsular War to the French *coup d'état* of 1851; and where he collected gossip from others he preserved for us the style and flavour of Regency London and post-Bonapartist Paris. In the hundred years since he published he has been cherished by a few readers of discernment but must have increasingly escaped the notice of the public at large. The recent decision of the Surtees Society to re-issue in facsimile the two volumes of the collected edition of 1888 was a most happy one.

The Reminiscences of Captain Gronow is published by the R. S. Surtees Society, Rockfield House, Nunney, near Frome, Somerset at £28.50 for the two volumes or £14.95 per single volume.

[Dr Desmond Hawkins is the author of *Hardy, Novelist and Poet* (David and Charles 1976), *Concerning Agnes* (Alan Sutton 1982), *The Tess Opera* (Thomas Hardy Society 1984) and many other books and articles.]

The September issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Swedish Politics: The Beginning of the End of an Era:* Part One by Richard Pybus, *International Banking* by B. Narpati (held over from the August issue), *Beneficial Obstacles in the Polish Theatre* by Andrzej Zurowski and *Propaganda War in Schools* by Lady Olga Maitland.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE YOUNG MURDERER

by L. F. Lowenstein

THE general population is still not convinced that it is possible for children to commit acts such as murder, despite the fact that we are living in an increasingly violent society. We have only to open a newspaper to note, on virtually every page, acts of destruction perpetrated by groups or individuals and it is becoming increasingly apparent that young people are not excluded from such activities. We have even begun to be inured to reading about children who murder or rape or commit other violent acts against others.

When such accounts are presented, the average individual shakes his head in some disbelief. This is because there is still the common assumption that children and young people in general must be considered as relatively innocent and hence incapable of committing this type of crime.

Perhaps one of the first in-depth studies on the child murderer was that of Gitta Sereny in her study of Mary Bell. This case goes back to December, 1968 when two girls, Mary Bell, 11 years and Norma Bell, 13 years (neighbours, but not related) appeared in a criminal court in Newcastle accused of strangling, within a six-week period, a 4 year old and a 3 year old. Norma Bell was acquitted but Mary Bell, the younger, was found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. A situation of 'diminished responsibility' was the explanation and she was given detention for 'life'. Although Mary had come to the attention of the authorities on a number of occasions, including the police, such tendencies as murder and her needs in relation to this had been totally unrecognised.

The background of the child included the tendency of her mother to disappear for days at a time and for Mary to suffer a series of near fatal 'accidents' in infancy. As there was no place to put Mary after the verdict, she was placed at the age of 11 with 22 disturbed asocial boys.

From all evidence, Mary felt no sense of guilt either at the committing of the murder or thereafter. This is an unusual crime for a young girl to commit since most murders are committed by males under the age of 35. Four times as many murders are perpetrated by males as by females. There has, however, over many years, been an increase in females committing murders. Less than 30% of victims are strangers to the murderer and indeed in 95% of all murders, the killer and the victim are of the same race.

More often than not, murder is a crime of impulse. It would be quite interesting to know how frequently such impulses are acted upon and yet do not result in murder, to the good fortune of the victim and aggressor alike! Such information would never be made available but the result is almost certain to be very much larger in number than the incidents resulting in murder itself.

On the whole there is no evidence to suggest that there is 'a killer personality' although those however suffering from 'paranoid disorders'

are more likely to be dangerous and commit such acts, and hence require treatment as early as possible.

Sally (a name that has been created but the incidents are real) passed through my centre some years ago partly due to her attempted murder of another child. The fact that it was not murder but rather attempted murder was solely due to the involvement of a passer-by who watched Sally pushing another girl under the water with her feet and not allowing her to get out of the water or catch her breath. The whole incident was viewed by a group of other girls, who made no attempt to stop Sally and appeared to delight in this particular behaviour.

The girl was eventually saved by the passer-by who, for his good deed, was actually attacked by the gang of adolescent girls. The police were eventually called and Sally appeared before the court totally unrepentant of her actions.

Sally had been for many years out of the control of her parents and although of compulsory school age failed to attend school, spending her time associating with older men and eventually becoming pregnant.

The background of the girl is of some interest as it may well be the basis for her aggressive and sadistic outlook. Sally's mother frequently lost her temper with her children and allegations were made that she abused her children and 'dumped' Sally, who was then just over a year old, onto the floor on a number of occasions. The mother was also deemed to be depressed and was a heavy drinker. She was suffering from marital frustrations because of her poor relationship with her husband. The husband also suffered from depression and was an unhappy man, frequently out of work.

A consultant forensic psychiatrist who examined the mother considered her to be not so much suffering from mental illness but from her own damaged personality as a result of early childhood experiences.

Sally was frequently sexually provocative and seemed to desire physical relationships with males at a very early age. It was for this reason as well as her attempted murder that she was placed in my own centre. Her reason for wanting to drown the particular girl was that she claimed the girl had given her a 'nasty look' and because she coveted the girl's bracelets. Later, Sally even attempted to strangle her social worker while she was being driven to court by pulling the safety belt across the social worker's throat.

At the time of her referral, she was aged 14 and had absconded from many centres where she had been placed, resulting in secure accommodation being necessary. The girl was not very articulate in relating or describing her feelings. She often reacted to questions in a very defensive and sullen way, or did not answer at all. Often, her replies were curt and abusive. She liked to portray a very tough masculine image and to identify with 'rockers' and the 'biker' brigade.

An interview between Sally and the psychologist was transcribed and occurred as follows:

Dr. Lowenstein. Now Sally, you are going to take a number of tests which

I have been trying to give you. I know you don't like taking them, but they are good for you because they help me to help you and know you better. Now, you don't like taking them at the moment, do you?

Sally. No.

Dr. Lowenstein. Well, I am going to help you to try to take them a little better. I know the problem is mostly that you cannot read the questions and you don't want anyone else to read them to you. Is that why you don't like taking them?

Sally. Yes.

Dr. Lowenstein. Is there any other reason?

Sally. No.

Dr. Lowenstein. O.K. Now one of the things that I want to talk to you about is the trouble that you got into for which you went to court on Friday, do you remember? How do you feel about the trouble that you got into?

Sally. I don't feel bad.

Dr. Lowenstein. In what way don't you feel bad.

Sally. I don't know. She shouldn't have been there.

Dr. Lowenstein. She shouldn't have been where?

Sally. She shouldn't have been by the river when I was there and then I wouldn't have done what I did.

Dr. Lowenstein. Who shouldn't have been by the river when you were there?

Sally. The girl.

Dr. Lowenstein. Why shouldn't she be there?

Sally. 'Cause I was there.

Dr. Lowenstein. So what did you do when you were by the river?

Sally. Pushed her in and beat her up.

Dr. Lowenstein. Why did you do that?

Sally. Because she called me a slag and gave me a dirty look.

Dr. Lowenstein. Did you feel that was the right thing to do?

Sally. Yes.

Dr. Lowenstein. What did she do after you pushed her in the river?

Sally. She tried to get out.

Dr. Lowenstein. Tried what?

Sally. Tried to get out.

Dr. Lowenstein. Who tried to get out?

Sally. The girl.

Dr. Lowenstein. What did you do?

Sally. Pushed her back in.

Dr. Lowenstein. What would you have done if she was drowning?

Sally. Nothing.

Dr. Lowenstein. Would you have left her to drown or would you have tried to get her out?

Sally. Just walked away.

Dr. Lowenstein. How would you feel if the girl was dead?

Sally. Don't know.

Dr. Lowenstein. Why did you feel so much that you wanted her to be dead?
Sally. Don't know, she was just there.
Dr. Lowenstein. Would you have changed anything about what happened at that time if you had a chance to do it differently?
Sally. No.
Dr. Lowenstein. You would still have pushed the girl into the water and made sure that she couldn't get out and that she would drown.
Sally. Yes.
Dr. Lowenstein. Does your conscience bother you in any way about it?
Sally. No.
Dr. Lowenstein. Now that's what I am worried about, Sally, the fact that your conscience doesn't bother you about what you did. Do you think there is any chance that your conscience will change and that you will ever feel sorry for doing that kind of thing?
Sally. No.
Dr. Lowenstein. Do you think people should go through life trying to kill other people because they get called names, or receive dirty looks?
Sally. No.
Dr. Lowenstein. Then why did you do it?
Sally. Because she called me a name.
Dr. Lowenstein. But you have just said that people shouldn't go around killing other people for being called names.
Sally. Yes, well they can take it, can't they?
Dr. Lowenstein. And you say you can't take it.
Sally. No.
Dr. Lowenstein. What other things upset you?
Sally. Loads of things.
Dr. Lowenstein. Like what for instance?
Sally. Depends when it comes along.
Dr. Lowenstein. Do you really think you could kill someone without feeing any conscience about it?
Sally. Yes.
Dr. Lowenstein. Under circumstances like the one that you mentioned happened at the stream, could you do that sort of thing again to anyone if they did the same thing?
Sally. Yes.
Dr. Lowenstein. And your conscience would not bother you at all?
Sally. No.
Dr. Lowenstein. What do you think we can do to change your way of thinking about things like that?
Sally. Nothing.
Dr. Lowenstein. You think everybody should behave in the way you behaved at the stream if the circumstances were the same?
Sally. In a way — yes.
Dr. Lowenstein. Why?
Sally. If you don't do anything to her, she would go around calling every-

body slag.

Dr. Lowenstein. You realise, of course, that if the girl had drowned as a result of what you did you would have been in court on a manslaughter or even murder charge?

Sally. Yes, I know.

Dr. Lowenstein. And you don't feel any different about it?

Sally. No.

Dr. Lowenstein. How do you think I can best help you to feel differently about that sort of thing in the future?

Sally. You can't.

This interview led the psychologist to probe further into Sally's personality because it was vital to ascertain some of the basic reasons for her attitudes which made her, not so much the way she was, but to think and behave as she did. Even more important it was necessary to find ways of altering that attitude of nonchalance and hardness and lack of conscience.

Sally was given a number of tests including the Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children and had a verbal I.Q. of 91, a non-verbal I.Q. of 115 and a full scale I.Q. of 103. This made her slightly above average in intelligence. It was therefore clear that it was not lack of intelligence that made her behave as she did, indeed one comes across many children of very low intelligence who never commit such acts of aggression merely because they feel something deep inside them which would prevent them from doing anything of this kind.

It was therefore felt that Sally suffered from a deeply damaged personality which made it possible for her to hurt others without feeling anything about it. One might say she had become hardened to aggressive behaviour, which she then practised on others.

Her educational attainments were very poor. With a chronological age of 14.03, she had a reading age of 7.06, a spelling age of 7.03 and a maths age of 8.00, as measured on standardised tests. Therefore her self esteem was very low and she was very much on the defensive.

She said she liked painting but disliked virtually every other subject in school. Personality testing indicated that Sally was relatively high on psychoticism, moderately high on neuroticism and was somewhat below average in extroversion.

This indicated that she had a tendency to enjoy sadistic behaviour towards people and to get into aggressive situations with others of her own age. The personality tests certainly could have indicated that she was a child who had basic needs and treatment was required in order to eliminate her desire to hurt others. She also needed a great deal of excitement to keep her contented and was likely to be of a restless temperament. On another test, the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), it was clear that problems of sexual identification were evident and that she had a high level of psychopathic deviant behaviour. She was also above average on schizophrenia and of course above average in paranoia.

Projective personality assessment showed her to have a very strong

bond with the father but a very poor one with her mother, whom she hated. She also disliked teachers and, because of her poor relationship with her mother, failed to identify with females generally. She expressed homicidal reactions on a number of projective stimuli and also showed a continuous need to escape, especially by means of alcohol and cigarettes.

After a somewhat longer stay in the community a number of impressions were produced as a result of individual and group therapy sessions. These were:

1. She was prone to alcoholism.
2. She was prone to glue-sniffing, and substance abuse generally in order to get 'high'.
3. She was eager to please and be helpful at times.
4. She had a low frustration tolerance and a tendency to want her own way, and reacted very badly when crossed.
5. She accepted definite limits when these were put firmly to her.
6. She respected physical strength rather than rational argument.
7. She was eager to have a close physical and affectionate relationship with a male and would not have been averse to this being a member of staff.
8. She identified with a male, showing high degrees of aggression and a desire to ride roughshod over others, if allowed to get away with it.
9. She showed no real concern for others or feelings of guilt about her behaviour towards them.
10. She showed a lack of care for herself and attention to detail.
11. She had a strong feeling of inadequacy due to low educational achievement, particularly due to her low reading ability.
12. She could be engineered through a relationship and behave and develop towards a more feminine orientation and behaviour.

The treatment of Sally could be summarised as follows:

There are many ways in which individuals who suffer from personality problems such as Sally's may be treated. The first and most important is that an environment must be provided which protects the child from any further likelihood of actions leading to aggression and certainly attempted murder. Such an environment must be vigilant, caring and therapeutic.

Different orientations in psychological treatment undoubtedly inspire different ways of helping children who have such extreme aggressive tendencies.

To be avoided at all costs are the extremes of being over-sympathetic or over-hard when dealing with such individuals.

The procedures used upon which successful treatment relied were:

1. Providing Sally with a caring, secure and structured environment which would guide her towards attitudes and behaviour which would eventually result in her trusting others and being trusted by them. It was also vital to make it quite clear that under no circumstances would she be rejected or abandoned by that environment and the individuals which constituted it. At the same time, any aggressive or negative behaviour would be disapproved of and would result in

negative repercussions including punishment. It was important to structure her time. It has been found by numerous investigators that more acts of aggression and murder in particular occur at week-ends i.e. at times when individuals are not constructively involved, than during periods of hard work. Sally came to the therapeutic community knowing that it was in a rural setting. Her initial reaction was one of indifference and yet half wanting to succeed as the alternative was a long term incarceration. Reluctantly, she settled in, constantly declaring that she was in the middle of nowhere and was bored with no town to frequent nearby. She showed a caring behaviour with animals and work with them was introduced into her daily routine. Sally rose every morning at 6.00am and had a number of jobs to do on the farm. This she enjoyed, and after breakfast at 7.30am she was given homework until 9.00am with a meeting following which included the staff and other children. After this, she had a full day at school, followed by more work on the farm.

2. Promoting Sally's self-esteem by motivating her towards a sense of educational achievement. This was hoped, in turn, to lead to desirable vocational goals and the capacity to fulfil these.
3. Working on the possibility of increasing Sally's frustration tolerance, and helping her to overcome a tendency to over-react aggressively and to find for her alternatives by which she could express her displeasure or anger in acceptable ways. Her frequent moments of disappointment and depression were due to a lack of female identification and any positive aim for the future. It was therefore essential to guide her towards fulfilling ambitions in the future and to deal with her immediate frustrations effectively.

Treatment approaches involved the following:—

1. Daily group therapy sessions involving her with staff and other children and seeking to help her to come to terms with her own positive as well as negative traits. Her peer group was especially useful in drawing attention to her temper outbursts and these could be prevented through support by others around her and eventually gaining self control.
2. Individual therapy sessions carried out through the role of the psychologist discussing with Sally her early childhood and those aspects which were conducive to promoting negative behaviour including aggression, cruelty and a tendency to dehumanise those whom she disliked. It was quite clear that Sally, at the time of her hatred and anger, could not care less what punishment she endured and failed to see the consequences of her actions. Despite this it was discussed with her that such consequences and a life-time of incarceration were not a good reward for a momentary outburst of anger and aggression. Sally was followed up for a five year period after she left the therapeutic community and although her progress through life was not at all smooth, including unwanted pregnancy, she never again committed any act of aggression or attempted murder. It must

be remembered that Sally came from a secure unit or 'lock-up' to enter the somewhat freer atmosphere of a therapeutic community; but despite this fact, she never again committed acts that were likely to jeopardise her freedom through homicidal tendencies.

3 Milieu Therapy is probably the most important aspect of helping Sally. Sally lived in an environment where certain patterns of bahaviour were approved. Others were severely censured and a variety of punishments used to stamp in one and stamp out that which was undesired. This continued reinforcement of desired behaviour with a consequent reduction of negative behaviour may take a period of months or even years but eventually it is likely to succeed. Sally was used to doing a considerable amount of bullying and had a strong will to achieve her own ends whatever the consequences. She therefore resembled more a masculine, bully-type individual than a feminine girl. She was undoubtedly helped to become more feminine by her relationship with a boy who appeared naturally to encourage her femininity and discourage aggressive masculine behaviour.

This type of natural therapeutic involvement is something which cannot be controlled or directed through any therapeutic medium but occurs partly as a result of children being thrown together with certain consequences resulting from this. The boy did a great deal to help Sally to realise that being feminine was acceptable and even preferred to being rough and masculine. He himself was of fairly masculine personality who undoubtedly found it uncomfortable to be in association with one of similar behaviour of the opposite sex.

During the initial part of the treatment involving therapeutic milieu incidents, Sally had frequently to be restrained when she became violent and aggressive. This had to be carried out firmly, decisively and caringly. Once she had gained control over herself and was able to speak rationally she was released. Eventually, it was hoped and indeed it occurred that a more rational aspect of her personality was able to deal with self-control rather than being controlled externally.

In order to achieve the end of changing personality, a new style of behaviour must become habituated through habits learned over a period of time. Eventually Sally noted that her behaviour, if positive, caring and less aggressive, gave her certain advantages over her previous demeanour. Such realisation comes, not suddenly, but gradually and after numerous experiences which fluctuate from improvement to deterioration and ultimately lasting improvement.

[Dr. L. F. Lowenstein, Chief Examiner in Advanced Educational Psychology, College of Preceptors, London, Visiting Professor, University of Khartoum, Sudan, was formerly Chief Educational Psychologist for Hampshire. He is currently Director, Allington Manor School and Therapeutic Community.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

SECRET UNIVERSITY ASSOCIATIONS

The Red and the Blue. Intelligence, Treason and the Universities. Andrew Sinclair. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £12.95.

Much has already been written, most notably by Andrew Boyle, about the Cambridge spies. They were communists, a high proportion of them homosexuals who operated from the privileged vantage point of the secret society called The Apostles. An Oxford don myself in the nineteen-thirties, who joined a very left-wing Oxford City Labour Party in 1936, I am fascinated by all I read of the goings-on in the rival university. And Andrew Sinclair is a first-class narrator.

At the time I did not think that I had much to learn about communism from Cambridge. I took the Chair in the town hall for such as Harry Pollitt, the leading British communist, John Strachey, their most persuasive propagandist, and the 'Red Dean' of Canterbury, their statutory, but far from tame, Christian. When I was elected to the City Council in 1937, my colleague on the 'ticket' was Abe Lazarus, their very eloquent local secretary (who just failed to be elected). My best friend in the undergraduate world was Philip Toynbee, the first communist President of the Union, badly under-estimated here. The City Party and the university Labour Club were riddled with communists, mostly crypto.

I don't think that at that time I had ever heard of the Apostles. I knew Guy Burgess fairly well, because everyone knew Guy Burgess fairly well without knowing the real person. We are told that Andrew Sinclair 'was suggested as a member of the Apostles, but was not accepted; it was thought that he would not keep the society's oath of secrecy.' He has certainly written about them as a potent but anti-social force. There are brilliant pieces of writing in the book, though some of his facts have been challenged.

He labours however to present a general thesis and here I cannot find him convincing. He is obsessed with the weaknesses of the 'arts culture', though himself a double first in history. He has an idealistic belief in the spirit of free enquiry exhibited by the scientists. They represent, in his view, the true Cambridge tradition. 'Its minor tradition, however, of clandestinity and coterie, esoteric research and arcane knowledge, intensity and narcissism only has worth to an establishment which values secret intelligence more than the open exchange of it. That minor tradition, exemplified in the Bloomsbury group and the Apostles and institutionalized in parts of the civil service and of government, derives from an arts "culture" that cannot and is not changing human society'.

I cannot share Mr Sinclair's suspicions of arts culture in general. I can agree, however, that the secrecy which was the hallmark of the Apostles, led on in too many cases to actual or potential treachery. There was nothing remotely comparable to the Apostles in Oxford. Nothing could have been more open than the manifestations of communism mentioned earlier. I do not know how far this secrecy of the Apostles was in the years in question linked with the homosexual flavour which was so mild and respectable in the days of Lytton Strachey and Keynes.

Homosexualism was rife in Oxford in my undergraduate days, that is to say in the 'twenties. But it had disappeared, from my view at any rate, in the 'thirties. The gestures of the aesthetes of the 'twenties would have seemed ridiculous ten years later. I would never dream of implying that homosexualism is more likely to lead to treachery than hetero-sexualism, but when associated with a secret society it seemed for a time to have that effect. The numbers involved were always very small and I am ready to believe it all seems ancient history to the present generation.

FRANK LONGFORD

DEVELOPMENT IN THE BRITISH ECONOMY

Britain's Economic Renaissance; Margaret Thatcher's Reforms 1979-1984. Alan Walters. Oxford University Press. £19.50.

As the Prime Minister's personal economic adviser from 1981-1983, Alan Walters relates to us the "in and outs" of Conservative policy but whether this can be related to "economic renaissance" is questionable. The book is in three parts Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy and "Some Consequencies". Walters argues that Fiscal Policy adopted by the Conservatives was relatively "loose" apart from in 1981, though "different statistical adjustments" could reveal the reverse. As an example of this reinterpretation of data, Walters suggests in the chapter on "Policy, Productivity and Employment" that "Productivity growth in the UK has been about twice that of France and almost 50% greater than that of Germany" between the years 1980/81 and 1983/84. These figures, however, make no reference to the base figure, nor to the way pay is awarded, the degree of capitalism, the political structure, types of industry and fear of unemployment. Furthermore, Buiter and Miller argue that productivity has increased since inefficient plants have been closed, i.e. the UK has played only its best batsmen. In reply, Walters notes ". . . not everyone must play cricket. There are other games . . ." such as Bridge! One might take the analogy forward by saying that in the case of the UK the general growth in unemployment is tantamount to the players turning up for a football match only to find there is no pitch.

In a comparison with Europe, Walters suggests "(Europe) suffered increases in unemployment in 1981-83 which were just as, or even more, severe than those of the UK", even though they had pursued different policies. Unemployment figures, however, may not be collected in the same way. It was Lord Young who noted that the way of collecting/classifying the figures for the UK had been changed eight times since 1979. Furthermore, if we look at the percentage increase in unemployment, the UK has the third highest figure, behind Germany and The Netherlands, out of the eight countries listed. The point that the UK has increased the number in employment faster than its European neighbours is true. Critics, however, would say that they are low paid, part-time, "womens" jobs or increases in the numbers in self-employment.

The section on Monetarism begins with a historical journey through the development of Monetary Policy in the UK. Particularly important is the way the banks and other financial institutions have circumvented government restrictions on credit creation. All in all this is a very good exposition of the development of Monetary Policy.

Walters at the beginning of this section lists the factors which have contri-

buted to Britain's current circumstances; he answers the conundrum as to which is the most important by saying "We shall be able to settle little . . .", yet 20 pages later he notes "we are left, therefore, with no simple explanations . . . There must be some missing factor — a Thatcher Factor?" Perhaps even a Walters factor!

The points, together with errors in Table 9.3, may suggest to the reader that the book is of little value. Far from it. The text is very readable, very illuminating and instructive. Its weakness is in deducing that what happened to the British Economy was through specific policies adopted by the Thatcher Government. These instruments often are not under their strict control nor should we discount external factors. The book, therefore, is one which will act as a catalyst for academic argument and should be congratulated for that.

MARK COOK

PURITAN ICONOCLASTS

Reflections on the Puritan Revolution. A. L. Rowse. Methuen, 262pp. £14.95.

Dr. A. L. Rowse has written a magnificent diatribe against the Puritans of the seventeenth century. As a man who knows the Classics he would understand this for the compliment it is. A diatribe is not just a denunciation but an impassioned piece of argument, a discourse which in the original Greek implied a wearing away through time.

Like any civilised man who travels round the British Isles he has seen the evidence of the Puritans' vandalism in the shattered statues, the white-washed walls, the smashed glass. He undertands that the loss of so much of our medieval heritage was due far more to the Puritans than to the sixteenth century "reformers". Without the Puritans much of what survived in the Lutheran churches of Germany might well have survived in Britain.

Rouse's point of view is that not of the political or social historian but of the historian of art. He writes that "it is a duty to condemn hostility to the arts and sciences wherever it occurs in human history or (in) whatever form it takes." If sometimes his chapters take on the form of a catalogue of horrors perpetrated in the name of religion it is because there were so many horrors perpetrated.

His book surveys a wide range: his aim is to show how an entire culture was destroyed or driven underground. He describes what was done to our cathedrals, colleges, parish churches, palaces, mansions, the theatre, music, poetry and art. It is a sad tale and the author never slackens in the venom of his attack.

Sometimes this venom leads him into some odd syntactic by-ways and occasionally he spots, like Don Quixote, the odd wind-mill or two that calls for a tilt. He is anxious to point out how the Puritans' revolution against church, state and civilisation can be compared to that in France and in Russia; but this is in passing and is, anyway, too large a question to be dealt with in a book centring on the destruction of a national culture.

The concentration on art — on the tangible manifestations of a culture — limits the book. It is religion, not art, that provides the key to understanding the seventeenth century. Religion could lead men like Charles I to die a martyr's death; it could also lead hypocrites to positions of power when they discovered how to manipulate people. But not all Puritans were hypocrites and Puritanism was a tremendous force in English life which survived into the nineteenth century. It now survives normally either as anti-Catholicism or as a dry-as-dust

antiquarianism. (One thinks of the furore when Wells Cathedral first contemplated the restoration of the Christ in Majesty on its splendid western front. On one side were those who saw the Cathedral as the embodiment of a living and true faith. On the other were the "purists" who preferred an ugly, defaced but old statue to a "new" one.)

Rowse's view-point is presumably that of a "civilised sceptic" — a phrase he uses of one iconoclast. Insofar as this limits his understanding this is sad. Perhaps the last great Puritan was Charles Spurgeon. He was once compared to an astronomer who had focused on one star which he studied passionately and in so doing forgot the heavens. To concentrate too exclusively on one aspect is to fall into Spurgeon's trap. But Dr Rowse is saved (if I may use the phrase) by the validity of his argument and the size of his evidence. It is a book very much worth reading.

JAMES MUNSON

SOME THOUGHTS FROM ON HIGH

On Acting. Laurence Olivier. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £12.95.

This is an impossible book to review. I shall try, but only after rejecting the alternatives — merely to quote from its contents or write a love letter to its author. These are his considerations on his career, poured into a tape-recorder before a fellow actor, Gawn Granger, who prompted some of the reminiscences and afterwards 'tidied' them up (if not very much, I fancy) for publication.

It's been said of him that he believes that he'll defy death as long as he goes on working. He defends some of the film roles he has taken in recent years, if adding sweetly that the money is handy: and who would deny him that, when he put his Hollywood gold at the service of actor-management at the St James Theatre, a venture which he rightly calls 'courageous'? It is for the same reason — his enormous energy — that he has conquered illnesses which would have felled a lesser man, and that is why (although he considers writing an agony) he has produced this book.

To learn how he tackled his great roles — Othello, Lear, Hamlet, Richard, Macbeth (though, alas, not a word on his Oedipus) — is to share with him his excitement in knowing that he was achieving what he wanted; and if, as I did, you saw him play them, it's reliving some of the most memorable evenings of the twentieth century theatre. He tells us that some of these have given him some of his greatest satisfaction outside of himself, but much that he has done for the cinema has provided him with the most intense pleasure within. There are some rare anecdotes: Ralph Richardson trying to kill him at the height of their rivalry (he makes no bones about that); his planning to do Lear only to force Richardson to do an exchange for Cyrano; Ken Tynan asking to come to the National as dramaturge, but *only* if Olivier would take on Othello (he had thought Iago the better role); Jonathan Miller observing, when they were rehearsing Olivier's Shylock, that if he was only going to be Olivier doing Olivier he didn't need Miller — which brought him up short; and Joan Plowright threatening to invite Otto Preminger as a house guest if he did Lear as his swan song at the National.

As with his autobiography, some reviewers have complained that he shows little admiration for other players — so I do wish that he had managed to mention Paul Scofield, whom he once described as giving the finest performance he had ever seen (in *The Power and the Glory*). He is proud (again, I think, rightly) of the young actors he gathered round him at the National: and if he

didn't invite Richardson to join them, he may well have seen two of the worst performances even seen on any stage (Richardson in *Timon of Athens* and *You Never Can Tell*). He muses on the competition with Gielgud, not to Gielgud's advantage, but when — in another part of the book — he boasts gently of a crown he's unwilling to cede, who would deny him? Certainly not anyone who saw his Macbeth, which ensured that that recalcitrant piece continued to move to catharsis, instead of tailing off in the 'bitty' battle scenes of the last act. He set out to be, he confesses, the greatest actor who ever lived. I can't speak for the past or posterity, but he'll hear no argument from me.

DAVID SHIPMAN

FEMINIST CULTURAL CRITICISM

Feminist Criticism and Social Change: Sex, Class and Race in Literature and Culture. Edited by Judith Newton and Deborah Rosenfelt. Methuen. £18.00 Hb. £7.95 Pb.

There cannot be many readers who have marked the paradoxical way in which the Sherlock Holmes stories, although projected as the ultimate in total explicitness, realism and scientificity, with always a rational explanation to dispel magic and mystery, are nevertheless 'haunted by shadowy, mysterious and often silent women.' Catherine Belsey, in a densely-argued contribution to this challenging and formidably academic collection of papers devoted to a 'materialist-feminist' criticism, shows how (where they deal with women's sexuality) the Sherlock Holmes stories 'contain within themselves an implicit critique of their limited nature as characteristic examples of classic realism' at that time. Such an insight must be accounted both surprising and valuable. There is, even so, another — biographical and psychological — element in Conan Doyle's portrayal of women, which Catherine Belsey does not invoke: his wife lingered for thirteen years with phthisis, until her death bestowed upon him the freedom to produce from the wings as his new bride the long-desired but still inviolate Miss Jean Leckie. Years of abstinence and the preservation of a *princesse lointaine* were in fact quite sufficient to render women ethereal and insubstantial in Doyle's imagination.

In Cora Kaplan's fine, strong essay on *Aurora Leigh*, there is a total biographical awareness, and without distortion she projects the massive poem as 'a major confrontation of patriarchal attitudes'. Judith Newton's paper on *Villette* is deep and subtle, illustrating how although at one level it is a 'novel about quest, about a life of independence and of making one's way', there flows still through the narrative a persistent romantic and self-sacrificing ideology about dependence on the love of a good man. This has been perceived before, but never better argued. Sonja Ruehl demonstrates how, although restricted by adherence to Havelock Ellis's theory of 'congenital inversion', *The Well of Loneliness* contributed to the process whereby lesbians politically articulated a demand to define themselves. In a particularly interesting essay, dealing with unfamiliar material, Barbara Christian examines the work of the nineteenth-century black American novelists: the patriarchal society encouraged myths, such as that of the alabaster southern lady, which in turn demanded another image as back-up, of the black mammy. A black woman heroine at that time had to be a comely mulatta — *thus illustrating how social conventions determine literary ones.* The disaffected reader will see how the best feminist criticism illuminates the text.

MOLLY TIBBS

YEAR OF ABDICATION

1936 as recorded by the Spectator. Introduced and edited by Charles Moore and Christopher Hawtree. Michael Joseph. £14.95.

This must have been a difficult book to compile and is even more to review. However, the disjointed material has been divided conventiently into six parts: *The King is Dead; Foreign Affairs; Home Affairs; The Arts; Life and Leisure; The Drama of the Throne.* This arrangement allows readers to identify their several interests and favourite journalists. The year opens with the death of George V: the Abdication story covers many months and the Accession of George VI follows. I will refer later to these events.

Meanwhile it is fun to re-read Peter Fleming on Graham Greene's travels; Andre Maurois on Rudyard Kipling; John Hayward on Yeats; Edwin Muir on Eliot's poetry; Graham Greene's devastating review of a Beverley Nicholl's effusion; and Siegfried Sassoon and Evelyn Waugh on almost anything, also some younger writers like J. S. Collis and — dare I say it, A. L. Rowse. But this is the Arts Section.

On Foreign Affairs R. C. K. Ensor and E. H. Carr seem to dominate, while Denis Brogan and S. K. Ratcliffe are the experts on the USA and a young man called Alistair Cooke has become an expert on the American *Language*. There are also some devious characters like Goronwy Rees and Anthony Blunt (Spectator Art Critic); the former was deputy-editor on a three-days a week basis.

Perhaps I may be allowed a personal word on the year 1936. I was at the time a Spectator reader and an M.P. and Civil Lord of the Admiralty (a post now disbanded). In January when the old King was dying I was in Alexandria visiting the Mediterranean Fleet, under Admiral Fisher. This was at the time of threatened *sanctions* against Italy, but *only* the Navy moved in readiness for action. In April, with the goodwill of the Prince of Wales, I had an hour's talk in Berlin with Rudolph Hess, while attending the Olympic Games (*Olympic Berlin* by E. A. Montague in the Book) and staying with Count Bernstoff, late Deputy-Ambassador in London whom we all admired and who was finally shot by Hitler. Hess had said in 1935 that the only person who could stop a second World War was the Prince of Wales, hence my unofficial visit. Later in the year I went by flying boat to Singapore and Australia, where I saw the abdication through Commonwealth eyes and Foreign Affairs from a wider angle than those at home. Perhaps I was anxious to write myself but alas not even a Junior Minister, especially in a Defence Department, is allowed that sort of freedom. But I read the Spectator with a different background at the end of 1936.

Looking now over this selection of Spectator articles and reviews of 1936 I find them well worth re-reading. If there is a weakness I think it is due to the Editor, Wilson Harris. His own 10 contributions, five under the name of Janus, are undistinguished. Later he became a University M.P. where I saw something of him, but he rarely joined A. P. Herbert and my colleague Eleanor Rathbone and myself in our Parliamentary jousts, though we got valuable help on the Book Tax from Rose Macaulay and V. S. Pritchett — contributors to this book.

After all, 1936 was a lively year with the Spanish Civil War, the Mosley and the Jarrow marches, the German invasion of the Rhineland and much else at home and abroad. The shadow of war was hanging over Europe; uncertainty was the order of the day; not an easy period for a leading weekly journal. But it maintained standards and elegance. It was not concerned to lead, but it

faithfully reflected the moods and manners of the reading public and rode high. I commend two contributions from the pens of 1986 Spectator-writers, who also wrote in 1936. The first comes from an honoured and lately ennobled name, William Deedes, and is entitled *The Abdication and the Press* — a model piece for any journalist. The second is a brilliant reminiscent article on *Writers and Writing* by Peter Quennell, where he recalls 'a brilliant array of talents' in 1936. This is a good read.

KENNETH LINDSAY

A BOOK OF SCANDALS

Scandal! An Encyclopaedia. Colin Wilson and Donald Seaman. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £12.95.

"Love and scandal," observed Henry Fielding, "are the best sweeteners of tea." And an enchanting 'dish' of scandal is provided by this thoroughly quenching volume. Of course the classic scandals are here, but also, and this is the great strength of the book, some of the more *outré* modern cases are included. Thus, served as it were piping hot, is Frederick 'Kevin' Coe, the Spokane Rapist, Calvi, God's Banker, and Michael Fagan, trespasser into Her Majesty's bedchamber. Out of the fading scandal sheets of the past emerge, sepia-toned, the misfortunate Reverend Harold Davidson, Rector of Stiffkey and Albertian lion-prodder; Professor Joad — "It depends what you mean by bilking . . ." — and the sorry story of his most costly free railway journey off the lines; Lobsang Rampa, *vulgatim* Cyril Henry Hoskins, the Plymouth plumber, who rode a flying saucer to Tibet; Thomas Wise, a book maker who always made sure that the literary odds were forged in his favour. Like a well put together patchwork quilt, this well put together pastiche of guilt, provides a bright and pleasing mixture of attractively colourful characters, most of whose misdemeanours are naughtinesses rather than wickednesses. The mixture may be confidently prescribed as antidote to tedium.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Against All Hope (Hamish Hamilton. £12.95.) These 'prison memoirs of Armando Valladores' provide a terrifying account of political repression in Fidel Castro's Cuba. At the age of 23, he was arrested solely because he 'espoused and expressed principles distinct from those of the regime'. For 22 years he was a prisoner of conscience, refusing to accept 'political rehabilitation', and suffered continuously varying ghastly forms of physical and mental torture. It is a story also of great courage, determined not to give in. He was able to make secret contacts abroad, and also to send out poems. At length President Mitterand persuaded Castro to release him and fly him to Europe. Valladores left behind him 'thousands of my countrymen still held in jails', some for the whole period of Castro's rule. 'The violence, repression, and beatings, the torture, lack of mail, news, and visits, and the solitary confinement are facts of life for them'. This frightening account needs to be read

and understood. In due course the regime itself will pay the price.

Modern China (Longmans. £7.95 paperback.) The latest addition to the Present and Past Series is this short introductory history of China by Professor Edwin E. Moise, Associate Professor of History at Clemson University, South Carolina. There is unfortunately a widespread ignorance of China in almost every context at a time when she is steadily emerging very actively as a world power. This book should help to encourage some understanding of general conditions in China against the historical background. Professor Moise starts with traditional China and concludes with a general description of present conditions, political and ideological, economic and social. They are still very much in the course of change and Professor Moise points out that China's long term prospects remain 'very unclear'. This should prove a very useful and informative study, although inevitably there will be some differing views on emphasis. While there are no textual annotations, a helpful bibliography for further reading is included.

George Eliot, A Biography (Penguin Literary Biographies. £5.95.) Gordon Haight's monumental and greatly admired Life, originally published in 1968 after some thirty-five years work. Like all the Victorian men and women of letters, George Eliot led a complex cultural and social life, and Professor Haight's reliable researches, drawing on much unpublished material, built up into a massive contribution to Victorian studies. The biography's greatest strength lies in its meticulous scholarship. Professor Haight *expressly* does not undertake extensive psychological comment; he indicates where there is an area open for speculation, but he refuses to construct on insufficient data. Where he does venture an interpretation, based on his deep knowledge of his subject, his opinion therefore carries the greater weight. In this way, he feels that 'Though some harm may have come from his (George Henry Lewes's) zealous overprotection, without it she would probably have written nothing.' For an on-going motif, he is content to elaborate her 'need to be loved' — what John Walter Cross (who married her) described as her 'absolute need of some one person who should be all in all to her, and to whom she should be all in all.' The learned Professor is sympathetic, understanding, not without humour, but oddly remote from the life which he details so lovingly. No one would mistake this biography for the work of a woman writer. (M.T.)

Sex, Class and Culture (Methuen. Paperback. £7.95.) Re-issue, with new Introduction, of classic, pioneering essays (1978) by Lillian S. Robinson, who was the first American feminist critic to define and explore the connections between sex, class and race as they shape works of art and the critical response to them. Good, feminist criticism of this kind is not merely limited to the exposure of 'sexism' in one work of literature after another. Lillian Robinson brings her keen eye to a whole range of writers, from Edmund Spenser, Jane Austen and Virginia Woolf to modern feminist poets such as the excellent Marge Piercy. She is always interesting, subtle, wide-ranging. (M.T.)

PEOPLES' TRUST FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES

Hamble House, Meadrow, Godalming, Surrey GU7 3JX

The badger is Britain's shyest and most harmless animal in the wild. It has no enemies except man.

It is being persecuted and slaughtered.

We need help most urgently to save the badger from suffering and extinction.

Please send your donation to:

People's Trust for Endangered Species, Lord Houghton's Badger a/c, c/o Barclays Bank PLC, 171 High Street, Guildford, Surrey GU1 3BR.

Director: W. J. Jordan, M.V.Sc, B.Sc, M.R.C.V.S.

Patrons: The Rt. Hon. Lord Strathspey
The Hon. Mrs. Norman Field
Registered Charity No. 274206

NOW REPRINTED

THE EXTENDED CIRCLE

Compiled by Jon Wynne-Tyson, this Dictionary of Humane Thought quotes hundreds of the famous and lesser known who have questioned our treatment of animals and seen its bearing on our behaviour toward each other.

"A dazzling register. An angry and sorrowful book, but it is also full of beauty. The chief splendour of *The Extended Circle* is its absoluteness." THE TIMES

"Superb anthology. Invaluable for reference, quotations, fuel in debate." OBSERVER

"So much of value from so many unexpected hands." LISTENER

"A stunning assembly." GOOD BOOK GUIDE 1986

"An impressive sourcebook. Wonderful value." SPECTATOR

CENTAUR PRESS £4.95

ORDER FORM

To: **The Subscription Manager,**

Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG

I enclose herewith my cheque for ....., for a year's subscription
[For rates, see inside front cover]

Name .....

Address .....

.....

LIBERAL NEWS

Published every Friday, Liberal News features information and articles about issues at home and abroad, as well as details of local and national activities of the Liberal Party. Liberal News is an indispensable part of every Liberal's life — as the General Election draws near you can't afford to be without it!

To: Liberal News, 1 Whitehall Place, London SW1A 2HE.

Please send me **Liberal News** every week for one year. I enclose £15.

Name .....

Address .....

.....



Discover

HENRY WILLIAMSON

WRITER — SOLDIER — VISIONARY

Please write for information to:

The Henry Williamson Society,

Membership Secretary Mary Heath,

Longclose, Langtree, Torrington, Devon EX38 8NR

Printed by BRAZIER & NAISH LTD., 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG Tel 01-242 3215 All business matters should be addressed to the publishers

Contemporary Review

121st YEAR OF PUBLICATION

SEPTEMBER 1986

THE LIMITS OF MODERNIZATION

Anthony Harrigan

GENOCIDE IN EAST TIMOR

Alexander George

PROPAGANDA WAR IN THE CLASSROOM

Lady Olga Maitland

BENEFICIAL OBSTACLES IN THE POLISH THEATRE

Andrzej Zurowski

and other articles together with an eight-page Literary Supplement.

£1.10

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

September 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1448 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
The Limits of Modernization	Anthony Harrigan	**113**
Genocide in East Timor	Alexander George	**119**
International Banking	B. Narpati	**124**
Rising Muslim Consciousness	Kusum Bhambri	**127**
Propaganda War in the Classroom	Lady Olga Maitland	**131**
Swedish Politics: The Beginning of the End of an Era?	Richard Pybus	**134**
Rate Capping and 'Poplarism'	Philip P. Bober	**139**
Beneficial Obstacles in the Polish Theatre	Andrzej Zurowski	**142**
A New Assessment of Denton Welch: Part V: The Dancing Mouse	Richard Whittington-Egan	**146**
Assisting the Tourist Boom	Mark Cook	**153**
Cinema: A Quarterly Review	David Shipman	**157**
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		**161**
Frank Longford, Esmond Wright, John Biggs-Davison, Paul Rose, Richard Whittington-Egan.		
SHORTER REVIEWS		**167**

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE, O.B.E.
Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL
Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY
Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON
Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1986. Published monthly by the Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG, England, and printed in England by Brazier & Naish Ltd., 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD. U.S Mailing Agent: Mercury Airfreight International Ltd. Inc, 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N.J 07001. Second Class postage paid at Rahway N J. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £16.00, U.S A. and Canada $55 00. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S. and Canada: extra costs given on request U.S Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc., 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J 07001. Contemporary Review. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

September 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1448

THE LIMITS OF MODERNIZATION

by Anthony Harrigan

ONE of the prevailing ideas in the Western world is that modernization is an ever-rising, irresistable tide that is sweeping across the world. Recent events, however, are beginning to make thoughtful people realize that modernization is anything but inevitable. It takes place here and there in the Third World. Sometimes it co-exists with the most ancient of ways. In some parts of the world, however, modernization may recede for decades or generations.

Two events suggest a need for a fresh look at the idea of the inevitability of modernization: the disastrous chemical accident in Bhopal, India and the famine in Ethiopia.

India is an example of a country where modernization co-exists with living patterns and attitudes established thousands of years ago. An extraordinarily complex chemical plant was built in a city where the streets are filled with water buffalos, cows and goats. Workers at the plant were recruited from the agricultural age that is India in the main today. Their minds were still back in that age, though the plan was predicated on the employment of people from the technological age. S. K. Goyal, head of the New Delhi University body concerned with corporate responsibility, was quoted after the accident that 'An unfortunate assumption has been made—that when technology arrives here, it is transferred. We are finding that the technology often just gets transferred to the premises of the subsidiary, not into the society as a whole. It stays within the walls of the factory.'

We see in this and similar statements what Prof. K. Z. Poznanski, writing in *World Politics,* refers to as 'the disillusionment among the countries of the South regarding the ease with which they expected to become industrialized through the importation of Western technology'. It's easy to import technology but not so easy to import the mind-set for using it safely and constructively.

Indeed there are a growing number of Third World complaints alleging the inappropriateness of First World technology. The West has had the notion that Third World countries could be modernized rapidly by importing high tech systems. A Brazilian economist has noted that his country

has an elaborate computerized data bank, but nobody uses it. Societies which need low-tech tools and equipment are supplied with devices that are suitable only to the conditions prevailing in advanced countries. The result is disappointment, anger, and frustration.

There's a notion in the West today that advanced technology is the birthright of all peoples. The idea that Western-style technology is applicable everywhere on this planet is deeply rooted in the contemporary mind. For example, John Popham, the author and journalist, wrote last March of 'the beneficient world that technology promises for all cultures on the globe'. That is a questionable concept. India, for instance, may have little more than technological icing on its ancient society for as far into the future as one can see, though Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said before the Bhopal accident that India must make up industrially and technologically for more than 300 years of lost time. One wonders how that can be achieved in a country of 750 million people, most of them simple villagers. There's good reason to believe that the ancient edifice of Indian life will survive intact through the next century, only slightly modified by modernization, and India is a country with substantial intellectual resources.

This isn't a matter of hostile opinion in the non-Indian world. One frequently hears Indians warn of the harsh character of the unfolding future.

On January 20, one of India's top medical scientists painted a grim picture of the health problems which will confront India by the beginning of the 21st century.

In an address to eminent scientists at the 75th Indian Science Congress in New Delhi, Dr. V. Ramalingaswami, Director General of the Indian Council of Medical Research, predicted that at least 300 million people will be living in slums in India by the year 2000. All of them, apart from being denied proper ventilation, will be without adequately filtered water, drainage and will also be exposed to such diseases as filariasis, tuberculosis and a variety of stomach ailments. Dr. Ramalingaswami pointed out that 156 million Indians already live in slums in urban centres. He makes this forecast despite India's success in one important area — agriculture. In this area it *has* benefitted from modernization; its wheat production has doubled since 1970; its rice production is up 30 per cent.

What, then, of the Third World countries without India's intellectual resources, or other resources, for that matter? What of Ethiopia where famine has shocked the Western world and brought forth an outpouring of compassion? Ethiopia is a country where 'socialist transformation and construction' was to have produced a bright future, but where the reality is mass starvation, and where that reality is likely to endure. Moreover, famine condiions exist in 27 African countries. It is enough to cause the world to despair, and the despair is beginning to surface even in circles where it was an article of faith that the emancipation of Africa from colonial rule marked one of the great steps forward in the history of mankind. Few essays could be more revealing and indicative of changed attitudes than an article published in *The New York Times* March 20,

1985, by the newspaper's Paris correspondent, Flora Lewis. In her article, Miss Lewis said that 'The progressive disintegration of Africa a generation after independence is a global distress,' adding that 'The cold, dreadful conclusion to be drawn from a generation of independence is that African governments are incapable of providing the framework and services that development requires'. Miss Lewis' honesty is as admirable as her clear-sighted view of African reality. She rightly says that 'These people can't survive without us'. On the whole, Westerners have yet to appreciate this fact, or to understand the full dimensions of the famine crisis in Africa, let alone the development crisis.

Here and there, to be sure, understanding is emerging. The Centre For International Security noted in January of this year that 'It is obvious that no amount of Western aid under the present policy framework can free Ethiopia from relief dependency, let alone lead it to food sufficiency'. Sooner or later, Westerners will have to recognize that simply channeling food to starving Africans through oppressive regimes isn't acceptable. These regimes lack the capacity as well as the will to utilise food assistance from abroad in a fair and effective manner. Though there will be allegations of neocolonialism on the part of European countries, the donor nations will have to insist on new administrative structures in Africa in which they have a voice that is heard and heeded. Such structures will be needed not only for famine relief but for the kind of low-tech development needed in countries that have no choice but to abandon extravagant ideas of rapid modernization along Western lines. Miss Lewis, in addressing the development issue, favours a type of European Peace Corps that would focus on village level projects and have room for participation by private enterprise. Indeed, a resourceful Portuguese business group, with long experience in Africa, is already engaged in low-tech business-development projects in two of the country's former colonies. The premise is that American development schemes are too advanced for these backward lands.

The Ethiopian famine situation is compounded by the fact that the country's Marxist regime wants to starve the rebellious population in the province of Eritrea. Either incapacity or hostility to the countries which are feeding Ethiopians has resulted in a dangerous slowdown in the unloading of food shipments. However, there is a more basic cause of distress. Ethiopia and other African countries have exploding populations.

According to recent World Bank figures, Ethiopia had 37.7 million people in 1980 and will have 64 million in the year 2000. Consider the figures for several other countries: Ghana, 11.5 million and 23 million; Kenya, 16.6 million and 37 million; Nigeria, 84.7 million and 163 million; Uganda, 12.6 million and 25 million. The total population of Africa in 1980 was 452.6 million. By 2000, population is expected to rise to 826 million. In 40 years time, Africa may have 1.5 billion people.

There is simply no way these additional millions can be fed. Sub-Saharan African states are experiencing a decline in agricultural productivity. Even if the Western world had the means to feed these hundreds

of millions, the African states don't have the seaports, railroads, highways and storage facilities necessary to receive, store and distribute vast quantities of food. The realistic prospect is a grim one indeed. Westerners who want to be charitable soon will find that the task of alleviating hunger in Africa is beyond them.

Despite this truth, many Westerners are determined to pour more money into the treasuries of African states that lack the integrity and efficiency to make effective use of aid. Robert S. McNamara, former head of the World Bank, recently gave a lecture in which he recommended massive new external financial assistance for Africa. He said that the World Bank itself should aim at 'quadrupling the net transfer of funds'. In other words, he wants taxpayers in the West to provide huge new outlays to the World Bank for aid to African projects. Nevertheless, his own figures make clear that such loans, however well-intended, won't work. They will simply disappear in Africa.

The retreat from the modernization process in Africa is occasioned in part by the deterioration of the modern infrastructure the European powers put in place during the colonial era. Roads, bridges, ferries and other facilities are breaking down and no funds exist for their replacement. With the advanced countries encountering severe economic problems of their own, there is no likelihood of provision being made for what used to be called the developing countries.

Dr. Henry S. Bloch, writing in *The Journal of International Affairs*, has described the global austerity situation and the insufficiency of capital to invest. He sees the gap between underdeveloped and developed nations increasing. He judges that this is 'a dark age for development and it will continue for some time to come'. This means, in terms of the thesis advanced here, that modernization will recede in many countries. No one in the West can view this recession without profound concern. There's no guarantee that even the worst crisis — appalling hunger in Africa — will lead to more rational administrative structures or political improvements. The situation may simply continue to worsen while regimes, such as the junta in Ethiopia, hold on to power with ever-greater tenacity, leaving the West frustrated.

As for Latin America, where post-World war development resulted in rapid expansion of the middle class, the lack of development funds and the crushing burdens in the continent's great cities may result in new proletarianisation. A dispossessed middle class, bitter over its losses, could well turn to the most extreme leadership, despite the fact that revolutionary movements are no longer viewed as credible in their economic promises. The turn to extremist leadership could come simply as a means of venting anger and frustration. What may occur in the future is suggested by the rioting in the cities of south Brazil in 1983. Rampaging mobs in Sao Paulo sacked shops and pillaged supermarkets in an orgy of street violence which attracted diverse social elements.

In Asia, one finds a different picture but one full of contradictions. While India's contemporary life is deeply embedded in the ancient past,

Japan represnts the most successful and dynamic modern economic society, though it combines a unique national consensus system with a fierce drive for the ultimate in modernisation. Several smaller Asian countries, including South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, share Japan's total immersion in the modernization process. Indonesia, with almost 200 million people of diverse ethnic strains, has undergone extensive modernization but contains serious ethnic and religious stresses because of its makeup. The difficulties the country faces in terms of modernization is evidenced by the fact that 250 mutually unintelligible languages are spoken in Indonesia. The future of the People's Republic of China is even more problematic because of its enormous population and the extraordinary changes in economic and social policy in recent years. It is too early to tell whether the current policies will endure and what impact they will have on a society that underwent the most severe shaking of any society in the world during the years of Maoist supremacy. At this point, it is wholly unclear what level of modernization will be reached over the next decade or several decades.

What we see, as we survey the globe, is a very uneven world with vast disparities in wealth and development. While some nations and regions are surging ahead, others seem to be sinking. The tensions that will be created as this process accelerates — as the gap widens between rich and poor, between developed and undeveloped, between the well-fed and the hungry — undoubtedly will be enormous and fraught with potential for occasions of conflict now unforeseen. Then there are the 'crazy states' to use Brian Crozier's term — Libya and Iran — that are wild cards on the world scene, where partial modernization is mixed with religious fanaticism.

Certainly, this is not the kind of world that was envisioned at the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955. Then, it was assumed, the Third World would catch up with the First World, and massive resources were transferred from the First World for that purpose, but the wealth transfers didn't work. The influence of the past in many of the new countries was too powerful to overcome. Countries have risen and virtually collapsed in the space of the decades. The impact of these changes is likely to be as strong on the mind of the West as it is on the fragile structures of the countries which either can't cope with modernization or have decided that they don't want full modernization after all. The emergence of a fundamentalist Iran indicates that the people of that country did not want the Western-style modernization that the late Shah attempted to impose on his people.

That any people would choose irrationality over rationality is hard for Westerners to understand. They also find it hard to understand that Russians don't have a natural appetite for liberty. As we confront a changed, uneven, and divided world in the late 20th century, we also will be compelled to confront our own notions about the allegedly universal nature of human aspirations and cultural desires.

Despite the turbulence of the 20th century, Europeans and Americans

frequently continue to view faraway peoples as Westerners in exotic garb. They regard peoples with the most alien traditions as having a potential for becoming some type of social democrat. In particular, Americans embrace the notion that modernization, the application of technology to the processes of community and personal life, is as inevitable as the sun rising in the East. They expect the differentiating factors in humanity to be smoothed out by an application of technological modernization and everyone, in short order, to be almost the same. This is a form of utopianism that is very strong. Whether it is as strong in the mid-1980s as it was in the 1950s is open to question. The harsh world events of the past 30 years have undoubtedly increased the number of Westerners who appreciate the differences between peoples and cultures. Gradually, perhaps, technocratic Westerners will comprehend that the culture of a society is made up of hundreds and thousands of layers put down over as many years. If Westerners are to deal successfully with the world around them, they need this kind of understanding; they need to grasp the fact that the history and character of a people are not eliminated because radios are introduced into remote villages or a few nuclear power plants built on the edge of ancient ricefields.

Modernization is sometimes superficial to a degree that Westerners fail to understand; this was the case at Bhopal. The outward signs of modernization in a society often conceal the illusive intangibles of a society's inner existence that affect the thoughts and actions of a people. It is difficult for Westerners to recognise these existential intangibles and acknowledge their controlling influence. Both the Bhopal accident and the gradual breakdown in post-independence Africa, culminating in famine, are reminders of the power of the intangible qualities in two societies that have experienced a disaster. These disturbing events serve to make us understand that the simplified view of history that has prevailed since the end of World War II is grossly inadequate and cannot account for historical accidents and surprises that reveal hidden attitudes and patterns of human behaviour.

[Anthony Harrigan has contributed articles to *Europa-Archiv, American Heritage, Australian Army Journal, The Dalhousie Review* and many other journals.]

GENOCIDE IN EAST TIMOR

by Alexander George

THE recent U.S.-aided departures of dictators Duvalier and Marcos have led to an impressive brouhaha in the West, accompanied by a good deal of relieved backslapping. Reports of the demise of a decent Western foreign policy have been greatly exaggerated, we are now being assured. I am not convinced. Since Haiti and the Philippines arguably present cases in which the West's duty and interests coincide, one cannot straightforwardly test the principled character of its foreign policy by examining them. In order to avoid confounding, then, one must seek a case in which ethics and pragmatics dictate different courses of action. Even a brief examination of East Timor's torment, just entering its second decade, reveals in razor-sharp fashion just those sterling attributes of Western foreign policy that have made the rest of the world so enamoured of us, and will make clear, in case there was ever any doubt, exactly which considerations are the motivating ones.

On November 28, 1975, amid mounting Indonesian attacks from across the border, FRETILIN, a nationalist and popular movement, declared the independence of East Timor, eastern half of the island of Timor and former Portuguese colony, and appealed to the international community to protect its right to self-determination. On December 7, 1975, just hours after President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger left Jakarta, Indonesia invaded East Timor and began a campaign, now over ten years old, that is leading, in the words of the head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, 'to the ethnic, cultural and religious extinction of the identity of the People of East Timor'.[1]

Amnesty International's latest report[2] on human rights violations in East Timor is almost unreadable, so horrifying and widespread are the sufferings the Indonesian forces have inflicted on a defenceless people. According to Amnesty, 'since the invasion in December 1975 Indonesian troops have systematically and persistently violated human rights in East Timor'. They report the arbitrary killing of hundreds of non-combatants, the extrajudicial execution of those surrendering to Indonesian forces, 'disappearances', arbitrary arrests and detention without trial 'on a massive scale', and forced resettlement in *campos de concentracao,* as they are generally known. Torture of detainees is widespread and, apparently, officially condoned. Amnesty confirms the existence of secret military manuals issued to troops which permit torture and suggest how force may best be used during interrogations. After only the first year of the war, Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, estimated that between 50,000 and 80,000 people had died.[3] The most intense savagery, however, was yet to come.

From 1977 to 1979, the Indonesians conducted massive aerial and naval bombardment of the central mountainous region where many Timorese lived or had fled after the invasion. This completely disrupted

food planting and starvation was soon taking its toll. According to Amnesty, the Indonesian Foreign Minister admitted that, by 1979, the famine might be worse than those 'in Biafra or Cambodia'. While a Portuguese census in 1974 counted 650,000 Timorese, an Indonesian census in 1980 counted only 550,000, a loss of one sixth of the population. Many urge that the Indonesian figure is too high; Catholic authorities put the current population at 425,000 and the former Bishop of Dili (the capital of East Timor) said in 1983 that the territory had lost 200,000 people, almost one third of its population.[4] During most of this time, the Indonesians refused to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross access to the territory, thereby effectively preventing relief activities of any kind, in itself a crime against humanity.

Throughout this period, Western nations have offered the Indonesian regime continuous and increasing military, financial and diplomatic support. There is clear evidence that the U.S., Britain, and Australia knew of the impending invasion, decided to avert their eyes, and hoped that the subjugation of the East Timorese would be swift and silent. Sir John Ford, then London's Ambassador to Jakarta, reported in a telegram to the Foreign Office in July 1975 that

> The people of Portuguese Timor are in no condition to exercise the right to self-determination. . . . The territory seems likely to become steadily more of a problem child, and the arguments in favour of its integration into Indonesia are all the stronger. . . . Certainly as seen from here, it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible, and that if it should come to the crunch and there is a row in the United Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid taking sides against the Indonesian Government.[5]

That the East Timorese should be crushed, 'unobtrusively' if possible, was in 'Britain's interest', more accurately, in that of a powerful élite, though certainly not in the interests of most British people, let alone in those of decency or justice. For this reason, examination of the course of action the British Government chose to pursue proves a very valuable corrective to the self-congratulation regularly disseminated by its functionaries.

As it turned out, Britain, along with most of the Civilised World, did indeed keep its head down as the suffering of this "problem child" was repeatedly raised before the United Nations. Five days after the Indonesian invasion, the General Assembly voted on resolution 3485 which strongly deplored the invasion and called upon Indonesia to remove immediately its forces so as to permit the East Timorese exercise of their right to self-determination and independence. This resolution was adopted with 72 votes to 10 and 43 abstentions, including the U.S., Britain and most of Western Europe. It is likely that a different voting outcome, coming right after the invasion, would have provided a clear signal that Indonesian aggression was not going to be tolerated. As it was, Indonesia did get the message: the West was giving it a green light in East Timor. As Lord Avebury noted, 'If at the time of the Indonesian invasion there had been anything like the outcry in the West which greeted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Indonesian aggression might well have been

halted.' He goes on to note, quite correctly, that 'Western countries after all, give Indonesia massive economic, military and diplomatic support. Far from diminishing since the invasion, the support has substantially increased.'[6]

The diplomatic support has yielded a steadily decreasing majority by which the seven following annual resolutions calling for an act of self-determination in East Timor have been passed. The U.S. (since 1976) and Australia (since 1978) have voted regularly with Indonesia; Britain has consistently abstained. In 1983, for the first time in nine years, the U.N. did not vote on any resolution condemning the Indonesian occupation and subsequent 'integration' and calling for self-determination for the East Timorese. Similarly in 1984. In March 1985, the UN Human Rights Commission voted to delete the issue of East Timor from its agenda. The day nears when the whole issue will be permanently shelved — no doubt much to the relief of Western nations, who will then be able to raise their heads again at last.

The diplomatic support has proceeded in tandem with financial aid. In addition to making Indonesia one of the World Bank's largest clients, in 1967, in the wake of massacres of an estimated million citizens following Suharto's seizure of power, several Western nations (including the UK) and international monetary institutions formed the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) which has provided significant financial assistance for two decades. Indonesia, with a foreign debt approaching $30 billion can expect an estimated $2.4 billion of aid from IGGI in 1986/87.

The war against East Timor has consumed vast amounts of Indonesia's military hardware and the West has continuously and increasingly supplied Indonesia with all the military equipment needed in order to carry out its subjection of the East Timorese. The US, of course, remains in the forefront, although the UK and others, quick into the race, are now jockeying for position. In April 1978, under a Labour Government, and at the time of massive and indiscriminate Indonesian bombardment of East Timor, British Aerospace (BA) signed a £25 million contract to supply that Government with 8 Hawk trainer/ground-attack aircraft. By 1982, Britain had sold $80 million of military equipment to Indonesia and had become its fourth largest weapons dealer (after the US, West Germany, and France).[7] In 1984, Vosper-Thorneycroft obtained a contract for the supply of three refitted naval frigates. It is not difficult to see that such ships would be useful during military operations against an island in parts most easily accessible by sea. Furthermore, the crucial role of Indonesia's navy in the illegal quarantine of East Timor is obvious. British Government officials when pressed with these facts could again only lamely reiterate that 'we would not grant an export licence if we thought that the equipment in question was likely to be used for purposes of repression.'[8]

Seven months after this assurance, Indonesia opened the campaign in which it was going to hit the rebels 'without mercy'. By early 1984, the

£20 million Vosper-Thorneycroft deal was sealed. It has been followed by several others, culminating, in December 1984, with BA's £100 million sale of the Rapier missile system and, in December 1985, with a £82.7 million sale of further Rapier units.[9] There is every reason to believe that this trend, if unchecked by public outcry, will continue.

The media must also bear their share of responsibility. Before Mrs. Thatcher's visit to Indonesia in April 1985, an editorial in *The Times,* quite representative on the whole, suggested that 'the people (of East Timor) have not reconciled themselves to being part of Indonesia, and that the Indonesian authorities have done little to endear themselves to the Timorese.'[10] It is revealing that *The Times* considers East Timor to be part of Indonesia, though every UN resolution passed thus far has rejected Indonesia's claim to the territory. It is also slightly jarring that this newspaper of distinction casually refers to casualty estimates of 100,000-200,000 in such an understated manner. This is not untypical. An earlier headline in *The Times* read 'Indonesia fears terror tactics in Timor'.[11] For nearly a decade, Indonesia has massacred and starved the East Timorese population, driving it to the brink of 'extinction', without either *The Times,* or any other wide-circulation publication, labelling that Government's actions terroristic; at worst, the Indonesians 'have done little to endear themselves'. Yet, when the victims rise up to defend their lives and culture, then they are guilty of 'terror tactics'.

At any rate, *The Times* editorial went on to reassure us that 'Mrs. Thatcher can be relied on, at the very least, to repeat to her Indonesian hosts the words of her Foreign Secretary, who said in January that "the people of East Timor deserve the opportunity to determine their own future in accordance with their own political aspirations, unaffected by pressures of one kind or another." ' Hollow and cynical words, given the diplomatic, military, and economic support Britain has consistently and increasingly offered the Indonesian Government. *The Times,* in accord with the conventions of tasteful reporting, omitted to mention the nature and source of the 'pressures' weighing on the Timorese. In any event, *The Times* was in for a surprise for, though it is unknown what Mrs. Thatcher told her hosts privately, she did inform them in public that 'when it comes to defending independence and freedom we are at one with you'.[12]

During this time, much ink was spilt on the event of the tenth anniversary of the 'fall' of Saigon. Scores of stories, interviews, reports, reminiscences, and reflections were printed, most of which did not hesitate to lament the sorry state of many Vietnamese today — from a practical perspective (but not an ideological one), all totally futile exercises in view of the virtually complete lack of influence the West now has over Vietnamese policies. Quite a different state of affairs exists when one considers Indonesia's enormous dependence on the West. One might guess then, that December 1985 saw periodicals overflowing with first-hand refugee accounts of a decade of genocide against a mountain people in East Timor, with honest and thorough analyses of Western complicity,

and with appeals to our governments to cease their so far unswerving support and begin pressuring Indonesia into abiding by international law and withdrawing immediately from East Timor. Guess again.

In a secret cable sent on August 17, 1975, Richard Woolcott, Australian Ambassador to Jakarta, advised his country's Department of Foreign Affairs to adopt, with respect to Indonesia's designs on East Timor, 'a pragmatic rather than a principled stand (since) that is what national interest and foreign policy is all about'. (See footnote 5.) This is exactly what the West has done. Once this is grasped, we will see more clearly how to evaluate those situations in which our interests happen to coincide with our duty, and we will cease to have illusions about the uses to which our power is put. One must hope that with this insight will come change, and yet one can only wonder and fear how much more misery will be inflicted in the name of decency, albeit in the spirit of 'pragmatism'.

NOTES

1. Released by the Apostolic Administrator, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, and the Council of Priests of the Diocese of Dili, January 1, 1985; reprinted in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 69, May 1985, pp. 12-14.
2. *East Timor: Violations of Human Rights*, Amnesty International Publications, 1985.
3. Malik's comment is worth quoting more fully. He is reported to have said: '50,000 or 80,000 people might have been killed during the war in East Timor. . . . It was war . . . Then what is the big fuss?' Quoted from *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 April 1977.
4. *The Irish Times*, 8 September 1983. *A World at War — 1983*, published by the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, ranks the casualties in East Timor as the second largest of all current wars, with between 100,000 and 250,000 dead.
5. This cable was one of many published in a book which proved so embarrassing to the Australian Government that it was immediately banned by the Australian High Court and ordered withdrawn from circulation. See *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1963-75*, G. J. Munster and J. R. Walsh, Hongkong, 1980. Some further excerpts are reprinted in *The War Against East Timor*, C. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, Zed Press, London, 1984.
6. Letter to *The Times*, 7 July 1980.
7. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1972-1982*, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1984, p. 96. The figure given is cumulative from 1978-1982.
8. Letter from Lord (John) Belstead to Sir Bernard Braine, 18 January 1983.
9. *Financial Times*, 16 December 1985. This report add that 'discussions are said to be well advanced on the sale of up to 600 British-built Scorpion light tanks to the Indonesian Army'.
10. *The Times*, 9 April 1985. See my *East Timor and The Shaming of The West* (TAPOL Publications, London, 1985), for a more extensive discussion of the role of the press.
11. *The Times*, 7 March 1985.
12. *The Guardian*, 10 April 1985.

[Alexander George is a Junior Research Fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford. He is the author of *East Timor and The Shaming of The West*, TAPOL Publications, London, 1985.]

INTERNATIONAL BANKING

by B. Narpati

IN the United States it has become increasingly difficult to separate banks from nonbanks. These difficulties have arisen partly as a result of financial innovation spurred by the desire of institutions to avoid costly regulation. According to Mr. Walter B. Wriston, 'the banks of the 1990s are already here; the only trouble is that bankers are not running them'. He suggests that nonbank companies can now do everything a bank does and more. (The term 'bank' as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (the BHCA) and its later amendments).

Concepts of what is banking and what is not are blurred and national borders are losing their significance. The level of interest rates has created new incentives for innovation and competition. Presently there are a number of financial institutions and instruments that were unknown a decade ago. Financial intermediation as a whole has grown.

Within banking, foreign-owned institutions now have a significant share of the market. Conversely, the large US banks have greatly expanded their activities abroad.

There is an enormous field for possible expansion, for example, in some forms of insurance, management consultancy, travel services, securities activities, money market funds, data processing and transmission.

The Bank of New York stated in 1982 that it is, or will be, a participant in certain reschedulings, extensions and new money commitments to a limited number of foreign countries. It welcomed a new law in New York State that limits hostile takeovers.

There has been a slippage in the capital position of some of the large American banking organizations over much of the postwar period. The turbulent financial environment of today and the risks in even money transfer business emphasise the importance of capital adequacy.

The era of deregulation in banking in the United States has begun and is evidenced by the fact that banks are able to offer savings accounts and checking accounts without any interest rate ceilings. Further deregulation will come about within the next few years through modification of the Glass-Steagall Act to permit banks to offer such services as mutual funds and to underwrite revenue bonds.

Progress in Washington towards interstate banking has moderated somewhat. Recent actions by state legislatures suggest that interstate banking may evolve on a regional level through affiliations of banks in states which offer reciprocal banking privileges.

According to Dr. Günther Schleiminger, there has been a major shift in relations between official institutions and commercial banks. The rapid expansion of external operations of commercial banks is a striking phenomenon in international monetary developments of the past two decades. International banking activity took on completely new dimensions within this relatively short period of time.

Bank operations with non-residents have reached proportions not experienced hitherto in the history of banking. In contrast to the traditional use of national currencies, banking transactions have come to be conducted predominantly in foreign currencies. New techniques greatly increased the volume and efficiency of intermediation across national borders. More importantly, the main function of international bank lending shifted from financing external trade to the financing of international payment imbalances.

The entry of commercial banks into the field held by international institutions has resulted in the accumulation of huge bank claims on deficit countries. No marked reduction of existing payments imbalances can be expected in the short run and it calls for an assessment of the roles of international institutions and commercial banks in such circumstances.

International banking activity increased rapidly in the 1960s and was subject to much official discussion. Attention shifted to its prudential aspects and later to the implications of bank lending for the working of the international adjustment process.

For practical reasons international bank lending cannot ensure with exactitude a continuing balance between financing and adjustment. A proposal seeks a way out in shifting the responsibility for the international adjustment process from the commercial banks back to the international financial institutions. This needs acceptance of an economically and socially adjustment process and to treat it as a residual variable with a pre-determined time for the expected improvement to work through.

An expanded financing role for any of the three major financial institutions (the BIS, the World Bank with its regional financial institutions, and the IMF) would alter their basic characters.

BIS lending to official debtors is restricted to central banks, is not tied to economic policy constraints, and is of the nature of bridging finance. It is not suitable for medium-term adjustment programmes.

The endeavours of the international financing institutions to improve the environment for financing and to guide adjustment have been a decisive factor for commercial banks to assume and to continue with their role in the financing of payments imbalances. The present-day role of international institutions as centres for economic policy in co-operation and co-ordination shows the differences between today's world and that of half a century ago.

The international debt problems are medium-term and there are no instant remedies for them. They can be resolved over a period of years and only by the concerted efforts of all those concerned. There is no cure-all and nor is there any substitute for adjustment by the debtors.

There was a risk of a crisis of confidence in the international financial system. The declaration of moratoria and the provision of bridging money have provided time for more secure financial arrangements. The events of the past few months will lead over time to an appraisal of the role for commercial banking intermediation in international banking flows.

The problems of sustaining the soundness of individual banks and of the system as a whole in the current circumstances have been extensively debated. Seemingly there is no alternative to make do and mend at present. Events of the past few months will lead over time to a reappraisal of the proper role for commercial banking intermediation in international banking flows, levels of exposure, and monitoring global business. There has been excessive concentration on marketing and asset-led growth.

Concern is expressed that short-term interbank funding has been inappropriately used and that interbank linkages have increased the vulnerability of the banking system. Interbank lines have become an important part of some borrowers' financing structure. It is vital that such expenditure be maintained at least until alternative funding sources have been provided.

Serious adjustment programmes by debtor countries will often prove socially and politically difficult to achieve. The financial institutions (the commercial banks, the central banks, and the official international bodies) all face risks in doing too much and in doing too little.

There is a break from a market-oriented system of lending to many developing countries to highly organized lending programmes.

A characteristic feature of the new financing practices is the increasingly thin line between credit markets and capital markets. There is a shift from conventional loans to issuance of negotiable securities. This was the backdrop for the emergence of a host of financing mechanisms as the 1980's began. The banks take on a liquidity risk by agreeing to grant a long-term credit line. This risk can often be hard to quantify.

REFERENCES
Blunden, George: Speech at the Mansion House. 6 May, 1986.
Cooke, W. P., Head of Banking Supervision, Bank of England. The Ernest Sykes Memorial Lecture. 26 April, 1983.
Jenkins, Roy. Speech at a meeting at the University of New York organised by the American European Community Association. 6 January, 1983.
Leutwiler, F. Speech delivered to the fifty-third Annual General Meeting of the BIS, Basle, 13 June, 1983.
Martin, Preston. 'Financial Services Evolution' — an address. San Francisco, California. 20 March, 1985.
McMahon, C. W. Speech given at the IMEDE Banking Management Conference, Lausanne, Switzerland. 17 September, 1985.
Schleiminger, Günther. An address to the 34th International Banking Summer School in Timmendorfer Strand. 10 September, 1981.
Volcker, Paul A. Remarks before the Forex Association of North America, New York, N.Y. 28 April, 1983.
Werner, Pierre. Prime Minister, Luxembourg.

[B. Narpati is a financial journalist.]

RISING MUSLIM CONSCIOUSNESS

by Kusum Bhambri

A RAGING tide seems to be an apt simile with which to sum up the chaos and turmoil that has taken place within the Muslim community in India. As most often happens, the controversy started out as a mere whimper, but all too soon it was replaced by the loud and virulent anger of the people, and no one could have predicted the kind of emotion it would generate which would turn it into one of the most complex political issues of the community. The cause of all this commotion and heartache is Shah Bano; a 73 year old woman who resides in the old princely city of Indore. Ten years ago, Shah Bano's husband divorced her after 43 years of marriage. Divorce or *talaaq* not in itself unusual or the reason for the controversy. What was unusual however, was the 73 year old Shah Bano's decision to go to court to get her husband to pay a small maintenance. That unprecedented move has made her a figure of national importance to the small number of liberals who want to change the Muslim laws and the way they are applied, as well as the local fundamentalists who feel that the Muslim Personal Law should be left to the Muslims to apply in accordance with the Quran as they see fit, without any interference from the government. Shah Bano's case is now a matter of great importance, the effects of which are being felt right across the country, and this has led to an Islamic resurgence such as has not been witnessed for decades.

In India there are five distinct religions: Hinduism, Sikhism, Christianity, Buddhism and Islam. The Muslims consist of one third of the religious sects, they constitute 11.35 per cent of India's population, a sizeable number, but in such a varied and diverse country as India they feel their culture and way of life is slowly disappearing.

Many Muslims believe that any self-respecting woman should refuse to accept money from the man who has divorced her, and they cite the Sharia which has specific rules about this. They see divorce as a total breaking of all ties and once the obligations of *mehr* (dowry) have been paid the man is like any other stranger. This means that the woman has to wear a veil in front of her ex-husband and he can no longer be treated as one of the family; thus his money becomes *haram* or untouchable.

The controversy has led to loud and bitter debates with the fundamentalists arguing that in Islam there is no concept of *kanyadan*. The emotional idea of the daughter going from the father's house to the husband's house does not exist. In a Muslim *nikaah* the issue of marriage is treated much more clinically; it is not a sacrament but a contract; and when a woman gets divorced all that she is entitled to from her husband is her *mehr*. After that her blood relatives become responsible for her. Any responsibility as a spouse or ex-spouse is then truly terminated. Because Muslim Personal Law is open to interpretations, the fundamentalists feel that women are being given a rough deal which makes it

easy for the man to divorce them simply by saying the words *talaaq, talaaq, talaaq.* The liberals, while taking this into account, argue that it is not unreasonable to expect that laws made 14 centuries back should change and develop with the times, and since the religious scriptures are the main framework it becomes necessary for the government to legislate when it sees fit.

Because the statute book is not at all clear about the Muslim Personal Law, the Supreme Court interprets the scriptures on its own; hence the decision in Shah Bano's case that even under Quranic law maintenance was admissible, and this is what lies at the heart of the controversy. And to add further to the tension, Shah Bano's judgement was followed by a number of similar judgements which were based on the Supreme Court decision.

The Muslim Personal Law has as its guiding star the Quran, but apart from the Quran there are three other sources of personal law: Sunna (practice and explanation of the prophet), Ijma (the sum ideas of the learned) and Qiyas (analogies). Also, there are seven distinct and quite separate schools of Islamic law, namely Hanafi, Shafei, Malki, Hambali, Ithna-ashari, Ismaili and Zaidi, and differences arise because none of these schools of Islamic law interpret Muslim Personal Law uniformly.

In 1862 under the rule of the British, English laws were brought in but simultaneously the Muslims were granted the right to be governed by their traditional laws on matters relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance etc. But problems arose because this was not made part of the statute book and as a consequence the ambiguity often resulted in trouble. In 1937 the Muslim Personal (Sharia) Application Act was brought into being, whereby cases of marriage, *mehr,* divorce, separation decisions would be based on the Sharia. In 1939 the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act was passed, whereby a Muslim woman seeking a divorce could move court.

All through time, while changes have been taking place, one major problem has not been solved and that concerns the new laws which, while being based on the Sharia, have done nothing to codify the divine Muslim law. Hence, without any firmly stated Sharia law, it is an open target for a number of interpretations depending on the various schools of thought. This further exacerbates the need today to codify the Muslim Personal Law and adds weight to the arguments the liberals have been putting forward.

The signing of the Assam accord is seen by many to be a political concession made at the expense of immigrant Muslims in the area and this has been a proverbial thorn in the side of the Muslims. It is important to understand the Muslim's desire to be able to maintain his religious identity at all costs, and evidence of this can be seen in the victory of the Janata Party Lok Sabha by-election at Kishanganj in N. Bihr in December 1985, where this issue played a major part in securing victory. In December 1984, exactly a year before R. Gandhi's Congress(I)

Party had won the Kishanganj constituency, by a formidable margin of 1.3 lakh votes. The Kishanganj constituency is a large area along the Indo-Bangladesh border and has vast numbers of Bengali speaking Muslim peasants. But with the threat and evidence of assimilation and interference in their personal modes of living, the Muslims decided not to vote for the Congress(I) Party despite the fact that the party's candidate was the general secretary of a well-known Muslim religious organisation, the Jamiat-Ul-Uleme-e-Hind. Although Mr. Syed Shahbuddin won by a 70,000 vote majority, there is a strong feeling amongst the electorate that the Muslims voted not so much for him but for protection of Sharia law.

Right across the country, supporters of the Congress(I) Party have been complaining bitterly of the losses they have sustained from voters they had earlier relied upon. As election results show, the tide is slowly shifting in a new direction and unless something is done soon, Congress(1) Party could face a political debacle from which it might not be able to recover.

1. The newly set up United Minorities Front in Assam, (UMF) took 18 assembly seats. Almost all of these constituencies have a Muslim majority. The UMF while campaigning concentrated on two very major points. One concerns the threat which immigrant Muslims face as a result of the Assam accord, and two, the threat to Muslims all over the country and their culture and identity which has arisen from the decision passed on the Shah Bano case.

2. In the election in Bavoda, the Congress(I) candidate was defeated by 8,365 votes. The Chief Minister of Gujarat, Amarsinh Chaudhary, sees the defeat as a direct result of the loss of a large number of Muslim votes in the constituency. It was ironic that Jaspal Sing, who won the votes was a former police commissioner who had resigned from the police force when he was accused by the Muslims of pro-Hindu communalism.

3. Meena Kumar of the Congress(I) Party barely managed to win the elections in Bijnore, but the party failed to get the Muslim vote from some 1.6 lakh Muslims. And on the other side it has been estimated that the Lok Dal's Ram Bilas Paswan got 1 lakh votes from the Muslims.

4. The Chief Minister of Kendrapara in Orissa, J.B. Patnaik, blamed the Congress(I) Party's high margin of defeat on the 10% Muslims who had deserted the party.

5. And in Bolpur, in West Bengal, Siddhartna Shanker Ray lost to the CPI (M) Party by 40,000 votes, an increase on that sustained by the Congress(I) Party in December 1984, while the Congress(I) Party's votes from the Muslims had dwindled to half the amount of the previous year.

These trends in the electoral spectrum are bad news for the Congress(I) Party, although even before the elections the Prime Minister was aware of the way the tide was turning. Now, after Assam and the December by-elections Rajiv Gandhi is very conscious of the political burden he carries in the form of the Muslim Personal Law controversy. The recent

introduction of a bill which removes the right of divorced Muslim wives to seek maintenance from civil courts is a concession Rajiv Gandhi has made to appease the fundamentalists before the situation got out of hand and the Ulemas managed to tilt the scales decisively, thus swinging the Muslim electorate away from the Congress(I) Party. The Muslim clergy can easily influence the Muslim voters to repeat the 1977 debacle when they voted *en masse* against Congress(I). For the Congress(I) Party and Rajiv Gandhi this would spell disaster. Although the Muslim vote in the Lok Sabha can only win a maximum of 50 seats it still has the power to affect decisively the situation in about 100 others. Also, it is impossible for any party to win in Sammu and Kashmir, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Assam without a sizeable vote of confidence from the Muslims.

Far from easing the situation the ruling party has further divided the Muslim community and given the opposition parties another stick with which to beat the Prime Minister. The new bill limits the responsibility of the husband to pay maintenance up to three months, after which the divorced woman's blood relatives become responsible for her well-being. And in cases where this is not possible, the responsibility could in turn be passed on to the Muslim society at large and organisations funded by the government.

The Congress(I) Party is at the moment caught in a difficult position and should be wary of other political parties taking advantage of the situation, though this does seem unlikely. Still, one should not rule out the possibility of a new Muslim party similar to the UMF in Assam making its presence felt on the national level. The Muslim vote could also be captured by an alliance between the Lok Dal and Janata Party but this would only come about in a post-Charan Singh era.

Whatever the outcome, the controversy has highlighted a problem that needs to be tackled, and the debating of this issue is but one step nearer the goal of change and reform. The Muslims must look ahead and see what is best for them, thus a solution to the problem is one they will have to find for themselves. However, they must also bear in mind the comment made by three members of the Constituent Assembly: 'One of the factors that has kept India back from advancing to nationhood has been the existence of a personal law based on religion which kept the nation divided into watertight compartments in many aspects of life'. If in the future the dialogue takes a few positive steps towards that ultimate solution, the person most deserving of praise will be a 73 year old divorcée from Indore.

[Kusum Bhambri is studying Indian and English literature at the University of Exeter with a special interest in the works of Salmon Rushdie. A collection of her poetry is shortly to be published in India.]

PROPAGANDA WAR IN THE CLASSROOM

by Lady Olga Maitland

> Education for Peace must try to bring about changed conditions . . .
> Some areas it will be concerned with are:
> Challenging the militaristic values of society, in which society is glamourised and unquestioning patriotism is a virtue; breaking down rigid, authoritarian hierarchies; . . .

THE author of these aims is the National Union of Teachers in their *Education for Peace* pamphlet.

It is hardly surprising therefore that the Gallup Poll published on May 19th 1986 shows that there is wide all-party support for legal action to enforce an education free from partisan political bias.

In my call for an Independent Enquiry or Watchdog Commission into political indoctrination and bias in schools, I would not only like to gather the fullest picture possible of what is really going on in schools but also to make recommendations ensuring that a proper balance is returned to the classroom.

Not only has the classroom become a political football, but it is worrying that educationalists have so completely lost sight of their original calling for dedicated professionalism.

There is a systemic determination to turn children against society. They, the educationalists, seek to deny them a sense of identity with their history, culture, even religion. It is hardly surprising that school-leavers feel there is not a world worth working for. They are bred to distrust the framework of society which provides the guidelines for a civilised world.

The anti-police campaign has meant that in ILEA schools police are not invited in to speak to the children about their work or their fight against drug abuse.

I found it depressing in an education debate in my ILEA campaign where I was a candidate for Holborn and St. Pancras to hear my opponent, Elizabeth Monck, say that schools would have to know the exact identity of a policeman before he set foot on the premises. Indeed, he could only come at all if a vote in the staff-room agreed to such a visit. It would appear that the head teacher had no right of veto.

It is worth examining the late GLC Police Committee Support Unit work, still under protection through tombstone funding. They produced a video and poster entitled 'Policing London' where in vivid pictures it was alleged that police are 'bored'. Therefore, they go in search of excitement (pursuit, arrests and car chases are popular). They suffer from routine over-reaction with the use of excessive force which results in deaths. Women, gays and blacks are particularly harassed while the police allegedly are in a search of the cult of masculinity, particularly through drinking. Stop and search, surveillance, the use of police dogs are to be condemned while apparently we have a 'militarised' police force. In this area

they use guns with a policy to shoot to kill rather than wound.

That is the gist of the allegations and it is hardly surprising that such material, freely available in schools and backed up by teachers is designed to give the young a very distorted idea of the real purpose of the police force.

Race riots in which young people play a major part are worth studying when you examine the anti-racist policies in schools. An examination of the publication *How Racism came to Britain* by the Institute of Race Relations and funded by the late GLC and the British Council of Churches, an off-shoot of the World Council of Churches, is very disturbing.

This glossy cartoon style book is aimed at ten-year-olds upwards. It is designed to re-write history and encourage the newcomer to hate Britain. Chapter headings are: Plunder, Slavery, Colonialism and the ideas behind racism, Racist Britain, Employment, Housing, Education, Police, Violent Britain, etc.

One drawing shows a totally naked white man standing on the shoulders of two black men manacled together with more oppressed blacks on the ground. The white man with a beam is reaching towards his halo in heaven and saying: '. . . nearer my God to thee . . .'.

Further on in the chapter on police it states: 'While police swamp black events by force of numbers (over 1,600 police were at the Notting Hill carnival in 1976) they are nowhere to be seen when it comes to racist attacks. A drawing follows of a black man dying of stab wounds, blood flowing into the gutter and a policeman saying: 'Now then, what's all the fuss and panic about claims of an alleged racist attack eh? Move along here in an orderly fashion or I'll have you for obstruction . . .'.

It would appear that there is a systematic attempt to undermine the Christian morality of our society especially through the family. The anti-sexist education is not about teaching girls to be scientists; it is about undermining family values and propagating homosexuality and lesbianism. The GLC Gay Working Party published *Changing the World, A London Charter for Gay and Lesbian Rights* in which a chapter is devoted to: 'Tell it in the Classroom'. It recommends that 'Schools should acknowledge the work and achievements of lesbians and gays. Lesbian and gay pupils should see reflected in the curriculum the richness and diversity of homosexual experience.'

ILEA's magazine, *Teaching London Kids*, confuses all issues with an article entitled, 'Miss is a Lesbian; the Experience of a WHITE lesbian teacher in a boys' school.'

A study of *GEN*, funded by ILEA which is aimed at teachers with ideas for classroom projects, shows a complete contempt for educational standards while furthering an almost revolutionary style of sexuality. It does nothing to bring love and respect into the family but seeks deliberately to undermine it. Amid a series of downright pornographic items there is a letter published, produced in its original childlike handwriting, from a 12-year-old schoolgirl from North London to the Womens Education Resource Centre saying: 'We are a group of girls aged ten to fourteen

and we would be grateful for any information you could send us to help run our women's group?'.

It would be impossible for me to conclude this article without a brief comment on how nuclear issues are being used to frighten school children without a study of the meaning of war and the importance of preventing a war starting in the first place.

Today, more than ever in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, children will be told that anything nuclear must be avoided at all costs, again without putting the tragedy into perspective. While I am not suggesting for a moment that nuclear issues should be swept under the carpet, it is absolutely essential that they are discussed in a calm and balanced atmosphere. It does not help when studying teaching materials that children are encouraged to write stories imagining they are the victims of a nuclear attack.

CND have an offshoot entitled *Teachers for Peace* compiled by a number of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms. In a pack for teachers entitled 'Teaching About Nuclear Weapons' it suggests that children are asked: 'Do you think that nuclear war is likely in the future? Do you think you would stand a good chance of surviving a nuclear war? Do you think that American nuclear bases should remain in the UK? Children are also taught about the physical and medical effects of a nuclear blast with a table of the effects of an explosion both on their homes and the degree they would suffer skin burns.

While the public are just waking up to the insidious effects of indoctrination, it is nonetheless disappointing that they did not register their disapproval in the recent ILEA elections. Parental and child intimidation is still too strong for many to speak out. I would therefore hope that an Independent Enquiry or Watchdog Commission will set out with the urgency the task requires, to ensure that we respond to the needs of cowed, silent majority. It is tragic that the VIPs of the future — our children, are allowed to wallow at the mercy of some members of the teaching profession, because of lack of moral strength on our part to tackle it.

[Lady Olga Maitland is Chairman of Families for Defence.]

The October issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Sinhala-Tamil Negotiations* by Karan Sawhny, *Liberation Movements* by Urs Schoettli, *National Security, Official Information and the Law* by Graham J. Zellick and *Has History a Future?* by Peter Beck.

SWEDISH POLITICS: THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF AN ERA? — 1

by Richard Pybus

IN 1984 it was not uncommon to encounter, in Sweden as much as elsewhere, self-congratulatory opinion as to just how thoroughly wrong George Orwell had been in his gloomy prognosis. The prevalence of such attitudes in Sweden, where the tentacles of the State *apparat* reach into almost every aspect of existence, where Social Democrat Newspeak flourishes rankly, where a large proportion of the populace are mesmerised by State TV, where social alienation is a widespread fact of life (and where the State Telephone Company advertises its services with the slogan, 'Telephoning is a way of being together'), would seem to suggest that Orwell had not been so far from the mark after all.

In September 1985, at what *Time* magazine dubbed 'The Big Brother Ballot', the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) managed, with the help of the Left Party Communists (VPK), to scramble their way into a further term of office. Though the SDAP result was poorer than their narrow victory in 1982, when they resumed power after six years out of office, in fact it was an outstanding success, since all forecasts four to nine months previously had been that they had no chance whatsoever of winning an election. The poor outlook then had many contributory causes — economic restraint and inflation, growing dissatisfaction with the SDAP hegemony and state paternalism, and, by no means least in importance, the steadily declining popularity of the SDAP Chairman and Premier, Mr Olof Palme, struck down, as the world knows, by an unknown assassin on 28th February, 1986. To see how this pattern had evolved, it is necessary to take a quick look at developments since the 1982 election. (A thumbnail sketch of the fifty years of SDAP participation in Swedish government up to 1982 is to be found in *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 242, No. 1405, February 1983.)

One of the main topics of debate at the 1982 election, and one eagerly avoided by SDAP representatives, was the Wage-earner Funds, intended to tithe the profits of industry for investment in shares, ostensibly to give 'the people' a say in the terms of their working existence. The new leader of the Moderate Conservatives, Mr Ulf Adelsohn, repeatedly warned that the Funds represented a dangerous step in SDAP plans for ever-increasing socialisation and state control; and Mr Palme often found himself in the anomalous postion of having to deny decisions made at his own Party Congress, repeatedly avowing that the question of the Funds was by no means settled, repeatedly extending 'an open hand' to the non-socialist bloc to join in discussions and help arrive at a generally acceptable solution. Of course, this gambit was purely a *ruse de guerre*, for once the election was over the Funds were simply introduced, without further discussion requiring the presence of any non-socialist representatives. In the event, five Wage-earner Funds were established under the

direction of the highest paid civil servants in the land, and already there have been scandals over their administration. One director had to resign when it became known that he had approved loans from the Fund through one of the banks to private individuals for the purpose of what is known by the euphemism, 'taxation planning' (i.e., manipulations to reduce one's tax bill).

A dramatic aspect of the new SDAP term of office was the intense activity of foreign underwater craft in Swedish coastal waters. There was a certain bitter-sweet irony in the inexorable conclusion of the official Swedish investigative committee that the Soviet Union was responsible, since Mr Palme's thesis, as what Mr George Bush was later to call 'the Jane Fonda of the Peace Movement', was that aggression was not deterred by armed defence but by cooperative relationships between countries, conducive to mutual confidence. The pathos inherent in this philosophy was highlighted by the fact that the foreign power responsible for the violation of Swedish territorial integrity should just be the Soviet Union, with whom Mr Palme had always been so concerned to maintain a co-operative relationship that for long his only overt response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had been to trot off to Moscow and discuss with Arbatov what could be done about NATO, and particularly American, warmongering.

The juxtaposition of two unconnected and relatively trivial incidents, one following hard upon the other, brought home to the electorate how some are more equal than others in the SDAP Brotherhood. Mr Ove Raine, director of the Post Office which, despite an impression convincingly conveyed by its staff of being actors in a slow motion film, actually functions well, was obliged by the Party to resign when it transpired that he had been playing the stockmarket. Though the buying and selling of shares for profit is not (yet) in any way illegal in Sweden, apparently such conduct was felt to be inconsistent with the standards expected of a senior Party official.

Mr Jan Guillou, something of a one man watchdog committee, who runs a TV programme exposing cases of miscarriage of justice and of official malfeasance or dereliction, made public that Mr Palme had converted a £4000 lecture fee from Harvard to defray the expense of his son's tuition there, thus omitting to declare it on his tax returns. After ineffectually trying to dismiss this as untrue, Mr Palme suddenly found himself billed for retroactive tax for the lecture fee. Though failing to declare any items of income is a serious crime in Sweden, apparently such conduct was not felt to be inconsistent with the standards expected of the Party Chairman and Premier, and there was never any question of Mr Palme's resignation being required. With characteristically quick footwork, Mr Palme tried to turn the event to his advantage and enlist the sympathy of the public by representing himself as a victim of overbearing bureaucratic intransigence just like any other citizen, vowing that something would have to to be done about the mandarins of the Tax Authority; but few average citizens, 50-65% of whose incomes are swallowed by taxation,

can have been very impressed.

More telling than such events, however, and quite as much of a threat as growing disenchantment with tutelary government and the awakening desire for more liberal politics and conditions of existence, was the economic situation. After the 1982 election the krona was devalued for the sixth time in as many years, and by a drastic 16%, which gave a much needed boost to foreign trade. Attempts were also made to curb inflation (the rate of which was one of the highest in Europe), and hold down prices, not only of goods and services, but even of wages — an income policy which hit employees in the public sector hardest of all. By early 1985, when the beneficial effect of the 1982 devaluation was almost played out, the Finance Minister, Mr Kjell-Olof Feldt, raised the bank rate, tightened up consumer credit restrictions, and responded to wage-claims by TCO (the Salaried Employees' Union) by promising that they would not get a single krona more.

This brought the Union out on a strike that they threatened could last until the election in September, and which paralysed foreign trade, closed the schools, grounded civil air traffic, and even brought the police out on their first strike ever. The outlook for the SDAP at the coming election was bleak, and it was being predicted that the conflict would be their Waterloo. In particular, there was extreme irritation over Government meddling in wage negotiations, which traditionally had always proceeded without any State involvement. Worst of all, Mr Feldt's tightfistedness did not appear to be having any real effect on inflation. Though the strike was eventually resolved, at least temporarily, the Party image had suffered from the conflict.

By September, however, the waters had calmed, and the SDAP sailed into the election campaign with an earnest if artificial buoyancy that bore witness to a concerted effort to project a new image of optimism and benign bonhomie; even Mr Palme, who in election campaigns hitherto had been wont to harangue aggresively over the rostrum as if he were an understudy for the rôle of Lenin at a Communist Party Congress, seemed determined to show that one may smile and smile and . . . . ; there was no change in his tactics otherwise, however, for as usual he dodged almost every question put to him. When interviewers or the opposition tried to pin him down to explicit declaration of SDAP policy on any issue, Mr Palme would smile indulgently and talk of other things, or reiterate, 'We shall safeguard employment, and defend the welfare [state].'

In the past few decades, voting patterns in Swedish elections have varied less from left to right than within the non-socialist bloc, but so crucial is the marginal vote that a number of SDAP supporters are said to vote VPK to ensure their maintaining the 4% threshold required for representation in the Riksdag, as their seats are almost invariably needed to make up the SDAP majority. Similarly, apparently to secure critical marginal votes lost at each previous election to the Christian Democrats (KDS) who have never succeeded in surmounting the 4% threshold, the Centrists now combined with the KDS at the price of a seat for the

KDS Chairman, a tactical error which almost certainly cost the Centrists votes at the polls.

Apart from fundamental disagreement over collective *vis-à-vis* private ownership that separates the blocs, differences are often minimal, and in Local Government in Stockholm, for instance, the SDAP and Moderates frequently collaborate without undue friction. All parties claimed to stand for the interests of young families with children at home, a sensible enough choice in view of demographic statistics. The SDAP electioneered under the slogan, 'Sweden on the Right Road; Let us Finish the Job!', but were reticent as to where the road would eventually lead. Apprehensive of the wave of popularity for liberal views, they tried to pre-empt its being reflected in poll results by labelling it 'egocentric neo-liberalism, motivated solely by personal greed', and proposing as an alternative, 'a society where we care about each other.'

Unlike the SDAP, whose new optimistic image precluded overt concern over the economy, all the non-socialist parties were concerned about the national economy and employment; they were against further state intervention and collective ownership, and wanted the Wage-earner Funds abolished. The Moderates wanted tax reforms, including reductions in marginal tax. The Liberals wanted to reduce public expenditure, but to guarantee single rooms for those in Old People's Homes. The Centrists were concerned with the environment, the phasing out of nuclear energy, and international peace. The KDS, while campaigning under a slogan of 'Live and Let Live!', wanted to prohibit abortion and 'video violence', and to introduce a more restrictive policy with regard to Sweden's alcohol problem. The VPK wanted to abolish MOMS (VAT) on food.

A new local party had grown up in Scania, the southernmost province of Sweden, which had been Danish until the mid-17th century. Their immediate aims were the abolition of State monopolies on alcohol supplies, radio and television, and their longer range aims were secession from Sweden, membership in the Common Market and NATO, and the setting up of nuclear bases for defence from the East Bloc. Though the Scanian Party (Skånepartiet), as it is called, was widely regarded as a bunch of malcontents, lightweights not to be taken seriously, it was to surprise everyone with its subsequent significance.

For the bulk of the electorate, elections in Sweden are largely a matter of TV coverage and the personalities of the leading party figures which vary much in appeal. Mr Ulf Adelsohn of the Moderates, ever on the *qui vive*, a witty and incisive speaker, crisply articulate, prior to the election enjoyed far greater popularity than any other party leader. Unfortunately, his inbred civility and a tendency to abide by the Queensberry Rules were distinct disadvantages to him in dealing with an opponent as untrammelled by scruples as Mr Palme, who often baited Mr Adelsohn with snide remarks and vicious personal attacks which were, to put it mildly, disconcerting. When Mr Adelsohn did succeed in hitting back, it often came across as overkill, which lost him a lot of sympathy during the campaign and votes for his party at the polls. Mr Torbjörn

Fäldin, the Centrist leader, who had so surprised people at the 1982 election with his unusually sharp, on-the-ball manner, now often gave a feckless impression and occasionally lost the thread of his argument in the middle of a sentence. Mr Palme's new image of bubbling enthusiasm was a refreshing change from the patrician hauteur he often displayed in his role of the cool, speculative Machiavellian, supremely indifferent to facts, and always read to sacrifice truth to expediency. Mr Lars Werner of the VPK comes across as a stubborn, unimaginative, Pooh Bear sort of figure, apparently sincere in his beliefs, and hard to dislike. Mr Alf Svensson of the KDS exuded superficial charm and smiled even more than Mr Palme, but was hard to get a grip of.

The newcomer to TV electioneering, and something of a dark horse to much of the electorate, was Mr Bengt Westerberg who had taken over leadership of the Liberals only two years previously. He entered the campaign very piano with his plea for single rooms for the elderly, but went from strength to strength, showing an alert mind and a good grasp of economic realities. If at the 1982 election a critic sharp enough to pose difficulties for Mr Palme had appeared in Mr Adelsohn, in Mr Westerberg yet another made his entry now. He is one of the very few people ever to cut right to the core through Mr Palme's breathtaking arrogance and contempt for his opponents, and put him in his place when he overstepped the mark — coolly and merely *en passant*, but so unequivocally that for once Mr Palme had the good grace to look contrite, if only momentarily. Mr Westerberg presents an impression of that apparent contradiction in terms, a thoroughly honest and straightforward politician; his utterances are considered, understated, and unmarred by any hint of ulterior motive.

Most confrontations between party representatives on TV were less the occasion of actual debate than of each participant taking advantage of valuable media exposure to reiterate his party message. What promised to be an exception, owing to the urgency of its subject matter, was the debate between party economic experts, where the issues at stake were reduction of the budget deficit by £4-6 bn. (USA) over the next three year period, inflation to be brought under control, and a rising trend in unemployment to be reversed. In the event, however, debate was frustrated by Mr Feldt's obstructionism, and the time wasted by his opponents in vain efforts to get him to give an inkling of SDAP policy. Though SDAP representatives are wont to urge the importance of 'maintaining a dialogue', in fact they seldom permit one to develop, it being impossible to have a dialogue with anyone who adamantly refuses to discuss the same things as oneself, or to say what is on his mind, if anything.

[Part Two of 'The Beginning of the End of an Era?' by Richard Pybus will be published in the October issue.]

RATE CAPPING AND 'POPLARISM'

by Phlip P. Bober

THE present-day concern of labour councillors and local authorities with rate capping raises once again that dreary, eternal struggle between Central Authority and local government expenditure. Like 'King Charles's Head' it continues to afflict us at varying periods of our civic history and takes us back to that other epic battle between a labour borough council and the Central Authorities of the time — 1921.

1918 saw the end of the 'war to end all wars' and the promise of 'a land fit for heroes'. Three years on the short 'boom' had bust. As at present, unemployment was running high, with around two million men out of work, which for a then population of forty million compares proportionately with the three million unemployed today. Cuts were being imposed, as usual, on those least able to bear them, with a callous disregard. The former Borough of Poplar (now Tower Hamlets), was a classic case in point. Its predominently first-time labour council was presided over in 1919-20 by its Mayor, George Lansbury, a labour stalwart, a fighter for peace and social justice throughout a long and distinguished political career, and a fierce upholder of trades-unionism. The stand taken by the Poplar Borough Council, instigated and inspired by Lansbury, sparked off a situation unique in the history of local government in this country. They actually defied the Central Authority and the Lib/Tory government and won — in the end! But victory was not achieved without months of bitter in-fighting, legal battles, High Court Injunctions, contempt-of-court, and the full weight and panoply of civic authority and the law, culminating in the imprisonment of the Poplar Council's twenty-five men and four of its women. They were all solidly unyielding. The main battle-ground of all this fiedce contentiousness lay within the areas of the London County Council, the Poplar Board of Guardians and the Borough Council itself. In 1919 there had been a radical change in the political scene throughout the London boroughs, and Labour had won control of twelve out of the twenty-eight Metropolitan borough councils, including Poplar, which had a particularly large majority. Among Poplar's total of forty-nine councillors, forty-two were labour, five of whom were women. Of the labour members on the Council, the majority were industrial manual workers, covering a wide variety of trades and occupations, making this Poplar Council a truly left-wing, working-class body, entirely radical in its aims and functions.

The word 'Poplarism', having been allotted an honoured *niche* in the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* has been defined as 'a policy of giving outdoor relief on a generous or extravagent scale'. This was later amended to 'the policy of giving generous or extravagent relief on a scale like that practised by the Board of Guardians of Poplar in 1919 or later'. With such a majority on the Borough Council came also labour's control of its Board of Guardians. And it is around this general accusation of 'extra-

vagance' against the Poplar councillors that finely led in 1920 to the prolonged and bitter confrontation between the Central Authority (the London County Council backed by the Government) and the Poplar Borough Council.

The Borough's reputation for 'extravagance' had already preceded the events of 1920-21 when, in 1919, the Labour Councillors first took office. Almost immediately they inaugurated housing projects to deal with Poplar's appalling slums, provided cheap milk to mothers and free to those with babies, appointed officers and clinics to control the incidence of tuberculosis within the area. They improved the library services and developed still further their electricity undertakings. To add further to the increasing consternation among the commercial and industrial rate-payers within the Borough, the Council raised the wages of all its municipal employees from three-pounds-four-shillings-and-sixpence to four pounds a week. This payment applied to women as well as men, and included the wash-house and toilet attendants and cleaners. The womens' pay had actually been raised from £2.9.9.

With the sudden eruption of mass unemployment through widespread trade depression, Poplar was particularly hard hit. Its geographical situation made it peculiarly vulnerable to the loss of overseas trade. By reason of its proximity to the main dock's area of East London, there was a predominance of workers engaged in the docks industry and its attendant trades and services (ship repairs, etc), the bulk of whom were unskilled and semi-skilled. This anomalous situation merely aggravated the Borough's unemployment problems, for 'out of a population of 162,000, 25% of its male workers were now out of work'. The result was that the Poplar Board of Guardians was under increasing pressure from thousands of its benefit-deprived citizens clamouring for outdoor relief. This was the direct result of the Lloyd-George (Lib/Tory) government's callous manipulation of the Unemployment Act, with the introduction of the 'Gap' — a Ministry of Labour euphemism for the varying periods during which no 'uncovenanted benefit' would be paid.

With the burden of having to provide outdoor relief for some 4,000 of the Poplar poor, the weight of all this fell heavily onto the Poor Law Guardians, stretching their financial resources to its utmost limits, bringing the entire Borough Council to virtual bankruptcy. The limit had in fact, almost been reached up to which the rates could be increased. Poplar, had become the most highly rated of the Metropolitan boroughs; indeed, throughout the whole of Britain. There was little help from the government who had refused to un-freeze the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, which would at least have provided the Poplar Borough with some £30,000 a year. This proved the 'last straw' for Poplar's labour councillors, who decided that other steps would have to be taken, even if 'illegally'. To give credit to Sir Alfred Mond, the then Minister of Health, this dereliction by the government of its statutory obligations to local boroughs was ultimately if belatedly, corrected, and their legitimate rights restored with a measure of relief to the Poplar councillors and their

fellow-councillors on the other London boroughs.

Poplar Borough Council's pleas for the 'Equalisation of Rates' were consistently ignored. A blatant example of the injustice suffered by the council through the attitude of the Lib/Tory government was starkly demonstrated in the case of London's richest borough, Westminster, getting £29,000 on a 'penny rate', while Poplar, with over £4,500 weekly outdoor relief bill, was granted a mere £3,200.

March 31st, 1921 was the decisive moment when the Poplar Borough Council agreed to go into action against the Central Authority and the government. Thus began a campaign of protests, of refusals to collect the precepts for the statutory bodies — Police, Health, Water and the LCC — and in some cases withholding them and diverting the funds to the special needs of its own people within the borough. This was, indeed, a head-on collision between the two conflicting bodies that continued until the London County Council, in sheer desperation to recover the hugely mounting precept debts, eventually forced the twenty-five men and four women councillors into gaol with writs for contempt-of-court. Despite their incarceration and pressures from all sides they all remained steadfastly obdurate, refusing to budge from the stand they had so courageously taken. Eventually, the Central Authority caved in and compromised. Means were found for making it possible for the Central Authority and the other precepted authorities gradually to recover the outstanding debts on terms favourable to the Poplar Borough Council.

With the end of the six weeks imprisonment, on the 13th October 1921, the councillors relentlessly continued their pressure against the government. From the very beginning, soon after 1918-19, the government's 'dead-hand' had been felt everywhere throughout the London Boroughs (and indeed, throughout the whole country). Its rate capping process was already at work. And in this respect they were mainly instrumental in creating those very conditions that drove municipal councils such as Poplar to the verge of frustration and despair. The Council's slum clearance schemes and rehousing had to be met entirely out of its own rates. The vast Dagenham Housing Project, undertaken by the London County Council, had to be dropped.

Whatever condemnation the Poplar labour councillors had to endure for their intransigent stand against Central Authority — and critics within their own party were there in plenty, particularly the higher echelons in the Labour Party itself — the fact remains that their points were made and taken. There were eventual amendments in the 'Equalisation of Rates Act' that benefitted the poorer boroughs and, of course, Poplar while further reforms of the 'Poor Law' followed.

[Philip P. Bober is sincerely indebted for the information and inspiration engendered by Noreen Branson's standard work, *Poplarism — 1919-1925.*]

[Philip P. Bober is a teacher at the Working Men's College, London.]

BENEFICIAL OBSTACLES IN THE POLISH THEATRE

by Andrzej Zurowski

IT is undoubtedly true that obstacles stimulate development unless they are so intense as to stop action completely. I would like to refer this statement to theatrical life and indicate how circumstances apparently hindering the progress of social and artistic life may in fact prompt theatre creativity. To avoid generalities, let me take Polish theatre as an example, outlining the Polish situation from the end of the 18th century. Divided by three neighbouring powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia, Poland did not exist as a state between 1795 and 1918. Yet the nation existed and very soon became aware that its basic task in the tragic political situation was to preserve national identity, primarily by means of the fine arts, mainly literature and theatre. The task was actually put into practice. Throughout the partition period, as well as the 20th century up to the present, theatre has grown to be one of the basic elements of intellectual and artistic life, despite the permanently complex political situation of the Polish nation. Among other things, theatre performs the fundamental integrating function. It creates links in a disintegrated and continually disintegrating nation. Through this function, it affects the process of the cultivation and the preservation of national and artistic identity.

This happens in the theatre thanks to its specific qualities in comparison with other artistic disciplines. The construction of a drama script, the ramifications of numerous elements ranging from text to acting, gives theatre a particular freedom, capable of speaking at different planes and levels about quite different things. *Hamlet* may be a story of an unhappy prince, but *Hamlet* may also help to articulate a message about general mechanisms of history and power. This is the secret of the theatre's relative freedom in comparison with other semantic arts.

It is no accident that the profession of a priest and actor underwent peculiar sacralization in Poland in the 19th century. These were the only professions, the representatives of which had the right to speak Polish in public in Warsaw at that time. Only a priest at the pulpit and an actor on the stage were allowed to speak to Poles about Poles and their affairs, however indirectly.

One hundred years later theatre is still among the leading arts of a peculiar artistic potential. This is testified by the internationally acclaimed achievements of such theatre people as Jerzy Grotowski, Józef Szajna, Tadeusz Kantor, Andrzej Wajda. Yes, Wajda... the world knows him primarily as a film director. This is a very good example, for it prompts a general question. Can we still speak about the leading artistic, social and intellectual role of the theatre in a world where the performing arts have been so markedly dominated by film and television? Yes, we can, and indeed we should if we accept that meaning is measured in terms of direct impact upon the member of the public and his active participation in the

artistic and intellectual discourse. Polish research has revealed that 17% of the thirty-seven million nation's adult population go to the theatre regularly, 41% sporadically and 42% remain outside the theate's influence. Let us bear in mind, however, that 17% out of thirty-seven million — including babies and old people — are over five million. Five million people in a rather small country are willing to think and talk about themselves and the surrounding world in terms of theatre.

Theatre — which is the source of its power — is a field most directly dependent upon public life as its mirror and stimulus. This by no means implies, however, that theatre should be topical like a newspaper and respond only in a direct way. As an art, theatre should be able to offer a summary, to raise current events to the ranks of general reflection or at least rational assessment. This does not mean that theatre, Polish theatre included, has always acted this way. The shape of Polish theatre life between August 1980 and December 1981 was a drastic example. For the most part, the theatre was not able artistically and intellectually to formulate the profundity of the state of minds and emotions of Poles during those months. When it pretended to be a newspaper, it became even more transient and casual than a newspaper. Whenever 'grand theatre' is enacted in the streets, an attempt simply to reproduce it on the stage proves pathetic. At a time when rapid changes are occurring in society, theatre can and should provide a 'standstill'. For theatre, this is not a period of loudly articulated slogans; it is a time for Sophocles and Shakespeare, for reflection upon the general mechanisms of history and the complexity of human emotions.

Shakespeare's name has not been mentioned accidentally. For the last two hundred years in Polish theatre Shakespeare has been regarded as the most national of playwrights. The local repertoire being basically curtailed, entire generations of Poles from the 19th century onwards spoke about their times, the relation between society and power, the individual versus the community, through Shakespeare. Using Shakespeare to think about Poland is one of the characteristic qualities of Polish theatre. Facts confirm the importance of Shakespeare's role in the process of Polish thinking. After the national uprising of 1830, the Tsarist authorities put a ban on Shakespearean productions in the Russian sector of partitioned Poland for thirty years. In the early 1950s, in the Stalinist period, Adam Mickiewicz's *Forefathers' Eve,* Stanislaw Wyspianski's plays and Shakespearian tragedies disappeared from the theatres. And yet, since the end of World War II, there have been about four hundred premieres of Shakespeare's plays in Poland.

I do not care what Shakespeare, an actor of the London Globe theatre in Elizabeth I's times, thought and how he thought. I care what my contemporaries think in terms of Shakespeare and how they think. I care about the things they say through his plays and the way they say them in the theatre. It was no accident that in the autumn of 1956, a year of political upheaval in Poland led by Wladyslaw Gomulka, reviews of *Hamlet's* premiere in Cracow were published in papers whose front pages

were filled with photographs of Gómulka's return to the political stage. That was a *Hamlet* summarizing the experience of the Stalinist period, a political production in the strict sense of the word on the subject that 'Denmark is a prison'. Jan Kott entitled his review of the production *Hamlet after 20th Congress* (of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The production was a particularly prominent symptom of the general situation. At the beginning of our century, Stanislaw Wyspianski wrote: 'In Poland, the secret of *Hamlet* does not differ from the current thinking matter in Poland'. More generally, the nucleus of thought and experience of each successive generation of theatre people and the theatre audiences is the permanently topical and the continually changing meaning of Shakespeare's dramatic writing.

Shakespearean productions in Poland have always been attempts at elucidating the national history and political systems of the recent past and the present. Similarly, Yuri Lyubimov's famous production of *Hamlet* at the theatre in Taganka in Moscow, mounted in the 1970s with Vladimir Vysotski in the title role, focused on the relation between an outstanding individual and the system of extra-individual circumstances. *Richard III* staged by the Rustaveli Theatre of Tbilisi in the late 1970s, a hit at an Edinburgh Festival, was a tale of totalitarianism with clear references to the Stalinist period.

One of the most successful productions in Poland in the early 1960s was *Richard III* staged in Warsaw by Jacek Woszczerowicz, presented with much acclaim during a *Théatre des Nations* in Paris. The production was clearly linked with Jan Kott's concept of the Great Mechanism featured in Shakespearean histories. The production showed the order or rather the disorder of the world, where mechanisms annihilate individual freedom. Woszczerowicz presented the question through the 'local', Polish perspective as well as through the lens of universal phenomena.

This is, perhaps, the most important thing — the art of speaking 'here and now', yet not in a purely topical or casual way. The danger outlined in Woszczerowicz's *Richard III* found painful materialization in the spring of 1968. The wave of students' — and not just students — movements of that spring began in the auditorium of the National Theatre in Warsaw during performances of Adam Mickiewicz's *Forefathers' Eve* directed by Kazimierz Dejmek. The play was soon banned from the repertoire. In 1973, *Forefathers' Eve* was staged in Cracow by Konrad Swinarski, the greatest contemporary Polish director who died two years after the premiere. His *Forefathers' Eve* has been on the bill of the Stary (Old) Theatre for twelve years — quite a few epochs in Poland. The play means something somewhat different in each of them, and yet it continually touches upon something equally essential for the Polish audiences.

In the autumn of 1980, Andrzej Wajda staged Stanislawa Przybyszewska's *Danton's Affair* in Gdansk. Performances were held not in a theatre building but in a time-honoured interior near the Gdansk Shipyard. Przybyszewska's play presents an episode of the French Revolution. Wajda's wise production shown in Gdansk in 1980 made diagnoses, out-

lined prospects, gave warnings. It spoke about the mechanisms of all revolutions, and the terrible danger they conceal. It spoke about that stage of every revolution when it begins to betray itself. This happens when the freedom for which a revolution has fought begins to transform into the terror of freedom.

Two Polish productions in 1983 are closely linked with our subject. One is *Hamlet*, in which military boots are worn at Claudius' court. Denmark has just experienced a coup d'etat, and the winners put on gas masks. The topical approach trivializes the many-layered structure of Shakespeare's tragedy, which may be forgiven, though with difficulty; yet this particular *Hamlet* is a symptom of a much more dangerous phenomenon in the theatre; namely, it shows how a current journalistic interpretation deprives a play of the chance to make broader observations and convey an intellectual message. Another meaningful production is *La vida es sueno* by Calderon staged at the Stary Theatre in Cracow by Jerzy Jarocki. The plot of Calderon's philosophic tale is set in Poland. Prince Segismundo says among other things that 'who incites fate against himself will not defeat fate. Only if cautious and cunning, you may be able to win. Therefore, be wise, Poles. May this production teach you something'. Jarocki's production is indeed instructive. It teaches the wise understanding of hard times.

Let me recall what Hamlet says to the actors about the theatre's basic tasks: 'to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure'. He adds that 'here and now' be reflected in the mirror of the theatre. This may and should happen if we do not restrict our vision entirely to the here and now.

Obstacles are not always welcome, yet if they crop up, intellectual and artistic conclusions should be drawn from them. Then obstacles may become beneficial in the world of theatre.

[Andrzej Zurowski is a leading theatre critic in Poland. He is Vice-President of International Association of Theatre Critics and a frequent broadcaster from Gdansk and Warsaw.]

A NEW ASSESSMENT OF DENTON WELCH: PART V: THE DANCING MOUSE

by Richard Whittington-Egan

ENTHUSIASM outpacing critical discretion, Paul Binding let forth the halloo, 'The publication of the *Journals* . . . seems to me a major literary event, and surely as a result of it Denton Welch's position in the pantheon of English literature must be revised.'

Rather more realistically, Philip Oakes observed in *New Society:*

> 'Whether Welch was a major or a minor writer is unimportant. What matters is that he was unique. . . . His prose was succulent, picky and almost wholly self-absorbed. . . . But after thirty-six years the glitter has subsided and the bones of his art show through. They are still exquisite, but as tough as steel.'

Ronald Blythe points out that 'Denton Welch died, locked, it has always seemed, in the neo-romanticism of the period, the archetypal sick genius perishing, in his case, from multiple injuries. Now the mere decorativeness vanishes as the depths of his experience are reiterated in a kind of antiphon between himself and his biographer'. Blythe regards Welch as a writer 'of chiefly historical significance'. What this revival has done, he says, is 'to demonstrate Welch's tenacity, not to mention a prose style which keeps one feeding as greedily on his pages as he did on the treats that supplemented his ration-book.'

In *The Times Literary Supplement* Alan Hollinghurst says that in his view Michael De-la-Noy's new, complete edition of the *Journals*, along with his biography of Welch, 'goes far to restitute the whole man'.

Taking this opportunity to look again at Denton Welch's style, it becomes clear that one must not make grandiose claims for him. He was a painter of superb miniatures. There is a Fabergé-like delicacy of touch, an exquisiteness of refinement. He uses his pen as a Japanese artist uses his brush. Some of his prose conveys the feeling of having been painted with a quill. But even at his most impressionistic he is never insubstantial. He is not airy-fairy. There is realism — horse pee (a golden jet, of course) and people seen from the top of a bus as head-stoppered bottles, with, inside, only black, churning depths like bile, or bitter medicine — and the rebarbative acuteness of an invalid's barbed hypersensitivity observing the mote in his brother's eye, displaying the warping of mind which so frequently accompanies a warped body to add the piquancy of a waspish sting. He recalls Barbellion, but he puts his fellow-men under the lens of his eye, instead of insects beneath the naturalist's microscope. He describes the external world, but almost always in terms of its impingement upon his inscape. We are listening to an interior monologue spoken sometimes in the high tones of near-hysteria. Yet, oddly, self-pity is conspicuously lacking. It is a wistful bitterness rather than pathos that runs in his ink. He did not lack courage — though it may have been the courage of despair. He is an egoist with the gift of communicating the delight of his egoism. He was a young man lingering in a hurry . . . dying — and

living — by inches. Facing death, he found joy in life, and hymned it, pen dipped in the bitter gall-ink of nostalgia. In *A Voice Through a Cloud*, where agony hugs him 'like some huge grizzly bear', he wrote an indisputable classic of illness.

Peter Vansittart thinks that Denton's talent resembles that of William Sansom, though with smaller range. Francis King compares him — as, indeed, Eric Oliver, in all his innocence, did — wih Marie Bashkirtseff. Peter Parker finds 'something of the Jacobean, or (perhaps more likely) of Beddoes in his imagery'. Anthony Powell scents Kilvert sometimes in his descriptions of landscape. John Russell Taylor, like Colin MacInnes before him, is reminded of Fournier's *Grand Meaulnes*.

Denton Welch's sensibility was essentially aesthetic, but totally different from the aestheticism of the Nineties. It is, says Alan Hollinghurst, 'agnostic, direct, pungently full of sensation and quite lacking in the camp or preciosity of many of the admirers it brought him.'

Anthony Powell, who casts a very cold eye, sees Denton Welch differently. He mercilessly encapsulates him as 'homosexual by inclination, narcissistic, snobbish, precious, spiteful, pushing, and a painter of rather limited talent.' Almost as subtle as the label supplied from another quarter to Michael De-la-Noy — 'The faggot who fell off his bike'. Powell, in fairness, goes on to add that he was also 'intelligent, sensitive, gifted with altogether exceptional powers of observation, and of expressing what he saw briefly and cogently.' But what he saw was 'mainly characters from a fairly seedy homosexual or bisexual underworld' and 'the action consists in rather ambiguous pickings-up, buying bric-a-brac, visiting churches, drinking in pubs, meals with acquaintances, the complex relationship between Denton Welch, his bisexual boyfriend, Eric Oliver, and their housekeeper Evie Sinclair.'

Peter Vansittart describes Denton's work as 'fastidious, vivid, charged with all five senses simultaneously, uninterested in ideas but swiftly conveying the texture of an occasion, personality, object, the result of a tireless concern for details, brilliant, bizarre, comic, tragic. . . . Almost all Welch sentences are small journeys of discovery, readable even to those who read little.'

John Lehmann talks of 'the freshness of the prose and the sharpness of observation with its underlying note of cool, irreverent wit . . . the minute exactitude of unsentimental description and a unique gift for conveying his impressions to the reader by startling his imagination.'

'No doubt', writes Francis King, 'from his continual high temperatures he derived the febrile sensibility that made him apprehend the most ordinary of objects and the most trivial of happenings with the intensity of hallucination.'

Michael De-la-Noy's gloss — less recondite, rather better — suggests that Denton compels 'simply by enhancing the impact of small events by exploiting the fact that life is often — indeed almost always — about things that do *not* happen.'

It is my personal view that at least part of the charm of Denton's stories

is their absolute (apparent) ordinariness: the fact that nothing out of the way *seems* to happen. That, plus the deceptive simplicity of the narrative style, which tempts, making you feel that *you* could so easily do it, and be a writer too!

What is interesting to note is how Denton Welch wrote all those decades ago very much as the young American women novelists write today — the sensuous precision, the exactness, the detail, the emotional probing, and also the savouring of the moment.

He was dubbed by John Carey, writing in the *Sunday Times* (28.10.84) the 'Sir Galahad of Soppiness', sugaring the christening water with the saccharine additive that he was 'defiantly, courageously soppy'.

Iain Finlayson is quick to challenge Carey's concept. 'To take a shattered life and to examine it without flinching takes the greatest discipline and bravery.' Denton Welch, says Finlayson, has perhaps more claim to be regarded as a Fisher King than as a Sir Galahad. 'His wounds went deeper than the body.'

'Welch was, in important respects, wounded long before the accident,' says Paul Binding. 'The introspection that his physical sufferings imposed upon him enabled him peculiarly to come to terms with his earlier psychological ones . . . in the all-important years of early adolescence, Welch lacked the accepting love his ardent nature demanded.'

Oliver Harris enlarges: 'The powerlessness of the lonely child was duplicated as the helplessness of the adult invalid.'

> As a child and as an art student he felt constitutionally alone. The death of his mother and his accident were critical events which endorsed his isolation . . . and the concentration of his feelings and ambitions on artistic objects, aesthetic ends. . . . Physically damaged, lame, impotent, bedridden for weeks on end, Welch clung to the fragile endurance of old china and glass, the poignant dereliction of eighteenth-century grottoes and plaisaunces, the brief perfection of young men about to be 'spoiled' by time or death. . . . 'My thoughts are never on nature', he insists . . . they go out instead to 'lovers lying on the banks, young men that are dead'. So cruelly 'spoiled' himself, his emotions recurrently focus in this Housmanesque nexus of voyeurism and the 'torturing flood' of elegaic recall. (Alan Hollinghurst).

Edward Blishen acutely recognises that 'His driving need was to nail something down, in a world where the wind took everything left unfixed.' Anthony Powell dourly comments: 'Short as his life was, he managed to get it all down into print.'

Understandably obsessed with *sic transit gloria mundi,* Denton set psychological store by, and stronghold on, *objets de virtu,* antiques, beautiful artefacts which had contrived to outlast generations of rough handling, superstitiously hoping perhaps that their secrets of survival might by sympathetic magic rub off on him. He was a man racked by a sense of life's brevity and, as Edward Blishen sadly underlines, himself ironically limited to a life far briefer than most. Unsurprising, remarks Peter Parker, that being as it were his own *memento mori* he should be unusually aware of change and decay in all around he sees. Very rightly, Iain Finlayson discerns how he 'enjoys with faintly self-conscious melancholy, broken, abandoned things, people, and places. Peeling wallpaper disgusts him, but he contemplates it with a morbid pleasure.'

Wrote Francis King: 'A man cheated of the future and experiencing the present for most of the time through a fog of pain and fever, constantly turned back to a prelapsarian past for comfort and inspiration.'

Ronald Blythe expresses it: 'Because he lacked a future, Welch hugged the past to him. The important past was that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and of his own lifetime, and he reached out to both via ornaments, furniture and architectural detail.'

To escape what Oliver Harris has called 'the dead-weight of his mutated body', Denton re-animated the past. John Carey writes well and sympathetically of the 'magic burrow down which he can escape from the raw landscapes of Kent', or indeed the raw edges of his wounds, physical and psychical. He goes back to his romance with his mother . . . 'Shanghai, and the wind-up gramophones in Edwardian Gothic planters' houses: rambles in the peanut fields, and cream cakes for tea. The feel of her gloved hand as he clasped it — suede leather warmed from within: and the musty, elaborate upholstery of ancient taxis, with sliding glass screens, in which he and she sat cosseted.'

Love and death are constant themes of Denton's, and Carey points out: 'The mingling of love and death in Welch's psyche pretty clearly relates to his mother's loss.'

An important part of the psychological profile was, of course, the sexuality factor, which, in these more liberated times it is possible to discuss without let or hindrance.

Thus Paul Bailey: 'In the company of his friends Francis Streeten and Marcus Oliver, Welch could be as camp as that now legendary row of bell tents, expressing a desire for the pleasure of rough trade that isn't couched in the language of Sensitive fiction. According to Denton Welch, Streeten tried to pick him up near Tonbridge public library with the words "Oh — you look interesting; do tell me about yourself." Where, I wondered as I read of that strange meeting, had I heard something similar before? The brazen tone sounded familiar. "Don't be cagey, dear — introduce!": Sherman Winter's clarion call from Angus Wilson's *Hemlock and After* catches to perfection the daringness of those who had the courage, or perhaps the effrontery, to dare in the 1950s.'

Denton is explicitly High Camp on occasion. Here, writing to Marcus Oliver in 1941, he queens it in rare style:

> 'My dear, I'm having such a camp time . . .' He proceeds to the description of meeting up with 'the queerest bunch of queers! An officer, a corporal, a doctor, a person who puts fuses in bombs and a Dutch boy with a headache!! I was quite overwhelmed. Today I've been to tea with two lesbians who asked me to meet what they described as "a charming boy with green eyes"! My dear, it was forty with huge gold teeth and a horrible leer. It kept on talking about guardsmen all thro' tea. It was really quite blush-making.'

Bailey continues: 'I have long considered that Denton Welch's "ambiguous approaches to young rustics" have given repression a bad name. . . . Oh, the coyness, the prissiness of little Denton as the great big, red-faced farmer makes an obvious pass at him. And oh the studied innocence, the calculated boyishness of the writing. At once knowing and unknowing, Welch turns a healthily direct invitation to have a bit of fun in the hay

into a sinister threat.'

This sham innocence is referred to by Edward Blishen also: 'An obsessive voyeur (left alone in a room, he'd read, sniff and hunt out everything that offered), he used the technique of the innocent eye to construct a vision profoundly lacking in innocence. His own powerful and angrily elegant view of things lay behind all those apparent mere inventories of a scene, an event, a person . . . there is ample evidence in these writings that he simultaneously made himself available and withheld himself.'

Oliver Harris sees 'Welch's brilliant ability to capture the nuances of childhood' not as sham innocence, nor, indeed, as re-creation, but as 'return'. And this immaturity is the lens of his fictional eye. 'His moments of risqué homosexual frankness, the thrill of horror or scatological fascination, all derive their power from this disingenuous perspective. The veneers of 'sane' adult society peel off and Denton is there to witness the shaming vulnerability and animal terror beneath. It would be a mistake to underestimate the psychological acuity of his vision, to see him as an eccentric curiosity and no more.'

A mistake, too, according to Edward Blishen, to 'think there was anything immature about him: he had a feeling for the work he might do, a grasp of the human tragedy, that were completely adult.'

Ronald Blythe considers that the 'sexual candour which once so bothered the publishers and editors now proves to be nothing more than a compulsive ringing the changes of first encounter, plus a voyeurism resulting from a mixture of his knowing himself to be too 'spoilt' to go further and a writer who needed to see bodies both lyrically and clinically. Slow dying through one's twenties is a fleshly business.'

Taking up that lyrical point, Paul Binding's view is that Denton's fiction 'shows him as a veritable lyrical poet of the sensuality so strangely coiled in almost every English public-schoolboy.'

Peter Parker subtly notes: 'The erotic quality of his writing is exact and tactile, yearning one suspects after a delicacy and wholeness denied him by his accident.'

For John Carey, his 'touchiness and his sexual ambivalence both recall the young D. H. Lawrence.'

I think that the tendency to regard *everything* that Denton Welch wrote as autobiographical is excessivist. Unless one is prepared to postulate a war-time Kentish countryside as densely inhabited by *déshabillés* bucolic Narcissi — pale, nacreous, or bronzed, according to predilection — it must be obvious that his encounter accounts are wish-fictive. Denton surely confected a self-stylised blend of fact and fiction, to separate the strands of which definitively is as impossible as unnecessary an exercise.

While it is Oliver Harris' opinion that 'Welch had no philosophy to speak of and only a passing interest in social or political events', conversely Ronald Blythe holds that the 'ceaseless accumulating of the facts and feelings relating to his existence, the careful listing of them in stories and diaries, has, quite incidentally, made Welch a World War Two social historian — something he would not at all have liked to be.'

Anthony Powell disagrees. 'On the whole the war itself is ignored so far as possible, though from time to time someone who is drinking in a pub at one moment is killed a few weeks later.' It is a disagreement counterbalanced by Peter Parker's plain statement that 'The war in which young men and old buildings were being destroyed prompted Housman-like visions of "lovely lads and dead and rotten".'

Paul Binding sees Denton, like Henry Green in *Caught*, like Stephen Spender in *Ruins and Visions*, like Elizabeth Bowen in *The Demon Lover*, as 'one of the great celebrants of ordinary English people in the war', and refers to his 'mediumistic relation to the English landscape past and present. . . . Welch is a wonderful recorder of the English scene . . . the England of approximately half the *Journals* was at war, and Denton Welch's descriptions of the doodlebug raids, of people's reactions to them, of the whole oxymoronic ordered chaos of wartime life, with its abrupt appearances and disappearances of persons — as if they were members of the cast of some vast disorderly play — show how far he was from self-absorption in the usual pejorative sense of that word'.

Had Denton Welch, as several critics have suggested, written himself out, said all there was in him to say? Anthony Powell opines: 'It is unlikely that, had he survived, any considerable development would have taken place in his writing or painting'. David Pryce-Jones, with greater wisdom and more caution, modestly ventures: 'Nobody can be sure how much further his great gifts might have taken him.'

Indeed, nobody can. But I do not believe for one moment that Denton had had all of his say. I think that we were permitted to see, as he was permitted to live, only his 'prentice years. He might not have grown old as we who are left grow old. I suspect he would have remained a Peter Pan of letters, but his pipings would only have grown the sweeter. But all this twisted vastness of the might-have-been was long ago crushed out of shape by a stupid woman who caught the future off its guard in the migrainous heat of a June day just beyond Peter Pan's pool.

What is so chastening, frightening, about reading again of Denton Welch for those of us who knew him in our youth, is how Time has diminished *us*. Today, Denton would be seventy. Evie Sinclair, who vanished to Boston, cradle of Christian Science, would be ninety-one. Eric Oliver *is* seventy. But *they* are all flies in amber (the cliché is fixed: not to be avoided), young, unchanging, frozen in chrysalis . . . while *we* hurtle on. In (fled) youth is (dis) pleasure!

'It is idle to speculate', speculates Francis King, 'whether, if it had not been for his accident, he would have written better or worse; but that he would certainly have written there can be no question at all.' John Russell Taylor, however, believes that: 'If Denton Welch had not been early doomed by the long term results of a serious road accident, he might never have found in himself the creative urgency which turned a quaint fancy into a rich and disturbing imagination, and the stages of his physical decline, matched by his gathering of creative power, are sharply and unselfpityingly chronicled in the journals.'

Forty-one years ago, Denton recorded in a letter to his much-loved Eric Oliver:

> I want to write all about you, so that years afterwards people will read it and think about us. They'll read how we had tea together or went for a walk in the moonlight wood. When we're in our cold, cold graves, they'll be sitting cosily by the fire turning the pages! I'm always thinking of this. I want people to read about us 500 years from now.

Ever and behind, Denton's cocked ear heard the inexorable hickory, dickory, dock, as the mouse of his life ran up and the clock of his time ran down . . .

'In my wall is the mouse that scratches and dances. It seems as immortal as we are, and it is all a painted lie. No mouse or man after a hundred years — no cottage in the trees — only the earth, the water, the dripping woods and the low sky for ever.'

A final picture. A leave-taking. It has been raining. Eric and Denton are drenched. Back at Pitt's Folly Cottage they strip. Eric slips into an old camel-hair dressing-gown. Denton puts on the priest's cassock he is fond of wearing. Eric rests his head on Denton's knees . . . then, a little later . . . taking Denton's head carefully between his hands, begins to massage — behind the ears, the nape, the temples. The magnets of his fingers draw the pain out. It is a vignette characteristic as that of Holmes and Watson by the sea-coal blaze in Baker Street — only it is a gas-fire. Let us leave them there, fixed for ever in their shared moment, just as Denton wanted them to be — remembered and read about 'five hundred years from now'.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works currently in print:

Denton Welch: The Making of a Writer. Michael De-la-Noy. Viking. 1984.
The Journals of Denton Welch. Edited by Michael De-la-Noy. Allison & Busby. 1984.
I Left My Grandfather's House. Denton Welch. Allison & Busby. 1984.
Maiden Voyage. Denton Welch. Penguin Books. 1983.
In Youth is Pleasure. Denton Welch. Oxford University Press. 1982.
A Voice Through a Cloud. Denton Welch. Penguin Books. 1983.

[The above article concludes the series of five articles by Richard Whittington-Egan on the life and works of Denton Welch.]

ASSISTING THE TOURIST BOOM

by Mark Cook

BRITAIN'S manufacturing sector has been in decline for a number of years and such is its recent demise, be it due to government policy, the world recession, the strength of the pound, the impact of unions, the UK's relative rate of inflation, poor management and so on, that 1984 saw Britain for the first time running a deficit on its manufacturing trade with the rest of the world. One of the major impacts of the decline in the manufacturing sector has been the rapid growth of unemployment that has followed. As a proportion of total civilian employment, manufacturing employment has fallen from 36% in 1960 to 24.5% in 1983. The question then arises, how can these displaced workers together with the growing number of unemployed school leavers be absorbed into the economy? A number of commentators suggest that the tourist industry is one of the sectors which could provide some of the jobs for those lost in the secondary sector of the market.

Rising unemployment and the 1980s 'health and fitness' boom are just two factors which have stimulated the dramatic rise in the importance of leisure, not only for the unemployed but also for government. Lord Young's report *Pleasure; Leisure and Jobs — The Business of Tourism* stressed the importance of the leisure industry and the need for its expansion. Leisure currently accounts for 27% of all consumer spending and tourism alone contributes 1.5 million to the employment register — approximately 8% of the working population, with a growth rate of 50,000 new jobs each year. In 1983, 13.8 million overseas visitors spent £5.3 billion not only on the obvious tourist expenditures such as hotels, restaurants and theatres, but also on goods. 1985 saw Britain record a surplus on its tourism account, the first for five years, whilst expectations for 1986 are for £12 billion worth of tourist expenditure. Estimates for tourism in the UK show a projected growth of 30% in volume and 50% in spending by 1990. With this buoyancy in the British market there are indications that tourism could generate almost half a million new jobs by the end of the nineteen eighties. There may, however, be constraints on tourism which could in themselves prevent Britain's tourist potential being realised. These checks can take many forms, institutional factors such as licensing laws, Sunday Trading Laws and Planning restrictions, as well as the problems of the weather, exchange rate volatility, political factors together with others such as general attitudes towards tourism.

One of the major institutional barriers is suggested as the present licensing laws. The hours during which people can drink in England and Wales are complex, and can vary all over the country. Normally, public houses cannot open before 11.00 a.m., must close 2½ hours in the afternoon and can be open no later than 10.30-11.00 p.m. On Sundays, there is even less time allowed. There are as many people in favour of changes in the drinking laws as there are opponents, nevertheless the relaxation

of the drinking laws in Scotland appears to have resulted in no more drunkeness and/or unseemly behaviour than normal, and almost 2,500 extra jobs being created. Whether this last fact can be multiplied up on a national scale depends on increased drink sales, though it is expected that increased sales of alcoholic and non-alcoholic drink and food will occur within areas that have the highest touristic potential. If changes to the Licensing Laws are not forthcoming then brewers feel that the present hours do not allow them to meet the leisure needs of today, more specifically they prevent foreign tourists from drinking at times they would expect to be able to do so in their own country. Early closing is one reason why London nightlife is suggested as 'dull' when compared with New York's, Paris' or Amsterdam's and why over-priced clubs proliferate.

With regard to planning factors that inhibit tourist growth, hoteliers often put forward the case that they are prevented from extending their property to increase room space by the present planning restrictions and this therefore impedes the rise in employment that could follow. John Huxley and Michael Imerson point out that 'Like the tourist authorities, the CBI is concerned that visitors may be deterred by a lack of adequate facilities'. They argue that restrictions on hotel building should be relaxed and that more spending on the UK's infrastructure is required.

The current situation for visitors, particularly those to the capital, is that during peak periods visitor overspill is 'booked-out' as far as Birmingham or the coast. Although this may affect only a small proportion of the total visitor numbers the fear is that it will get London hoteliers a 'bad image'. Why do we get this overspill? A number of factors have been put forward, firstly, planning restrictions on hotels have led to the total number of rooms in London remaining relatively constant since the nineteen seventies; secondly, there may be some lack of foresight by all parties not anticipating the growth of tourism and thirdly, individual Boroughs may not want the social costs of 'tourism pollution' and the cost of new hotels. A third major stumbling block to reaping the full benefits of our tourist boom is suggested as the UK's Sunday Trading Law.

Since the 1950 Shop Act there have been eighteen private members' bills to alter the act bringing it more up to date — all have failed. Why this reluctance to allow shops to open when they want or when local authorities will permit them? Evidence suggests that it is partly due to the pressure by the large corporations and partly due to the unions, most notably, the Shopworkers Union (USDAW), though grassroots pressure from the Church should also not be discounted.

A report by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) in 1984 gave the broad conclusions that to operate on Sunday Trading would in the long-term have few effects on retailing. Shopping is becoming more and more a leisure activity, this is particularly the case with personal shopping rather than 'chore shopping' where the former is concentrated on the one leisure day that is available — Saturday, whilst the latter is spread more evenly throughout the week. The IFS report also points out that although extension to trading hours undoubtedly would have effects on retailing

costs, prices and employment these would be small. Moreover they note that it is unlikely that these effects would be of sufficient magnitude readily to be distinguished from changes that are already taking place with regard to the style and structure of British retailing. Whatever the pros and cons of Sunday Trading, the Government's defeat in the House of Commons in April will not see deregulation of the Sunday Trading Act during the present term of office. We now return to the status quo with the volume of illegal Sunday Trading continuing to rise. For the tourist industry the impact will be even greater since if Sunday Trading cannot be got through the House of Commons deregulation of the licensing laws, for which the Shops Bill was a forerunner, is now unlikely.

In the opening section, 'other' institutional factors were also mentioned as having a role to play in the scaling down of the tourism boom, such things are the Employment Protection Law, VAT on hotel services, and Fire Regulations. Lord Young, in his report, also proposes an increase in the number of traffic signs — some sights are already well sign posted, for example Alton Towers Theme Park in Staffordshire, the third most popular tourist sight in the UK, has 10 signs on the nearby motorways and 200 on the other approach roads — to aid the tourist. Some hoteliers, too, would like to signpost their hotels. On the other ways to stimulate tourism the cutting down on official controls, encouraging visitors to move out of London and the improvement of training and education among those employed in the industry are proposals. All in all 30 separate suggestions have been made by Lord Young.

The tourist industry is therefore seen by the Government as being one of the places which can halt the rising tide of unemployment and create lasting jobs. Quite rightly, some of the jobs will be permanent, but many will be seasonal and of a part-time nature, as Ken Livingstone notes, 'many of the jobs will be low-paid, part-time, cleaning and catering jobs which are so common in the leisure industries'.

Aside from the barriers which may prevent our tourist potential being realised Britain must not be lax in marketing its product. Britain has largely achieved its growth in tourism because of its considerable natural, cultural and historical assets. How long these can cover up some of the British attitudinal problems to increased visitor numbers waits to be seen. Nevertheless, at present we often hear of cases such as general discourteousy by motorists, staff and the general public and also the problems of 'making a quick buck' out of tourists so often seen in the pricing of ice creams etc. to visitors. Alan Devereux, chairman of the Scottish Tourist Board echoes some of these sentiments, 'Success in the long-term depends on delivering the customer (tourist) value for money with a smile, not on having good luck with the weather'.

Some of the measures needed to assist our tourist boom are therefore known and require long-term policy changes, there are other conditions, both political and environmental, however, which can have a larger short-run effect on visitor numbers. The bombing of Libya and increased terrorism in Europe, particularly the Mediterranean area, has received

large press coverage resulting, initially, in a large fall in the number of US tourists coming not only to the UK but also to Europe. In Britain, 3.3 million Americans last year spent approximately £1.7 billion and initial estimates mostly provided by tour operators were that there would be a 50% decline in numbers. This figure is most likely to be inflated as the BTA Director General notes, 'eighty per cent of American visitors to Britain come on independently organised visits, not on packages'. Furthermore, the US tourists make up less than 30% of the UK visitor market. Even if the decline in numbers has been overstated it has resulted in British Caledonian Airways cutting its staff by 1,000 to enable the airline to maintain its profitability. The response by the British Tourist Board has been to assure Americans of their safety in the UK compared with other countries. The BTA has also stepped-up its marketing and public relations activities in the USA. Meanwhile British Airways has offered a lottery of 5,600 return tickets to Britain from America, whilst Stratford-upon-Avon is offering a 10% discount to visitors who stay at least one night in the town. All will help in the wooing back of foreign tourists.

We should not directly point our finger at terrorism, however, as the only cause for some of the initial short-fall in visitor numbers. The impact of the Chernobyl disaster, the UK's poor weather last year, and the strengthening of the pound are all contributory factors. Moreover, the problem with Britain's general untidiness, particularly litter, as highlighted by Mrs. Thatcher, may also play a part. Whether the appointment of Richard Branson to take charge of the 'clean up Britain scheme' is giving medicine to the problem without getting to the underlying root causes is open to question.

There is no doubt, therefore, that a buoyant tourist industry does and can yield enormous benefits to the UK, particularly in terms of invisible trade and employment. These may be achieved through changes in legislation, changes in the attitudes of residents/tourist sites and/or better marketing. Britain has begun to tackle the last two problems but changes in legislation are unlikely to occur in the short term. Let us hope we are doing enough.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Economic Effects of Sunday Trading Examined, *The Guardian*, 22nd November, 1984.

Pleasure, Leisure and Jobs — The Business of Tourism. Lord Young Tourism Report, July 1985.

Paying Guests. CBI Report by Professor Rik Medlik, July 1985.

Serviced Accommodation and the Northamptonshire Tourist Market. M. Cook and R. J. G. Wells, *The County Councils Gazette*, August 1985.

[Mark Cook is Head of Economics in the Faculty of Mathematics, Management and Business, Nene College, Northampton.]

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

THIS column is slightly dotty about Shelley Long. In fact, it doesn't know how it will survive the summer now that 'Cheers' has been withdrawn from the schedules. The withdrawal symptoms are liable to be severe around ten o'clock on Friday evenings. This obsession has certainly been hinted at, as faithful readers may recall: to those and others my apologies for neglecting till now *Irreconcilable Differences,* which was briefly around last year. Copies may now be hired from your local Video library to fill that Friday evening gap. The film is structured like those films they used to make — such as *Penny Serenade* and *The Marrying Kind.* Like them, it's the story of a marriage, from first meeting to separation and onwards. It hasn't been on very long when Ryan O'Neal, playing a movie nut, starts to explain to Miss Long how Lubitsch achieved one of his witty effects in *The Merry Widow.*

References to old movies in today's comedies aren't new, especially when contemporary talents are trying to copy them, but the difference here is that the writers, Charles Shyer (who also directed) and Nancy Meyers have really understood what they're emulating — though I think they're mistaken in turning serious at the end, when the unwanted child of the marriage spouts his grievances in court. Otherwise, the mixture of sentiment and humour is very adroit; and the piece gets pretty near to brilliant when O'Neal, turned movie director, makes a musical about the Civil War (he couldn't get the rights of *Gone With the Wind)* to star the protegée who has broken up the marriage. Earlier, when Long had asked him what he sees in her he had replied 'The same as Jimmy Stewart saw in Jean Arthur.' Wow! that's a big one. But I don't think we've had a comedienne so adept since then.

You would not know this from *The Money Pit,* in which Miss Long and Tom Hanks play a couple who buy a large mansion just outside New York. It not only falls down around them but one gang of repair men turns out to be wreckers. That's about its level. I saw this thing in a cinema with five other people, one of whom was actually laughing at each new disaster. It has to be said that it did make a lot of money very quickly in America, despite dreadful reviews. Perhaps today's young audiences don't expect wit or logic; perhaps bigness is all, as in a blunderingly long sequence modelled on Lloyd or Keaton (huh!) when the scaffolding gradually collapses and Hanks ends up in the fish pond. Richard Benjamin directed David Giler's screenplay, which wisely attempts only four or five jokes beyond those concerned with destruction and dilapidation. You wonder that it ever met the approval of Steven Spielberg, the Executive Producer, but then you note that no less than thirty-five people worked on Special Effects and Stunts combined. Spielberg seems to think that's how you make movies. This is a ghostless remake of his equally dire *Poltergeist.* Financially, he's the most success-

ful single figure in Hollywood history, but in the words of Alex Cox, the young British director responsible for *Repo Man*, he's 'not a film-maker, he's a confectioner.'

Down and Out in Beverly Hills isn't up to much, but it's a masterpiece beside *The Money Pit*. Just as that film fed on the past (*Mr Blanding Builds His Dream House*), so does this (*My Man Godfrey*), though its acknowledged source is Renoir's 1932 movie *Boudu Sauvé des Eaux*, which was considerably more acrid than this one, desperately anxious to be liked. A bum (Nick Nolte) falls into the pool of a wealthy businessman (Richard Dreyfuss), who invites him to stay. Said bum ignores all suggestions of getting a job; he beds the man's wife (Bette Midler) and mistress, who is also the maid, *and* the daughter; and persuades the teenage son that he'll get on better with his parents if he gives in to his desire to be a transvestite. You've got to have a reason for this vagabond being welcome, so it's inferred that Dreyfus has guilt feelings about his money; you've got to have a climax, so he gets mad when he finds his guest is in love with the daughter — secret incestuous feelings, you see, since he hadn't been so upset about the other infidelities. All very unlikely, must say. The director and co-writer, Paul Mazursky, has often fancied himself as a social satirist, but I would have thought the ultra-rich of Beverly Hills would have provided more lucrative material, if you'll forgive the pun. It's a pleasant movie, but only in Dreyfus does it reflect Hollywood glories of the past. He has a way of standing which exudes self-satisfaction, and an impish quizzical expression which makes us like him despite that.

I don't know whether either of these two films has had the same success here as in the States. I do know that the British have made *Out of Africa* the most profitable movie to play here in — well, since *A Passage to India*, anyway. Maybe our nostalgia for Empire is keener than I thought, though I expect the truth is that there comes along just about one movie a year — an old-fashioned one, and I don't mean that in a derogatory sense — which brings back to the cinema all those people who used to love it, and who do watch movies avidly on television. *Out of Africa* certainly is, in the age of *Rambo*, a throwback: like *A Passage to India, Gandhi, Amadeus* it was hugely expensive and a box office risk. But these are precisely the films which gain prestige and win Oscars, which can be as much of assistance in the executive suite as any amount of dollars clinking at the box office. That is why they get made. In this case the producer-director Sydney Pollack read one of Karen Blixen's books and immediately saw his old colleague Robert Redford as Blixen's lover, the English big game hunter Denys Finch-Hatton. This almost beggars belief, since (unless I'm wrong) Finch-Hatton was stout, small, bespectacled and moustached. Redford does a star turn of sorts, and he's partnered by another supposedly 'hot' name, Meryl Streep, who as we all know is a whizz at accents. The Danish accent comes and goes; she has lowered her voice and is perhaps less mannered than of yore. But once Klaus Maria Brandauer — playing her husband — is shunted off into the background

the film bores, except perhaps to those who like to see certified 'stars' disporting themselves no matter what. As lovers, Streep and Redford strike nary a spark, and he is so blah a presence that he almost sinks the enterprise. But because of its popularity one asks what has it got going for it? It is intelligent, it is beautiful to look upon, it is honest (did ever a movie heroine before admit to having syphilis?), it is distinguished. It is everything admirable except worthwhile, though admittedly the first half has much in its favour, the tale of a strong lady who marries a man she doesn't love and goes with him to live among the ghastly British colonials. The portrait of this society is tentative; the screenplay only plays with Blixen's obsession with the Kikuyu, with her love of Africa; so it becomes what the director Sydney Pollack intended, a star vehicle.

I really cannot imagine why *Out of Africa* was so welcomed and *King David* so execrated. It's the same breed — a costly attempt to return to the movie genres of an earlier day. In 1980 someone at Paramount looked to the huge profits made by every religious epic up to *The Greatest Story Ever Told,* which flopped. A small fortune was made on research to find which historical figure between 2000 B.C. and the birth of Christ held 'relevance' for today; but between 1980 and 1985, when *King David* was released, the film industry and its audiences changed enormously. It's no longer 'hip', if it ever was, to like rehashes of yesteryear's favourites. *The Bounty* was much better than either version of *Mutiny on the Bounty,,* but nobody wanted to see it. *King David* is not as good as that, and it looks wonderful — reminiscent of Zeffirelli's television *Jesus of Nazareth,* which probably was its real inspiration. The writers and the director, Bruce Beresford, have tried to make a film about a primitive tribal people, of Old Testament warlords plotting against each other; they've looked at those old Hollywood religiosos and learnt what to avoid. *King David,* with Richard Gere dutifully playing the title-role, is marginally more entertaining than they were; but in the old days the public didn't object to dullness if it went hand in hand with uplift.

Perhaps there's nothing new under the sun. *Runaway Train* is exactly about that. The film industry in its infancy had a passion for train movies which it finally lost, I suppose, in the '50s, with adventures like *The Great Locomotive Chase.* But back around 1914 they were churning out dozens of movies about runaway trains. The difference is that in those days they only lasted one reel or two; in this case the director Andrei Konchalovsky has almost two hours to fill, and the train starts to run away after the first twenty minutes — a pretty brutal time, incidentally, in a prison. Caught on the train are two prisoners, an inarticulate thug, played by Jon Voight again astonishing us with his range, and the more chirpy Eric Roberts, confirming the fine impression he made in *Raggedy Man.* Konchalovsky hasn't made it easy for himself, for neither is exactly sympathetic, and the scenery through which the train runs isn't exactly impressive — but it is unearthly, Alaska in a perpetual drizzle of snow. There's real mastery here: the action, which hardly lets up, is marvellously handled and exciting. The screenplay, based on one by Akira Kurosawa,

is splendidly managed; and in case you haven't guessed, it's a piece which doesn't give a damn whether it's liked.

At first glance, Karel Reisz does a fine job on *Sweet Dreams,* the story of Country and Western singer Patsy Cline, put together by the producer responsible for *Coal Miner's Daughter,* a roughly similar story which Michael Apted directed. The principle seems to be that British directors will respond to the dull urban landscapes, in this case Virginia, and to the fairly sleazy dance-halls (such things being unknown in Britain). And so does Reisz respond. But he directs every scene in the same controlled manner, so that it begins to sag as entertainment — especially as the material isn't as rich as that of the earlier film. There, Loretta Lynn and her husband weren't quite bright enough to cope with the strain fame imposed upon their marriage; here, Patsy (Jessica Lange), has a not-too-good marriage from the start, but she sticks to her man through thick and thin. Didn't success change her — and if not why not?

Another of our better directors has come up with a film to be only warily recommended. Krzysztof Zanussi says that *The Year of the Quiet Sun,* a co-production between Poland, West Germany and the USA, 'is not the result of any official cultural rapproachment. It is something of a historical quirk', going on to add that at a time when politicians have nothing to say to each other it is up to the artists to build bridges. He has tried to keep clear of the more sensitive issues, but emigration remains important with Poles, for that is what many of them dream of doing. He places his screenplay in 1946 and imagines an American soldier (Scott Wilson) on a special assignment falling in love with a Polish woman (Maja Komorowska), with whom he can hardly communicate. She finds the authorities no more sympathetic — or less corrupt — than the recent Nazi rulers; they certainly don't smile on love and marriage. In the end she doesn't go, having given up her place in the clandestine convoy out to someone who needs it more. Mr Wilson waits in vain, and while de didn't expect a happy ending (that's why I don't think I'm giving anything away) too many questions remain unanswered — throughout, as it happens, though the director half-deals with most of them with his customary intelligence.

Who did what on *Police* isn't quite apparent. Much of it was improvised, and then there were quarrels between Maurice Pialat, directing, and Sophie Marceau, his leading actress, and Catherine Breillat, ones of the four writers — and the one, in fact, credited with the 'idea'. In clinical detail we're shown modern police methods and whatd'you know, the mentalities, attitudes and language of the cops aren't much different from the pushers and the crooks who are their quarries. Pialat claims this is not documentary, and it's not the scream of anguish we often hear from him. Nor is there much plot. There is, as strong as ever, Gérard Depardieu, a racist, sexist and violent cop, finally revealed as just a mushy music-loving romantic at heart: but if we're not to grow to like him, what is the point? Maybe there isn't any.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THE FORD DYNASTY

FORD by Robert Lacey (Heinemann). £15.

Occasionally one comes across a book so excellent that nothing is left to the reviewer except exposition and eulogy. He has to hunt about to discover minor criticisms to avoid boring his readers. Such a one is Robert Lacey's book *FORD, The Men and the Machine* — the best biography of a twentieth century figure or figures that I can remember reading.

There is considerable competition for that accolade from books such as Kenneth Rose's *George V* and Kenneth Harris's *Attlee*. But Lacey's *FORD* covers a wider area than the others.

Henry Ford I was born in 1863 and did not die until 1947. His son Edsel Ford was born in 1893 and died fifty years later after gross maltreatment from his father. Henry Ford II was born in 1917 and is still with us though he resigned the chairmanship of the Ford Company in 1979. So the whole saga has lasted 123 years. Lacey is wonderfully at home throughout. One aspect of Lacey's virtuosity I am taking for granted. He appears to be a thorough master of all the technological developments that accompanied the Ford rise to eminence and the maintenance of a strong though variable position ever since. Personally, I have no knowledge of or interest in motor cars but as far as I can make out no one has questioned Lacey's handling of the technicalities.

'In 1923 Henry was able to celebrate his sixtieth birthday with a phenomenal 2,120,898 sales — 57 percent of all the cars produced in America, and, thanks to a growing number of Ford agencies outside the US, just about half the cars produced anywhere on the face of the earth.

'It was an astonishing achievement. Never before, or since, has one company so dominated world car production. The taxis of Hong Kong, the tractors of the Ukraine, most of the cars of South America — all bore the name of Ford.'

Henry Ford I emerges from these pages as an extraordinarily unattractive character. Edsel, on the contrary, as highly loveable, interested in the arts and all good philanthropic causes. His wife, no doubt correctly, assumes that his father precipitated his early death. Henry Ford II was slightly more agreeable than his grandfather but not much. Lacey vividly describes the break-up of his first two marriages and the unhappy relationship between the resulting children and the father.

Charlotte and Anne had heard about their father's marriage to Cristina on the radio. They disliked Kathy and had made their dislike very plain. They had got their father to promise that he would sit down and talk to them and try to sort out all the differences before he married again. The girls felt discarded, betrayed.

Kathy Ford (his third wife) has little sympathy with them. 'Poor little rich girls,' she says, 'with all this complaining, you know, about daddy never did this and daddy never did that. Well, I just feel like saying, "You were damn lucky you had a father. My kids didn't . . ." I don't ever want to stay in their home or have to take a trip with them again. I mean, I've been subjected to just enough.'

Robert Lacey tells us that he undertook two hundred interviews in the course of preparing this book including interviews with Henry Ford II and the third Mrs. Ford. I have no idea what the last two feel about the pictures of themselves presented here. But the story as told provides a wonderful read for the rest of us.

FRANK LONGFORD

THE THIRD WORLD WAR

No More Vietnams. Richard Nixon. W. H. Allen. £10.95.

No one can read this book without being reminded of the personal tragedy of 1974: that a man with this capacity to analyse foreign policy issues, and with this experience should have had to resign the Presidency under the circumstances he did. For it can safely be said that few American Presidents have ever analysed any foreign problems with the clarity, and lucidity, that Mr Nixon brings to bear here.

The book has two themes: the re-telling of the Vietnam story as he witnessed it, and the lessons to be learnt. While at each stage he sees all sides of the question, he also brings unusual decisiveness to bear. The US could not go to the aid of France at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 without being associated with a colonial power; but it was communism, not colonialism, that was the cause of the war in Indochina, and already the central issue there. Ho Chi Minh, though presented in the liberal press (in Europe as in the US) as a charismatic Vietnamese George Washington, or as an Asiatic Tito, was in fact a brilliant and ruthless Communist determined not only to unite the two halves of his country, but to communise it, by the use of internal war, by Chinese-style agrarian disruption, and by total terror. For the Vietnamese, the years of 'peace' afterwards, were the years of 'the killing fields.' What Ho's successors, notably Le Duan (who died a month ago) did in Vietnam after the War was over (at least a million dead, and as many in prison), what the Pathet Lao did in Laos, and what Pol Pot did in Cambodia in 1975 and 1976 (over two million dead, or one-quarter of the total population) have made the old Indochina a disaster area, empty of freedom and of hope. Those awful events in themselves go far to justify Mr Nixon. The boat people, those who escaped the massacres, to whom the US has been generous in its admissions, numbered well over 1.5 millions, and something like half of them drowned at sea.

It is a chilling tale: the US did win the War, but it lost the peace. And it lost it by a failure of nerve, not in the fields or jungles, but at home, by the unending sniping at the War in Universities, in the press, and on television, in a dangerous compound of liberal innocence and near-traitorous malevolence levelled at the man in the White House. Mr Nixon is polite but rightly bitter about *The New York Times* and its use of the Pentagon Papers; he is sustained in his indictment of the folly of the War Powers legislation and the curbs that an irresponsible Congress put on the President's constitutional duty to act as Commander-in-Chief; and he is remorseless in his emphasis that, after Vietnam, came: Laos, Cambodia and Mozambique in 1975, Angola in 1976, Ethiopia in 1977, South Vietnam in 1978, Nicaragua in 1979. The lessons are there for all of us, and not only Americans, to read.

With some of these countries, Sir Geoffrey Howe, on behalf of Europe's parliamentary democracies, is having to negotiate, if that is the word. To some of them, Bob Geldof and his crusaders are pouring millions of aid from the

West. Mr Nixon has no such illusions. For him, the Third World War began before the Second was over, and it is being fought in the Third World. Since 1945, there have been 120 wars, in which 10 million people have been killed. Except for Greece in 1947 (and had only aid and not troops gone there, it too would now be Communist) and the Falklands in 1981, all of these Wars began and were fought in the Third World. Mr Nixon quotes B. H. Liddell Hart: 'If you want peace, understand War.' He adds: 'If we want peace, we must also understand the Third World, because it is there that an incident is most likely to occur that would lead to War between the US and the Soviet Union.' He does not quote him but he echoes throughout the exhortation of Theodore Roosevelt: 'Speak softly, but carry a big stick.' Has he, in retrospect, not been proved right?

ESMOND WRIGHT

DEFENCE OF THE REALM

A Nation in Retreat: Britain's Defence Commitment. Christopher Coker. Brassey's (unpriced).

Christopher Coker lectures on International Relations at the London School of Economics and is on the Council of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. In this sphere of learning he is a man to watch.

He has written this chastening, challenging book at a time when the defence expenditure of the United Kingdom is on the point of decline. About 20 per cent higher in real terms than in 1979, it will not continue to rise by three per cent a year, as has been desired by NATO. The Defence Estimates of 1986 proclaim lean years after what Mr Coker describes as "the seven successive years commitment to the NATO real growth aim".

The outlook for the Services is sombre. The cost of arming and equipping them ever rises and "Britain's cost record happens to be 30 per cent worse than most" of her Atlantic allies. Mr Coker insists that we cannot go on as during the past 35 years. Hard choices must be made; which is never easy for a declining power.

Her Majesy's Opposition has a record in office of starting, maintaining and prolonging the life of the national deterrent. It appears now, however, to stand for its elimination and for the removal of US nuclear bases from Britain. Labour does not officially repudiate NATO but advocates an incompatible, quasi-neutralist policy. The position of the Alliance parties is confused.

Mr Coker writes with clarity, discernment and flashes of arresting prose. He points to modest conclusions and sensible choices. Britain, he counsels, should show herself "reliable and responsible" in NATO, active to reconcile Europe with North America. He exposes the shortcomings and inconsistencies of politicians of both main persuasions. The Government's attitude to the liberation of Grenada was indeed "lamentable"; and the decline of ships wearing both the White and the Red Ensign has been catastrophic. The author places faith and hope, however, in a puissant, warlike people to whom the ebb and flow of far off fights in the South Atlantic appealed more than the revival of free enterprise and "Victorian values".

The British can give the lie to the cartoon of a despairing, if heavily armed, Lion reproduced on the jacket from the satirical Soviet magazine, *Krokodil.* How often, and disastrously, have we been misunderstood, and under-rated, by aggressive empires?

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

THE BOYS IN BLUE

The Police Under Attack by Ian Grieg. Aims of Industry. 80p.

Aims of Industry constitutes an important pressure group which it would be foolish to ignore. However, their publication *The Police Under Attack* provokes the comment that they should stick to industry. The obsession with Trotskyist, Maoist, Anarchist and other assorted revolutionaries is hardly a new theme, reflecting the paranoia of the author living in a society which has visibly moved to the right and become increasingly authoritarian and polarised during the last seven years.

The real cause for concern is the polarisation and the 'we and them' attitudes that characterise sections of society and police, not least in inner urban areas. By making seven proposals to curb those perceived as hostile to the police, including only one dealing with 'disturbing racialist attacks', the pamphlet written by Ian Grieg, which itself is totally one-sided, fails to deal with causes rather than symptoms.

There are dedicated, honest law enforcement officers and there are uniformed thugs in any police force but by its very nature a police force tends to be in favour of the status quo and authority, whether in Poland or Peru, Birmingham or Brixton. Consequently, their use in large numbers during the miners' strike and at Wapping has created a perception among many trades unionists that the force is repressive and hostile to the Unions. When nuts, bolts and staves are used against them the police have responded with indiscriminate cavalry charges; but the blame usually lies with a small minority of violent demonstrators using a legitimate dispute to provoke confrontation and an element in the force which has damaged its reputation. Indeed, the incidence of acquittals involving the rejection of police evidence by juries is the converse of the situation when I began practice at the Bar and the word of a policeman was rarely doubted.

Outside the Metropolitan and larger Urban areas, the police live among the community and are known and respected. They are seen as the protection against the burglar and the local villain. They have not been brutalised by the inner city environment and they are welcome wherever they go. If that is not the case in Brixton or Tottenham one must look at the deprivation in those areas, the level of unemployment, the idle hands, frequently black, for whom the devil has work even if the local Job Centre has not.

Greater contact on a personal basis, the recruitment of more police from the ethnic minorities, better training with an emphasis on an understading of industrial disputes and the sensitivity of minorities will only be of value if the root causes of alienation are tackled in the decaying infrastructure of our neglected urban areas.

There is no doubt that, when given a uniform and authority, some will abuse it and that for a section of society the police are the visible manifestation of the hated authority which is an abstract concept. The ensuing clash is really about a society that has bred hooliganism, crime, industrial confrontation and mindless violence. In the face of this, escalation of weaponry and the scapegoat chosen by Ian Grieg are counter-productive.

Simplistic answers are futile, albeit legislators, judges, police and public all have their role and accountability would create greater confidence — and significantly not a word is written by Ian Greig about this — except to denigrate

police committees. It is vital to restore mutual confidence and avoid stereotypes. *The Police Under Attack* will not help in that task.

PAUL ROSE

SIXTEEN VIEWS OF BRITAIN

Britain: a view from Westminster, ed. by Julian Critchley, MP. Blandford Press, Poole, Dorset. £12.95.

This book gives us not 'a view' but sixteen very varied views, by Julian Critchley's Parliamentary colleagues, drawn from both Houses and from all parties except Plaid Cymru and the Scottish Nationalists. Despite (or because of?) that omission, Wales and Scotland emerge with most sharpness in these sketches of the social-economic-political make-up of the regions of the country. Perhaps Scotland and Wales, with their distinct national identities, their picturesque geography, and their similar economic problems are the easiest to portray. Certainly Lord Grimond and John Smith for Scotland, and Lord Cledwyn and Neil Kinnock for Wales give us clear and fresh essays on their native heaths, even if they confine themselves mainly to physical descriptions. And Teddy Taylor's tail-piece on Essex and Kent, as seen by one who, until his election in 1980 as MP for Southend, was a 'kenspeckle' Glaswegian, is enriched by his awareness of the contrast between the affluence of his new commuter constituency and the poverty of his original Clydeside.

In this kaleidoscope of the regions, it is England, however, that suffers. It is allotted, a little casually, to eleven authors. One, Austin Mitchell, MP for Grimsby, writes on The North East, which is not the same place; he builds his essay around Newcastle, of which he gives abundant evidence of not being a native; behind a number of clever phrases and a front of laboriously cultivated 'Geordie' slang, he makes heavy, because 'contrived', weather of it — and some of his 'Geordie' words are, in any case, either misunderstood or mis-spelt. (There are many such mis-spellings throughout the book. Billingham is not Billington, and Teddy Taylor (or his editor) must know that Sussex is not east of Kent.) When Austin Mitchell describes the Dukes of Northumberland as 'an obscure aristocracy . . . greedy roughnecks,' he only betrays his ignorance of the history of the North Country; but then what do they know of Northumbria who only Bingley and Grimsby know? Matthew Parris is also too prompt to abandon the facts for the sake of a journalistic wisecrack or two, and if his attitude to his colleagues as represented here is typical, they are not likely to lament his departure to a more lucrative and publicity-giving career as a TV presenter. And too many, including even Enoch Powell in his essay on Ulster, are too prompt to make party debating points, or to give avowedly partisan portrayals. That said, outsiders and in particular Americans for whom the book seems primarily intended, will gain from reading David Harris on Devon and Cornwall, Michael Colvin on Bristol and Avon, and Nicholas Budgen's frank description of the urban and racial tensions of Birmingham and its neighbourhood.

In all, this is a reminder of the immense variety of scene, of problems, and of human characteristics in the many diverse regions of this only-just-United Kingdom. This reviewer, with his own roots in Tyneside and in the Border country, regrets that, as is usual, it is the Anglo-Scottish Border country that suffers. John Smith catches the flavour of the Tweed and Teviot valleys. But

Gerald Kaufman (a Lancastrian only by adoption, and a Yorkshireman originally) does not go north of Carnforth in his cursory survey of the North West. And Northumberland is thus ignored. But, despite these *caveats,* this is a collection of readable and richly varied sketches.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE SCOTTISH PEOPLE 1830-1950

A century of the Scottish people 1830-1950. T. C. Smout. (Collins £15.).

The Professor of Scottish History at the University of St. Andrews has already earned justified praise for his study of Scotland from 1560 to 1830. In this second volume he lacks the high drama of those years: Knox, the Reformation, Mary Queen of Scots, and the Union of the Crowns in 1603 and of the Parliaments in 1707. He triumphs again here even if this is a story of the working class, of the movement from countryside into the towns — and especially into Glasgow — and a story of squalor and poverty. There is however, much that is dramatic enough in his accounts of the campaign against the demon drink, of religious splits in the Kirk and of the impact of Irish immigration into the West. He is a sceptic about Scotland's educational system, and perhaps minimises the significance of the academy in the Scottish educational tradition. The lad o' pairts had a better chance in Scotland than south of the Border, or anywhere else. He pays appropriate tribute to the Kirk as prompt to speak for and to the State, in a country where the annual General Assembly of the Kirk is still its only real 'Parliament', not least when it speaks on behalf of the Church of Africa Presbyterian. His final chapter, 'The Rise and Fall of Socialist Idealism,' is the most interesting and the shrewdest of all, even if he does pull his punches over the extent to which the Hard Left in Scotland moved to the Soft Right as age and honours over or undermined them. He notes how true it was of some, and even names one or two. There are, however, more than he admits, and not only the (now late) Lord Shinwell. But he has no doubts that the Scottish political tradition is still incorrigibly radical, and has no illusions about the real strength of the Nationalists. He supports his conclusions with an impressive array of notes and supporting evidence. This is a scholarly yet highly readable achievement.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE VICTORIAN MAN WHO CAME TO DINNER

Augustus Hare: Victorian Gentleman. Malcolm Barnes. Allen & Unwin. £20.

The child was horsewhipped regularly. His bed on freezing winter nights consisted of a straw mattress on bare boards and a single blanket. He was kept short on even the penitential diet of mutton and milk pudding. Occasionally an exquisite dessert would be set before him — only to be snatched away with the order that he was to hand the sweetmeat over intact to the local poor. Once, he accepted a peppermint lollipop from a village dame. Home, the smell on his breath betrayed him. He was dosed per forcing-spoon with an emetic compounded of rhubarb and soda until he vomited the sweet up again. On Sundays he was locked in the vestry between church services, with two human skulls and a scuttle of live rats for company. The pet cat he loved was hanged in the garden, and the little boy escorted to see its pendant, still-quivering corpse.

A page from the dossier of one of the nastier sado-masochistic case histories in the Krafft-Ebing closet? A report from the N.S.P.C.C. record of East London slumland cruelty? Not at all. More like a page of Fox's *Book of Martyrs* — good, clean, well-intentioned Christianity, practising the precept of self-sacrifice . . . on someone else! In this case, the early life history of a small boy of the privileged uppish middle class being raised by respectable, churchgoing, devout, Evangelical clergyman uncle and aunts in cosy Victorian England. It is the story of the writer Augustus Hare — and the years with mother. 'Mother' was not his parent, but his Aunt Maria. His real mother had fired him — one arrow too many for her quiverful — towards the requesting target of a recently widowed sister-in-law. "Yes, certainly, the baby shall be sent to you as soon as it is weaned; if anyone else should like one, would you kindly recollect that we have others."

The odd thing is that the religio-sado-masochistic relationship between Augustus and his adoptive mother, flowering out of a religious zealotry that surely sanctifies humane paganism, resulted in the blossoming of the Patty Hearst Syndrome — he lived to kiss his chains. Together, Augustus and aunt traversed the wide and dangerous spaces of the Grand Tour country, braving, off the beaten track, bandits, snuggling safely through snowstorms, sniffing scented 'kerchiefs at the cholera, discounting the perils of overturning carriages, he writing and lovingly illustrating Continental guide books which were, ultimately, to transform his £60 *per annum* into the £31,000 which he left at his death, aged sixty-nine, in 1903. When Aunt Maria died, her 'son' was on his knees mouthing in Pavlovian anguish by her deathbed "How bright those glorious spirits shine!"

Then, truly, was the hunt on for the happy home he never knew. All the great houses of England enfolded him as a guest. He was the Victorian gentleman who came to dinner . . . breakfast, lunch and tea . . . He gave his hosts excellent value for their money as a house-guest. From Mrs. Gladstone and Sir Henry Irving down to the latest ducal recruit from the chorus line, they hung upon the tales of ghosts and ghouls and gossip which he so beguilingly recounted. For the hunt for love, it was too late. Something had died, been smothered, within him. He remained a bachelor — not gay. The magic of the man is captured in this completely charming book by Mr. Barnes, whose interest in Augustus Hare extends over nearly half-a-century and who must be acknowledged not only as Hare's editor, but as the foremost authority on this very particular Victorian gentleman.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Thinkers of the Twentieth Century (Firethorn Press, distributed by Sidgwick & Jackson. £12.95 paperback.) This 'biographical, bibliographical and critical dictionary' has been compiled and edited by Elizabeth Devine, Michael Held, James Vinson and George Walsh. It consists of some 650 pages in a large format and covers over 400 entries of thinkers who have influenced thought, development and behaviour in their particular fields, and often beyond. Each entry includes a critical essay by a competent writer in the relevant range of study. Almost every profession is represented. The

volume contains a vast amount of valuable material to the enquirer. There are bound to be some disappointments. For example, Lord Atkin deserved inclusion. He has had a great influence in the development of the Common Law during this century. Nonetheless this volume is extremely useful as a reference book.

A History of Modern Criticism 1750-1950 Volume V, **English Criticism 1900-1950** and Volume VI, **American Criticism,** (Jonathan Cape £20 each). It is no accident that the first four volumes of René Wellek's monumental work have already been translated into five languages; they represent a life-work of study and reflection by the Central European-born-and-educated emeritus Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale. He gives us a series of short essays, a few of which have already appeared in print. The English volume is especially valuable for the studies of T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence and the Leavis and Bloomsbury groups; the American for Edmund Wilson, Cleanth Brooks, Lionel Trilling and the Nashville School; he is less sympathetic than one might expect to Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. A series of brilliant portraits is fully supported by detailed bibliographies and notes.

King of Air Fighters (Thackwell Publishing Co. £4.50). This biography of Major 'Mick' Mannock, VC, DSO, MC by Flt-Lt Ira Jones was published well before the last war, in 1934. It is now reprinted as a paperback. He was, without doubt, the leading air fighter in the first world war, and this account of his character and his exploits will continue to attract readership.

Dictionary of Abbreviations (Dent. £10.95.) This Everyman dictionary, compiled by John Paxton, was first published in 1974. It contained 25,000 entries and 37,000 definitions. Now in this second edition Dr. Paxton has revised the 25,000 entries and added a further 2,000. He has 'sought to incorporate abbreviations and symbols from as many fields of global activity as is possible' within the practical limits of 200,000 words. In addition to everyday abbreviations in common use 'special emphasis has been placed on economic and commercial matters including particularly employers associations and trade union organizations'. He properly accepts that changes are bound to occur in the speech habits of our society and 'will be grateful to readers for suggestions for the improvement and extension of the present work'. For example, what about F.R.U. for the Free Representation Unit? Meanwhile this volume remains an invaluable guide through the jargon of abbreviations.

Just some of the new books at bargain prices from

READERPLAN

292. Roy Jenkins: a biography by John Campbell.
With photos, references, index, and bibliography. Was £10.95.
READERPLAN price £1.99

205. A Brighter Sunshine by Donald Campbell.
A hundred years of the Edinburgh Royal Lyceum Theatre. Indexed. Was £8.75.
READERPLAN price £2.50

236. David Steel: his life & politics by Peter Bartram.
Authorised biography. Was £7.95.
READERPLAN price £2.95

204. Future War. Edited by Frank Barnaby.
Information source for peace campaigner and weapons buff. Sections on the arms trade. Index, refs. Was £9.95.
READERPLAN price £3.10

173 On the Rails by Sidney Weighell.
Autobiography. Includes criticism of Labour's left wing Was £8.95.
READERPLAN price £1.45.

271. USSR: Secrets of a corrupt society by Konstantin Simis.
Reveals Russia's hidden private enterprise economy. Was £8.95.
READERPLAN price £1.99

293. Thatcher by Nicholas Wapshott & Geo. Brock.
Biography; covers both her personal and political life. Indexed. Was £9.95.
READERPLAN price £3.25

Plus many more.
To order, send cheque adding £1.25 p&p.
Or request full list.
READERPLAN, Box 199, St. Albans, Herts. AL4 9PB.

THE UNHEEDED

by Sheila Parry and others:

An Anthology of verse by single parents, senior citizens, disabled teen-agers and the unemployed.

Published by Horton Writers' Group, £2.00
53 Burnley Road, Halifax, West Yorkshire

CARE FOR OUR DISABLED
RAFA WINGS APPEAL
DURING
SEPTEMBER

DONATIONS PLEASE TO: ROYAL AIR FORCES ASSN., APPEALS DEPT (SD), PORTLAND RD., MALVERN, WORCS. WR14 2TA.

GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE PEOPLE

by

Rodney Atkinson

A devastating attack on the Failure of Government intervention, questioning the very definition of "Democratic Government".

"An excellent book." Matthew Parris, *Sunday Times*

ISBN 0 9509353 1 X Hardback. Price £9.00

Compuprint Publishing, 4 Sands Road, Swalwell Industrial Estate, Tyne and Wear NE16 3

The Henry Williamson Society

The Society's Annual General Meeting will be held on Saturday, October 11th, 1986 at 5.30 p.m. at The Putsborough Sands Hotel, Putsborough, Braunton, North Devon EX33 1LB. Telephone: (0271) 890555

To be followed by a talk by Rosalind Wade OBE, and a Society supper.
For particulars of this and other events please apply to:
Tim Morley, Roschill Lodge, Middle Wallop, Stockbridge, Hants. SO20 8HW.
Telephone: Andover (0264) 781779

ORE

POETRY MAGAZINE

THE HENLEY ISSUE (No. 28)

Research articles on William Ernest Henley (1849-1903), poet and critic, Editor of *London*, *The National Observer* and *The New Review*. Guest editorial by Prof. Andre Guillaume. £1.80 post free including 1986 brochure of Cockayne Hatley Church where Henley, his wife and daughter were buried. The famous 'Invictus' poem is quoted.
From Ore, Owles Warehouse, 4 Trinity Street, Bungay, Suffolk.

Printed by BRAZIER & NAISH LTD, 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG. Tel 01-242 3215 All business matters should be addressed to the publishers

Contemporary Review

121st YEAR OF PUBLICATION

OCTOBER 1986

BIG BANG: THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES

Charles Villiers

TURKEY AND THE LONG HOT SUMMER

Richard Cottrell, MEP

NATIONAL SECURITY, OFFICIAL INFORMATION AND THE LAW

Graham Zellick

THEATRE ANTIQUE, ORANGE

Peter Orr

and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement.

£1.10

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

October 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1449 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

Big Bang: the Opportunities and the Responsibilities	Charles Villiers	169
Turkey and the Long Hot Summer	Richard Cottrell, MEP	174
Anglican Anxieties: the Ministry of the Church and the Ordination of Women	The Rev. Geoffrey Rowell	178
Sinhala-Tamil Negotiations	Karan Sawhny	184
National Security, Official Information and the Law	Graham Zellick	189
Poems: A Trilogy	Pamela Constantine	197
Making Lists	John Elsom	198
Locust Outbreaks Prolong the Agony of Africa	Thomas Land	203
Theatre Antique, Orange	Peter Orr	205
Edinburgh Festival 1986	Laurence Green	208
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		
Quarterly Fiction Review	Rosalind Wade	213
Non-Fiction Reviews John Biggs-Davison, Kenneth Lindsay, Betty Abel, Laurence Tanner, Della Couling, Richard Whittington-Egan		217
SHORTER REVIEWS		224

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE, O.B.E.

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director.
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1986 Published monthly by the Contemporary Review Co. Ltd, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG, England, and printed in England by Brazier & Naish Ltd, 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD U S Mailing Agent: Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc, 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J 07001. Second Class postage paid at Rahway N J Annual subscription (including postage): U K £16 00, U S A and Canada $55 00 Rates for all other countries on application Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S and Canada: extra costs given on request U S Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd. Inc, 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J 07001. Contemporary Review. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

October 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1449

BIG BANG: THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES

by Charles Villiers

'BIG BANG' is a term which is being much bandied about this year: it is used to describe the changes which take place on October 27th, when the Stock Exchange's new regulations come into effect. These are designed to ensure that London has a major role in the 24-hour trading around the globe, which is now an imminent reality.

One major change, the acceptance of corporate members into the Stock Exchange, has already taken place in March this year. This opened the way to firms of stockbrokers becoming parts of larger groupings, such as banks and other financial institutions. However, the majority of the changes will be introduced overnight on October 27th. Apart from the abolition of minimum fixed commissions, the main effect will be that whereas traditionally all dealing involved both brokers and jobbers (market-makers), now there will be only one class of member — the broker/dealer. The resultant unification of the banking and securities industries — through the mechanism of Big Bang and all its ramifications — gives London a unique opportunity to enhance its position in the world.

Quite rightly, though, as well as being regarded as a great opportunity, Big Bang is also viewed with some caution by all those concerned. Few would claim to have any clear picture of what the City will look like after October, and those who do are quite likely to be wrong. The question of self-regulation is being looked at very closely indeed. Furthermore, although we fondly imagine that our path for the future is entirely a matter of design, there is no denying that the very roads which have brought us to this present opportunity are strewn with accidents; and there is no less likelihood of further accidents in the future.

Just to turn away from the UK banking and securities systems for a moment, and looking instead at the American and Japanese systems leads one inevitably to conclude that historical accident plays a far larger role than logical design, however much one would like to believe otherwise. The most important factor in shaping the US system was the Wall Street Crash, for which the banks were severely blamed, and as a result of which

their hands were closely tied for the future. Separation of banking activities from broking became a cardinal virtue.

The US occupation of Japan led to a very similar system being adopted there, with Japanese banks being prohibited from undertaking securities business.

The opportunity with which London's market practitioners, regulators and the Government have been presented, that of designing a structure and writing a new book of rules, is a rare one indeed. The resultant system should give practitioners more scope and potential for action than exists in either Japan or the US, as long as separation of activity remains a cardinal principle in the other two main financial centres.

It is interesting to look at two trends in particular which have made Big Bang inevitable. One is disintermediation — the tendency for large companies and other bodies to prefer to organise their own financing rather than relying heavily on banks and other intermediaries. The other is internationalisation of the world securities markets (or, in other words, stocks and shares). The trend away from intermediaries is reflected in the far more professional and demanding investment approach that exists nowadays as a result of the institutionalisation of savings, and the much greater sophistication of corporate treasury departments. Above all, though, it is the advance in technology which has made it possible.

The technological revolution gives finance directors and professional investors the ability to make their own judgments on the basis of up-to-the-minute information; and thus it alters the balance of power between bank and customer. Whereas 20 years ago the intermediation of a bank was necessary, it is not so any longer — at least for high quality business. Thus, there is a movement towards commercial paper rather than borrowing from a bank. As a result, too, we have seen a progression towards increasingly complex financial instruments as corporate financiers look for cheaper and cheaper funding techniques.

Technology is the most important factor in the trend towards internationalisation, which complements the securitisation process. The greater professional awareness of the investor, institutionalisation of investment and reduction in the cost of transmitting informaton, all point the way to global investment rather than a limitation to one market. Added to this, the volatility of exchange rates and the differing interest rates in different currencies, together with the varying performance of individual equity markets, all contribute towards the attractiveness of recycling investments from one part of the world to another.

In the UK, overseas investment has increased dramatically since exchange control was abandoned. For example, a typical pension fund portfolio may now be 25% invested overseas, as opposed to 5% in the 1970s. Trends in Japan and the US are very similar, although the percentages are still much smaller. The world is the fund manager's oyster. The Big Bang in London is the focus of these changes. On one hand we have the involvement of the banks in securities dealing, and on the other

the internationalisation of the Stock Exchange; and so London is poised for a major role in the global securities market. One of London's prime advantages, in fact, is another accident: time zone. For dealing books to be transferred around the world on a 24 hour basis in the global markets, three different centres based on time zones will be needed — that is three different eight hour working days. Because New York and Tokyo represent the two largest securities markets in the world, they really choose themselves; and London is conveniently placed between the two. We thus have the opportunity to become a major capital market centre, not just for the UK but for the whole of Europe. At present, our equity market represents less than 8% of the total world market; but if we can speak for Europe, this figure goes up to 20% of the world's equity market capitalisation.

We can be encouraged, too, by the fact that Europe does seem to regard us as being important. Two of the three major Swiss banks have bought stockbrokers in London, and both Deutsche Bank and Paribas have recently moved their international capital market operations to London. In the ownership of stockbrokers, we must have the most international Stock Exchange in the world by far, incorporating not only American and Swiss operations but also Austrian, French, Australian and Chinese. The opportunities to create an extremely competitive and efficient business in London are therefore immense; but so are the responsibilities — and we have no guarantee that we are going to get everything right.

Paradoxically, one of the areas which has been causing the most concern in commentaries on Big Bangs is one from which I think we have least to fear, and that is the question of conflicts of interest. Essentially, these conflicts have the possibility of arising because brokers and market-makers can now operate under the same roof. In order to ensure, therefore, that the investor's interests cannot be influenced by those of the market-maker, the Stock Exchange's new regulations insist that organisations where potential conflicts may exist should construct internal 'Chinese walls' — so that one division does not have access to another division's information.

The arrangement has caused some concern, and of course there may be accidents; but the incentive *not* to abuse conflicts is very strong — there will be high standards of disclosure, and a high premium on integrity. Looking at the problems at Lloyds, I believe these stemmed from the very lack of high standards of disclosure which the new Stock Exchange will require. One of the biggest dangers associated with Big Bang, however, is the abuse of opportunity — and there can be no denying that in recent years there have been abuses. Insider dealing — and the apparent inability of the authorities to see justice done — is just one example. The movement away from obeying the spirit of the law, quite against the City's traditions, is another. Behaviour in some of the recent takeover battles, in particular, has rather served to dent the City's

reputation: cynical and destructive advertising, the ruthless exploitation of regulatory loopholes, and the pursuit of fees which in some instances bore very little relationship either to the risks or the costs involved.

The Business Expansion Scheme serves as another instance of a carefully-designed opportunity, which has degenerated into a tax planning device instead of the intended vehicle for generating employment and taking risks. Neither does the kind of remuneration currently being paid in the City because of temporary shortages of specific skills present a very attractive spectacle to the rest of the country.

All these abuses must be checked — and the task should not be left solely to the law or to the regulators. Then in addition, we cannot overlook the very stiff competition from overseas which British institutions will be taking on. We need only to look at the advantages the American investment banks bring with them: a domestic market representing over half of the world market, a very strong capitalisation, 10 years' experience since their own Big Bang and a lifetime of dual capacity trading. Returns for British organisations may be very disappointing in the short term at least — particularly if foreign competitors are satisfied to make only a marginal profit through their London operations. As a result, disillusionment and lack of commitment could prevent the City from becoming the international centre it should be; or equally unfortunately, it could end up simply being foreign owned.

In looking ahead at our responsibilities, again, we cannot ignore the possibility of a bear market, or general decline in share prices, just when fixed costs are at their highest. And a further concern: I am far from convinced that all the new risks being taken on are fully understood. Transactions become ever more complex and sophisticated, and it may prove that not all the control and monitoring systems are totally watertight; or, with the very heavy emphasis on technology, that computer security is as strong as it needs to be.

Above all, it is important that the City should be perceived not as a place where insiders make money for themselves, but as a place for *making a market* in money. It should be judged according to its efficiency as a marketplace, and according to the benefits it brings to its users. The new competition introduced post-Big Bang should help ensure that a reasonable return on capital, commensurate with risk, is earned; but that monopolistic profits are forced out.

Our business in the City is to provide a satisfactory market place — mainly for money and other financial assets, but also for shipping, insurance and commodities. In the turmoil caused by the introduction of revolutionary changes, we should not lose sight of the fact that the whole purpose of Big Bang is to make this market place more efficient. The City is not some unilateral power: it is the servant of the saving community — those who have pensions, those who have insurance policies, those who invest in unit trusts and not forgetting those who invest in deposits — and it invests objectively in the best interests of these people.

Regulation and supervision of the emerging world securities market is possibly the greatest technical challenge we face as we design the future. It is vital that we hit the right balance between protecting the investor and creating a free market governed by morality and integrity.

To create a statutory regulatory regime that seeks to write rules for every activity, foreseen and unforeseen, would be to strangle the market and force business to seek a kinder haven. At the other extreme, however, there will always be instances where disreputable practitioners will creep into the investment banking business, and may find the client's nest egg irresistible; and so a way must be found of closing the market to these offenders.

The Financial Services Bill has the potential to achieve the right balance, by giving a vital role to market practitioners who are amply qualified to monitor business which they understand. Competition and enlightened self-interest should do the rest.

The outlook for the future, then, is extremely positive: we now have the opportunity to design a future for London that will keep it a major financial centre. Unlike past centres such as Genoa or Amsterdam, London has proved that it can keep abreast of change, despite a declining currency, a declining share of world trade and a declining domestic economy. London has staying power. Arguably, too, the sheer power of the Japanese and American economies may act as centres of gravity and pull in the major share of the world's securities business. London may not be the biggest market, but it certainly has the potential to be the best truly international market. A better market in terms of the expertise of skilled people, the size and depth of institutions and the quality of infrastructure.

From the interest shown by domestic and foreign institutions, it is apparent that I am not alone in looking to the future with confidence. The fact that leading European banks have transferred their capital markets operations to London may be a symptom of the deficiencies of their over-protected and conservative markets. It is at least a sign that they see London as the European centre of the world securities revolution.

The risks we are taking in the Big Bang, let there be no mistake, are substantial; but they are also *very* much worthwhile.

[Charles Villiers is Chief Executive, NatWest Investment Bank.]

TURKEY AND THE LONG HOT SUM

by Richard Cottrell, MEP

TURKS have spent the hot summer broo worrying topics, all very different in them which charts some kind of constructive cou nation of fifty million people desperately pursui Chernobyl and the Libyan raid have sent shudd trade, equipping gold sellers in the Grand Ba uncharacteristic frowns. The oil price yo-yo has hiccoughs into a slowly recuperating economy. technology glossy newspapers are fretting over t the minority taste for Islamic fundamentalism — disturb the bones of Ataturk, whose vast impei over the many hills and teeming people of Anka the very least, the talk in corridors of power wit buzzes mostly around the likely reaction of the EE Turgut Ozal goes for the grand slam — probi certainly before expiry of his mandate in 1988 — cation for full-scale membership of the European

Despite all the horror stories about the comi (which, being a nation of good husbanders, Turk and echoes of the endless political ructions in] yearning to join the parade as full-recognised, paid based diplomats of the Twelve are busily telling else who will listen, that 'now is not the right ti as much to Ozal when he dropped into London re found wanting on constructive advice as to whei more opportune. The Germans, who have been c century and more ('commercial Greenmantles') because they fear a second invasion of Anatolia Greeks, of course, are reaching about for the bi in the deck. The humour in other Community ca discouraging noises about the condition of huma whether the fabric of state is fit for democracy. reasonably be suggested, suspiciously, three other — Greece, Spain and Portual — trooped into E much as a pulse-check. Turkey is a 'special case' a set of rules which will be instantly applied so so from Ankara arrives onto the desk of EEC Jaques Delors. So, why is it that the Turks are so a door they suspect will not even be opened fo face?

The character of Turgut Ozal has much to do and lucky gambler, in political terms. He cc approach to religion with robust, free-market ec how to play to an audience. By winding up emc

the slightly lurid press, and even in the mosques, he has aroused a powerful state of anticipation. This is not for home consumption. It is meant to be the stuff of diplomatic cables sent back home to the EEC's capitals. Ozal's message, writ simply, says this: the Europeans are only too pleased to contemplate a large, well-trained and reliable army guarding the back door, while, so far as any further advance is concerned, it remains firmly a case of knocking politely at the tradesmen's entrance. Ozal intends to work up the impression that if the Turkish application is not taken seriously, the re-buff will be received throughout Turkey as a calculated insult, the consequences of which might be unfortunate. Ever since Kemal Mustapha put an end to the Sultans and commanded his new republic to look West, it has been doing precisely that, but receiving precious little in the way of encouragement. The origins of this cool embrace from the West are largely historical. The image of the cruel Ottoman remains deeply entrenched in the Western political imagination, thanks in no small part to the fevered dreams of T.E. Lawrence. The minaret also towers precariously above the argument. If he had had his way, Ataturk would have torn every one down with his bare hands, but instead judged that the mullahs — if confronted with rigorously imposed conformity to European standards — would soon be preaching to empty mosques. That turned out to be not quite the case — perhaps the only significant misjudgement which the Founder took with him to the grave at his premature death in 1938 — but nevertheless, the residual Muslim flavour of Turkey has proved to be an irritant in all her dealings with the 'established West.' The Judaeo-Christian ethic may be no more than a shorthand convenience to describe a certain kind of political evolution but it is a fact that even the prospect of a close alliance with the successors of Saladin is enough to set nerves jangling all the way from the Tagus to the Rhine.

This, as Turks will point out at every opportunity, is wicked humbug. If a shooting war ever breaks out with the Soviet Union, assuming at least a preliminary conventional engagement, no-one in the NATO command post in Brussels will care two bullets whether Muslim or Christian soldiers are dying in the defence of democracy. So, if Turkish lives could be sacrificed to protect Frankfurt or Birmingham, what is wrong with sitting down at the same table with the same people, squabbling over free trade and the sugar mountain? The fact is that Turkey's record of loyalty to the European 'community' — in its widest sense — looks a good deal better than, say, Greece, who since her own admission to the EEC has behaved like a spoilt child. The Turks openly proclaim their admiration for the Portuguese and Spanish, who they consider have gone into the club with determination, instead of using tantrums to win subsidies for raisin growers.

Of course, it is the existence of the Greek joker in the pack which succours the other Eleven with considerable comfort. Greece may be defiant and troublesome but the reality of an Athens veto against Turkey offers a suitable escape route once the application for membership finally arrives in Brussels. Delors can say to Ankara that a Greek veto stops him

seeking a mandate to negotiate seriously. This would be the second largest demonstration of political cowardice since the Treaty of Rome was created (the other, much larger one is the refusal to reform the common agricultural policy). But Delors, should he be sensible, cunning and long-sighted, could see a way to cut between the two and use both the inevitability of a veto *and* the need not to offend the Turks to chart a different approach which would bring the Community itself out on top. He should advise the Council of Ministers that he sought a mandate to start 'talks about talks.' Many useful items could compose such an agenda. For example, the Turks could join the political co-operation machinery of the Community without too much difficulty. They could be encouraged to join the European Monetary System. Turkish observers could be sent to Brussels and the European Parliament on a permanent basis. Deals could be struck on development of EEC credits to develop backward Turkish regions and further technical investment. This would provide sufficient breathing space to isolate the Greeks by, in effect, warning them that the Community is not a prisoner of nations. Should they find the presence of the Turks anywhere near the Community wholly unacceptable, then they should do the other thing by packing up their political baggage and pulling out. It is in any case well past time to tug the Greeks into line by showing that breaking all the rules (and they do) for the sheer hell of it, while the club picks up the tab for the sickest economy in Europe, is a game which must end somewhere.

I believe the Greeks will back down and jump the hurdle along with everyone else. A new, more mature generation of potential leaders are now gaining ground in the country and they wish an end to the partisan bickering with their neighbour, An accommodation with Turkey — inside the EEC — would provide the perfect framework for solutions to the long-standing problems of Cyprus, military rivalry and commercial development of the Aegean. The Anglo-Spanish 'understanding' over Gibraltar points a useful and promising example. So does the rapprochement between Lisbon and Madrid, two capitals which might just as well have been located in different continents this past century. Would the Anglo-Irish agreement (whatever one thinks of it) stand a chance outside the context of the European Community?

Mrs. Thatcher ought to be an important component, as ever. She has been frightened by the prospect of incorporating Anatolian agriculture into a policy which now bankrupts the EEC budget every year. In fact, the reality of Turkish accession ought to inject a renewed sense of urgency into notions for reform of the common agricultural policy. The Turks are potentially powerful allies on this issue. They do not believe the CAP is credible, or even desirable. If the Twelve chose to dismember it before accession, and dispose of Community resources on advanced technology, promotion of Community exports and re-dedication of the urban unemployed, that will go down very nicely indeed in Ankara. But without doubt the Prime Minister has also been listening to the Americans, long time manipulators of eastern Mediterranean affairs.

Washington perceives democratic Turkey — whose balcony provides excellent views of the Soviet Union, Iran, Syria and Iraq—as a key linchpin of security in the region. They would like to see a reversal of the country's political polarity, as envisaged by Ataturk, towards the east, with containment of Soviet interests in the area as one objective. Whatever the Americans say in public about the Iranian regime, its anti-Communist credentials are readily appreciated. Turkey's links with Tehran and the most important conservative power in the region, Saudi Arabia, are considered of such significance that Washington believes a Western-orientated Turkish policy could seriously weaken regional stabilisation — or such stability as exists. None of this stands up to analysis. The Turks have in fact prescribed strict limits to their interests in the Middle East cauldron. The Iran-Iraq war looks increasingly like a no-win situation so far as Turkish interests are concerned. Victory for Iran means a boost for mullah-power — an edgy subject — while nothing would be gained from a triumph for Iraq, whose restless army would then be left to brood fitfully on Turkey's southern frontier. If Turkey had real objectives in the region, she might have been persuaded to join the international peace keeping force in Lebanon, or at least send a detachment of observers as one of the most important Islamic regional powers. All such overtures were in fact firmly resisted.

Nothing, therefore, will deflect the Turks from their wider ambitions in Europe. If the British and the Germans can be persuaded to accept that, a political concensus would begin to emerge rapidly. This could take the form of placing Turkey on a moving escalator which gradually takes her towards full Community membership and responsibilities before the end of the century. 'Talks about talks' avoid a dangerous stalemate which would leave Turkey without an effective policy of political development: they would underpin the effervescent democracy now bubbling up all over the country. America's interests, and those of Europe, are not after all so very wide apart. Turkey has to remain firmly anchored within the western sphere of interest. The cost of letting her join the established European club is a small one — particularly once the Community breaks through into the post-CAP open country; but the cost of excluding her might be very high indeed.

[Richard Cottrell is Member for Bath and Bristol of the European Parliament.]

ANGLICAN ANXIETIES: THE MINISTRY OF THE CHURCH AND THE ORDINATION OF WOMEN

by The Rev. Geoffrey Rowell

THE General Synod of the Church of England gathered for its residential meeting at York in July of this year, 1986. There were gloomy predictions in the weeks before the Synod of a prospect of schism within the Church. It was known that two controversial issues at least were to be debated — the response of the bishops to the doctrinal controversies sparked ofl by the comments of the Bishop of Durham, and two issues relating to the ordination of women to the priesthood. The first of these issues concerning the ordination of women related to women ordained to the priesthood in provinces of the Anglican Communion which have admitted women to the priesthood. It was intended to give limited permission for such women to exercise their ministry in the Church of England. The second issue was the report of a working party given the task of outlining the character of the legislation which would be necessary if the Church of England were to agree to ordain women. That working party set out a number of options which, in making provision for those unable in conscience to accept the ministry of women ordained to the priesthood, sketched out the possibility of two parallel churches and lines of episcopal succession in England.

In the event the Synod failed to approve the Women Ordained Abroad Measure and protested at the picture of division in the church presented by the working party. The matter was referred to the bishops, whose report on *The Nature of Belief* had in general been welcomed as a judicious assessment of the doctrinal controversy engendered by the comments of Bishop David Jenkins. In both instances the bishops have been accorded a theological and pastoral responsibility in relation to the Synod which has been welcomed by at least some of those who are critical of the way in which synodical government has developed in the Church of England.

What is it about the ordination of women to the priesthood which arouses such deep conflict and anxiety for Anglicans? There are those prepared to answer this question solely in psychological or sociological terms. The church has for long been a male dominated preserve, so the argument runs and, amongst the clergy in particular, there are often hidden fears of women. Churches are by their nature conservative bodies and are ill-designed to adapt to change. Ancient Israel was a patriarchal society and the cultural expression of its faith was therefore in predominantly masculine terms. The Christian church was shaped by that heritage and continued it, and arguments from tradition are no more than expressions of that cultural conditioning. The emancipation of women is one of the new facts of our time and we must expect such emancipation to have consequences for the church. The Christ whom the church proclaims is the breaker down of barriers and divisions. Just as the barrier

between Jew and Gentile was dissolved and the church came into being not as the people of God narrowly based on race but as a catholic, a universal church, so the barrier of gender is to be broken down in our own day.

There is undeniable force in all these arguments. One may admit that and yet still maintain that they are not conclusive so far as the particular question at issue — the ordination of women to the priesthood — is concerned. One thing is clear: the ordination of women to the priesthood is not a simple issue of equal opportunities. It raises for the church the issue of what is 'given' in its inheritance. Christianity is an historical religion. It makes the tremendous clam that at a particular time and at a particular place God chose to enter his creation and to know it humanly 'from the inside'. 'God became man' in Jesus of Nazareth, whom we acknowledge as 'the Christ', the 'anointed one', the Messiah of Jewish expectation. To become man means to become historical man, and we cannot lightly say that this particular moment in time, with all its particular historical patterning, was somehow irrelevant to the purpose of God. The New Testament itself speaks of 'the fullness of time' as the moment when God so chose to involve himself in our human situation. The particular context in which God so acted was the context of Jewish faith and history.

The New Testament is cradled in the Old. Jesus is seen as both the fulfilment and the transformation of the Old Testament. The language in which he speaks about God, and from which is minted the new Christian language of faith is the rich language of Jewish faith born out of the experience of exodus and exile, of psalms and prophecy and temple worship. Such language is not repudiated but reinterpreted. The 'given-ness' of the Christian faith is what God did in Jesus Christ at a particular time and at a particular place, and those particularities of history are thereby invested with a special significance. From that point of history grew a community which saw itself as 'one, holy, catholic and apostolic'. As it spread into the Gentile world it looked to the succession of bishops (the *episcopoi* or 'overseers') to be the guardians and teachers of the faith, and the focus of unity in the church. The bishop was the 'hander-on' of the tradition (the Greek word *paradosis,* translated 'tradition', means that which is 'handed on').

Of course there was change, not least in the ministry itself, which evolved quite early into a three-fold pattern of bishops, *presbuteroi* (priests/elders), and deacons from an earlier variety in which the apostles had a special place. But the change, such as it was, was conservative, and was related both in doctrine and practice to the preservation of apostolic faith. The ordination of women to the priesthood, as something unknown to that tradition until our own day, raises the question of whether it may or may not be regarded as a legitimate development. And since the order of priesthood is a delegated ministry from the primary ministry of the bishop the question which has to be asked is does the restriction of

the episcopal ministry to males — something acknowledged by all to be historically the case — belong to the 'givenness' of Christian faith and order, or is it merely a cultural phenomenon that has endured for almost two thousand years?

Traditions of faith, like all traditions, are transmitted in subtle ways. Liturgical language, for instance, becomes invested with symbolic significance with the consequence that alterations in liturgy are the occasion of heart-searching and sometimes controversy. Every religion has its symbolic pattern by means of which it endeavours to speak of the things of God. To worship is, amongst other things, to enter into a symbolic universe, to 'indwell' in an imaginative way the symbols of faith. Those symbols are the words of liturgy, and the actions and architecture of worship. The sacraments, the 'outward and visible signs' of God's grace, are normative expressions of this universe of signs. There is therefore a force in the argument which stresses what is called the 'iconic' character of priesthood, pointing to the priest as the one who in this sacramental worship is an icon of Christ. Such an understanding does not relate to the worthiness of any particular priest to fulfil such an awesome role, for it his setting aside by the church (itself a sacramental action) which is important. The priest in presiding at the Eucharist does what Christ did, and although it is true that in the order of eternity God in Christ took human nature and not simply male human nature to himself, yet in the order of history his particularity was male. In the universe of signs it is to the givenness of the historic Jesus that the priest is related. This sacramental understanding is stressed with differing degrees of emphasis in the Anglican tradition, yet it is one of the things which differentiates Anglicans from those Protestant traditions whose understanding of ministry is conceived very largely in terms of preaching and service. Because Anglicans, like the Orthodox churches and the Roman Catholic church, share this sacramental understanding of ministry it is perhaps not surprising that it is in the Anglican church, with its particular inheritance of 'reformed Catholicism', that the issue of the ordination of women should be felt so keenly.

Anglicans, moreover, claim that the ordained ministry of their church is the historic ministry of catholic Christendom. At the Reformation Anglicans preserved the historic threefold ministry of bishop, priest and deacon, and came to value that inheritance as witnessing to apostolic ministry and continuity. There is therefore another issue involved in the controversy over the ordination of women. If it were to be clearly agreed that it was right for the church to ordain women to the priesthood, are Anglicans entitled to act in this way in relation to a ministry which they claim to be a shared ministry with both Orthodox and Roman Catholics. This issue of authority and what it is appropriate for a church to do in the anomalous situation of a divided church is given a sharper focus by the coming together of the church in the ecumenical movement. When Pope Paul VI and more recently the present Pope stated that the ordination of women in the Anglican Communion constituted a new and grave

obstacle to the reconciliation of the churches, this cannot simply be regarded as a move in ecclesiastical diplomacy. Concern for the unity of the church is fundamentally a *theological* concern, rooted in the prayer of Jesus himself that 'they may be one that the world may believe.' Although it would be naive to suppose that the issue of the ordination of women is not a live one in the Roman Catholic church, Anglicans ought not to proceed to take action on the basis of unofficial opinions of some Roman Catholic theologians. It is the considered response of the papacy in a specifically ecumenical context which must be their proper concern.

It has also been argued with some force that the question of the ordination of women is a 'second order question'. In other words it does not touch the central affirmations of the Christian faith, the doctrines expressed in the Creed. Therefore, it is argued, in a divided church, churches are free to act in this matter. The problem with the label 'second order questions' is that the context alters the situation. All would agree that the ordination of women does not have the significance of the doctrine of the Incarnation, for instance. But it is worth pointing out that the bishops of the Church of England implied that the Virginal Conception of Jesus and the Empty Tomb were 'second order' doctrines in relation to the central affirmations of Incarnation and Resurrection. Yet although a certain liberty of opinion was allowed on such doctrines it was not implied that the Church of England had any authority to discard them. Rather it was affirmed that only the Virginal Conception for instance could be regarded as being the faith of the universal church. In the matter of Christian practice there are also common traditions. Bread and wine are used for the celebration of the Eucharist. They could be said, again in certain contexts, to be 'second order' in comparison with other Christian doctrines, but that would not give the Church of England, or indeed the Anglican Communion, authority to decree that water and rice might be used instead.

A further point might be made. In matters where the theological expression of Christian belief is concerned it is often possible to allow a liberty of interpretation. The ordained theologian of radical views is still ordained by the church and acts with the authority thus given. In celebrating the sacraments he does what the church does and those who receive those sacraments need have no doubt that the grace of God promised in the institution of those sacraments is indeed given. Where doubt arises in what are matters of order and practice it is difficult if not impossible to invoke such arguments. For a devout Christian who is unsure whether or not it is in accordance with the will of God that women should be ordained to the priesthood it is no answer to say it is all a matter of experiencing it. At the present time it is quite clear that the ordination of women to the priesthood would have the effect of destroying a 'commonly accepted ministry' where at present such a ministry exists. There is one recognised ministry in the Church of England, whether those who exercise that ministry are catholic, evangelical or

liberal in their churchmanship and theology. Such a commonly accepted ministry would not exist if women were to be ordained to the priesthood, as the report of the Synod's working party demonstrated. An early resolution of Synod stated that there were no theological objections to the ordination of women. What has happened subsequently has demonstrated that there are different views about what constitute theological objections. For some people questions of church order do not seem to belong in this area, for others they clearly do, and the continuing controversy has sufficed to show only that there *are* theological objections, but many do not find them compelling.

If ordination of women to the priesthood is divisive then it must be taken as axiomatic that ordination of women to the episcopate would be even more so. The bishop is the focus of unity and the chief celebrant of the sacraments, and the one who ordains to the ministry of the church. If a woman were to be ordained to the episcopate many would be unable to accept the validity of the ordinations at which she was the ordaining minister. Far from being a source of unity, the focus of the commonly accepted ministry and a sign of the historic continuity of the church withthe church of the apostles, such a bishop would inevitably be a source of division. As the bishop is the fundamental order of ministry it should surely put a question mark against the ordination of women to the priesthood if it is clear that ordination of women to the episcopate is in all probability likely to be so destructive.

There are, of course, churches within the Anglican Communion which have ordained women to the priesthood, notably America, Canada and New Zealand. In America there has been considerable unhappiness and some actual schism. This should simply be noted here, for perhaps the important point is that the tensions within the Anglican Communion over this issue have highlighted the problem of authority within the Anglican Communion itself. It was agreed (rather too readily perhaps) that this was a matter on which individual Anglican churches might make their own decision. It was not a synodical decision of the whole Anglican Communion for the simple reason that such a synod does not exist. The Lambeth Conference of bishops meeting every ten years has both a moral authority and an advisory role, but it does not meet the need foreseen by Bishop Selwyn, the first Bishop of New Zealand, over a century ago, of a body able to make an authoritative decision binding on the whole communion. (There are analogies here between Anglican Communion and Commonwealth, and the roles of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Queen in relation to these respective bodies). Just as the issue of decision making in a divided church is being forced into the open by this question of the ordination of women, so too is the question of how the Church of England, which has become the mother church of a worldwide Communion, takes decisions in relation to that worldwide Communion.

The ordination of women to the priesthood raises complex questions

in the areas of church order, sacramental symbolism, ecumenical relations, the authority of bishops and synods, the nature of tradition and relation of church and culture. John Henry Newman recognised in the 1840s that the Christian church rooted in history has need of a theory of doctrinal development to sift what is legitimate and organic change from what is subservience to passing fashion and the betrayal of part of what is given. The Church of England is now wrestling with this question of doctrinal change and development in relation to a specific and practical issue. In doing this it is seeking the common mind of the church, but this is something which takes time and inevitably involves those Christians who share with Anglicans the inheritance of the historic three-fold ministry. The vocation of women to Christian ministry is not in doubt. The church is being challenged to respond to that call. What is not yet clear is whether such a call to ministry can be unequivocally affirmed as a call to priesthood, of which the Christian community can say 'it seems good to the Holy Spirit and to us'.

In an important report, *The Priesthood of the Ordained Ministry*, which is likely to be the subject of debate in the November synod, the Faith and Order Advisory Group address themselves to some of the issues raised by the question of the ordination of women to the priesthood. Noting that 'there is no consensus on this matter in the ecumenical forum and very little convergence either', they make certain statements and raise certain questions.

> One function of ordination is to show beyond doubt that the person so ordained has authority to act on behalf of the community. Is it possible while the Church remains divided upon the question of the ordination of women to the priesthood that women can be recognised as able to exercise authority on behalf of the whole Church?
>
> More and more women in the accredited lay ministry are claiming a vocation to priestly ministry. Moreover, congregations are affirming that call and asking the Church to test their call. What questions does such contemporary experience pose in respect of the radition of the Church?
>
> The Church has 2,000 years of unbroken traditions of a male priesthood. In view of the fact that Anglicans claim to have a ministry within the universal Church can such a change be made without the authority of a truly ecumenical council?[1]

Those at least are some of the issues with which the Church of England will be wrestling over the coming months and years. Prayer and patience and the willingness to see what is at issue in the widest perspective are qualities that will undoubtedly be required.

NOTES

1. Board for Mission and Unity of the General Synod of the Church of England: *The Priesthood of the Ordained Ministry*, p.88.

[The Revd. Dr. Geoffrey Rowell is Fellow, Chaplain and Tutor in Theology at Keble College, Oxford, a University Lecturer in Theology and a Canon of Chichester Cathedral.]

SINHALA-TAMIL NEGOTIATIONS

by Karan Sawhny

THE anti-Tamil riots of July-August 1983 marked perhaps the most significant turning point in Sri Lanka's recent history. Only the events of 1957-8 were more fateful in that Prime Minister Solomon Bandarnaike reached a settlement with moderate Tamil leaders only to abandon it soon after.

The compromise settlement of 25 July 1957 accepted that the proposed Regional Councils' Bill would make provisions to meet some of the demands of the Federal Party (then the main Tamil organization) and that Tamil would be recognised as the language of a national minority (and be used for administration). Mr. Bandarnaike also clarified that 'the Government had no intention of swamping the Tamil-speaking areas with Sinhalese colonists.' Twenty days later a joint statement affirmed that there were 'no substantial differences of opinion on the few points on which some misunderstanding had arisen.'

In the following months a campaign was launched against the agreement by the United National Party (UNP). The Vice-President of the party, Mr. J. R. Jayerwardene (now President of Sri Lanka) organized a march 'to invoke the intervention of the Gods to prevent division of the country' and the agreement was denounced as 'a threat to religion and country'.

After a demonstration by Buddhist monks outside his residence on 9 April 1958 Prime Minister Bandarnaike announced that the Government had decided not to proceed with the implementation of the agreement. This action was supported by Mr. Jayerwardene's Party. The leaders of the Tamils accused the Bandarnaike Government of surrendering to the Buddhist monks 'and failing to prevent or control Sinhalese hooliganism'. In the previous month riots had been provoked in both Sinhala and Tamil areas.

In March 1960 both the main Sinhala parties failed to get absolute majorities in the General Elections. They approached Mr. Chelvanayakam, the then leader of the 'indigenous' Tamils who held the balance of seats in Parliament and who had negotiated the 1957 pact with the subsequented assassinated Solomon Bandarnaike. He listed four Tamil demands for the consideration of the UNP and the SLFP and said his party would support whichever one accepted them. These were: the replacement of the unitary constitution by a federal one, giving autonomy to the Tamil-speaking areas; parity of the Tamil language with the Sinhala language; the granting of citizenship rights to Tamils of Indian origin; and, the cessation of colonization by Sinhalese of the traditional Tamil-speaking areas.

These demands were partially accepted by Mrs. Bandarnaike, who had become leader of her husband's party. As a consequence the Tamil party voted with the SLFP to defeat the minority UNP Government. In the

general elections which followed in June 1960 the SLFP returned to power. Instead of implementing the accord on the status of the Tamil language the SLFP vigorously pursued a 'Sinhala only' policy, nationalized the schools and made a rapid switch over from English to Sinhala in administration and education. This greatly agitated the Tamils and the Christians.

In 1965 the SLFP was defeated and a coalition was formed between the UNP and the Federal (Tamil) party on the basis of a pact between them. This provided for the use of Tamil in official business, restrictions on the colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalas and the formation of District Councils. The first part of the agreement was implemented in 1966. But the District Councils move could not be implemented because of opposition by an influential section of Sinhala nationalists in the UNP who were in sympathy with the aggressive chauvinism of the other Sinhala parties. The pact had to be given up and in 1970 Mrs. Bandarnaike was returned to power. In 1972 she introduced legislation imposing differential conditions for university admission so that many bright Tamil children lost the opportunity of gaining a higher education. Her government followed also an aggressive policy of colonization in the traditional Tamil speaking areas. This spawned Tamil militancy and the young Tamils began to advocate and organize an armed struggle. By 1977, when the SLFP lost the General Elections, policemen and their informers were being killed sporadically by Tamil 'terrorists'.

When the 71 year old Junius Richard Jayewardene took power in July 1977 many believed he had learned from the history of the previous two dacades; but within a month of his coming to power the worst anti-Tamil pogrom since 1958 took place. More than 125 people were murdered and 40,000 Tamils became refugees.

Extremism became widespread, especially among young Tamils, although the Jayerwardene Government took swift and severe measures to control the violence and return the situation to normality.

A few months later the Tamil leader A. Amirthalingam advocated giving Mr. Jayerwardene the benefit of the doubt and stated that the President had assured the Tamil community that all problems would be solved fairly and justly and that he should be given a fair opportunity to do so. In fact, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) MPs elected from the eastern province publicly argued in favour of giving up the demand for an independent Tamil state 'if the Government behaved well'. The Tamils had campaigned in the 1977 election on a platform which demanded a Tamil Eelam (Homeland).

Talks between the TULF leadership, and the UNP parliamentary group began on November 3, 1981, which covered among other things the functions and powers of the recently created District Development Councils — the Government having announced earlier that it envisaged expanding their role.

Meanwhile a report by the International Commission of Jurists who had investigated communal tensions in Sri Lanka concluded that the

country's security legislation was not justified by what it described as 'political terrorism by a small group of Tamil youths'. Between 1972 and 1981 twenty policemen, five politicians and seven alleged informers had been killed. But in October 1981 the first attack on soldiers of the Sri Lanka army took place,when two were killed in an ambush.

On July 23, 1983, thirteen were killed by a bomb explosion. Next evening their remains arrived in Colombo, sparking off what the Tamils call 'the holocaust'. 140,000 persons became refugees in their own country, Tamil property valued at nearly two billion rupees and some 15,000 jobs were lost in arson and looting, and more than 1,000 people died. A month later the UN Disaster Relief Organization reported that there were still 10,000 refugees in camps in and around Colombo.

The International commission of jurists said in a report to the UN sub-committee on human rights on August 19, 1983, that there had been brutal attacks on Tamils by members of the Sri Lanka armed forces; the report said that Sri Lankan Security legislation had removed some of the basic protection of human rights and that the riots had been made worse by government indifference to the fate of the Tamils.

After a visit by the Indian Foreign Minister and several by Mrs. Gandhi's special emissary Mr. G. Parthasarthy, President Jayerwardene announced on December 2, 1983, his intention of holding a conference on the Tamil issue. Agreement had been reached on a package of proposals. The devolution of powers under the existing Development Councils would be taken further by allowing such councils 'to agree on a merger within an existing province, to form a Regional Council with a Chief Minister and powers relating in particular to economic development, land reform, the judiciary, and law and order.' The Sri Lankan Government was however unwilling to create a single Tamil region made up of the Northern and Eastern provinces. A few days later a section of Buddhist monks reminded the Government that pacts in the past had been foiled and the monks enjoyed a better voice and better power in the country than any President or Prime Minister'.

The conference convened on January 10, 1984, and the participants included the Supreme Council of the Maha Sangha (who represented the Buddhist clergy) as well as representatives of the Christians and the Muslims. Within a month of its commencing Mrs. Bandarnaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (which had won 30% of the votes in the 1977 general elections) withdrew, charging the TULF with 'inviting South Indian intervention in the internal affairs of our counrty'.

The conference continued throughout the year but look long recesses. Sinhalese Buddhist hardliners continued to oppose the Tamils regional demands. The Tamils said that if these were not granted they would go back to their separatist platform.

On August 22, 1984, Mr. Amirthalingam, leader of the moderate Tamils, stated that 'the TULF's basic demand is a separate state. However, we have stated that we are willing to recommend a viable alternative to our people'.

Meanwhile, all through 1984 there were recurring cycles of savage violence. These invariably followed the initiation of large scale operations by Sri Lanka Security forces. In two weeks of violence in the middle of August alone 95 persons were killed leaving the Tamil areas tense. Security personnel were involved in most of these attacks. The Government blamed 'extremists and Marxists' in the Army. The TULF walked out of the all party conference in August saying it could not participate while its people were being killed and harassed.

The conference reconvened at the end of September and on October 17 censorship was imposed on all news about it. At its last session on December 14 Mr. Jayerwardene released a set of proposals offering a limited measure of autonomy to regional councils. Their powers and functions would be those delegated by the participating district councils; they would have no more power than those invested in the district councils. Inter-provincial linking was not included. The conference itself was dissolved on December 21.

On December 22 the TULF predictably rejected the proposals saying that they 'did not embody any scheme of autonomy which could be accepted by the Tamil people . . .'. On the other extreme were the powerful Buddhist clergy represented by the Supreme Council of the Maha Sangha, who prophesied the proposals would 'spell doom' for the country. On December 26 the Government itself abandoned the proposals.

In 1985 Indian pressure brought the Tamils and the Sri Lankan Government to the negotiating table. On June 18 a cease-fire was declared according to which Sri Lankan troops would remain confined to their barracks in the Tamil areas. Representatives of the Tamil armed groups joined the talks for the first time. The talks were held between July 9-13 in Thrimpu, the capital of Bhutan. The Sri Lankan side was led by a lawyer, Hector Jayerwardene, who was a younger brother of the, now, 78 year old President. Nothing substantive emerged and the first round became bogged down in procedural difficulties. However, the most important Tamil groups and the Sri Lankans were at least talking to each other and the cease-fire held. The talks were adjourned to August 12 and the Sri Lankan side promised that they would return to Thimpu with a positive response to the principles put forward by the Tamils. The most important of these were that the Tamils were a nationality district from the Sri Lankans; that the Tamils had a traditional homeland and that they had a right to self determination.

When the talks resumed the Tamils issued a joint statement adhering to their 'basic principles'. However, they reiterated that this did not imply that they were opposed 'to any rational dialogue' with the Sri Lanka Government.

The Sri Lanka response was an outright rejection of the principles which the Tamils said constituted their 'legitimate national aspirations'. Instead Mr. Hector Jayerwardene offered a scheme of devoluton of power similar to what had been offered in December 1984 after the all party conference. This the Tamils rejected on August 17, 1985, which was

followed on the same day by their walking out of the conference as news reached Thimpu of the killing in the previous few days of more than 200 innocent Tamils by the Sri Lanka armed forces, in breach of the cease-fire accord. The talks then collapsed and no direct negotiations have taken place since. Although the Sri Lanka Government announced on September 16, 1985 a unilateral extension of the cease fire for another three months reports of violent incidents continued to pour in. The death toll has averaged nearly 150 a week for the last six months. Indian Government representatives continue to meet both sides, but the Tamils refuse to return to the negotiating table unless a new cease-fire is ordered and 'strictly adhered to' and proposals are put forward 'which could be considered as an acceptable basis for talks'.

The latest offer from the Sri Lanka Government gives the proposed provincial councils considerable authority to deal with law and order and land settlement. The cabinet of President Jayerwardene approved on June 18, 1986, a scheme of devolution of power and invited all recognised political parties to a conference on June 25. The consensus of New Delhi's diplomatic community and Indian officials is that if the provinces get a substantive measure of devolution of power, a workable solution to the ethnic problem can be reached and the violence ended. Until this happens, the 125,000 Tamil refugees in India and the 45,000 in Western Europe cannot return to their homeland.

[Karan Sawhny is Assistant Editor of the *Statesman*, India. He was a consultant on the A.T. and T. anti-trust case in New York and promoted (unsuccessfully) joint ventures and a rural development project in India.]

NATIONAL SECURITY, OFFICIAL INFORMATION AND THE LAW

by Graham Zellick

INTEREST in, and indeed concern about, the scope of the law on government information have been revived by recent prosecutions and litigation. How governments use the claim of national security, and how the courts respond to those claims, are crucial tests of civil liberties and the independence of the judiciary in any society. This discussion of the law and recent developments may, therefore, be of some interest in focusing on these important and sensitive issues.

Before examining these recent developments, it is necessary to set out the principal legal provision, section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. Justice can be done to this horrendously drafted, complex and prolix provision only if sub-section 1 is set out in full:

> 2. Wrongful communication, etc., of information
>
> (1) If any person having in his possession or control any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information which related to or is used in a prohibited place or anything in such a place, or which has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under His Majesty or which he has obtained or to which he has had access owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under His Majesty, or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of His Majesty, or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held such an office or contract, —
>
> (*a*) communicates the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information to any person, other than a person to whim he is authorised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the interest of the State his duty to communicate it, or,
>
> (*aa*) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State,
>
> (*b*) retians the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document in his possession or control when he has no right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it or fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof or
>
> (*c*) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code or pass word or information,
>
> that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

There is much more in the Act of 1911 and its companion passed in 1920, as well as other statutory provisions which bear on this general question, but for present purposes it will suffice to concentrate on this one central provision, for what it prohibits is the communication of any official information, whatever its character and whatever the purpose. The Act was passed hurriedly in 1911 and it is, of course, for the courts merely to interpret and apply the Act, not to pass on its constitutionality or validity. If there were a Bill of Rights, it is questionable whether section 2's vagueness, breadth and intrusion on freedom of speech would survive scrutiny.

There has been much criticism in recent years of this law and it is accepted by virtually everyone that it is over-broad in its reach and should

be replaced, but it is at this point that the difficulties arise, for there is no common ground on what the new law should say and how its objects might be achieved. On the one hand there are fears that a new law would continue to inhibit public knowledge and discussion by controlling the supply of information too strictly; on the other are anxieties that a much curtailed law would release information too freely and do genuine damage to the public interest and national security. It is these opposing forces which have combined to preserve the 1911 Act in the face of protracted and universal condemnation, the latest from the Select Committee on the Treasury and Civil Service.[1] There are few signs that reform is imminent.

It is now 14 years since the Franks Committee[2] reviewed section 2 and recommended its replacement by a new Official Information Act which would limit the use of the criminal law to controlling government information in relation to defence, security, foreign relations, the currency and reserves, Cabinet documents, and that which would facilitate criminal activity, reveal confidential details about individuals, and where the disclosure was for private gain.

It is worthwhile dwelling briefly on the civil servant's obligation to his employer, the State, and the extent to which the law, as opposed to other devices, may be utilized to enforce that obligation. Is the civil servant just like any other employee? If so, he should be subject to precisely the same rules and laws. An ordinary employee who divulges his employer's confidences and is identified is unlikely to remain in that employment, but he is unlikely to have committed a criminal offence. Moreover, some revelations will be regarded as wholly innocuous and the employer would acquiesce in the conduct or at least take no action.

But perhaps the public official is not in the same position as the ordinary employee. The law recognises the special position of other workers, too, for certain purposes. Police officers and members of the Armed Forces, for example, are not treated as ordinary employees and are subject to various restrictions. Many workers in public corporations and various governmental agencies ('quangos') carry out work no less sensitive than many civil servants, as do employees in private organizations, whose work may be as important and sensitive to the State as anything done by a civil servant. And, of course, the vast majority of civil servants are engaged on work which is routine and neither sensitive nor inherently confidential.

The only distinctive aspect of the civil servant, then, is that he is a civil servant — that he is employed by the State. But that is no longer likely to be universally regarded as a necessary or even adequate basis for subjecting him to special rules. It has to be shown that there are certain aspects of his work which call for special rules and that the use of the criminal law becomes uniquely necessary in the public interest.

The difficulty is that most employers will take exception to their staff habitually discussing the organisation's affairs with those outside and, in the case of the civil service, the dismantling of the Offical Secrets Act and the withdrawal of the criminal sanction from certain kinds of disclosure

would not mean that the civil servant would then be able freely to disclose information falling outside the reserved categories. It is to be expected that the employer's normal rules against disclosure will remain in place, backed by internal disciplinary sanctions and ultimately of course by dismissal.

Several attempts have been made to legislate along the lines recommended in the Franks Report, but all have failed. The one area where the Government had no choice but to legislate was in respect of telephone tapping, which hitherto operated outside any legal regime, simply on a warrant issued by the Home Secretary, on the premise, endorsed by the courts, that telephone tapping was not anyway unlawful under English law.[3] This approach, not surprisingly, did not find favour with the European Court of Human Rights[4] and the result was the Interception of Communications Act 1985.

The Act now makes it a criminal offence to tap a telephone or interfere with mail unless a warrant has been issued by a Secretary of State, and this may be done if it is necessary in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting 'serious' crime, or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. National security is left undefined; a crime is 'serious' if it involves violence, results in substantial financial gain or involves a large number of persons in pursuit of a common goal, or for which a person without previous convictions 'could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for three years or more'; and the last ground relating to the country's economic well-being was apparently so sensitive that scarcely any words of explanation could even be offered to Parliament during the passage of the Bill.

The Act also establishes a Tribunal, composed of lawyers, to which persons who suspect that their telephones are being tapped or their letters intercepted may complain. If there is a warrant in force in respect of that person's mail or telephone, the Tribunal can investigate whether that warrant should have been issued and whether all the procedures, safeguards and arrangements laid down in the Act have been observed. If there have been infringements, the Tribunal must inform the applicant and report to the Prime Minister and may quash the warrant, direct destruction of the intercepted material and order the Secretary of State to pay compensation to the applicant.

If there is no warrant in force, or if there is a warrant but no infringements have been discovered, the applicant will simply be told that no infringements have been found. He will thus not be able to discover whether his telephone has been tapped and, if so, whether lawfully or otherwise. The thinking behind this is that the Government were adamant that it should not be open to individuals to ascertain routinely whether they were subject to a warrant or not. If their telephone calls or letters are being intercepted without a warrant, that is not a matter for the Tribunal or the Government. It is a criminal offence and investigation lies with the police, as with any other criminal offence. This, however,

overlooks the fact that public disquiet has centred chiefly on unauthorised taps, thought by some to be extensive, rather than on the relatively small number — some 550 a year — authorised by warrant, and that to expect the police to investigate when it is they themselves or their colleagues in the Security Service who are probably conducting the tap is absurd.

Several recent cases have inspired much discussion and disquiet. A six-month trial of several servicemen for passing official secrets, almost all of it *in camera,* estimated to have cost almost five million pounds, recently ended. All defendants were acquitted. Once again section 2 of the Official Secrets Act reared its head: once again the Government emerged from the process with its judgment and good sense in doubt.

A junior clerk in the Foreign Office, Sarah Tisdall, was sent to prison for six months for anonymously passing to *The Guardian* a copy of a memorandum sent by the Secretary of State for Defence to the Prime Minister about the arrival of the United States Cruise missiles at the Greenham Common air base. In order to trace the culprit in this case, so that criminal prosecution and dismissal could follow, the Government brought civil proceedings against *The Guardian* for the return of the photocopies in the hope that they would bear markings which would enable the offender to be identified. The case reached the House of Lords, which held that the documents had to be surrendered even it this meant revealing the 'source', since this was provided for by statute where, *inter alia,* it was in the interests of national security or of justice.[5]

The other recent case which aroused even more interest was the prosecution of Clive Ponting, a senior official in the Ministry of Defence. Ponting was incensed over what he regarded as deception by the Government of the House of Commons in regard to the sinking of the Argentinian frigate, *The General Belgrano,* during the Falklands war. He therefore sent to a Member of Parliament who was particularly interested in this matter copies of documents which apparently showed that Ministers had misled Parliament.

At his trial for breaching section 2 of the Act, Ponting advanced just one line of defence, namely, that he passed the documents to 'a person to whom it is in the interests of the State his duty to communicate it' within the terms of section 2(1)(*a*) and that he had therefore committed no offence, because it was his duty to bring wrong-doing by Ministers to the attention of Parliament.

The trial judge rejected the argument, holding that the word 'duty' referred to an official duty imposed upon the communicator by virtue of his position and not any moral or civic duty and the words 'in the interests of the State' meant what was in the interests of the State according to its recognised organs of government and the policies as expounded by the particular Government of the day. It was in this case the Government's policy not to divulge the information in question: it was therefore not in the interests of the State for Ponting to do so.

The judge so directed the jury, thus negativing the one line of defence relied upon by the defendant. The jury nevertheless acquitted. Whether

this perverse verdict is seen as a triumph of the jury system in protecting individuals from laws perceived as unjust or as a regrettable departure from the constitutional function of the jury to apply the law as laid down by the judge depends on one's point of view of the proper role of the jury in the modern criminal trial in the Anglo-American criminal justice system.

Efforts to persuade the Attorney-General to refer these important and contentious points of law to the Court of Appeal for authoritative consideration and determination were unsuccessful. The Attorney-General pronounced himself in agreement with the judge's ruling and that, he felt, obviated the need for a reference.

In July, the Court of Appeal upheld interlocutory injunctions sought by the Attorney-General restraining *The Observer* and *The Guardian* from publishing any information revealed by a former member of the Security Service, even where it exposed alleged wrongdoing by MI5 officers.[6]

Some of the cases already considered have faced the courts with issues of national security. The readiness with which the Government invokes national security and the degree of scrutiny of that claim by the courts make interesting study.

The most recent case on national security in the English courts is *Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service* which was decided by the House of Lords in 1984.[7] The Government wished to ban trade union membership at one of its top-secret establishments, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), because of various incidents of industrial action there over recent years which in the Government's view jeopardised or threatened in the future to jeopardise national security. Without any prior consultation with the staff or unions at GCHQ, the Government, on the orders of the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister for the Civil Service, banned all staff at GCHQ from membership of a trade union. Staff who agreed to resign from their union would receive £1,000: those who refused would either be transferred to other work or, if none was available, dismissed. Amidst uproar in Parliament and the trade union movement, the unions sought judicial review of the Government's decision on the ground that the rules of natural justice or, more precisely, the duty to act fairly required prior consultation by the Government before reaching its decision — in accordance with settled administrative law doctrine — there being a legitimate or reasonable expectation on the part of the unions that such consultations would precede a decision of this character.

The House of Lords accepted the general basis of the unions' argument that the failure to consult was unfair, but the national security considerations outweighed the requirement of fairness. The Government's contention was that prior consultation would have precipitated the very disruptive action its decision was designed to eliminate, to the detriment of national security. The explanation was offered late in the litigation and others have questioned whether this was a mere afterthought, an *ex post*

facto rationalisation, the real reason for the absence of prior consultation being fear of political embarrassment and public agitation. How far would the court go into these questions?

Lord Fraser of Tullybelton put it thus:

> The decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case is for the Government and not for the courts; the Government alone has access to the necessary information, and in any event the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security. But if the decision is successfully challenged, on the ground that it has been reached by a process which is unfair, then the Government is under an obligation to produce evidence that the decision was in fact based on grounds of national security.

Lord Scarman, agreeing, said: '. . . the court does not abdicate its judicial function'. Once the factual basis is established by evidence, he said, so that the court is satisfied that the interest of national security is a relevant factor, the court will accept the Crown's opinion as to what is required to meet it, unless it can be shown that no reasonable Minister advising the Crown could have reasonably entertained such an opinion. 'There is no abdication of the judicial function,' he continued, 'but there is a common sense limitation recognised by the judges as to what is justiciable . . .' Lord Diplock said:

> National security is the responsibility of the executive government; what action is needed to protect its interests is . . . a matter upon which those upon whom the responsibility rests, and not the courts of justice, must have the last word. It is *pas excellence* a non-justifiable question. The judicial process is totally inept to deal with the sort of problems which it involves.

The House of Lords had no difficulty in accepting that the legitimate expectation of the unions to be consulted before their members' rights to continued membership were abrogated must yield to the requirements of national security. But the Government's argument seems unrealistic. If industrial action following consultation was envisaged, why was it not envisaged — and why indeed did it not materialise — after the peremptory announcement that union membership must cease? Could not the offer of consultation have been coupled to a warning that any industrial action in respect of this matter would forthwith lead to abandonment of the negotiations and introduction of the complete union ban? But none of this was discussed and none of it influenced the Law Lords in their decision. The courts do not abdicate their role: evidence is required: the mere claim to national security alone does not foreclose judicial inquiry. But the practice belies the rhetoric. It would, it seems, have to be a manifestly hopeless claim to national security before the courts would turn nasty. So long as it is merely specious, it will not trouble them.

The Government's GCHQ decision has been denounced by the ILO and is currently under examination by the European Commission of Human Rights. One can well accept that the Government was right to conclude that industrial action at GCHQ could not be countenanced, without accepting that their method of responding to the problem was procedurally proper and lawful.

In earlier cases, too, invocation of national security has inhibited the courts and advantaged the Government at the expense of the individual. A

good example is *R.* v. *Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hosenball* in 1977.[8]

Hosenball was an American working as a journalist in Britain. The Home Secretary decided to order his deportation 'in the interests of national security'. No appeal was possible, but non-statutory provision was made for the making of representations to a panel. But no particulars of the evidence or the basis for the Home Secretary's decision were furnished to Hosenball, and he sought to have the deportation order quashed on the ground that it violated the rules of natural justice.

In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning M.R. observed that, if this were an ordinary case, it could be rightly criticised, for none of the information before the Home Secretary or the advisory panel was made available to the appellant: he thus had no opportunity to correct, contradict or test it in cross-examination. Moreover, he was denied sufficient information about the charges against him to be able to deal with or answer them effectively. 'But this is no ordinary case,' said Lord Denning:

> It is a case in which national security is involved, and our history shows that, when the State itself is endangered, our cherished freedoms may have to take second place. Even natural justice itself may suffer a set-back.

He went on to point out that dangers arose in peace-time as well as war time: 'Spies, subverters and saboteurs may be mingling amongst us, putting on a most innocent exterior.' 'The rules of natural justice have to be modified,' commented Lord Denning, 'in regard to foreigners here who prove themselves unwelcome and ought to be deported.' The conclusion to which the court's reasoning might have led is thus presented as an axiomatic rule of law from which consideration of the case begins. Lord Denning concluded:

> There is a conflict here between the interests of national security on the one hand and the freedom of the individual on the other. The balance between these two is not for a court of law. . . . In some parts of the world security has on occasions been used as an excuse for all sorts of infringements of individual liberty. But not in England.

Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce saw little scope for judicial review in cases of national security:

> In my view, the field of judicial scrutiny, by reference to the enforcement of the rules of common fairness, is an extremely restricted field in the sphere of the operations necessary to protect the security of the State.

The principles of ordinary fairness which applied to domestic institutions had no significant bearing where security was involved, he added. The court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the Home Secretary's conception of national security entitled him to withhold all particulars and information from Hosenball in his efforts to challenge the need for the deportation order against him.

Efforts to reform the Official Secrets Acts, and indeed to prise open the doors to government information, are likely to be rewarded with success in the fullness of time. What is likely to endure, however, is the somewhat unsatisfactory handling of national security questions by the courts, even if the very recent *GCHQ* decision offers some improvement on what has gone before. Maybe Lord Diplock was right when he said that the judicial process was inept at dealing with these problems. But there is a

role for the judges to play here. To remove themselves from all involvement with these admittedly difficult issues is simply to deny protection to individuals and encourage government to behave irresponsibly and abuse their authority. Even after *GCHQ*, the courts are too quick to defer to the Government and Government may in consequence be too quick to invoke national security. It may, after all, be used to cloak political embrarrassment or serve as a specious justification for questionable action. Not everyone would share Lord Denning's opinion that national security has never been used as an excuse for infringing individual liberty: 'Both during the wars and after them, successive ministers have discharged their duties to the complete satisfaction of the people at large.'

National security is a valid and indeed vital consideration and it is the duty of the Government to accord it the highest priority, but it must not be devalued and should as a justification for otherwise dubious action be resorted to only when it is absolutely necessary. Law and practice should ensure that it is taken no further and that is the duty of the judges who must accord that consideration no less high a priority.

NOTES

1. *Civil Servants and Ministers: Duties and Responsibilities.* Seventh Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, May 1986.
2. *Report of the Committee on Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act* 1911, Cmnd. 5104 (H.M.S.O., 1972).
3. *Malone* v. *Metropolitan Police Commissioner* [1979] Ch. 344.
4. *Malone* v. *U.K.*, Series A, No. 82, August 2, 1984; 7 E.H.R.R. 14.
5. *Attorney-General v. The Observer Ltd., The Times,* July 26, 1986.
6. *Secretary of State for Defence* v. *Guardian Newspapers Ltd.* [1984] 3 W.L.R. 986.
7. [1984] 3 W.L.R. 1174.
8. [1977] 3 All E.R. 452; [1977] 1 W.L.R. 766 (C.A.).

The above article is based on a lecture delivered in the University of Siena.

[Graham Zellick is Professor of Public Law and Dean of the Faculty of Laws in the University of London and Dean of the Faculty of Laws and Head of the Department of Laws at Queen Mary College. A former editor of *Public Law* and of *European Human Rights Reports,* he is a member of the Lord Chancellor's Legal Aid Advisory Committee and of the Data Protection Tribunal.]

POEMS: A TRILOGY

DIONYSUS ZAGREUS

New Titans have devoured my truest part.
Who amongst men will give me back my heart?
Giants world-powerful and heavy-shod
Live by the stolen essence of the god.
Yet I will conquer. In each man am I
His beating self, his solar alchemy.
Within, without, fertile under change,
I lead him to our mutual sovereignty.
Substance and essence cry for a common life,
Victor and victim seek a common goal.
By virtue of my sensitising pain
My destroyers shall recreate me whole.

RE-ENTRY

In the final cry of Chaos
I hear Tomorrow start:
The laughter of Omega
In the lover's heart.
The self-renewing atom
Knowing only that it is
Moves through the living chamber
Whose name is genesis,
Proceeds by an ancient rhythm
That was before the Earth
To re-enter Alpha's kingdom
By the act of higher birth.

EMERGENCE

The sky grows luminous and wears no cloud;
Leafless trees prepare to greet the Spring;
Birds that should migrate remain to sing;
And I am emergent from the human shroud.
Instinctive self with no conditioned leaning,
With ecstasy I greet my boundless clime,
A mythological being freed from time
And returned to her original World of Meaning.

Pamela Constantine

MAKING LISTS

by John Elsom

MY worst enemy could not call me a tidy person, and I have been known to be absent-minded, but I am very good at making lists — or if not good, prolific.

The surfaces of my room, horizontal, vertical and undecided, are strewn with scraps of paper marked NB or Urgent, each with columns of words or figures, underlined here and there, even circled in red, perhaps ticked hopefully or crossed out in anger, with an arrow pointing somewhere; and even the strewing of them is not as random as it seems but has its pattern and procedure. What looks like the scattering of alphabet confetti at a giant's wedding is the result of a process which starts with the sorting out of lists into piles and rows, held in place by gravity and blu-tac, a patient regiment of good intentions waiting to be called into battle; and it is only later that they find themselves rudely getting kicked over, as they encroach on the narrow path from the door to the desk.

In panic, they flutter out of position and seek their own squashed and bootmarked resting places near the knacker's yard of the wastepaper basket — which is not to suggest that they do not get attended to from time to time, but rather (like profusely bleeding patients, semi-conscious, in the Emergency waiting room of a neighbourhood clinic) the treatment which they have come timidly to expect does not amount to any cure or solution, but simply a more forceful categorisation of their problems, which may in due course lead them to a more important-looking pile, one less likely to be kicked, and then from the bottom to the top, after which, what wonder may result? A positive action perhaps, as after an accumulation of waiting hours they become top names on the top lists — although in my experience such pre-eminence does not automatically lead to something happening, but only to someone looking at them blankly (probably me) whose concern is not with the items in themselves but rather the rationale behind the sifting process, the class system which emerges despite all efforts to eradicate it, leading to top names and bottom names and a sycophantic bureaucracy sustaining the status quo. By what right are they *on* the top, I'd like to know?, in which case, rather than take any headstrong plunge one may later regret, I am always strongly tempted to throw the existing lists away, and leave the surfaces stripped bare for a new life and an even more systematic approach — which begins, naturally enough, with a fresh list.

What stands in the way of such progress is the knowledge that the next list, while superior in so many ways from all the preceding ones, will sooner or later run up against the same fundamental dilemma which has ruined the rest of them — to whit: the inadequacy of the ordering system — for when I said I was good at making lists, it would have been truer to state that my talents are really for half-lists, or quarter-lists, if that. No list which I have ever begun can be honestly said to have been

finished. This is not my fault. On the contrary, the conscientious persistence with list-making is commendable in itself, revealing that longing for an essential order inherent (if not usually visible) in all civilized life; and what holds me back is nothing more or less than the refusal of life to be civilized.

Even a simple address list, alphabetical, by surnames, has its difficulties, into which one would prefer not to delve for they reveal so many sad truths about our times, among them that only salesmen and Americans normally carry calling-cards with all the necessary information neatly laid out, while most other people prefer to be a little evasive. 'Well, my *married* name is . . .' hints a friend, 'but you can call me Cider. All my friends do'; which is fine for intimacy but not for easy reference, for do you list the married name which she seems so willing to forget that it may be on the way out anyway, and note the nickname, in which case did she say Cider or Sadie? And what would she be listed under in the telephone directory, and was all that apparent friendliness merely a device for not giving you a proper name and a number that you can actually use? Nor is it much different these days in business, for the more important contacts which you are anxious to cultivate have the unfortunate habit of being ex-directory and always on the move, and when you do catch up with them, they are liable to hand you an extension number to an unknown phone with the cryptic message, 'Ask for Joan. She keeps my diary', which is no use at all for a list. Add all these fashionable symptoms to all the other deepset ailments of address books, such as people who have died without telling you, or got divorced, or emigrated, or taken sabbaticals, or have left the final digits of a long postal code on the well-thumbed edges of page S where they fray and blur into illegibility, and you are left not with a list at all, but a confused jumble of names, a small temple to social contacts, now ruined, through which the weeds of the forest have implacably grown.

Of course, the trouble with all alphabetical lists is that they are insidiously unselective. Anything starting with A goes in this pile, with B in that, whereas the human mind sorts things out differently, more according to little spasms of fear, apprehension and hope; but when I start to waver from the strict outline of A to Z, I begin to wallow in categories whose subleties increase as the list extends, until they become an impenetrable code with the original key forgotten. To separate business contacts from family friends sounds reasonable, but for the fact that some persons who are strictly speaking members of the family, are barely known quantities whose very existence would be in doubt but for Christmas cards and wedding invitations, and meet only on such business-like occasions as the sorting out of property matters, whereas some business friends have become like eighteenth century confidants, in receipt of intimate details which would not be admitted to any member of the family at all except in a deathbed confession — in which case what one really requires for total accuracy are several lists ranging from 'Hostile' and 'Alien' to 'Bosom', which is fine in theory but for the fact that such perceptions

change from month to month, if not moment to moment. One careless phone call can decategorise a bank manager, a lost handkerchief turned Desdemona to a demon; and with any attempt to establish various lists of names separated on lines of intimacy, each entry frankly needs to be date-and time-stamped, and cross-referenced with a comprehensive diary, another kind of listing to which flesh is heir.

I am very good at keeping diaries. I receive them in bulk every Christmas, and I never throw them away in case the friends who gave them to me fight their way into my study and say, 'Where is that diary I gave you last Christmas, which had the dates of the Belgrade Festival on it?' I have diaries for every kind of situation, for desk, pocket, wall, car, kitchen, garden and miscellaneous. I have Liberal diaries — and cricket diaries, and ones giving the dates of every British monarch since Jesus Christ; and even one which is infinitely extendable, with loose pages, on a Filofax system, which is supposed to be comprehensive, but I have never found a diary which is always in the right place at the right time, magnetised, as it were, to events.

There are, it is true, more-or-less useful diaries and more-or-less useless ones, and perhaps one should grade diaries in that kind of order, with Old Moore's Almanac bringing up the rear. An Appointments Diary by the phone is, of course, indispensable, except that I have a habit of noting down appointments in a pocket diary, which are supposed afterwards to be listed in the Appointments Diary, except that I have the habit of forgetting to do so, unless I remind myself by scrawling NB Appointments Diary on a scrap of paper and try very hard to remember what the hell that means when it lands up on my floor. But the situation is not always straight-forward when the phone rings and an appointment is made directly into the Appointments Diary according to plan, for apart from all the basic information which needs to be scrawled down, with the right shoulder pressing the receiver to the ear, such as date, place, time and name, there are often incidentals to be noted as well, such as 'Bring cheque-book!!!' or 'Warn Francis . . .', little memos like that which after a while, that is, as the day of the appointment approaches, puzzle more than they enlighten.

Where diaries and address books fail, the Action Priority Lists take over. They masterfully step into what looks like confusion and sort things out without a qualm or vestige of self-doubt. To establish their importance in my scheme of things, I have developed the habit of sticking up A/P Lists on A/P Notice Boards with colour-coded drawing pins, and when one board fills up, I simply move on to another — not at all like the Mad Hatter's Tea Party, not at all — and sooner or later, when my walls are filled with colour-coded lists on boards, I shall have to choose between moving house or starting at the beginning again. But that at least is a decision which does not have to be taken too often and is not a daily occurrence, whereas the A/P Lists are a different kettle of fish, for they tell me what I have to do now, if I can find the right one on the right board, this very instant, and most of them start with a peremptory BANK

or a polysyllabic threat 'Income Tax', nothing that I can possibly evade or postpone, 'Invoices to X and Y', 'Check VAT', 'Complete draft for Z', really aggressive stuff, 'Phone D/C, F/E, H/G and J', 'NB URGENT check proofs (R/W) and bibliography for M', fascistic orders to curdle the blood, 'DRY ROT', 'Solicitor re: Summons', until I can look around the room and sense hostility in my own handwriting from all sides, wallpaper from the House of Usher, decorated with thorns and paranoia, all the more threatening for being so insistently listed, until I am forced to wonder whether it is healthy to live in such surroundings at all, and whether it is possible to survive without sending such messages to oneself, and would succumb to the temptation of doing without them altogether, like a dumb, insensate beast, were it not for the underlying thought that list-making is nowadays all that distinguishes man from brute, the one indisputable degree which raises human consciousness above that of animal existence.

We used to be able to say to ourselves, in the 19th century, after Darwin had burst on the scene, that human beings were different from animals because we used tools, and were thus reassured when we hunted foxes or staked pigs. They use no tools, we would say, and therefore they are not like us — and probably feel no pain but rather enjoy being hunted and killed in their curiously instinctive ways; but now, alas, do-gooding zoologists have proved that some animals do use tools, if only little sticks to poke out ants. Then we decided that animals do not have our kind of social organisations, such as democracy and parliamentary procedures, and therefore they could not respond as we do to being torn apart and gutted, being mere creatures of mechanical instinct without souls; but the biologists rushed in, protesting that some animals, even bats, live in well-ordered communes in which each is given its role and function, the acme of social behaviour. And so what balm to our consciences can we call to mind, as we dine on carcasses and benefit from drugs tested on rats? Only the thought that no animal has yet been proved to make lists — and when you come to think of it, making lists is a highly complicated, spiritual procedure, involving reason, memory and the perception of value judgements. Lists are a kind of prayer, which is why so many holy writs are couched in the form of lists, the 10 Commandments, the 7 Deadly Sins, and the routine of repeating lists brings its spiritual benefits, 10 'Hail Marys' at confession, the nightly 'Lord's Prayer'.

It is, in short, a way of imposing the mind upon the infinite complexities of existence; and so when in my optimistic moments I gaze around the total chaos of my study, and see threatening messages on every wall, and a litter of trodden notepaper obscuring every corner of the carpet, and feel a flutter of white wings as a draught from the window stirs up the accumulated debris of a thousand lists, thus disordering still further a phenomenon whose only claim to interest lay in furthering order, I calmly reason thus to myself, like the exiled Duke in the Forest of Arden, saying, 'This is no ordinary muddle. This is a tribute to the extraordinary spirit of man as it seeks to express the inexpressible. This is the cosmic drawing

board before God suddenly saw how to create the universe from a handful of dust. Within this rubbish tip of options lies the one, true essential list of lists, whose pattern one dimly perceives within the discarded imitations, and whose discovery provides the be-all and end-all of my endeavour, as of every other human being.'

And so to bed.

Which is one reason why I cannot but regard the coming of computers as anything other than a mixed blessing, for with their capacity to make lists, and cross-reference them *ad infinitum*, we may find that order is being imposed on us, whether we like it or not, and not of the divine kind, but of some mechanical variety, and we will have no alternative but to accept the categories as they crop up, without nuance or modification, and in a supremely rational environment, we will have no place left for intimate confusion other than in our souls.

[At the Congress of the International Association of Theatre Critics held in Rome, November 1985, John Elsom was elected President of the IATC. He has been the theatre critic for the *Observer, The Listener* and *Mail on Sunday* and broadcasts regularly on such BBC programmes as *Kaleidoscope, Meridian* and *Critics' Forum*. Publications include *Theatre Outside London, Erotic Theatre, History of the National Theatre, Post-War British Theatre* and *Post-War British Theatre Criticism*. He adapted Samuel Beckett's *Malone Dies* for the actor-comedian Max Wall, whom he directed at the 1984 Edinburgh Festival. His play, *The Man of the Future is Dead*, is scheduled for production in 1986. He is Chairman of the Liberal Party's Arts and Broadcasting Committee, which brought together the 1982 Arts Manifesto.]

The November issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *South Africa and its Neighbours* by T.B. Millar, *Moscow's Blitzkrieg Option* by Manfred R. Hamm, *Childbirth in 1986* by Dame Josephine Barnes, *The Poetry of Seamus Heaney* by Elmer Andrews and *Has History a Future?* by Peter J. Beck and *Swedish Politics: The Beginning or the End of an Era:* Part II (both held over from the October issue).

LOCUST OUTBREAKS PROLONG THE AGONY OF AFRICA

by Thomas Land

FIVE species of locusts and grasshoppers are plaguing Africa. The emergency is the gravest in the Sahel region bordering the Sahara desert where it follows one of the worst famine disasters within living memory.

The United Nations has launched a global appeal. Relief supplies are already being rushed into the stricken areas by the European Community, the United States and other donors.

'Given the resources, we can ward off this terrible new scourge,' says Edouard Saouma, the director-general of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The development agency is in charge of a gigantic campaign to save the harvests.

The last big locust outbreak in the Sahel led to the destruction of millions of tons of foodgrains, claiming an estimated 30 per cent of the region's total cereal yield in 1974/75. But Africa as a whole may not have faced anything like the present threat for nearly half a century.

Experts blame the unfolding disaster on the recent, generous rains which came after several years of drought, creating ideal conditions for the return of man's ancient enemy. Famine prolonging the agony of the hungry continent may follow.

Vast swarms of desert locusts have recently reappeared in Egypt, Mauritania and the Sudan as well as Saudi Arabia after the virtual disappearance of the insect from its traditional breeding grounds in the Horn of Africa. The African migratory locust has invaded Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda from its breeding areas in the Sudan. The red locust is menacing farms in Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya.

The biggest infestations of the brown locust seen for the past 20 years have been reported in Botswana and South Africa and an invasion of grasshoppers threatens many hundreds of thousands of hectares of foodcrop in the Sahel.

Saouma decribes the problems facing the Sahel as 'the most difficult in the entire African continent.' He adds: 'The region has only recently experienced one of the worst famines in living memory. It can ill afford another plague.'

He explains that the 1985 rains which broke the Sahel's worst drought in a decade also created fertile breeding grounds for the Senegalese grasshopper *(Oedaleus senegalensis).* And just two weeks after the rains begin again this year — very soon — the eggs are expected to hatch at high densities.

The young hoppers will attack seedlings of millet and sorghum and may well produce further generations. Western Mali is the most seriously affected area. Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and possibly Cape Verde are also threatened.

Only an immediate, intense pest control campaign extended over half a million hectares of infested territory can prevent a widening disaster. The FAO has launched an international appeal, seeking $3.5m on top of the $8m already pledged to finance survey operations, pesticides, aircraft and spraying equipment. Emergency assistance has been provided already by many countries and international organizations.

Grasshoppers and locusts prefer to breed in non-cultivated ground, explains a specialist at the FAO's headquarters in Rome. But as farming expands and untilled areas diminish in Africa and the Middle East, the insects are increasingly prone to invade food crops.

'And because they are nomadic pests, crossing international frontiers, locusts and grasshoppers necessitate a global control effort,' he goes on. 'The FAO set up the first truly international locust control organization in the 1950s, spanning 60 countries. Using meteorological and other information from satellite imagery and ground observers, the FAO's Locust Control Group detects outbreaks, mobilizes and coordinates emergency assistance, strengthens national and international plant protection services and simulates operational research and insect control.'

In ancient times, control was largely defensive. Farmers would try to fend off an attacking swarm by lighting bonfires and banging drums. The modern weapons include satellites for the observation of insects from space and aircraft for the application of powerful pesticides.

But the new Sahel emergency demonstrates the shortcomings of even the most modern techniques. The first signs of a serious grasshopper infestation were registered only in August, 1895, after dense concentrations of the insect had established themselves in 300,000 hectares in the Nara and Dilly regions of Mali.

They descended upon the ripening millet and sorghum plants, in some cases devastating entire crop areas. By September, further infestations were reported from as far west as Yelimane, Mali, with another 100,000 hectares of cereals at risk.

Catastrophic losses were avoided through control measures mounted by the national authorities with help from various UN organizations and other donors. But many insects survived, laying many more eggs.

In the approaching rainy reason, egg densities will be measured and the danger areas treated by pesticides in order to protect seedlings and reduce grasshopper populations. Nevertheless, hoppers at densities of up to 125 per square metre are expected to hatch over large areas.

Many of them are likely to escape and migrate to the north of the Sahel. If conditions are favourable, they will then produce another one or two generations, resulting in populations even larger than those observed last year. Specialists fear that, during September and October, these populations may well return to the south and descend upon the ripening cereal crops, inflicting yet incalculable damage.

[Thomas Land writes on politics and global affairs.]

THEATRE ANTIQUE, ORANGE

by Peter Orr

IN so many ways, the vast and wonderfully-preserved Roman theatre at Orange provides the ideal setting for spectacular operatic performances, and over the years *Les Chorégies d'Orange*, this year in association with Radio-France, have exploited the possibilities of the site. With a potential audience of almost ten thousand (something like three times the capacity of a good-sized opera house), and a top ticket price of £60, the organizers can afford to invite the finest talents of the operatic world. And so, year after year, visitors to this most enchanting of Provençal cities have been offered performances by such artists as Montserrat Caballé, Martti Talvela, Teresa Zylis-Gara, Piero Cappuccilli, Barbara Hendricks, José van Dam, Renato Bruson, Margaret Price and José Carreras. This year, *Macbeth* had the trustworthy and experienced Piero Cappuccilli as a notable exponent of the title role, with the Italian soprano, Mara Zampieri, in remarkable form, both vocally and histrionically, as Lady Macbeth. Musically, this was an immensely satisfying performance, with Thomas Fulton once more demonstrating his gifts as an operatic conductor, and bringing the very best from *L'Orchestre National de France*. It was good to find a sterling contribution from the British member of the cast, John Tomlinson, as Banquo, and a pleasant surprise to discover the considerable talents of the Japanese tenor, Taro Ichihara, as a virile Macduff. The chorus forms a vital part of the opera, and the *Choeur National Bulgare Svetoslav Obretnov*, who were heard at Orange last year in *Boris Godunov*, gave admirable weight and sonority to the evening.

Macbeth is something of a hybrid among operas: in 1846, when Verdi was 33 years old, he considered several possibilities for his next work, among them an opera based on a text by Schiller. His *Attila* had its first performance in March of that year at *La Fenice* in Venice, and already to his growing credit stood the success of such pieces as *Nabucco, I Lombardi, Ernani* and *Giovanna d'Arco*. In a sense, Verdi stood at a crossroads in his career, and his long-term obsession with Shakespeare (he had earlier contemplated the composition of operas based on *The Tempest, King Lear* and *Hamlet*) now determined the direction he was to take and, possibly, paved the way towards those great creations of his later years, *Otello* and *Falstaff* But they were still a long way off. *Macbeth* received its first performance at the *Teatro Pergola* in Florence on March 14th, 1847, when Verdi was still in his early thirties. Eighteen years later, he rewrote about a third of the opera for a production at the *Théatre Lyrique* in Paris on 21 April, 1865. For this second *Macbeth*, Verdi had introduced a ballet (to please the Parisians), substituted for Lady Macbeth's formal *cabaletta* in the second act the aria *'La luce langue'*, written a telling duet for Macbeth and his lady to close the third act, and drastically reworked the closing scene, omitting the aria

originally given to Macbeth.

In recent years Macbeth has enjoyed considerable success in the world's great opera houses, as well as attracting a certain amount of controversial comment. At the Edinburgh Festival, not long after the end of the war, Margherita Grandi's Lady Macbeth was the subject of a front-page spread in one of our dailies, because she had declined in performance to sing the high D-flat at the end of the sleep-walking scene, and another singer (Dorothy Bond, if I remember rightly) had been engaged to provide this taxing note. Then, a decade or so later, at the old Metropolitan Opera in New York, Maria Callas was to appear as Lady Macbeth. In the event, the role was taken by Leonie Rysanek who, by curious coincidence, was singing Elizabeth in *Tannhaüser* at Orange this season. I was in the audience at that first night in New York all those years ago, when a demonstrative *claque* of Callas supporters greeted Mme Rysanek's first appearance with loud cries for their favourite *diva.* That incident has been grossly exaggerated in a recent biography of Maria Callas; in fact, the evening ended with enthusiastic applause for Leonie Rysanek, and for her Macbeth, the formidable Leonard Warren.

All this is really by the way, but it does demonstrate that the opera, like Shakespeare's play, seems to be associated with dramatic incidents offstage. But to return to Orange. Musically, under Fulton, the evening was a most rewarding one. There is no disguising the fact that the score has moments of sheer banality, when Verdi appears to be offering something like a parody of grand operatic conventions; but there are also great dramatic passages, like the sleepwalking scene, when our ears begin to tingle with the anticipation of a later Verdi. Conductor, orchestra, soloists and chorus performed the work for all it was worth, stinting nothing along the way, so that we were able to relish the impact of music-drama at its finest, when it surfaced, and tolerate the episodes of less searching invention and shallow jauntiness.

The vast spaces at Orange encourage spectacle, and the Rumanian designer and director, Petrika Ionesco, really let himself go on this occasion, as the opening scene quickly indicated. The fore-stage was covered with copious quantities of material, rather like that used for the manufacture of parachutes, and made to undulate in the manner of waves. This was Shakespeare's blasted heath translated, with a headless body paraded through the midst of the billows. Sarcophagi surrounded the acting area, to keep us in mind of the presence of death in the drama, and a huge crown was, I assume, intended as a symbol of power. On a crowded stage, Ionesco contrived a number of striking visual effects, some of them, like the projected image of the imagined dagger, faintly comical; others, like the fireworks display at the killing of Macduff's 'pretty chicks', decidedly ludicrous. In Ionesco's daring conception, there was always an inherent danger of tipping over the edge into absurdity, and in his attempts to illustrate the qualities of this melodramatic work he frequently went too far. At the banquet, a half-naked apparition

climbing what appeared to be a lamp-post provoked a few giggles; and performers should be reminded not to thump tables with papier-mâché goblets — they make quite the wrong sound. There were clouds of smoke for the witches' cave and a good deal of energetic reeling and writhing. One of the apparitions actually appeared aloft in the niche hitherto reserved for the famous statue of the Emperor Augustus and Macbeth's 'corpse', hurled from on high, produced a momentary *frisson*, while at the same time reminding us of a similar trick used by the Crazy Gang in their days at the Victoria Palace. There was, however, general applause when Malcolm's armies made their assault on Macbeth's castle by means of an impressive descent of the great wall of the theatre on ropes, while below their companions energetically waved branches from Birnam Wood. The boos and catcalls which greeted Ionesco's appearance at the curtain call did seem a little unnecessary. He had employed a varied repertoire of theatrical tricks, some of which merely served to underline the melodramatic aspects of the piece. But he had shown the courage to create an original visual presentation of the opera, even though he found himself, at times, at odds with the demands of the music.

'An interesting failure' was Francis Toye's assessment of the opera, in his excellent book on Verdi. At Orange, we were given the opportunity to reach our own conclusions, by means of a production which, despite its failings, and those of the composer, left the distinct impression of a work worth exploring further and deserving memory.

Next year, *Les Chorégies d'Orange* are presenting Massenet's *Hérodiade* with Montserrat Caballé and Wagner's *Der Fliegende Holländer*. In 1988, they make their boldest move yet, in mounting a complete *Ring* cycle, conducted by Marek Janowski. From those of us who have supported Orange over many years come earnest hopes for the successful continuation of a really remarkable enterprise.

[Peter Orr began a career in broadcasting in the West Indies and the USA. Returning to Britain, he was for eighteen years with the British Council as Head of Recorded Sound and Deputy Director of the Literature Department. He was visiting Associate Professor in the Department of Theatre at the University of Denver, Colorado, USA and from 1971 has been chairman of the Apollo Society. He is Spoken Word Producer for the Argo label of the Decca Record Company, broadcasts frequently for the BBC and writes on opera for *The Times*. He is currently working on a study of Shakespeare's *Othello*. Publications include *The Poet Speaks* (Routledge 1966).]

EDINBURGH FESTIVAL 1986

by Laurence Green

EDINBURGH in August is a city in festive mood, in which clowns, actors and musicians jostle with shoppers and tourists in the streets and virtually every school, club hall and church becomes a makeshift theatre, teeming with life and vitality, for it is the month when the world's leading arts festival takes place.

This year's Edinburgh International Festival, now 40 years old, celebrated the Scottish Enlightenment, a time in history when all human knowledge seemed accessible; when art, philosophy, economics, law, religion and the social and physical sciences seemed part of the basic human endeavour: to understand the nature of human society and man's place in the world. This then could not be more appropriate as the city became what it was during that period: a turbulent, democratic, public place — at once a village and a place of pilgrimage.

Undoubtedly, the strongest section of the 1986 Festival was the World Theatre Season, with countries participating including France, Sweden, West Germany, Poland, Spain, China, Japan, USA and South Africa and such eminent directors as Andrzej Wajda who brought the much praised production of Dostoievsky's *Crime and Punishment* by the Stary Theatre of Krakow and Ingmar Bergman with the Bavarian State Theatre's staging of Ibsen's *John Gabriel Borkman* and the Royal Dramatic Theatre of Stockholm's production of Strindberg's *Miss Julie*.

Possibly the most eagerly awaited company was the Market Theatre of Johannesburg with two plays *Asinamali*, written and directed by Mbongeni Ngema and *Born in the RSA*, created by Barney Simon.

Asinamali (which means 'Nothing to Lose') is powerful political theatre with a vein of black comedy running through it, providing an account of how five blacks in South Africa ended up in a jail — their crimes range from shooting a security policeman to sleeping with a white boss's wife. The actors perform on a bare stage, save for five chairs, yet the intensity of their collective experiences of injustice under the apartheid system is strongly conveyed, the individual monologues interspersed with Zulu chants. Although there is no set storyline as such, the play conjures up a series of memorable images — the bureaucratic red tape involved in getting a work permit for a menial, lowly paid job, a police interrogation in which the unfortunate victim is forced to lie on the ground and is kicked by the sergeant in charge, an alleged 'terrorist' who unsuspectingly imagines the brown paper parcel he is carrying is a pair of smart shoes, only to discover later that it is in fact a brick and, particularly disturbing, police machine-gunning demonstrators armed with stones, dustbin lids and tyres amid an atmosphere of smoke, flames and burning hatred. *Asinamali* offers a rare insight into the causes of violence in that troubled country. Ironically the history of the production is just as fraught. It was produced in Johannesburg during the State of Emerg-

ency before an audience which included Winnie Mandela, and one performance was interrupted by an armed mob who disliked the play's political message, set out to kill the author but, unable to find him, killed the promoter instead.

Born in the RSA was initiated in a period of paralysing uncertainty for the country around mid '85. It was soon after the first State of Emergency was declared during the days of sudden eruptions of violence when both forces, the government and the young township 'comrades' who oppose them, were still gaining shape and momentum and little was known and nothing predictable. The elements of confusion and spontaneity run through this production which is not so much a drama as a kind of living newspaper that gives flesh and breath to the names and incidents that appear regularly in the corners of newspapers, from stories usually ignored or dismissed out of disinterest or fear. Taking the form of a series of interlocking monologues, with the actors directly addressing the audience, the play focusses on seven individuals representing a cross section of the nation from police informer to political dissident, who relate their experiences. The most vivid character is the graduate student who reports on his Marxist Professor, for which he receives a generous cheque. This leads to further 'commissions', in which he is asked to spy on anything from a crowd of black women chatting to workers' meetings.

Above all, it shows the way the system has poisoned an individual's conscience. The most affecting account, which indeed could make a separate play in itself, is that of a ten-year-old black boy who goes missing, and frantic efforts by his distraught mother reveal that he has been arrested for stoning buses, although at the time he had merely taken cover from the rain in a bus shelter. He is detained and eventually released with evidence of physical assault. Surely, the most unforgiveable thing about South Africa, apartheid aside, is that the police have the authority to beat children?

Gildas Bourdet and Alain Milianti have taken the basic ingredients of classic French farce — the frantic but forlorn pursuit of sexual fulfilment — and added an extra dimension of frustration in the *Théatre de la Salamandre* of Le Havre's production of *Le Saperleau.* The story as such centres on a man torn between two women, the well dressed, assured matron and the prim, bespectacled girl with whom he is enamoured. However, these amorous adventurers cannot comprehend each other because they are at a loss for words. This failure in communication is reinforced by the strange language in which the play is performed which resembles French but is actually a distortion of it. Although an imaginative idea in concept the execution was rather disappointing since the essential visual and verbal humour was in short supply. Nevertheless the extravagant performances, glittering settings — two glass partitions and a door — and clever use of lighting ensured that interest was maintained for much of its 90 minutes running time.

More pure enjoyment was to be had at the Chinese Magical Circus, without which any World Theatre Season would be incomplete. This is no ordinary circus with animals, trapeze artists and clowns, simply a dazzling mixture of acrobats, jugglers, magicians and dancers (the famous Lion and Dragon dances were included.) Presented by the Acrobatic Troupe of Guangzhou, capital city of Canton Province, its roots are in the Chinese acrobatic tradition dating back to 770 BC, and the skill and artistry of the performers — a girl balancing a cup on her toe while standing on the head of her partner, or trick cyclists simulating the outstretched feather of a peacock — had a truly magical effect.

The best production, however, in the World Theatre Season which alone was worth travelling the 400 odd miles from London to see was the Toho Company's breathtaking version of *Medea* by Euripides. The ritualistic traditions of the Kabuki theatre which is both disciplined and has the ability to move an audience, gave this tale of murderous revenge a dignity and power that was at times overwhelming, especially in the climatic scene when Medea ascends the magnificent flight of steps of the Old College's neo-classical courtyard, sword raised, to kill her two children .There were many innovations, all the roles were played by men, and the ending was both spectacular and truly inspired with Medea riding off in a chariot drawn by dragons in the hope of achieving the spiritual happiness with her offspring denied her on earth. The chorus, their faces veiled, swirling and dividing across the stage, strumming eerie sounds on their banjos, while lamenting Medea's fate, but helpless to do anything about it, together with the sad, dramatic background music served to heighten the tragedy. The dominant force, though, was undoubtedly Mikijiro Hira as Medea, dressed initially in elaborate ceremonial costume and later in a bright red dress and wearing a large pair of artificial breasts. Whether striding in fury as a result of her husband's infidelity, or playfully rolling across the ground with her children, Hira achieved levels of emotion rare in the theatre today. An unforgettable experience.

The Fringe also produced a play of particular merit in *Kathie and the Hippopotamus* (Traverse Theatre) by the Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa. Kathie decides to write a book about her travels in Egypt and employs Santiago, a pseudo intellectual to 'ghost' her experiences. The transformation of her memories into his flights of fantasy spark off associations for both of them and the reality of their everyday lives becomes inextricably bound up with the re-enactment of events from their own imagination. As they relive their experiences the real reasons for their collaborative venture emerge — both are seeking to escape from their own failed aspirations and disastrous marriages. Llosa's complex, eloquent play reveals a deep understanding of human nature while showing that the boundary between fact and fiction can be so perilously thin as to be almost transparent. Janet Amsden as Kathie and Robert Swann as Santiago gave fine performances. An unusual and enriching piece

of theatre.

Two minor eighteenth century plays, *Douglas* by John Home, an adventure story set in Scotland and *The Gentle Shepherd*, a ballad opera and comedy on Scots life were specially staged for the festival but received only a lukewarm response and were outshadowed by the international offerings.

Before moving on to art a few words of praise must be on record for Carl Davis's marvellous new score for Eric von Stroheim's masterpiece *Greed* about meanness and the obsession for money and how it becomes a kind of disease which destroys all concerned. The music considerably enhances the film, now in a completely new print, and gives it a grandeur all its own. It can be seen at the London Film Festival in November and should not be missed.

It was in the realm of art that the Scottish Enlightenment theme was most marked with three exhibitions celebrating the cultural, commercial and industrial heritage of this small but significant nation. *The Enterprising Scot* (Royal Scottish Academy until October 5) presents an original and provocative view of Scottish achievement with imaginative, audio-visual displays, specially commissioned models and hundreds of selected items from the National Museum's collections. Two of the models have animated heads and 'talk' directly to the visitor: Sir Harry Lauder, played by Bill Patterson, emphasises his contribution to Scotland's 'tartan' image; while early 19th century Professor of Midwifery, James Hamilton, played by Russell Hunter makes lofty remarks on his enterprising activities and the role of women! Possibly the most dazzling exhibit in the true sense of the word is a large crystal light designed by Thomas Stevenson which provided a fixed beam, evenly distributed through an angle of 45° to lead and safeguard ships up the Tay.

A Hotbed of Genius (Royal Museum of Scotland) provided a greater insight into the sixty years when the nation was in the vanguard of intellectual advance in Europe, and covered Moderatism, taste, morality and sentiment, science and industry, philosophy, music and links with other countries, notably the USA. Among the most memorable items were the recreation of an Edinburgh tavern, frequented by the local vernacular writers, in the mid 18th century, with three figures in a drunken stupor and a ragged woman lying at the bottom of the tavern steps, a staff in her hand, smoking a pipe, a fascinating line of early playbills including the original production of *Douglas* and lifelike cutouts of milliners, chemists, physicians, Adam Smith, author of *The Wealth of Nations* and William Smellie, first editor of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, with suitable musical accompaniment on the harpsichord.

Painters in Scotland lived up to philosopher David Hume's vision of the unity of human knowledge, as the third and best of the exhibitions entitled *Painting in Scotland, The Golden Age* (which can be seen at the Tate Gallery, London from October 15th 1986-January 4th 1987) cer-

tainly testifies. There are two principal themes in the development of Scottish painting. The first, seen in the work of the portrait painters, involved analysis and observation of the real world according to the principles of empirical philosophy. The second was shared with poetry and involved an attempt to find the original principles that govern human behaviour by imitating the unspoilt primitive imagination as it is represented by oral traditions in music and poetry. The marvellous portraiture and naturalistic detail are well in evidence in the work of the three greatest painters in Scottish history, Allan Ramsay, Sir Henry Raeburn and Sir David Wilkie. The naturalism of Wilkie's work matches his deep concern for the kind of values championed by the celebrated poet Robert Burns. This is illustrated by two contrasting works — 'The Penny Wedding' and 'Distraining for Rent'; the former is warm and happy, symbolised by the music which leads the dance, the latter is bitter and insecure showing members of a family being evicted from their farm, their very bedclothes impounded because they cannot pay their rent. My own favourite work is Raeburn's portrait of his wife, 'Isabella McLeod, Mrs James Gregory' (also on the cover of the magnificent catalogue). This is a fresh and animated picture, the beauty of the subject a function of a lively personality. The colours are carefully orchestrated overall, the tints light and soft but never cold. It is the sense of the living warmth of a real presence within the cool beauty of the painting that makes it one of the loveliest of all female portraits.

Briefly two other exhibitions of distinction: *John Bellany* (Serpentine Gallery next month), comprising about 60 oil paintings as well as watercolours, drawings and prints of this contemporary Scottish artist who depicts the harsh lives of fishermen and the environment of his native Port Seton, East Lothian, as well as members of his own family, with a vivid sense of realism and personal expressionism; and *Lighting up the Landscape* (National Gallery of Scotland until October 19th) which focusses on the early landscape of the Impressionists and their links with the distinguished tradition of landscape painting in France, and includes Pissarro's evocative 'The Marne at Chennevières' and Monet's famous 'On the Scene at Bennecourt'.

A veritable feast of a festival of which Scotland can justifiably be proud.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Scoundrel. Peter Elstob. Cape. £9.95. *A Misalliance.* Anita Brookner. Cape. £9.95. *Women of a Certain Age.* Colleen Klein. Century Hutchinson. £8.50. *Dizzy's Woman.* George Macbeth. Cape. £9.95. *The Pianoplayers.* Anthony Burgess Century Hutchinson. £8.95.

If it is true that all the world loves a lover, a profligate also captivates hearts and minds. There is much that is irresistible about a plausible charlatan working his way from rags to riches by means of a succession of knavish tricks The only problem is that the rascal's charisma must transcend his despicable dishonesty. For a character in fiction this poses a special challenge: one that Peter Elstob has set himself in *Scoundrel,* his first novel since the excellent *Warriors of the Working Day* published in 1960. *Scoundrel* revolves around the misdemeanours of one Harry Kelly, against whom nearly all the dice were loaded. The illegitimate son of an Italian prisoner of war and an Irish maidservant, he was reared in the household that employed his parents, in the manner of a stray puppy. The vice and deception which flourished within the outwardly sedate establishment provided a training ground for petty blackmail and deviant sex. When summarily ejected from the prickly nest he soon perfected the art of obtaining something for nothing. The routine did not always work out according to plan. Aptly, he compared his bumpy ride with a child's game of snakes and ladders. The purpose of *Scoundrel* is to explore the good times and the bad in a succession of flashbacks to the moment of total defeat, so vividly described in the opening pages.

The first glimpse of Harry Kelly shows him unwashed and unshaven in a station lavatory in Milan, thrown out onto the street by the only female dupe clever enough to see through his transparent subterfuges. The kindly washroom attendant sees him on his way and the scene is set for Harry Kelly or 'Colonel Ronald Rokesby-Gore' (his favourite alias) to set foot on the upward spiral once again. This proves astonishingly easy as he attaches himself to a group of American tourists on an art appreciation tour. And so, once more, the merry rake's progress continues, through a maze of expensive restaurants, shops and hotels. At times the repetition becomes oppressive, as does the oft-repeated emphasis on the victims' craving for affection and gallantry; and in one scene at any rate their emotional hunger borders on farce. Harry Kelly's cynical accomplishments in the sexual arts will not endear him to the women's liberation lobby Yet the sad realism of such incidents cannot be disregarded and when, in the finale, he is revealed as nothing more than a plausible windbag, thankful to make a conventional marriage and run a small bed and breakfast establishment, retribution catches up with him.

Anita Brookner, winner of the Booker McConnell fiction prize with her novel, *Hotel du Lac,* does not seek to present a glamorous scene. Her speciality is in describing a low-key, convincing background for people so inert as to be almost stationary. It is always a hard task for the novelist to make tedious people interesting although on some occasions it has been successfully accomplished. The central character in *The Misalliance,* Blanche Vernon,

described in the publisher's announcement as 'smart', certainly displays an almost obsessive concern for her clothes and the interior decoration of her nicely equipped flat, diverted only by visits to the National Gallery and the imbibing of light white wine. Money is no problem and, a childless marriage having recently been dissolved, Blanche is free to wile away the empty hours as best she may. In the evenings she looks forward to a reasonably early retreat to bed, while secretly hoping that ex-husband Bertie will call in on his way home to the new wife (Mousie). It is a deadening routine, yet there is a ray of hope. Blanche does a weekly stint of voluntary work at the refreshment counter of a local hospital. There she encounters Sally Beamish, raffish stepmother of Nelly, her husband's child by a former marriage. Nelly is an intelligent three year old though mute, for what reason the doctors are trying to discover. The visual impact of these two is masterly and lifts the novel onto an entirely different plane. In attempting to assist them, financially and with moral support, Blanche's own life pace is quickened. When she forces an interview with young Paul Beamish's peculiar employers, in an effort to obtain rough justice for the little family, she strays into the uncharted ocean of the 'real' world. Yet as she hastily withdraws and her interest in Sally's story dies a lingering death, Blanche retreats into her futile and meaningless existence. Acknowledging her own predicament, she decides to pull up her roots and go abroad for an indefinite period. An unwise decision, surely, halted only by ex-husband Bertie's almost incredible decision to abandon Mousie and return to his former spouse. Sadly unconvincing, because there has been insufficient groundwork to prepare the reader for this unexpected *volte-face.*

Consistently faultless, often brilliant prose, so evocative that the temptation is to linger over almost every paragraph, and a sincere appreciation of the problems of isolation and loneliness do not in the final reckoning stem the reader's rising irritation with this boring and useless woman. Unfair, perhaps, to confuse a personal antipathy for the central character with the general excellence, yet the hope lingers that Anita Brookner will one day harness her remarkable powers to a more acceptable character than Blanche Vernon.

With so much popular concern over women's rights and professional openings it may seem strange that the late summer fiction has been dominated by studies of wives and mothers apathetic about capitalising their opportunities. This attitude would appear to be the norm in Australia, according to Colleen Klein, a gifted Australian novelist whose *Women of a Certain Age* outlines the predicament of a handsome, forty-year-old woman, Elissa Campbell who, despite a devoted husband, daughters and friends, sees her life as slipping irretrievably towards a dead-end; as do some of her female cronies. 'Sometimes, I think I've missed something basic . . .' remarks one of them with commendable honesty. Elissa is even more astringent in her thoughts and observations about drinks and coffee mornings.

> How footling. All these gatherings that have been going on for years. So dreary. So damn repetitive. Buttering up. Back scratching. Back biting. I don't think I can stand another hour of it. And I've got thirty years lined up, with the grave yawning at the other end. There must be some way out, there's got to be something worth trying at. Worth believing in.

True, some members of the circle do charity or part-time work. Yet to the ambitious, energetic Elissa this is irrelevant and her strictures continue to be sharp-edged.

> They rose from their couches: leaving the imprint of their bodies on the cushions. Silken and scented, curled and creamed, past first youth and second

> youth too for that matter but still fighting the good fight against age, they stepped or strolled or pranced towards the dining room, making for the food that would stoke them, the wine that would set their tongues to ever more furious wagging . . .

So for Elissa there had to be something more than caring for Jim, her university lecturer husband's sexual and other requirements and maintaining relations with one extrovert actress daughter and another who is incorrigibly fecund and domestic. Yet how to set about widening the horizon? Elissa, as the publisher's announcement explains, is one of those women, no longer fashionable, who prefer to obtain their objectives by guile rather than aggression. And so to give her life what she imagines to be a discreet and manageable purpose she embarks upon the scheme of creating an ornamental garden on a stretch of wasteland; this, in defiance of her husband's incredulous disapproval. That the project is evenually abandoned is not due to an uprush of commonsense. The sheer physical and financial weight of such a scheme would in any case has been overwhelming: but this is a governing factor. Elissa conceives a late child, suffers a nasty fall on her uncultivated terrain and, contrary to the reader's expectations, a miscarriage is narrowly averted. Languishing in hospital after the accident, she learns that Jim had been about to ask for a divorce in order to marry Norah, one of his less engaging students. There are no hard feelings. Jim abandons Norah as readily as Elissa gives up the idea of the garden. So much is neatly observed, so many characters have the mark of truth on them and descriptions are always vivid that it is a pity that Elissa, her family and circle are so negative and mediocre as to preclude interest and sympathy, apart from which, much of the inherent honesty of the novel is negatived by the requirements of a happy ending.

In *Dizzy's Woman* George Macbeth has conceived the highly diverting notion of filling in a gap in the correspondence between Benjamin Disraeli and Anne Vane Tempest, Lady Londonderry. Why the letters temporarily ceased for a five year period must remain an unsolved mystery. True, at that time the rising young politician married a colleague's wealthy widow, Mary Anne Lewis, and the legend is that the new Mrs Disraeli suffered pangs of retrospective jealousy of 'Vane'. It is a fair enough proposition to speculate on the trend of the correspondence between Disraeli and Lady Londonderry had it continued in an unbroken sequence. Every detail and nuance of the twenty-four fictional letters remain true to the period background, and the future Lord Beasonsfield is revealed as being uncertain of the reception his missives might encounter. Eager to stress by innuendo and erotic allusion the pleasure he hopes to experience at some unspecified future date, he is at the same time careful to maintain a light note in the effusions. His loveless marriage will, it may be assumed, settle down into routine once he is established in Parliament, leaving him free for a resumption of the old intimacy.

In-fighting, as Benjamin Disraeli's novels demonstrate, was no doubt the norm of day-to-day life in the Houses of Parliament, much as it is today, as is indicated in the lively passages of gossip and repartee. The structure of what is a comparatively brief volume is underpinned by its historical accuracy. The main plank is an event as unusual as it was eccentric. This was the 'joust' convened by Lord Eglinton for the last time in 1849 at enormous cost, known as the Eglinton Tournament. It was held at Lord Eglinton's home in Scotland and the participants were wealthy young men dressed in Knights' armour. On this, the swansong, bad weather more or less washed it out and witty descriptions of it are interwoven with more personal passages. Whether being

robbed in Stepney, imbibing brandy or attending important functions, 'Dizzy' conveys the personality later to become so universally familiar. *Dizzy's Woman* is no mere pastiche but has an importance all its own, and if the character of Lady Londonderry remains shadowy, this is because the autocratic society hostess of the middle eighteen hundreds is so alien to contemporary thought.

Anthony Burgess must be one of the most versatile of modern novelists writing today. After the outstanding Biblical scenes of the Caligula regime and *The End of the World News* — to take two random examples from a list of twenty-eight published novels — in *The Piano-Players* he has turned his attention to a subject strikingly different. This is the seedy world of travelling variety artists in the period between the wars — a squalid scene seen through the young eyes of Ellen, daughter of a cinema pianist, Bill Henshaw. Motherless, she has no option but to trail along with father Billy, sleeping in the same room with her male parent for economy's sake, reared on a diet of unwholesome cafe food and hanging around the cinemas while Billy improvises accompaniments to the silent movies of the day. Yet she is as optimistic as her feckless parent that one day things will improve. They do not seem to do so. Self-indulgent clowning, the closure of local cinemas and money squandered in the pubs result in failure to pay the rent and other expenses so that the drop-out family of two are forever seeking new areas of activity The final one is Blackpool, where Ellen at last has a room of her own. Yet the scenario is still sordid, with crude gropings and fumblings in place of the more idealistic sexual relationships for which Ellen craves; but when she falls in love with a nice young man and is able to earn her own living, the future looks more hopeful until Bill conceives an unwise passion for the wife of a fellow player. The dire results of this indiscretion are mitigated only by his willingness to take part in a piano playing marathon. Predictably, the strain kills him and the orphaned Ellen is obliged to rebuild her life by entering a Brussels convent which turns out to be a recruiting ground for prostitution.

A nostalgic romp, recounted by Ellen with the aid of a ghost writer, brash humour and many interesting reminders of the Twenties which might have been left there to make its own effect. However, Anthony Burgess' intention is to carry the tale several decades further. Ellen has become a highly paid 'madam': she has married, borne a son Robert, been deserted by her husband on discovering her previous calling, and seen Robert forcibly removed from her care. In time, she links up with him again and the final part of *The Pianoplayers* covers the boy's own marriage — an unhappy one — as it might have been recounted to her on some unspecified occasion. Robert's son, William, named after Billy the grandfather, becomes a musical prodigy and for good measure a small piece of Billy's composition is in transcript on the final pages of the book. Is this two-part structure a success or a disappointment? It must be admitted that the story of Robert, wife Edna and egregious mother-in-law, Mrs. Aldridge, does not blend very happily with the well-documented tale of life below the poverty line and often deteriorates into black comedy. Yet devotees of Anthony Burgess's novels will rejoice that he refuses to settle for stereo-typed plots and situations and is eternally questing after something different and unfamiliar.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

IRISH TROUBLES & TREASURES

The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistoric to Modern Times. Liam de Paor. Hutchinson. £6.95 paperback. £15 hardback.
A Short History of Irish Literature. Seamus Deane. Hutchinson. £15.
Against the Tide: Rev. J. B. Armour, Irish Presbyterian & Home Ruler. J. R. B. McMinn. Public Record Office of Northern Ireland. £12.95.
Housing a Divided Community. C. E. B. Brett, C.B.E. Institute of Public Affairs Dublin in association with the Institute of Irish Studies. £13.98.
Children of the Troubles: Growing up in Northern Ireland. Peter Jennings & Maggie Dean. Marshal Pickering.

Liam de Paor is an archaeologist. He makes us as much at home in prehistoric as in modern Ireland. Having admirably examined the ancient origins of Celtic Erin, he tersely states that most important fact: 'The Romans never came.'

So Ireland continued as a tribal medley. Periodically High Kingship was won by the sword. If there was no Roman occupation, the Norman Conquest of Ireland in the persons of such as Strongbow and John de Courcy, conqueror of Ulidia (Ulster), was patchy. Instead of the productive assimilation England experienced, Ireland had its Pale and a 'going native' on the part of conquerors and colonists. Nineteenth-century Anglo-Irish landlords resented being called 'aliens'.

The English Catholic settlers planted by Philip and Mary merged into the country. Between Ulster and Scotland there was a traffic of centuries. Thus 'the chiefdom of Dál Riata' had spread the Gaelic tongue into the Scottish Highlands. Rathlin Island, now an outpost of Dr. Paisley's constituency, was disputed by Scotland and Ireland, to whom a Pope awarded it. Ulster held out the longest for the old faith and old ways; and what Mr. de Paor describes as 'the distinct regional identity of the north-east' ante-dates the Protestant Reformation. Indeed, the Ulster difference has roots in geography and in the folk-lore of that Northern champion, Cú Chulainn, stragely ignored by Mr. de Paor.

Seamus Deane does mention the Ulster Cycle centred upon Cú Chulainn and notes that 'the Presbyterian Scots settlers in the North of Ireland', a new element of Ulster distinction from the South, supported the 'Glorious Revolution . . . completed by 1690 in Ireland' which imposed a New English authority 'over the Catholic Irish and the Old English, the descendants of the Anglo-Norman invasions of the twelfth century'.

For his part, Mr. de Paor displays an objectivity unusual in Irish historiography. He pays tribute to the infrastructure laid under the Union whose administration, more centralised than in Great Britain, founded that now obtaining on both sides of the Border. Like Mr. Deane, in his study of the literary tradition of the Anglo-Irish, Mr. de Paor acknowledges the virtues of the Ascendancy — and of the Ordnance Survey, subject of a fairly recent stage

success, which did much for the antiquities of Ireland. Mention might have been made of Plunkett and the co-operative movement. But what could be more coolly dispassionate than to describe the operations of the Black and Tans as 'vigorous forays into the rebellious countryside' in a 'clumsy conflict'?

The author errs slightly however in terming the Civil War between Free Staters and Republicans as a struggle of Monarchy versus Democracy. Nor was the Constitution of 1932 and since more democratic than that of 1922. It was a stage in the progressive alienation of Northern loyalism by the removal of the symbols and connection of Crown and Commonwealth. Thus the anti-partitionists consolidated partition.

Not that Mr. de Paor has too much time for Eamon de Valera. He cares not for the Catholic complexion of the Republic. The referendum on divorce indicated however that it has wide popular support; and the political landscape Mr. de Paor finds 'dreary' would be drearier if the 'new history' to be shaped for the Republic by a very young electorate were to be one of secularism.

Students of Irish history may also turn with pleasure to Sean Deane. He could well be read in tandem with Liam de Paor. The uninitiated will learn that between the thirteenth century and the end of the sixteenth no fewer than four languages were current in Ireland: Irish, Norman-French, Latin and English. From the seventeenth century Anglo-Irish literature had affinities with Gaelic, English, Scottish and continental European cultures. In the eighteenth it developed an independent tradition, part of a culture and society whence sprang the nationalism of Grattan and his times. Thereafter 'the conciliation between Gaelic and Anglo-Irish writing makes it possible to speak of Irish Writing'. This Mr. Deane sees as hopeful.

Mr. de Paor has no space for J. B. Armour who particularly interests this reviewer whose grandfather, though of Down not Antrim, was also a Presbyterian minister and Home Ruler. In his fascinating Introduction the Ulster historian Dr. Richard McMinns shows the reader, under the title 'The Man and the Myth', an Armour different from the common impression. He was at first opposed to Home Rule, a cause he later espoused for social rather than political reasons. He looked to it for land reform. Armour also had a connection with the Independent Orange Order. He combined Nationalism, as did many Redmondites, with a belief in the Empire of which Ireland too was a Mother Country.

C. E. B. Brett quotes the Ulster historian, A. T. Q. Stewart, and the Unionist politician, Harry West, to point to 'the relationship of people to land' as 'the central theme of Irish history'. One of the dramatic events in the period covered by Mr. Brett is the 'Squatting at Caledon' in County Tyrone in 1968, in protest at the Unionist-controlled local housing authority's discriminatory allocation of homes (Nationalist-dominated Councils like Dungannon were also not without blame.) The Northern Ireland Housing Executive now prevents such abuse.

Charles Brett, solicitor and former journalist, was once active in the non-sectarian Northern Ireland Labour Party. He was Chairman of the Housing Executive from 1971 to 1984. He read history at Oxford and writes readably, placing his account of his stewardship in the perspective of an epoch of troubles.

Some of the young victims of those troubles speak in the interviews recorded by Peter Jennings and Maggie Dean. Alas, the commentary is superficial; and the false assumption is made that Catholics *en bloc* favour a United Ireland.

Nor has the editors' confidence in the Anglo-Irish Agreement been justified by events.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

THE PRICE OF PEACE

Road to Victory. Winston S. Churchill 1941-1945. Martin Gilbert. Heinemann. £20.

At *long* last (1400 pages) Martin Gilbert has finished his epic story of Winston and the Second World War, following on *Finest Hour* reviewed in these columns three years ago. This volume starts with Pearl Harbour, December 7, 1941, and ends with VE Day, May 8, 1945; it includes 40 pages of illustrations, 15 maps and 60 carefully chosen chapter-headings.

Although the massive volume is almost a day by day and intimate account of Winston's life, I found it bracing to relive those terrible days. Of course the hero and his circle, which includes family and secretaries, are larger than life itself. We are personally introduced to Roosevelt and Stalin, to Smuts and the Dominion Prime Ministers, to Foreign Secretaries and to the *Top Brass* of several nations, so that we sit in at historic meetings and listen to a pretty high level of discussion. Moreover, we enjoy exciting and glorious visits to Cairo and Casablanca, Teheran, Marrakesh and Yalta, often described by Winston in highly original prose. We visit Washington, Moscow and Quebec; we stay overnight at Hyde Park, Roosevelt's private home. But perhaps more exciting are the later visits to various fronts, to our own regiments and ships, to our allies, to Monty in the desert, to Alexander in Italy, to Ike on the Rhine, to Sebastopol with the Russians and above all to General Scobie and Archbishop Damaskinos in Athens, Christmas Day, 1944. Can one say, therefore, that there is never a dull moment? Not quite, as I explain later.

Of course this story has been told before in Winston's own six volumes *The Second World War*, but Martin Gilbert's genius is to have blended much new material from dozens of diarists, notably of course Alanbroke, Eden, Cadogan and above all Colville, from scores of persons some still living but mostly dead, such as Montgomery, Harriman, Beaverbrook and scores of other people, including secretaries and in this book typists like Elizabeth Layton whose comments often add relief before and after Winston's many speeches and broadcasts. But as every quotation from diaries or Cabinet papers is noted at the foot of each page, there must be several thousand *Notes*. Oddly enough these brief notes add to the interest and enjoyment of the reader. The research necessary for such a volume must have been back-breaking and we must congratulate not only Martin Gilbert, but also his wife Susie who for fourteen years has been his standard-setter for this monumental task.

The substance of this book is military strategy and political decision-making. Only a trained military historian can evaluate specific campaigns of such Generals as Auchinlek, Wavell, Mark Clark or Wingate. The wider strategy of bombing particular targets, of perfecting particular sea-lanes and even more of *second fronts* and Winston's desire to strike at the soft belly of the Axis become highly political issues, where wide differences of opinion must exist. The book allows analysis of all these strategic-political issues full scope. The differences with Roosevelt are never lasting, though sometimes serious. But it becomes clear, long before Yalta, indeed before Teheran, that Winston had



lost confidence in Stalin's post-war policies. At one point writing to Barrington Ward he writes, 'I have wooed Stalin as a man might woo a maid': at another time writing to the King, 'Your Majesty will have noticed that I have heard from the *Great Bear* and that we are on speaking or at least growling terms again' August 1943. But earlier he had said, 'The astounding victories on the Russian front are changing the whole aspect of the war'. He saw two things far ahead of anyone: — first victory and secondly the menace of Stalinist expansion in Europe, leading inevitably to his 'Iron Curtain Speech'. My only criticism of Martin Gilbert's narrative is that far too many pages are devoted to the Polish problem and too few to Greece. Winston's intervention saved Greece.

Little now remains to be said. This latest volume reveals the intimate daily life of a very great man, striving for his country, quite regardless of health or risk of life, buffeted by chance but in the long run ready to listen, change his mind, even scrap a letter written, if convinced it was for the good of his fellows and the country. But perhaps the final words on Winston must await Volume VIII, when Martin Gilbert will doubtless give us a memorable account of his later years and thus enable us to see the whole life in perspective.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE AUSTRALIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE

A History of Australian Literature. Ken Goodwin. Macmillan History of Literature. Hard cover £27.50. Paperback £8.95.

Ken Goodwin's survey of the literature of Australia covers the first hundred years of the settlement of that country, showing by copious example and illustration how strongly the feelings and especially the fears of those early immigrants have influenced subsequent novelists and poets, not excluding Aboriginal Australians. There is a richness and variety in the writing thus produced and its expression of colonial values is increasingly respected as a facet of the early lives of the builders of great cities and of outposts where education, and therefore literature, was deliberately fostered in the small community as well as in the city.

The recurrent themes are those of a recovery of the past, a determination at first to hold on to disappearing cultural values and later to blend these with a rightly preserved native heritage whose contribution, existing at the outset largely in visual art forms, has become increasingly verbal and politically expressive. Some of Australian literature's characteristic subjects are shown to be the need to endure, the idea of the alien and the imminence of violence It is clearly unique in that the poetry and stories often make common cause between the immigrant and his Aboriginal neighbour, in the sense that both are alienated and both have lost their homelands. Both, too, are required to express strange concepts in an alien tongue. Conflict arises less frequently from origins than from the opposing interests of country-dwellers and city populace. For a number of reasons and from a variety of cultural backgrounds, writers have often stressed such notions as the search for identity by a wanderer, his urge to settle the country and the establishment of a family line. The quest provided a metaphor for the exploration of the realms of the mind,

just as the novels of Joseph Conrad, in another country, described an infinite loneliness and a constant quest for certainty and peace.

The book concentrates in detail on the history of literature in the last fifty years, the period when writers have come of age in the sense that considerations of dependence on England or America have ceased to matter. Changes in social and economic status are reflected closely in the author's account of the symbolic novels of Patrick White, the expatriate work of Peter Porter and the absurdist stories of Peter Mathers and David Ireland. Women, writers of children's literature and Aboriginal authors are given full recognition in the comprehensive appraisal of twentieth century writing: many poets and critics who contributed to the influential journal, *The Bulletin,* founded in 1880 and known as 'the bushman's bible', were instrumental in shaping Australian cultural consciousness and bringing to an end the idea of critical dependence on Europe.

Above all, the particular charm of the book is its author's evident delight in his reading of the novels themselves and his vivid accounts of their attractions. In this there is no loss of critical acumen, — indeed, the proper criticism of Australian writers comes of age itself with Professor Goodwin, notwithstanding the presence of Ned Kelly in his appointed place in the narrative. No reader could fail to be pleased or enlightened.

BETTY ABEL

GOOD WORDS

A Christian Anthology Part III: The Christian Testament since the Bible. Firestone Press. £14.95.

This is a well devised book, full of interest, with texts from the first century to the present day. A pleasure to dip into or study, it would be a valuable addition to the library of priest or layman. Gone are the days when any English household with books would have *Pilgrim's Progress* among them and here it is produced in full. Bunyan, as was said of C. S. Lewis, had 'the rare gift of making righteousness readable'. And how good to see grouped together those splendid and familiar prayers from the Gelasian Sacramentary which play a large part in the *Roman Missal* and the *Book of Common Prayer,* and learn that The General Thanksgiving was composed by Edward Reynolds, the Bishop of Norwich in 1661. I suppose that the fact that the Bishop was the author of what is among the finest pieces of prose in the English language is widely known but it was not known to me. And so the book is also a source of information and reference.

However, if you call a book Part III and intend that to mean the third testament of the Bible, inevitably some will complain that suitable people have been left out. The title suggests that the choice is definitive. The ancient writings have been tested by time and all until Wesley would be acceptable, though something of Jeremy Taylor might have been added. It is with the modern selection that some criticism may be justified. One can understand the difficulty of the compilers and perhaps it was an impossible task. It is reasonable to include Martin Luther King and Mother Teresa because of their special contribution to practical Christianity. Karl Barth and Kierkegaard rightly appear but one might have looked for something of Bonhoeffer, Hans Kuhn

or Moltmann or Harry Williams. Some too might object to the American revivalists, Johnathan Edwards and Charles Finney. The Old Testament standpoint of these two with their Despot Creator image of God many would find not just off-putting but would drive them into reverse.

Nevertheless, this is a valuable collection and the biographical key admirable. It is ecumenical in approach and makes no reference to the problems of the denominations. The Foreword by A. N. Wilson warns of the dangers of institutionalising Christianity and yet so many of the writers are products of institutional religion as indeed are architecture and music. The book has been warmly recommended by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool, by the Anglican Harry Williams and the Methodist Lord Soper.

LAURENCE TANNER

DRAMACONTEMPORARY

DramaContemporary: Czechoslovakia, edited with an Introduction by Marketa Goetz-Stankiewicz. Performing Arts Journal Publications, New York, 1985. (Cloth $21.95. Paperback $9.95).

A Czech friend of mine once stated with gloomy resignation: 'All Czechs are Schweiks — we have to be.' This collection of six contemporary Czech plays (by Milan Kundera, Vaclav Havel, Pavel Kohout, Pavel Landovsky, Milan Uhde and Ivan Klima) goes some way to confirm his point. The plays are mainly about surviving — somehow. Three of the writers — Havel, Klima and Uhde — are still living in Czechoslovakia, and all six are suffering that peculiarly Czech fate of having their plays performed in the West, in translation, but not in their own language and country. This is the theatre of the absurd in the round.

As Schweik himself proved, living under adversity sharpens the mind wonderfully, and Czechoslovakia has under these conditions produced some remarkably fine theatre. Unlike much of the literature produced under other repressive regimes, such as South Africa or some Latin American countries, however, these playwrights have not primarily taken the high moral tone which comes with the comforting knowledge that one is on the side of the angels, and which can act as a sure-fire all-purpose visa to uncritical acceptance by the so-called free world. Perennial human situations are explored in these plays, as, for example, in Landovsky's *Detour*, where a prisoner is being transferred to another labour camp by two guards who want to combine the trip with a rendezvous with two women friends. Here Hevrle, the prisoner, is a direct descendant of Schweik (one of the guards actually orders him in exasperation to 'stop acting the good soldier Schweik'), yet most of the action and comedy in this play are centred on the scrapes the guards get themselves into.

Similarly, in the black humour of Pavel Kohout's *Fire in the Basement*, where thieves dressed as firemen swindle a honeymoon couple into believing their kitchen is on fire and finally clear off with their savings and valuables, any moral meaning definitely takes second place — this is high-spirited slapstick, though no doubt Czechs themselves can pick up signs invisible to us. For Czechs, its seems, laughter is the ultimate release — in every sense of the word.

The translations, by various people, are uneven in quality and some definitely not viable for performance as they stand. Nevertheless, the publishers are to be congratulated on making this selection available in English. The introduction by Marketa Goetz-Stankiewicz is informative and helpful.

DELLA COULING

A LITERARY HACKER

John Churton Collins: The Louse on the Locks of Literature. Anthony Kearney. Scottish Academic Press. £12.50.

Christened the 'Louse on the Locks of Literature' (Tennyson), the 'Most Envious Malignant Man in Great Britain' (Theodore Watts-Dunton), 'Shirt 'n Collars' (Gosse), the 'Demon Mole' (Richard Le Gallienne), the 'Timon of Critics' (Arthur Symons) and 'Random Tearem' (The *Oxford Magazine*), John Churton Collins was undeniably a savage reviewer and a dementedly stormy petrel. He was also a man of psychological mystery. Anthony Kearney's biography is timely. The specimen is displayed in the round — 'learned critic, energetic campaigner for English studies and inspiring lecturer', the 'new Macaulay', as well as 'a sort of Jack the Ripper' of the literary journals.

The last biography of Collins, written by his son, appeared in 1912. It left many things unsaid. Mr. Kearney has now said those things. He gives us the details of Collins' monumental quarrel with Gosse, tells of his unsuccessful application for the Merton Chair at Oxford in 1885, and his clash with London University in 1905-06. He also provides the first real portrait of the curious personality of the man whose bizarre life ended — even more bizarrely — in four feet of water in a dyke near Lowestoft, sedatives and a few verses from *Piers Plowman* in his pocket.

Contemporary Review makes an appearance in Mr. Kearney's pages, for it was herein, in the October 1887 number, that E. A. Freeman published his celebrated refutation, the philologist's professional objections to the literary approach, 'Literature and Language'.

There may well be those who regard John Churton Collins and all his works and pomp as numbering among those things best left to moulder among the foxing pages of times past. For those who do not agree — the present critic is among them — Mr. Kearney has performed a skilful and most welcome work of literary archaeology. He has resurrected a man who deserves better of posterity than a drowning in a brackish pool.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

ON SERENDIPITY

A Cast of Killers. Sidney Kirkpatrick. Hutchinson. £10.95.

Sidney Kirkpatrick, young and fizzing enthusiasm, set out in 1983, the quintessential YAW (Young American Writer) in top-gear bent to script an OB (Official Biography) of the celebrated recently dead. So far, so archetypal. However, the RD quarry, in this instance movie king named Vidor, one of the greats among pioneer directors, had a locked box surprise in store for his eager celebrant. The locked box, hidden away behind a boiler in King Vidor's whilom ranch — Willow Creek, Paso Robles, California — roughly persuaded,

snapped open to reveal a saga so riveting that the projected biography, swamped, went by the board. Mouldering therein were the records of King Vidor's compulsive investigation into — and solution of — the historic unsolved Hollywood murder of the 1920s: the shooting of William Desmond Taylor. Young Mr. Kirkpatrick, understandably shelving Mr. Vidor, promptly set forth upon the sixty-years-cold Taylor trail himself . . . and came up with a hot property. This is the step-by-step story of his findings — and those of Taylor's fellow-director, Vidor. The book is well, if just slightly over, written. But not, definitely not, in the worst possible taste. It is cliff-hanger planned. It comes off. It makes extremely interesting, atmospherically 'right', forward-nudging reading. Certificate A1.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Dispensations (Eerdmans Publishing Co.) This is an American study on 'the future of South Africa as South Africans see it' by Pastor Richard John Neuhaus. For many years he has taken a close interest in civil rights and has great experience as a pastor of a black parish in Brooklyn. He has been particularly interested in the struggle in South Africa, for many years. This volume 'comes chiefly out of hundreds of conversations with South Africans during the crucial months of the debate over "the new dispensation" in 1983'. He interviewed leading figures covering the whole political, social and racial divisions. He is also to some extent concerned with events since then. The book is not out of date. The opinions expressed then and the attitudes of the different communities have continued and indeed hardened. Pastor Neuhaus would probably agree that the prospect of a violent revolution by the blacks becomes ever more likely.

The Berlin Wall (Michael Joseph. £14.95.) The twenty-fifth anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall provides the occasion for this study by Norman Gelb. He is an American journalist who was based in West Berlin during the sixties and witnessed the erection of the wall. He is obviously concerned with the international crisis between Russia and the free world which followed, with President Kennedy and Krushchev in the final showdown. He is highly critical of American intelligence. He does not forget the frustration of the East and West Germans themselves. It is a dramatic event of enormous importance which the author brings vividly to life.

Ernest Hemingway. (Twayne Publishers, Boston. £15.95.) Earl Rovit and Gerry Brenner have together reissued Professor Rovit's original critical study of 1963. Much Hemingway scholarship appeared after his death in 1961, and this new edition informs readers of the important critical developments of the last three decades. The posthumous works are examined. There is a new bibliography of primary and secondary sources. It is not a biography, although Hemingway is, as the authors say, wonderfully intrinsicate in the midst of his own creation, and the study shows an unrivalled intimacy with the texts.

HOW TO USE YOUR NOUS

by A. E. I. FALCONAR

Price £1.90 net

ISBN 0 9510924 0 5

Nous in Plotinus's Higher Intelligence

This book is about Genius, Realization (seeing reality as it is undistorted by thought) and Creativity.

The contents include chapters on Krishnamurti; Korzybski's Non-Aristotelian Thinking; The Two Ways of Thought; Zen; Poetry and Mysticism.

Order with remittances should be sent to Non-Aristotelian Publishing, Clifton Slieu, Lewaigue, Maughold, Isle of Man.

THE POETRY OF STEVIE SMITH

"Little Girl Lost"

by Arthur C. Rankin

Publisher Colin Smythe £8.50

P.O. Box 6, Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire

Barnes and Noble Publishers,

81 Adams Drive, Totowa, New Jersey, U.S.A.

YOU ARE INVITED TO SUBSCRIBE TO

DEADPAN

A review of the development and gathering momentum of images from cave paintings to the cinema

by ANDREW LANYON

This is a limited first edition of signed and numbered copies, only available on subscription. There are 120 pages with 50 black and white illustrations and 60 tipped-in colour plates of Andrew Lanyon's paintings. The text is printed by letterpress on Zerkall 7624 mould-made 145 gsm paper. The book is thread sewn and casebound with a dust wrapper and presented in a slipcase. The price is £21.00 If abroad, please remit in sterling. The closing date for orders is 20th January, 1987.

ISBN 0 9511345 0 7

"This limited edition of the works of Walter Rowley makes available to the discriminating reader a wealth of material hitherto unsuspected. Words and images have rarely been more tastefully combined. Our gratitude to Mr. Lanyon for seeing through the press a cornerstone of Cornish, not to say Western, aesthetics".
William Feaver.

"If I ever am to re-edit my book the "Cult of Art" I would make long quotations from what Rowley wrote. He and I shared a considerable knowledge of the world of art and artists..."
Jean Gimpel.

Subscribers may collect their copies between 25th July and 30th August, 1987, from THE PHOTOGRAPHERS' GALLERY, 8 Great Newport Street, London, W.C.2. If you would like your copy posted, please add £2.00 (50p per additional copy); £2.50 abroad (£1 per additional copy). Posted copies will arrive by 16th September, 1987. Please order from Andrew Lanyon, 18 Farmers Meadow, Newlyn, Penzance, Cornwall TR18 5BP, England.

Contemporary Literary Criticism

edited by Daniel G. Marowski, will be published from autumn 1986 through autumn 1987. Each volume will contain excerpted critical evaluations from various sources to give balanced overviews of the work of about 45 to 50 novelists, poets, playwrights, and other creative writers. CLC is published in a clothbound text edition of about 600 double-column pages.

GALE RESEARCH CO.

Penobscot Bldg. Detroit, Mich. 48226, USA

Telephone: (313) 961-2242

THE BEST HOLIDAY CAR RENTAL DEAL IN EUROPE.

Only Budget lets you book and pre-pay at a guaranteed sterling rate in any of 26 countries – with nothing more than petrol to pay when you get there. That means unlimited kilometres, collision damage waiver, personal accident insurance and all local taxes are included.

Ask your travel agent about Budget's Super Sterling Deal or ring our toll free phone number 0800-181-181.

Budget rent a car

Printed by BRAZIER & NAISH LTD., 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD , 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG Tel 01-242 3215 All business

Contemporary Review

121st YEAR OF PUBLICATION

052
1008

DECEMBER 1986

CREATING THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS

Paddy Ashdown, M.P.

DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL

Martin McCauley

ARTIFICIAL MOTHERHOOD

Dame Josephine Barnes

IS SHAKESPEARE STILL OUR CONTEMPORARY?

John Elsom

and other articles together with a seven page Literary Supplement and Half Yearly Index.

£1.10

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

December 1986 Vol. 249 No. 1451 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
Creating the Partnership for Progress	Paddy Ashdown, M.P.	281
Disaster at Chernobyl	Martin McCauley	288
Secrecy in Swiss Banking	B. Narpati	294
Artificial Motherhood	Dame Josephine Barnes	297
And So To Vienna . . . The CSCE Eleven Years On	Jonathan Luxmoore	302
Liberation Movements — The Liberal Perspective	Urs Schoettli	310
Is Shakespeare Still Our Contemporary?	John Elsom	315
Holy Lumbini's Autonomous Status	Buddhadasa Kirthisinghe	320
'Let Them Smash Teacups' — Weimar Ceramics 1919-1933	Muriel Julius	322
Cinema: A Quarterly Review	David Shipman	324
Correspondence: What to Do in South Africa	Tertius Chandler	328
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		329
Frank Longford, Mark Cook, Esmond Wright, Kenneth Lindsay.		
SHORTER REVIEWS		334
Half-yearly Index, July to December 1986		336

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE, O.B.E.

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1986 Published monthly by the Contemporary Review Co. Ltd, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG, England, and printed in England by Brazier & Naish Ltd, 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD. U.S. Mailing Agent: Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc, 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J. 07001. Second Class postage paid at Rahway N J Annual subscription (including postage): U.K £16 00, U.S.A. and Canada $55 00 Rates for all other countries on application Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S and Canada: extra costs given on request U S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd Inc, 10B Englehard Avenue, Avenel, N J 07001 Contemporary Review. (ISSN/0010/7565)

052
.008

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

December 1986 Vol 249 No. 1451

CREATING THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS

by Paddy Ashdown, M.P.

SIR John Hoskyns was nearest the mark when, not so long ago, he described the progress, or rather lack of it, of the last few decades in Britain as:—

> a gigantic accidental strategy that has relegated Britain from number two position in the world of economic obscurity and the brink of tribal warfare in less than 40 years.

As a description of the part played by Governments, all of them, in the decline of Britain that seems to be as good as any I have heard. I am proud of the legacy of democratic and social welfare institutions which has been left by my Liberal forbears. But I often speculate that the inheritance they left us in our industrial and economic institutions has been little short of a curse.

While other of our competitor nations in Europe, North America and even the Far East seem to have recognised that the maintenance of an effective partnership between Government and those who create the nation's wealth is more important than chasing doctrinal solutions, Britain has been catapulted between opposite sides of the argument about the ideological limits of the free market and state planning. Indeed industry in Britain, far from being cushioned from the political battle, has been the very field upon which the competing armies have drawn up their forces.

The effects on our industrial and commercial base have been too widely and carefully listed to need much further documentation. A few examples will suffice. British Steel, for instance; wholly or partially nationalised and denationalised once each in every decade since the war — is it surprising that one of the staple industries for an industrial nation (the Japanese refer to steel as the 'rice of industry') was reduced to such confusion by the end of the 1970s? In the same way, the framework in which industrial relations are conducted has been ruthlessly reshaped by each incoming Government in order to satisfy their own supporters and party ideology. Is it surprising that British industry's chief industrial problem for the last 30 years has been its own internal relations?

Similar battles have taken place over education and training, the

nationalised industries, economic theory, indeed in practically every area which is crucial to the industrial success of our nation. Other countries have enjoyed at least a degree of long term continuum — in Britain the only continuity has been the certainty of conflict.

Industrialists are fond of complaining that politicians are not close enough to industry. The opposite seems to be the truth. Industrial conflict is planted at the very heart of our political system — in the political parties themselves. The problem is not one of too wide a gap between industry and politics in Britain, but rather that our major parties have become client organisations for one or other side of the industrial divide. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the Government of the day is unable to construct and carry out policies which are beneficial to industry as a whole; that their actions, however worthy, become inevitably and quickly subsumed into the general body of folklore of one or other side of the industrial battle.

Since the end of the socalled 'Butskellite' consensus (which itself was far less of a consensus than we sometimes like to remember), the ideological divisions between the two major parties have widened from disagreement about what must be done in industry, to conflict over the role of the Government itself. We have moved from the indicative planning of the 1960's to the present day theory of non-Governmental intervention from a total belief in the power of Governments, to a touching faith in the miraculous influence of the market place. In both periods (and in the interim stopping points between them), Britain's industrial decline has continued unchecked and unabated.

I find I cannot share the present Government's optimism about Britain's industrial future. They claim to have introduced a new sense of realism onto the shop floor; and yet our wage increases are running ahead of inflation at a pace which threatens to swamp the gains in productivity we achieved at such high costs in unemployment. Government seems wholly powerless to deal with the problem. Exhortations have failed and high real interest rates are exacting a cost which threatens to kill the patient long before he is cured. The Government cannot and will not consider tackling the problem directly as has been successfully done elsewhere, not just because of an ideological aversion to an income strategy but because they lack the understanding of how to go about creating the consensus which is essential to make such a process work.

Meanwhile, the lack of any industrial strategy has meant that the Government had no idea how to cope with the crisis at Westland, or any measure against which to decide the relative merits of keeping British Leyland British as against selling it off to General Motors.

Similarly, we are told that the official 'policy' is that Government should play less part in research and development and industry. Meanwhile, in the 'real' world, Britain's share of industry financed R&D has dropped from 27% in 1967 to 17% in 1982 and is now less than that of West Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, France, The Netherlands and

Belgium; and of even this inadequate total, nearly 60%, a much higher proportion than in our competitor nations, is dedicated exclusively to defence.

We are also told (and rightly) that the failure lies in the new technologies. Yet the Government then proceeds to cut the number of places in universities. In Britain today only 7% of pupils go to University against 44% in the US, 30% in France, 26% in Italy and 38% in Japan. In 1971, 12% of pupils in the UK were qualified to enter University against 13% in France. By the year 2000 the French have planned that this figured should, as a matter of Government policy, rise to 80%, while in non-interventionist Britain it will be stuck at 17%. The skill gap, that most appalling indictment of any Government at a time of high unemployment and low industrial output, looks set to continue to hold Britain back in the future, while others have planned the way to break free. In the same way, we hear that industry must lower costs; and then the Government artificially raises energy prices as a mechanism for indirect taxation to fill the Treasury coffers.

It is difficult, in the face of these facts and a growth rate in Britain which still lingers about half that of The Netherlands and a quarter that of Italy, to believe that the Government is right when it says that to interfere is foolish, to neglect benign. The truth is that we are going to need some industrial strategy and the will to apply it if Britain is to remain a prosperous nation in the face of rapid change in world markets and the building pressures of social division, deprivation and poverty at home. The problem, as we have seen all too clearly from previous attempts at industrial strategy, is that Government and industry are two very different animals. Governments are naturally averse to taking risks; industry must take them to survive. Governments seek equity; industry pursues only success. Governments are publicly accountable; industry is driven by profit. Governments have to choose singular methods to reach objectives; industry follows multiple paths.

Given these contradictions and past Government's inabilities at handling them, it is scarcely surprising that previous attempts at 'industrial strategy' have caused the concept itself to become discredited. It is not that industry in Britain lacks the public spirit. Quite the contrary. We have a fine tradition of social responsibility in business, which stretches back to the 19th century Quakers. Public buildings in Manchester and Liverpool and numerous education and charitable trusts bear witness to this in the last century, just as the Local Enterprise Agency Movement and such organisations as Pilkington Trust are an expression of it to-day. And yet, when industry interfaces with Government, they appear to be narrow, mean spirited and concerned only to fight their corner and grab what loot they can.

The reason is not hard to find. Past Government attempts at intervention have been restrictive, awkward, inappropriate and, more often than not, just plain damaging and wrong. Add to this, random switches

in policies when Governments change and it is not surprising that industry's first reaction when the man from the DTI appears at the door is to assume that as what is going to happen next will be unhelpful they should grab what they can and run. As Mr Tebbitt more graphically put it, one of the world's most unbelievable statements is 'I'm from the Government — I'm here to help you'.

This tradition is not confined to Labour or 'Heathite' Conservative Governments. It applies to so called non-interventionist· Governments, too. One only needs to think back to Sir Terence Becketts 'bare knuckles' speech for one example. Another can be found in the fact that the financial targets of the present Government's 'Medium Term Financial Strategy' are not so much targets as weapons, which in many cases have been used in ways extremely harmful to industry.

The Government has, of course proclaimed the virtue of a 'hands off' approach. Nigel Lawson put it clearly enough in his Mais lecture when he said: 'It is the conquest of inflation and not the pursuit of growth which is, or should be the objectives of macro-economic policy'. Norman Tebbitt went even further, declaring that it is no part of the job of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to concern himself with the status and employment prospects of various industries. These are sentiments which, no doubt, Mr Tebbitt and the Government as a whole learnt to rue over the protracted agony of the Westland and Leyland affairs.

The truth is that the Government cannot 'stay out' of industry for what it does or does not do has an inevitable effect on business. It is only Government who can decide on the resources being put into education and training, control monopolies and ensure fair markets; regulate and stabilise the exchange rates; decide whether to go into the EMS or stay out of it; set up trading and tariff arrangements; invest in the infrastructure industry needs to prosper and on the relative disposal of resources between social welfare and economic stimulation. Government must also create incentives for more investments. If that has been difficult in the past, it is about to become much more difficult in the future. How will increasingly scarce financial resources be apportioned, as between the competing needs of social deprivation and the regeneration of our industrial base? How do we decide between cushioning the decline between older industries and encouraging the new? What, after the 'big bang are those parts of our industrial structure which are so essential that they must remain in our hands if our sovereignty is not to pass to others? How do we decide between the survival of individual British industries and the merits of creating a wider European industrial base and what other sectors do we encourage and what do we do with those on which we have turned our backs?

Can we trust the Government — any Government — to get the answers right? Past experience does not give much cause for optimism. It seems that the two major Parties are partially right in the way that they approach this problem; Labour in insisting that the Government has a

role to play in mapping out the future; the Conservatives in insisting that Governments are bad at making commercial decisions and that industry, assisted by the markets will always do the job better. What we need, therefore, is a partnership in decision making between the two and a framework to make that happen.

This is not to say that Government should relinquish its power to make the ultimate decisions and be accountable for them. What it can do is test the validity of its ideas against the industrial realities. More important, by reaching agreed strategic objectives with industry, it can create the consensus for action which is so obviously lacking at present and which will be so vital in making the difficult decisions which lie ahead. There is no doubt that our competitor nations do this better than we do, chiefly through informal consultation networks which are both more powerful and less exclusive to one or other side of industry than our own. Fortunately, a structure already exists in that much maligned and too often ignored organisation, the National Economic Development Council, supported by its staff in the NED Office (NEDO). I believe there is a place for a serious attempt between Government and industry to come to a common understanding about the economic situation and then to set out some broad, high level, agreed strategic industrial aims for Great Britain Limited. These aims might include realistic targets for increasing exports, improving market share, decreasing unemployment and integrating with Europe encouraging certain sectors, etc. Sir Geoffrey Howe attempted just this in 1982, but subsequently fumbled the attempt.

Once the general framework has been agreed, the sector committee (EDCs or little Neddies) of the NEDC are perfectly capable of advising the Government on what is implied in each sector in reaching the objectives agreed upon. However, in the end, it is people in factories who achieve these things, as long as the Government is not adopting policies which are positively hostile to industry, as many of this Government's seem, at times, to have been.

At a different level, the partnership should be regional as well as sectoral. Quite the most powerful impetus to all modern British Governments' illusions of omnipotence and infallibility has been the increasing centralisation of power in Britain. What has, in consequence, grown up in Britain is a feeling of fierce tension and antagonism between the regions and central Government which cannot be good for the nation as a whole. The regions of our country should be allowed much more scope to take their own decisions within the broad framework set by the Government and this applies to industrial policy as much as to anything else.

At the workplace level, Liberals have long argued for the kind of partnership institutions common to many continental countries to establish and enact between management and workforce the community of interest they both have in profit, efficiency and quality within the industrial unit. It is possible to point some of the characteristics which

would be required. A higher level of consultation which is essentially strategic and does not involve itself in detail; a lower level which is sectoral and regional; a workplace level which is effective and flexible; a process which is iterative — neither Government or industry can second guess the market; an objective which seeks to create a continuum through political change and an overall compulsion to work always with the grain of the market, never against it.

It is also possible to map out the general shape of an industrial strategy, if we can get one. Its essentials (all incidentally identified in a recent NEDO study of industrial strategies in other European countries) would be:

a systematic view of the structure of the economy without any attempt at formal quantitative planning;
a basic realistic view of long term industrial priorities;
a high priority given to investment in human resources.

Success in creating such a partnership for the future will require three changes. Firstly, politicians will have to get rid of the ludicrous but widely held view that Ministers are required to pretend that they are infallible. I spoke to a German politician recently about the admirable level of research and development in the German economy. He told me that his Government knew that two thirds of all money they put into a programme for promoting research in small firms was wasted. A third is looked upon as a tax rebate; a third goes to firms who would find it from other sources anyway; but a third goes to real research and that is what really matters. The rest is a price that they are prepared to pay. Such a situation would be impossible in Britain. The admission that two thirds of the money going into any Government programme is wasted would call forth cries of 'Resign' from all sides. We must change this. Politicians working in the industrial scene are, in reality, little different from managers. They make decisions about the disposal of resources in order to maximise returns. Some of the decisions they make will inevitably be wrong and it would be healthier for society as a whole and for decision making in particular if Ministers at the despatch box were able, and allowed by Opposition Parties, to say so!

Secondly, we will need a change in the attitudes of industrialists. Of course, industry must fight its corner; but it must also realise that it is the Government's job to take a broader view. To be fair, many senior industrialists do recognise this, as people like John Harvey Jones has shown. But there is much more that can be done to strengthen this trend.

And lastly, we will need some institutional changes. I have my eye on the Treasury. It is there that economic policy and the financial management of the country rests, insofar as it rests anywhere. The Treasury is, however, not very good at economics, completely ignorant of industry and a disaster as an organisation for financial control. It is not set up to deal with interlinked issues of any complexity and seems incapable of taking anything but the narrowest view of any proposed policy or action. If

the Treasury cannot (and I suspect they cannot) perform the task of a broader Department of Economic Affairs because they cannot shake off the habits of a financial controller, then there may be some benefit in promoting the status of the Department of Trade and Industry to that of a co-equal, second economic Ministry. Norman Tebbitt in a brave early speech actually used those words in relation to his old Department, but even that bold vision soon vanished.

We have not yet created effective partnerships between Government and industry as a whole — only conspiracies between the ruling party and one side of industry against the other. Governments have sought either to overcome, or wholly abandon themselves to market forces, where they should have been seeking ways constructively to harness them. They have become obsessed with change to meet their concept of perfection, rather than with establishing a degree of stability to meet industry's needs. They have sought either to command or ignore — where they ought to have been finding the way to lead.

One thing is certain. We cannot go on as we are. Forty years of decline, as Sir John Hoskyns said recently, is about as much as Britain can stand. What is at risk now is not just our industrial future, but our social cohesion too. The task of climbing out of the trough is too big for Government or industry alone; but it is not too big for both combined, if we can find the right way to build the partnership between them.

The above article is derived from a lecture given to a Sperry UK Executive Seminar, Nice, on 27 August 1986.

[Paddy Ashdown is Liberal Member of Parliament for Yeovil. He is spokesman on Trade and Industry Affairs within the Liberal/SDP team in the House of Commons. Formerly an officer in the Royal Marines, serving in Borneo, the Persian Gulf and Belfast, he has also held appointments in the Foreign Office and with the British Mission to the United States in Geneva.]

DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL

by Martin McCauley

MORE radio active particles were emitted into the world's atmosphere, water and top soil by the explosion at Chernobyl than by all the nuclear explosions since 1945. Nevertheless, in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, which occurred at 1.23 am on 26 April 1986, local authorities concentrated on putting out the numerous fires and completely overlooked the fact that radio active particles could be escaping. They were to pay a heavy price for their lack of perspicacity. Besides the 31 who died, over 200 suffered radiation burns and another 100,000 will have to be monitored for the rest of their lives. Many will die before their time and some women will no longer be able to bear children. Chernobyl has its dead but there are also the living dead.

If the human cost is high, the material cost is enormous. One estimate puts it at £2 billion, almost certainly too low. Over 100,000 people have had to be evacuated. They have to be found new jobs and new accommodation which will have to be built since there are no empty dwellings in the Soviet Union. A 30 km zone (15 km radius) around Chernobyl has been declared industrially and agriculturally dead for the foreseeable future. This year's harvest has had to be abandoned. Shutting down Chernobyl has resulted in a loss of 96 kWh of electricity daily. (This led in October to electricity rationing in four Soviet republics.) Dams have had to be built to protect drinking water. Buildings, vehicles and agricultural land have had to be decontaminated and radio active top soil carted away. The damaged reactor has had to be encased in a sea of concrete. Since there is no slack in the economy those involved and the materials used have been syphoned off from the rest of the economy. Fulfilling the plan at Chernobyl means that the plan cannot be fulfilled somewhere else.

How competently did the Soviet Party and government cope with the disaster? Had they handled it differently could they have minimised the impact of the accident? Before attempting an answer it is necessary to analyse how the authorities reacted to the unprecedented situation which faced them.

Mikhail Gorbachev appeared on Soviet TV on 14 May 1986 to discuss the Chernobyl disaster. Hence only on the nineteenth day of the crisis did the Soviet leader appear before the nation to explain the situation. He defended the regime's handling of the matter but provided no analysis of the course of events. He stated that a government commission had been set up immediately after the accident and that it had then visited the site. A Politburo group, headed by the Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, ran operations from Moscow.

By 20 May the government commission consisted of 80 specialists from over twenty central ministries and committees. During the first two months the commission had four different heads, all deputy Soviet Ministers. Just why this occurred remains unclear but it may have been

connected with the danger of radio active fallout. The situation could also have demanded different technical and scientific skills as the crisis deepened.

Three central bodies played a key role in the government commission: the Ministry of Energy, the State Committee for the Supervision of Atomic Energy and the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy. The Ministry of Energy is a Union-Republican Ministry, meaning that there is a central ministry in Moscow but there is also one in the Ukraine — Chernobyl lies in Kiev oblast. The State Committee for the Supervision of Atomic Energy is directly subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers. The State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy is an all-Union body, hence it is responsible for the whole of the Soviet Union from Moscow, and was set up in 1983 to deal with accidents at atomic power stations. Its specialists were at Chernobyl even before the government commission but it proved quite incapable of dealing with the situation. Its deputy chairman was found to be ignorant of a report listing defects at the Chernobyl power station published in a Ukrainian newspaper in March 1986. The State Committee did not learn of the accident until three hours after it had occurred.

General Berdov, deputy Ukrainian Minister of the Interior took over command about an hour and a half after the accident and concentrated on putting out the fires. He was aware that radio active particles were escaping but this was ignored until 5 am when the fires had been extinguished. Hence no one wore any protective clothing during the initial stages. Those at the power station did not take any measures to warn the surrounding population since their area of competence was restricted to the nuclear reactor site.

After a nuclear accident civil defence authorities should react but this did not take place. It was the military which acted to try to cool down the molten metal mass of the damaged reactor. Not surprisingly there were sharp disputes between the central and local authorities on who was to blame and what should be done. Generally *Pravda,* the Party newspaper, and *Izvestiya,* the government organ, sided with Moscow but *Krasnaya Zvezda,* the armed forces newspaper, and the TASS correspondent on the spot showed understanding for the local Ukrainian authorities. The Ukrainian Prime Minister supported unequivocally those at Chernobyl.

There must have been a contingency plan to cope with accidents at the power station (providing transport, hospital beds and so on) which would also have involved the authorities in Kiev oblast and the Ukrainian government but it was the government commission which took over command. Its first directive concerned the evacuation of the people of Pripyat. For several weeks the Soviet media maintained that this had been carried out between 2 and 4.20 pm on 27 April. Then General Antoshkin, in charge of the helicopters, revealed in an interview in *Krasnaya Zvezda,* that he had encountered many buses during the night of 26-27 April on his way from Kiev to Chernobyl. Another report spoke of an electrician

who had remained in Pripyat until 28-29 April to finish a job. It is more probable, therefore, that the evacuation took place over several days. It proved much more difficult to persuade peasants in the vicinity of the power station to move out. Many refused to leave without their livestock.

On 30 April radio active fallout was such as to force the helicopter unit under Antoshkin to abandon its landing site in the middle of Pripyat. On 1 May good progress was being made in controlling the fire in the fourth reactor at Chernobyl but the meteorologists predicted that the wind direction would change the following day. This led to the radius of the afflicted zone being extended from 5 to 15 km. Those living in the town of Chernobyl were evacuated on 2-3 May. It would also appear that preparations were being made to move part of the population of Kiev to a safer place. Evacuation from the affected zone was by bus and on a few occasions by air and although a railway station was nearby no use was made of it until later when children and mothers with small children were sent into the country.

Initially only the power station and its access roads were closed. As a result of the decision to extend the diameter of the zone to 30 km — this increased the circumference to 107 km — the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior set up a special staff unit and it took over in early May. It was this body which had the authority to issue passes which permitted the bearer to enter the area once or on several occasions. Security however was not always tight. One report speaks of a young man who entered Pripyat after the evacuation to visit his mother. He found the door of her house unlocked and went in and waited for her to return. Many peasants refused to leave without their livestock and this slowed down the process. All this reveals that the authorities failed palpably to warn the local population of the real dangers facing them from radio active fallout. This was especially true of the period before 6 May, the turning point in the battle to control the fire in the reactor. Some Soviet sources speak of a 50 km (diameter) zone. Since three villages, all 20 or 30 km from Chernobyl, were not evacuated one cannot speak of measures of a general character. Affected areas were still being discovered throughout May, especially in Kiev oblast.

Great problems were encountered in caring for the many workers and specialists brought to the power station and the Ministry of Energy was accused of not doing enough in this respect. In an attempt to get the various official bodies to cooperate a special council was set up. However, initially this body only talked and did not act. This makes clear that despite the extreme urgency of the situation at Chernobyl the various Soviet authorities still failed to change their modus operandi and information policy.

In sharp contrast to the reporting of the KAL007 disaster (1 September 1983) Soviet information policy was forced to change course several times in response to Western reactions. The key date was 6 May when the danger of the molten metal mass penetrating the concrete base of the reactor had finally been averted.

According to Valentin Falin the Party leadership was informed on 26 April about the accident and, at the latest, provided with 'reliable' data on 28 April. This statement has to be qualified since perceptions of the danger of radio active fallout at Chernobyl on 28 April proved to be quite incorrect. If one believes that the Politburo was fully aware of the dangers on 28 April why did it give the go-ahead for the May Day celebrations in Kiev, Minsk and elsewhere? Since Gorbachev, for one, would never reveal such a callous disregard for the health of the Soviet population the only conclusion one can draw is that the leadership was unaware of the true dangers.

Initially the Soviet population was not informed about the accident. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs even denied it had occurred in answer to a query by the Swedish Government. Since Moscow could not have believed that all radio communications around Chernobyl would remain undetected two conclusions can be drawn from the denial. One that the authorities lied deliberately in order to gain time to assess the situation — they did not wish to make a statement and then be forced to refute it almost immediately — or that the Moscow spokesman was unaware of the true situation. (The Soviet Union also denied initially that it had shot down KAL007, stating that it had attempted to guide it to an airfield.) The level of information available to the Soviet population varied according to geographical location. Those in Estonia soon discovered the full story from Finnish TV and Lithuanians discovered most of what was going on from Polish TV.

In an attempt to calm the population and to scotch the wild rumours which were circulating immediately after 26 April, Soviet TV news carried interviews with British students withdrawn from Kiev and Minsk and departing for home. Those interviewed strongly opposed the dcecision to withdraw them and dismissed Western reports of radio active fallout danger as propaganda. Instead of reassuring viewers these interviews caused alarm in Kiev where those watching drew the opposite conclusion from the one intended by the media. Many set out immediately for Moscow by train and air.

Soviet newspaper coverage initially was sparse but on the whole optimistic. Short statements and TASS statements were all that appeared before 6 May. When Gorbachev spoke to the nation on 14 May it was the first time that the Party had reacted officially to the disaster.

The lack of precise information angered many citizens, especially in Kiev, who were initially told there was no danger but then after 2 May advised to wash vegetables again before eating and to keep children off the streets. After 6 May the most detailed reporting was to be found in the pages of *Krasnaya Zvezda,* the armed forces newspaper, since the military were responsible for rendering the damaged reactor harmless and then for combatting the effects of radio active fallout. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* provided the fullest coverage of the medical situation.

The Soviet media did not wallow in self-pity over Chernobyl. It was transformed into an event rivalling the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) and

the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Newspapers spoke of heroic fire-fighters and selfless devotion to duty. A poem was penned glorifying the efforts of the rescue teams. There appeared to be only heroes and villains. The latter were those officials who had deserted their posts or had failed to show initiative.

During his speech to the nation on 14 May Gorbachev underlined the leading role of the Politburo during the crisis. No information is available on the number of times the Politburo met between 26 April and 6 May, the day when the danger of a further catastrophe receded. Evgeny Velikhov, the leading nuclear physicist, who was present at Chernobyl from the beginning but did not become a member of the government commission until 3 or 4 May, gave the all clear on 10 May.

The silence observed by Gorbachev may have been caused by several factors: lack of precise information; lack of consensus within the Politburo on how to cope with the emergency; and the fear that the disaster could spread to the subsoil and subterranean water. The key objective was to ensure that the Party was not held responsible for the debacle. Hence it was decided to keep silent until the situation was under control. Some Western estimates of Gorbachev's power and authority were proved incorrect as he palpably failed to provide the leadership the nation needed and expected. Had he been the unchallenged leader he could have blamed Brezhnev for the defects of the nuclear power programme (Chernobyl was built under Brezhnev), appealed to the population to rally behind him, provided detailed information on the dangers of radio active fallout, sought the help of foreign specialists and cancelled the May Day celebrations in Kiev, Minsk and other affected areas.

It is not Gorbachev's style to stay silent and hope a problem will go away. He prefers to meet difficulties head on and to be very frank about failings and what needs to be done. Another conclusion which can be drawn from his silence is that he did not enjoy the full support of the military and the KGB.

It is unclear when the Politburo decided not to seek foreign technical assistance, indeed to reject all the offers made. It may have been taken on the night of 30 April-1 May. If this is so it was a dangerous thing to do since there was no certainty at that early date that the reactor fire could be extinguished by dropping sand, lead, and so on on it. Velikhov conceded that the Soviet Union had been within a hair's breath of disaster before the turning point of 6 May. Why did the Soviets phone West German and other specialists (but not British or American) about how to extinguish a reactor fire long after the decision had been taken on how to attempt it at Chernobyl? Were the Soviets suffering from an inferiority complex despite their successes in space and in military technology?

In drawing up the report on why the reactor exploded the Soviet specialists had to bear certain factors in mind. They had to exonerate the Party leadership; no lasting harm was to be done to the Soviet civil nuclear programme; the economic planning system was not to be held responsible; and they had to give the impression that this type of accident

could not happen again. Hence their report, published in September, was in many ways predictable. Blame was placed fairly and squarely on the shoulders of individuals, not institutions. Such a tale of negligence, carelessness, incompetence, technical ignorance and dereliction of duty is difficult to believe, at least in its entirety. How was it possible for officials and workers at an elite engineering plant to behave in this way? If the best behave like this what hope is there for Gorbachev's plans to revitalise the economy? One intriguing question remains untouched in the report, the role of the Soviet military. Among the officials dismissed in the aftermath of the explosion was the deputy Minister of the Medium Machine Building Industry. Now this is the ministry which produces nuclear weapons for the armed forces. Were the military conducting an experiment at Chernobyl when the accident occurred? This was denied several times by Soviet spokesmen.

In retrospect the handling of the affair by the Politburo leaves a lot to be desired. A major problem was the flow of reliable information about the seriousness of the accident. Here the federal structure of the Soviet Union was a drawback. Had the explosion taken place in the Russian Republic, instead of the Ukraine, the situation would have been easier since all reporting would have been directly to Moscow. From Chernobyl some material passed first to Kiev and then to Moscow and other information directly to Moscow. The Soviet leadership decided that silence was the best policy until it could claim that the danger had passed. This allowed wild rumours to circulate, fuelled by inaccurate foreign reporting. Too much time and energy was devoted to ridiculing Western reports instead of providing hard information from Chernobyl. Nevertheless Chernobyl may be a turning point in Soviet information policy. Reporting after 6 May was more extensive and revealing than in living memory. Not since the 1920s have the Soviet media provided such information on a current disaster.

Chernobyl is the greatest civil nuclear disaster to date. Its impact is being felt worldwide as nations rethink their civil nuclear programme. In the Soviet Union the loss of the electricity generated by Chernobyl has led to rationing in four republics. With the winter coming on the second reactor has been restarted. Personnel will be based in Kiev and will work special shifts, wearing protective clothing, at Chernobyl. The 30 km zone around the power station will remain dead for the foreseeable future. The civil nuclear programme, planned to provide 20% of energy needs by 1990, will not attain this target. Instead it will proceed more slowly and will require much greater material and human investment. Chernobyl is the first great disaster of Gorbachev's term of office and can never be eradicated. It is the birthmark of the Gorbachev era.

[Martin McCauley is Senior Lecturer in Soviet and East European Studies, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. He is the editor of *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev* (Macmillan, forthcoming).]

SECRECY IN SWISS BANKING

by B. Narpati

NUMBERED accounts are not unique to Switzerland. They are common practice in Austria, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Singapore, the Bahamas and even in Communist countries such as Hungary. Swiss law, however, differs from almost every other country in that it has placed banking secrecy under the protection of penal law.

The concept of confidentiality appears to have become the most widely questioned characteristic of Swiss banking. The theory of what constitutes a 'safe haven' has in general undergone substantial changes.

Numbered accounts are misunderstood and misrepresented. The codified laws of Western Europe differ radically from English and American law in tax matters. Tax evasion is not a criminal offence in Switzerland; tax fraud is. An end to banking secrecy would not diminish organised crime and tax evasion. These must be dealt with at their sources.

The law makes no distinction between accounts designated by name and those identified by a number. The numbering of an account is merely an internal measure by which the bank reduces the number of its employees who know the identity of the depositor. The name that goes with the number will be known only to a very few senior officers of the bank.

Banking secrecy was further strengthened by Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code which put legal curbs on foreign undercover agents.

Numbered accounts represent only a small percentage of the total accounts held by major commercial banks in Switzerland. They are permitted only when the depositor is already a customer of the bank or when the bank has established through interviews and references that there are legitimate reasons for wanting added protection.

'Anonymous' numbered accounts simply do not exist. Under the law it is impossible to open an account unless the identity of the holder of the account is known.

The members of the Swiss Bankers Association have agreed not to advertise numbered accounts or Switzerland's tax advantages in foreign publications. In transactions for American clients, Swiss banks will not assist in circumventing the margin rules of the SEC. They do not get involved in proxy fights and will not handle securities that are not properly registered in the United States.

There are tax havens and banking-secrecy havens. The difference between the two, and even what makes a haven in the first place, are important considerations. Not many havens have unambiguous bank-secrecy laws whereby all participants know exactly what information will be given to foreign authorities and under what circumstances. As a banking-secrecy haven an important factor is the strictness of the secrecy laws.

Two Caribbean Commonwealth countries, the Bahamas and the

Cayman Islands, have passed laws making the breach of banker/client confidentiality a criminal offence.

Panama has perhaps the strictest banking secrecy laws. In Switzerland, secrecy is waived if a foreigner is accused by his government of a criminal offence which is also a crime in Switzerland. As a contrast, the client must have broken Panamanian criminal law while in Panama before secrecy is waived.

Since the 1977 US-Mutual Assistance Treaty, Switzerland has been more inclined to help the American authorities in cases of securites fraud, tax fraud and other such crimes that are also crimes in Switzerland. Switzerland also agreed to co-operate in matters regarding 'insider trading' although this had not been a crime in Switzerland.

The Swiss tax system is based on the civic responsibility of the individual. The law forbids the government to engage in 'fishing expeditions' to demand an affidavit from banks to locate undeclared assets.

A special feature of banking secrecy in Switzerland is that violation of that trust is subject to criminal prosecution. Breach of banking secrecy is prosecuted ex officio by law whereas violations of professional secrecy are prosecuted only at the initiative of the aggrieved party.

In 1977, the Swiss banks and the Swiss Bankers Association, established binding rules of good conduct in bank management with the signing of the 'Agreement on Observance of the Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice of Banking Secrecy'. The banks agreed not to assist in the transfer of capital from countries which restrict investment of funds abroad.

The Agreement was extended in October 1982 for another five years with considerably stiffer provisions. The Council of Europe has recommended the Swiss 'Observance of Care' Agreement as a model to be emulated by other member states.

On 1 January 1985 a new Swiss Law on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters came into force. It stipulates that legal assistance can be granted in cases of tax fraud (broadly defined to include other state levies besides taxes, such as customs duties) where wilful deception through the use of false documents can be established.

The term 'insider trading' involved financial transactions whereby persons possessing privileged information use such knowledge to seek gains or avoid losses at the expense of other securities investors.

As an interim arrangement, an Agreement of the Swiss Bankers Association and a Memorandum of Understanding Between the Swiss Confederation and the United States was reached. Based on a special client authorisation it permits the banks to participate in a procedure by which a possible 'insider' is checked by a Commission of Swiss lawyers. This provisional solution is due to be superseded by legislation that would outlaw insider trading in Switzerland itself.

On 1 January 1985 the federal law on international mutual judicial assistance in cases of criminal offences came into effect. It covers cases of insider misconduct.

Judicial assistance by the Swiss authorities in favour of foreign countries and authorities is not granted in cases of fiscal offences or violations of foreign regulations governing currency, trade or economic-political matters. Swiss banking secrecy remains intact under these heads.

The Swiss referendum of 1984 overwhelmingly rejected a motion set to undermine the legal concept of bank secrecy.

It appears that in a new banking act to be implemented this year banks could become legally obliged to establish the identity of the final beneficiary of any account.

Members of the banking community at present adhere to a code of conduct which is due to expire in 1987. Bankers are, however, confident that a new system of self-regulation, or at least a watered down compromise, will limit possible disadvantages.

FOOTNOTES:

1. There are now 120 foreign banks in Switzerland and more than 70 'bank-like' finance companies from abroad. With aggregate assets of Swiss francs 103 billion in 1984, the foreign banks represented 14.2% of the country's total banking assets. (*Swiss Bank Corporation — Prospects.* October/November 1985. p.8).
2. At last count there were 573 banks in Switzerland with total assets of more than Sfr 700 billion. One has to add to this an estimated Sfr 700 billion of securities held in Swiss bank vaults on account of their clients and about Sfr 250 billion of fiduciary assets held abroad. (Source: *The International Investor,* March 1985. Bank Julius Baer, Zurich).

REFERENCES:

1. 'Secrecy in Swiss Banking': Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Credit Suisse.
2. 'The Truth About Swiss Banking': produced by the aforesaid banks.
3. 'What Makes A Haven?' — Foreign Commerce Bank, Zurich. *Swiss Economic Viewpoint.* Vol. 16, No. 2 April 1984.
4. 'How to use a Swiss Bank Account.' An interview published in *The Financial Planner* magazine, May 1979.

ARTIFICIAL MOTHERHOOD

by Dame Josephine Barnes

THE birth of Louise Brown in Oldham, England, in 1978 marked an important landmark in the study of human reproduction and of methods to relieve human infertility. Louise was conceived 'in vitro' literally 'in a glass' from the sperm of her father and an egg taken from her mother — a couple who would otherwise have had no hope of having children of their own; the Browns have since had a second child conceived in the same way.

In vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer have been known for some time in the spheres of animal experimentation and of veterinary science but this was the first time that such techniques had been successfully applied in the field of human reproduction. In fact this success followed more than nine years of careful work by the gynaecologist, Patrick Steptoe, and the physiologist Robert Edwards. Many problems had to be overcome: the appropriate media for successful fertilisation, the correct temperatures, the glassware, the methods of replacing the fertilised human egg, itself only one fifth of a millimetre in diameter, the methods of stimulating the ovary of the mother to produce eggs which could be successfully harvested, and the means of maintaining the transferred embryo in the mother's womb — these were only some of the problems which had to be overcome. Since 1979 more than a thousand babies have been born as a result of the techniques and the implications for the future of the human race have been considered in many parts of the world.

One of the important consequences of the new techniques has been that for the first time human embryos have become available for study and possibly for research. In the process of in vitro fertilisation it is now usual for the mother's ovaries to be stimulated with hormones before the eggs are harvested, so that many embryos become available for replacement in her body or for study and research. It has been found in units practising in vitro fertilisation that it is best to replace three embryos; the chance of success is increased if this number is used, while if more than three are replaced there is a risk of triplet or quadruplet pregnancy. An increase in the number of fetuses of this size does increase the risks to the mother and the babies themselves tend to be born prematurely and thus have less chance of survival. Very premature babies can now be kept alive and develop normally but it is still better for the children and their parents if they are born at or near full time.

The problem thus arises of the 'spare' embryos and for these there are four main possibilities: all the embryos may be replaced with the resultant risk of multiple pregnancies: the 'spare' embryos may be frozen and replaced at a later date when perhaps the conditions in the mother's uterus may be more favourable: an embryo or embryos, either fresh or frozen, may be donated to another infertile woman (to my knowledge this has not yet been accomplished successfully) or the embryos may be

observed or subject to experimentation. If the embryos are not used they will not survive beyond a limited time.

It is also possible to 'create' embryos for research purposes: eggs are harvested at a minor operation — as at one for sterilisation — and fertilised in the laboratory. These embryos are not destined to be implanted and will not survive.

It was public concern at these new developments which led to the setting up in the United Kingdom of the 'Committee on In-Vitro Fertilisation and Human Embryology' under the chairmanship of Dame Mary Warnock (now Baroness Warnock). The Committee sat between 1982 and 1984. It received a large amount of evidence from public bodies and from individual members of the public, and it made 63 recommendations concerned not only with in vitro fertilisation but also with other questions such as artificial insemination and surrogate motherhood.

Artificial insemination by donor (AID) has been practised in this country for more than 40 years. It is estimated that something in the order of 3,000 children are conceived by this means every year. At present AID is not unlawful and anyone can practise it. This in itself may lead to abuses. The Warnock Committee looked at the problems and made certain recommendations. It was recommended that all who handle human sperm cells, known as gametes, should do so under licence and that arrangements should be made for inspection of their premises.

At present the status of the child conceived by AID is ambiguous. Under present law the child is technically illegitimate, and if it is registered as the child of the mother and her husband they are in theory committing fraud and perjury, though no couple has so far been prosecuted. The Warnock Committee recommended that the child should in law be treated as the legitimate child of the mother and her husband provided they both consented to the treatment.

It was recommended by the Warnock Committee that a licensing body should be set up to regulate research and those infertility services that should be subject to control. Certain services should only be provided under licence, and these include the premises used as part of such a provision, to include provision of fresh semen and banks for the storage of frozen human eggs, semen and embryos. Research conducted on human in vitro embryos and the handling of such embryos should only be permitted under licence. No research on a spare embryo should be carried out without the informed consent of the couple from whom the embryo was generated. No live embryo derived from in vitro fertilisation may be kept alive if not transferred to a woman or used for research beyond fourteen days after fertilisation.

It was recommended that the embryo of the human species should be afforded some protection in law, and any unauthorised use of an in vitro embryo should constitute a criminal offence.

In fact, in English law (the law is somewhat different in Scotland and Northern Ireland) the embryo has no protection as such. The Offences

Against the Person Act of 1861, still in force in England and Wales, makes it an offence to attempt to terminate the pregnancy of a woman 'with child'. The Abortion Act 1967 did not repeal this Act but only made it not an offence to terminate pregancy in certain well defined circumstances. The question has arisen as to what is meant by 'with child'. This is important in relation to the use of intra-uterine devices for contraception and of post-coital contraception. It is held by most, though not by all, that a woman is not 'with child' until an embryo is implanted in her body. The Infant Life Preservation Act of 1929 makes it an offence to destroy the unborn child which is capable of being born alive. But it is clear that neither of these statutes affords protection to the unimplanted embryo.

There are those who hold the view on moral or religious grounds that the human embryo is an individual from the moment of fertilisation and that it is from that moment that human life begins. These people will oppose the use of any human embryo for research purposes and will maintain that all embryos conceived in vitro should be replaced in the mother's uterus. This view was held by three members of the Warnock Committee who signed an expression of dissent, recommending that spare embryos should either be frozen for future use or allowed to die. No research should be permitted on them.

Those who held the opposing view maintain that the cell, or the collection of cells, which constitutes a human embryo only has the potential to develop into a human being. It may perish before it is implanted or may be lost through miscarriage. In practice the success rate of in vitro fertilisation and embryo replacement as at present practised has been, to some, disappointingly low. Many implanted embryos fail to develop and the miscarriage rate among those that do has been quite high. Thus it may be argued that in Nature many naturally conceived embryos never develop to reach the potential of becoming a human being. Nor can a fetus be regarded as a person before the development of consciousness.

On the other hand there are many potential benefits to be gained by carefully controlled research on human embryos. It must be emphasised that at this stage few if any of the possible lines of research have proved practicable and that much knowledge gained by embryo research has been and continues to be based on animal experimentation. Indeed the development of in vitro fertilisation itself, as has already been made clear, depended on years of trial and error which might in itself be held to constitute research. It must also be made clear that it has not as yet proved possible to observe the development of a human embryo in the laboratory to a stage when it is recognisably human.

Possible benefits of research on human embryos are as yet speculative, but they are considerable.

In the field of human fertility it may become possible to enhance and improve the results of in vitro fertilisation. On the other hand, study of the process of fertilisation may lead to means to prevent it and this could

produce new and more acceptable methods of contraception.

The process of cloning has received publicity. Two possible methods of cloning exist: a fertilised ovum may be split at the two cell stage. The two individual cells so produced may develop to maturity, thus producing identical twins. It is theoretically possible to implant one and retain the other for study, for example of its chromosomes. This could be useful if a genetic abnormality is suspected. In the other method of cloning the nucleus of the fertilised ovum is removed and replaced by a nucleus from another individual. In this case the ovum will develop the characteristics of the donor. This second method of cloning is unlikely to be used in the foreseeable future.

The study of embryos may be valuable in the study of human genetics and in particular in inherited disease. Already by the use of gene probes it is possible to identify the genes responsible for inherited disorders such as cystic fibrosis. By the development of cell lines in early differentiated embryos it may be possible to replace defective tissues with normal ones and thus eliminate some congenital disorders.

Another possibility is that of sex selection — only the embryos of the desired sex being retained after it becomes possible to identify the sex of any given embryo. At present sex selection is mainly used later in pregnancy in cases where sex-linked inherited disease such as haemophilia is suspected. Sex selection, so that parents may select the sex of their unborn child, is not as yet a practical proposition at the embryonic stage though it may become so in future.

Future research may lead to a better understanding not only of inherited genetic disease but of the causative factors of other diseases such as cancer.

The Warnock Committee recommended (with three dissenters) that research should be carried out on spare embryos, but only up to 14 days after fertilisation with the consent of the couple from whom the embryo was generated, and under licence from the proposed licensing authority. Institutes which conduct research have in addition ethical committees, so that research projects will have to be passed from an ethical standpoint as well. The Committee recommended that no embryo, however generated, which has been used for research purposes should be implanted in a woman.

The Committee considered with great care the difficult question of the deliberate creation by in vitro fertilisation of human embryos specifically for the purpose of research. The majority was of the opinion that research on such deliberately created embryos should be permitted but under the strictest safeguards. A further four members of the Committee dissented from this view: the majority in favour felt that the benefits of such research in enhancing knowledge of the processes of human reproduction outweighed the objections. Much remains to be discovered, including knowledge of the process of human fertilisation which may lead not only to help for the childless but to improved methods of popula-

tion control.

The report of the Warnock Committee was published in July 1984: the Department of Health in London invited comments on the report from members of the public to be submitted by December 31st, 1984. Implementation of many of the recommendations depends on legislation passed by the British Parliament, and the debates are likely to be fiercely contested for some time to come.

The Warnock Committee considered surrogacy: this is the practice by which one woman bears a child for another with the intention that the child should be handed over after birth. With the possibility of artificial insemination and in vitro fertilisation conception can be achieved without sexual intercourse.

Cases involving surrogacy have recently featured in the Press. The setting up of an agency in this country, similar to those operating in the USA, caused a sensation when a baby was born following a surrogacy arrangement when the mother who gave birth received payment. In the event the baby was made a Ward of Court and the commissioning parents were permitted to take the baby out of the country.

In all such arrangements the welfare of the child so conceived must be of primary concern. The possibilities of exploitation were of concern to the Warnock Committee and it was recommended that commercial organisations for surrogacy should be made illegal. This has in fact happened and Parliament has passed legislation to this end.

The other recommendations of the Warnock Committee have not so far been the subject of legislation. In view of this delay the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and the Medical Research Council have set up the Informal Licensing Body, with Dame Mary Donaldson DBE (first woman Lord Mayor of London) as Chairman. This body has inspected all the units offering in vitro fertilisation and approved all but one. Legislation, however, remains desirable though there will be many difficulties in achieving agreement on the many issues involved.

Nevertheless there are already many couples who have much loved and much wanted children, who would not have been born were it not for painstaking work of the pioneers. At present the new methods of helping the childless are only available to a few — and mainly to those who can pay the relatively high costs involved. Surely this work must go forward to benefit those millions of couples worldwide who must otherwise look forward only to permanent childlessness.

['Childbirth in 1986' by Dame Josephine Barnes was published in *Contemporary Review*, No 1450, vol. 249.]

AND SO TO VIENNA . . . THE CSCE ELEVEN YEARS ON

by Jonathan Luxmoore

ON 4 November, 1986 teams of negotiators, media men, lobbyists and protesters descended on Vienna for the third review meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The costs and benefits of the Helsinki process, begun eleven years ago, are under scrutiny once again. The patient reassurances of the diplomats, are much in demand. For the truth is that, by any objective criteria, the Helsinki Agreement has failed, and failed miserably, as a framework for East-West relations. Yet few people, it seems, are prepared to admit it.

When the heads of state and government of the CSCE's thirty-five participating states met in the Finnish capital to sign the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, they made two resolutions. In the first, they undertook to 'pay due regard to and implement' the provisions of the Final Act — unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally. In the second, they promised to continue the multilateral process by proceeding with a 'thorough exchange of views' on the Final Act's implementation, and on the tasks defined by the conference, in subsequent meetings among their representatives. It was an unconditional agreement. It did not set out terms under which notice of withdrawal might be served; nor did it specify procedures by which certain of its provisions might be reviewed or renegotiated at a later date. It was to be the classic instrument of detente.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is not difficult to discern the potential drawbacks and shortcomings of a project of this kind. It can be argued, for example, that the Final Act was in many respects a weak and inadequate document, which left far too much to the fortuitous goodwill of either side, failed to anticipate the strength of the competing interests and ideologies which would prevent its implementation, and underestimated the depths to which determined violators would sink in a bid to evade their undertakings. It can also be argued that its definition of certain key concepts, such as sovereignty, self-determination and the role of culture, was too narrow; that in many areas it proceeded from political premises since exposed as false; that the primary emphasis of its detailed and comprehensive provisions was upon *ad hoc* concessions rather than rights firmly grounded in law; and that its language and structure were clearly and consciously designed to ensure a high degree of ambiguity, and to restrict specific commitments to the barest minimum.

At the time of its signature, however, the Helsinki Agreement was heralded as a major achievement. When the CSCE had first opened in 1973, it had been regarded as the culmination of a series of promising developments. The previous year had seen President Nixon's detente-building visit to Moscow, the signing of the SALT I and ABM treaties, and the opening round of negotiations for SALT II. A series of vexed issues surrounding the post-War territorial division of Central Europe

had been resolved by the Federal Republic of Germany's historic treaties with Poland, the Soviet Union and the GDR, and by the Four-Power Berlin Agreement. East-West trade had achieved a rapid increase over the 1960s, and many of the agreements and understandings later associated with the CSCE — in such fields as scientific and technological co-operation — had also come into being during the early 1970s. The human rights movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, meanwhile, had undergone a revival and a new Soviet constitution was being drawn up. In the climate of optimism which prevailed in the early period of detente, the resolution of outstanding problems seemed possible.

What, then, did the states of East and West achieve from the first resolution of the Helsinki Agreement, the commitment to implement the Final Act? The Soviet Union, for its part, had pursued two objectives at the CSCE. The first was a formal *de jure* recognition of the territorial divisions which had been accepted *de facto* at Yalta in 1945 and consolidated by later events; a confirmation of its hegemony over its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe; and an acknowledgement of the post-war status quo. The second, meanwhile, was a non-legal statement of intent, which would enshrine the precepts and premises of detente in a non-binding way, enabling a practical *modus vivendi* to be maintained with Western governments on the one hand, whilst a fierce political and ideological struggle was waged against Western unity and resolve on the other.

Since 1975, the Soviet Union has benefitted directly in several areas, enjoying favourable trading terms, access to Western scientific and technological achievements and a recognised voice in European affairs. But its principal objectives were not fulfilled by the document. The Final Act did not recognise a permanent territorial division of Europe. Such an interpretation was expressly ruled out by Basket I, which notes that the participating states 'regard as inviolable the frontiers of Europe and will refrain from the threat or use of force against their neighbours, but adds that 'frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreements.

It did not recognise a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The medium of the CSCE is consensus and sovereign equality. All states, the document asserts, are entitled to political independence and the free exercise of their sovereign rights, including the right to belong or not to belong to military alliances, and the right to neutrality.

The Final Act also provided no acknowledgement of a permanent political and ideological status quo. There is no distinction, under its terms of reference, between greater and lesser powers, military alliances, economic and political systems. Indeed, the only possible justification for the Helsinki Agreement in the form which it took was the desirability of overcoming divisions and of opening the established order to the possibility of peaceful change — in the words of the Finnish host President, Urho Kekkonen, 'the opening of gates rather than the raising of fences'. Whatever claims have since been advanced with regard to the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's *droit de regard* in the region, it is clear

that the nations of Eastern Europe are no more compliant a decade later.

Nor did the Final Act satisfy the Soviet Union's second requirement, a non-binding statement of intent. Due to its technical ambiguities, it is normally regarded as a political document — 'politically binding' in the sense that its practical impact must depend upon the political will of its signatories and that failure to comply with its provisions may have political consequences. But its language, concepts and classifications are clearly those of international law and are designed to carry the same meaning as those of earlier documents, from which its political and humanitarian provisions derive. There was, therefore, a valid basis for demanding compliance. Any suggestion that individual provisions might be discarded or qualified, or that these were matters of purely domestic jurisdiction, was clearly and expressly precluded.

The Final Act's binding status should be as firm as that of other instruments of international law. Compliance by individual states must take into account the general record of compliance by all. In the face of intolerable violations and infringements there is a right to seek redress — in any system of international relations states have a right to shape their policies in such a way as to influence the behaviour of others.

The West, for its part, had hoped that the initial outcome of the CSCE would be a comprehensive definition of the requirements of detente, which recognised that the causes of insecurity and tension were specific, and rooted in conflicting interests and ideologies. The criteria for lasting security and co-operation in Europe included the safeguarding of political independence, self-determination and sovereignty, the making known of military intentions and capabilities, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the free circulation of people, ideas and information. At the time of its inception, it was widely appreciated that the Helsinki Agreement would encounter setbacks, and no one expected any sudden advances. But it was hoped, at the same time, that certain positive developments would also follow, pointing in the direction of a gradual lowering of barriers and easing of tensions. If the Final Act had provided a rough framework for the pursuit of Western objectives, time and patient diplomacy would be needed for a positive record to be established.

However, the drawbacks and shortcomings in its compilation, the pressures impeding a firm Western stance and Soviet intransigence have together ensured that the Final Act's provisions were never implemented. The ten principles governing inter-state relations which were set out in Basket I have been generally ignored. Later developments — the campaigns of internal repression in the late 1970s, the invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland and others — have shown that the Soviet Union and its clients will continue to use force and the threat of force as instruments of policy, that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms will continue to be interpreted in accordance with the requirements of the state and ruling party, and national sovereignty and self-determination in the spirit of the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine.

The regime of military confidence-building measures included in Basket I has never been established. Although on certain occasions individual measures have been grudgingly observed, events have shown that the Warsaw Pact never fully recognised their purpose and potential value.

In the fields of trade and economic co-operation, a few possible precedents for greater openness have become apparent and the West has derived certain benefits. It seems unlikely, however, that any of these can be attributed directly to the provisions of Basket II, which were based in the main upon political rather than economic premises. Overall, East-West trade has remained at a relatively marginal level, despite the high political profile often assigned to it, and there is no evidence that the inducements for economic co-operation set out in the Final Act have fostered the 'economic growth and social progress' which the document envisaged.

In the areas covered by Basket III — human contacts, information, culture and education — there have been certain limited developments over the years. But these — like the short-lived increase in Jewish and ethnic German emigration which occurred in the late 1970s — have been *ad hoc* concessions and have almost certainly owed themselves to pressures and requirements bearing little relation to the Final Act. The Soviet Union has continued to expend great efforts on the jamming of Western broadcasts, the exclusion of Western publications and the control of journalists, and overall the human rights situation has worsened. The dissident movement in the Soviet Union has been virtually eliminated and emigration reduced to a trickle. New legislation has been introduced to restrict contacts with the outside world.

It must be concluded, then, that the Final Act itself, and its feeble record of implementation, have failed to meet the principal objectives of either the East or the West. But has the second resolution of the Helsinki Agreement, the commitment to continue the multilateral diplomatic process, yielded certain incidental benefits nonetheless? After two major review meetings, at Belgrade (1977-8) and Madrid (1980-3), and nine subsidiary meetings of experts on individual issues, a commemorative meeting of Foreign Ministers and a long-running 'conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament', which recently concluded in Stockholm, the record to date is also far from encouraging. Indeed, not even the Helsinki Agreement's more adamant supporters make very much now of the practical record. It *is* still possible, they argue, to gain certain practical concessions on occasion: and if just a few individuals gain their freedom then that at least is worthwhile. But on a more general level, there are, according to the Western governments, three major reasons why the West would now be in a worse position if it had not agreed to continue the Helsinki process beyond 1975.

First, the process has provided a means of safeguarding and upholding the permanent statement of universal values contained in the Final Act, and a permanent yardstick by which to measure the actions of other

states. By putting their signatures to the Final Act, the Soviet Union and its clients freely professed to share the same principles and standards as the West, and by this act they can justly be held to account before world opinion. Human rights are embedded in the discourse and consciousness of the European nations, and are a permanent item on the agenda of all bilateral and multilateral meetings. The failure of the CSCE to achieve practical results does not invalidate the Helsinki process as a forum of this kind.

Second, the process has served as a focal point for displays of unity and consistency by the West. It has made possible a co-ordinated stance on crucial issues, a joint response to wider developments and a public defence of the principles and standards shared by all liberal democracies. It has served as a point of contact with the neutral and non-aligned states of Europe and has helped to bind the United States and Canada to a permanent role in European affairs.

Third, the process has provided a stable framework in which to assert the equal importance of each element of the Final Act and to uphold the joint criteria for lasting security and co-operation against attempts to whittle them away. Thus, the CSCE has remained intact despite the vagaries of East-West relations. Its flexible agenda and rules of procedure have enabled it to survive sudden shocks and setbacks, permitting the conduct of practical business to continue and keeping the lines of communication open.

These putative justifications have an obvious attraction, and in many instances they have been ably and eloquently put forward. But there are several reasons why, even viewed as a purely diplomatic venture, the Helsinki process has failed to serve these purposes.

If the Final Act was to serve as a permanent statement of universal values, then it was nothing new. By 1975, the Soviet Union and its clients had already signed several international documents — including the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration and the International Convenants — in which the principles and standards, rights and freedoms later mentioned in the Final Act had been set out, often in a much more detailed and comprehensive way, and with the force of recognised international law behind them. In several cases, the brevity, imprecision and technical ambiguity of the Final Act may actually have weakened rather than enhanced their legal and moral foundation.

The West European governments have, in any case, shown great reluctance to asset the Final Act's principles and standards in this way. Since many of its provisions are deemed inoperable, short of a total change of heart and a radical political and ideological readjustment on the Soviet Union's part, it is often regarded as preferable to restrict attention to more 'realistic' objectives, rather than to demand anything more substantial. Quiet negotiation, it is reasoned, will produce results where public remonstrations will merely provoke confrontation and endanger other diplomatic and economic openings.

As a result, although the Final Act acknowledged the valid concern of

individuals, groups and institutions with the course of a process in which their interests and fortunes were deeply involved, very little serious effort has been made to engage the support and understanding of public opinion. The press is excluded from virtually all the CSCE sessions, and procedures for keeping the public informed are at best intermittent, depending upon the disposition of individual delegations, and at worst non-existent. With the notable exception of the United States, no consistent effort has been made to consult with interested parties, or to explain and justify current policy in an open and coherent manner. As a result, public interest has been almost entirely confined to moments of crisis and drama, like the session of February 1982 which followed the imposition of martial law in Poland, or the opening of the Stockholm conference in January 1984. There is no evidence that world opinion has been moved by the Helsinki process to any significant extent, nor that fear of being held to account at CSCE meetings has had any significant impact upon Soviet policy. Rather, it is probable that the vacuum created by the absence of coherent and sustained public demands and expectations has merely weakened the hand of Western negotiators and enabled the Soviet Union to resist substantial concessions.

Even if the Final Act were to serve as a permanent statement by which to judge the actions of other states, there would be no need for a long, costly and complex process, prone to diversions and inconsistencies. Nor would the West need to buy Soviet participation, certainly not at such a high price. There are sound reasons for supposing that the Final Act has been belittled rather than strengthened by the arduous pursuit of additional, *ad hoc* concessions, which there are few grounds for supposing will be implemented any more readily than the original provisions of the document. Such antics probably do more to weaken the normative status and balanced structure of the Final Act by tampering with its tone and content than to strengthen and extend it in any significant way. They stimulate disenchantment and resentment towards the West, and make its professed principles and standards look hollow, and at a practical level they produce no tangible benefits whatsoever.

As a focal point for Western unity and consistency — the second justification — the value of the Helsinki process is similarly doubtful. Cushioned from the impact of outside developments, the whole venture has been beset increasingly by a sense of unreality. When the Madrid Review Meeting opened in November 1980, to discuss opportunities for closer co-operation and understanding, the delegates could look back over a year which had seen the invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition of a new grain and technology embargo, the refusal of the US Senate to permit the ratification of SALT II, new human rights repressions and a Western boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. All these developments had cast doubt upon the very precepts and premises underlying the Helsinki Agreement. When the same meeting closed in September 1983, after three years of unproductive debate, its concluding document spoke of efforts to 'restore trust and confidence', to permit 'a substantial

improvement in mutual relations', of 'co-operation, friendship and mutual understanding'. Yet during the same month, recalling the destruction of a Korean civilian airliner by Soviet fighters one week before the document was adopted, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, would speak of the Soviet Union as a 'modern version of the early tyrannies of history', with a creed 'barren of conscience, immune to the promptings of good and evil'. In the West, the Madrid Review Meeting was acclaimed as a success. Yet it had not seen the satisfaction of Western demands: Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan, there had been no return to the 1980 Gdansk Agreements in Poland, and the human rights record in the Soviet Union and elsewhere was generally held to have deteriorated still further. The West had been unable to press its demands, and its failure to respond appropriately had merely revealed its disunity and unlocked an acrimonious debate over aims and priorities, questions of style and strategy, which would resurface intermittently over the succeeding years, most recently at the Berne meeting on human contacts of April 1986.

Finally, if the Helsinki process has provided East and West with a stable framework in which to conduct business — the third justification — then it must be concluded that it is one which, by its nature, the Soviet Union has used more effectively and adroitly than the West, owing to its near-immunity to domestic pressures, changes of policy and electoral requirements. As experience has shown, it is well able to exploit the flexible rules of procedure, to avoid the establishment of precedents, to lower expectations and to make diversionary demands. It can also create an atmosphere of crisis in the face of adverse developments. In the final months of the Madrid Review Meeting, for example, it successfully depicted itself as a party of compromise, confronted by the intransigence of the United States, when in reality it had conceded nothing.

At the same time, an increasing preoccupation with the technical complexities of the process has diverted attention from real issues and created a false sense of achievement, as the efforts to procure a semblance of normality during the opening days of the Madrid Meeting clearly showed. The 1983 Madrid concluding document was heralded as 'balanced and significant' before there had been any time to test its provisions.

The principle of balanced progress, making developments in security and economic co-operation contingent upon parallel improvements in the human rights situation, was clearly set out in the Final Act. Yet this is also being jeopardised by the growing frequency of the CSCE's separate subsidiary meetings. The Soviet Union, for its part, has continually fostered the belief that the security and human rights aspects of the Helsinki Agreement are incompatible. If it can succeed in separating the two, it will then be possible for it to abandon the troublesome remaining provisions and turn the CSCE into another large propaganda forum devoted to the familiar — and more manageable — issues of security and disarmament. It has already come close to achieving this, by ensuring that much greater prominence was given, both by the Western media and

by the CSCE mandate itself, to the Stockholm conference (known in the West by the question-begging abbreviation, 'Conference on Disarmament in Europe') than to the three other meetings on humanitarian issues which have taken place over the same period — on human rights at Ottawa, on culture at Budapest, and on human contacts at Berne. Preserving the principle of balanced progress, if necessary at the costs of delaying or blocking an agreement to proceed with the second stage of the Stockholm conference until progress is achieved on human rights issues will present the West with a test at the Vienna Review Meeting.

How, then, should the record of the Helsinki Agreement be evaluated? The Final Act itself was a weak document, replete with shortcomings, which did not meet the principal objectives of either the East or the West and failed to achieve significant practical results. The incidental benefits which might have been served nevertheless, despite the Helsinki Agreement's lamentable practical record, were largely offset by the West's commitment to continue with a multilateral process from which there would be no easy exit, and in which the Western democracies would be exposed to the dangers of unconditional negotiation and co-operation. To persist with the Helsinki process in its present form will place the credibility of the Western position under growing strain, as the language and provisions of the Final Act are further devalued and the professions of commitment wear increasingly thin. To withdraw, on the other hand, would be an admission of failure, which would enable the Soviet Union and its East European clients to claim a propaganda victory. This is the West's dilemma — and the reason why the CSCE will almost certainly continue to limp along as before.

If there is to be any thought of deriving advantages from the Helsinki Agreement, the West European governments should now consider the following steps. First, they should provide a clear and detailed statement of their aims and purposes, and of what they believe the Helsinki Agreement to have achieved thus far. It must be a statement susceptible to proof, or refutation, but without the bluster and equivocation of the past. In particular, it should provide an answer to the following question: is the Helsinki Agreement intended to achieve *change*, or merely to secure a practical *modus vivendi* between the ideologies, political structures and economic systems of East and West?

A much greater effort should be made to engage the support and understanding of public opinion, as a means of strengthening the West's negotiating position and of preventing the abuse of the process in future.

Unless such steps are taken soon, the case for placing a term on the Helsinki Agreement and for bringing the CSCE to a conclusion is certain to become progressively more powerful.

[Jonathan Luxmoore is the Executive Editor at the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, London. His book, *The Helsinki Agreement: Dialogue or Delusion?*, was published by the Institute in July 1986.]

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS — THE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

by Urs Schoettli

WITH today's threat of international terrorism it is particularly pertinent to have a clear idea of what liberation movements are, where they stand and how they are different from ordinary terrorist groups. This definition is difficult because, among other reasons, many terrorist groups claim political aims for their actions.

The following types of liberation movements have existed and exist today:

— those fighting for national liberation, for the creation of a homeland, a nation state for their people, e.g. PLO, Polisario.
— those fighting for ethnic liberation, e.g. the Tamil Groups in Sri Lanka, the African National Congress in South Africa.
— those fighting for political liberation, e.g. various dissident and opposition groups in the East and in the Third World (the broad political movements against Somoza or against Marcos).
— those fighting for economic and social liberation, e.g. certain tribal groups in Africa and Asia.

The variety of causes is also reflected in the wide variety of means employed to achieve the aims. Not all liberation movements use violent means, depending on the enemy they face or the political/social framework with which they operate. There is, however, a tendency to equate liberation movements with the use of violence, in spite of recent examples of liberation movements which employ purely political means (e.g. the church in certain Latin American countries or in the Philippines). Already the mention of certain names under the category of liberation movements leads to political debates as to whether they can be so designated. This indicates that the term 'liberation movement' is obviously primarily a positive term, and we associate with it the struggle for more freedom and justice in whatever field this may be. The term applies particularly to political movements that are open and tolerant. For some, however, there seems to be a determined identification of liberation movements with the left.

The attitude towards a liberation movement obviously depends not only on its declared political aims and on the methods it employs in order to realise them, but also on the opponent against which this fight is directed. History proves again and again that in order to achieve freedom and democracy against regimes that are totalitarian or authoritarian, violence has to be employed. None of the great liberal revolutions has been achieved without the employment of violence. On the other hand it is an equally sad fact that many of the revolutions begun in order to establish freedom and democracy have deteriorated into anarchy and totalitarianism, precisely because the use of violence became an end in itself and led to certain non-democratic groups or movements obtaining a monopoly

over the use of violence. This was the case in the French revolution as well as in Nicaragua.

The problem of liberation movements is further complicated by two facts:

a) there are movements which fight against constitutional. democratic governments;
b) there are movements which, although they fight a tyranny, operate within a framework in which a liberal point of view, it seems still possible to achieve political aims with poltical means.

The more culturally and geographically distant such a struggle becomes the more difficult it is to judge appropriately. This is particularly so in the Third World and with ethnic liberation movements, all the more so since in some cases the ethnic question is linked with religious affiliation (for example in India and Sri Lanka).

There can be no doubt that many of the justified — or not so justified — causes for liberation movements in the Third World are legacies of European colonial rule. The great colonial empires of Europe, particularly the British ones, were built on the principle of divide and rule. For this purpose ethnic, religious and social minorities have been employed to serve the political aims of the colonial masters (for example partition of the Indian sub-continent, Sri Lanka etc.).

Many of the countries which have come into existence since World War II, particularly in Africa, have artificial borders that have no relation to tribal affiliation or pre-colonial history. It is therefore natural that these new boundaries, particularly in an age which has not yet overcome much of the paraphernalia of 19th century nationalism, have led to political dissent, to conflict and in some cases to the creation of liberation movements, for instance. But also in Europe we face liberation movements fighting certain concepts of a united nation state (the Basques in Spain, IRA in Northern Ireland), which should remind us that violent dissent on an ethnic or linguistic basis is not a sign of underdevelopment.

There are still intensive links between the former colonial powers and their former possessions in what is today called the Third World. The further the independence struggle has receded into history, the more it has become possible to exploit these links in a constructive and mutually beneficial way. This had led to a certain 'division of labour' of the European countries within the framework of special relations with developing countries. Starting from the premise that the former European colonial powers, which are today all democratically ruled, have an interest in the peaceful and democratic development of their former possessions, their experience can be made use of in two ways:

1. in the case of flagrant repression of political and minority rights, they can act as mediator between the liberation movements and world opinion, trying to explain why armed struggle is imposed on those fighting for freedom. This task is particularly important, since it is directly aimed at reducing the influence of the Soviet Union in the liberation movements of the Third World, which very often seem to

believe — or rightly believe — that their only friend in the world is Moscow;

2. in the case of extremist movements threatening peace, stability and democracy, it is important that the former colonial powers cooperate closely with the LDCs, in order to fight terrorism and strengthen democracy. This, unfortunately, is often not the case, since there are still governments which, for their own political ends, tend to divide the world of terrorism into useful and inimical groups.

The most delicate questions indeed relate to those liberation movements that have succeeded, i.e., that have come to rule and govern. We have witnessed in many cases — again not only in the Third World but also in European history — that liberation movements, once in power, have turned to repression. The most striking example in recent years has been the case of Nicaragua. These distorting and disturbing developments are of prime concern because they raise the question of how to behave to a liberation movement for which formerly one has had justified sympathy, once it perverts its political aims. The present discussion around Nicaragua is not only caused by different attitudes in judging the real American threat to the sovereignty of that nation, but also by the great reluctance of many people to give up their idealistic view, and to realise that today the Nicaraguan liberation movement, in the form of the Sandinist Front is essentially nothing but an instrument for keeping absolute power. But it is not only the need to reconsider and to criticise one's own basis of judgement; it is equally, if not more so, the question whether repeated bad experiences with certain liberation movements should stop us altogether from considering the liberation struggle, be it politically, ethnically, economically or nationally motivated, as an appropriate means for achieving freedom, respect for human and political rights, and democracy.

This question is of particular political relevance because in many debates we face the argument that support for a liberation movement means undermining one's own geostrategic and political interests. This has been relevant in the debate on Rhodesia and is now relevant in the case of South Africa. The aim of all democrats in supporting the struggle against the apartheid regime should be to help the achievement of a just and democratic order in that country which will respect the rights and interests of all races and provide every citizen, irrespective of colour, with the political and human rights we enjoy in our own countries. On the other hand there are quite a few who have no doubt that, should the ANC come into power, neither political nor racial tolerance would be achieved. This opinion is based on experiences of other cases of racial struggle, but also on certain political statements made by the extremists within the ANC. Some would argue that in spite of this danger of a lapse into new political repression under an ANC regime, one has to support their struggle in the full knowledge of the fact that afterwards South Africa will have to go through a period of repression — for how long, nobody is willing to predict. The argument in favour of this strategy is that any-

thing is better than today's regime and that the existing regime itself is by its own policy closing the options of the moderate, democratic forces.

We would fully support the second argument; in fact the political struggle of our own member party, the PFP, and of its leading members is the proof of the rigidity of the present government, which has continually destroyed the basis of liberal, tolerant and democratic forces with the result that the Blacks have been driven into the arms of the extremists in the ANC. We would also go a long way with the first argument. Indeed apartheid is much worse than any other existing system of repression, even compared with the Soviet Union, where there is more human dignity possible and achievable than in South Africa. However, as liberals our support must go fully to those forces in the liberation struggle who fight on a basis of democracy, protection of minorities and racial tolerance. The question whether these forces should make political agreements with other groups in the country, is for them to answer: for us solidarity goes beyond mere political aims, but includes fundamental liberal values.

Liberation movements and our policy towards them operate within the existing framework of international relations, and particularly within the framework of super-power rivalry. It is quite obvious that liberation movements have been and still are used for the geostrategic designs of outside powers, smaller or major ones. From our point of view, the question why many liberation movements have orientated themselves towards Moscow is of paramount interest.

There are indeed various reasons for this one-sidedness, some being of an ideological, some of a monetary, and some of an organisational nature. We want to concentrate on the political aspect, which of course includes the logistics of monetary and organisational support. We can today start from the premise that the Soviet Union has lost its ideological or even political attraction for most of the Third World. Where there are liberation movements of political importance and not of a communist-dogmatic sectarian nature, they are mostly orientated towards Moscow because this is where they derive support in international fora (e.g. the UN). We may recall that the opposition movement to the Somoza dictatorship was very broad-based, including organisations such as the church, political parties of all persuasions and entrepreneurial organisations. However, even in the very early stages of the Nicaraguan revolution one could anticipate that the totalitarian elements within the Sandinist Front would predominate over all other groups. This certainly had to do with their organisational strength, but was to a large extent the result of these forces having a strong enduring backer in the form of Cuba and — behind it — the Soviet Union. If the United States and the Western democracies in Europe, including the various democratic international forces, had from the beginning concentrated their efforts on the democratic forces within the Sandinist liberation struggle, there would be no need for today's support for the Contras. The Portuguese revolution, as well as the recent political evolution in the Philippines, are other examples.

To conclude one may ask for concrete criteria for political cooperation

with liberation movements as follows:

1. The principle of non-violence against democratic, open government: this means that Liberals cannot accept as liberation movements groups which like ETA or the IRA fight against democracies, not only because the governments which they oppose are democratically and freely elected (and can be changed by the electorate), but also because within the framework of democracy sensible attempts in favour of devolution and decentralisation of power have been made .
2. The principle of internal democracy: liberals must stress that liberation movements which are fighting for democracy and the protection of minorities within their own framework accept and evolve the principles of democracy and pluralism.
3. The principle of democracy: the main aim of any liberation struggle must be to establish pluralistic democracy, a system which is opposed to the causes which have created the need for a liberation movement. Political repression cannot be replaced by another form of religious extremism.
4. The principle of liberal orientation. We belong to a community of liberal parties and movements. Therefore, our fundamental interest is in strengthening liberal forces. While the protection and defence of human and political rights is indeed very important to us, we do not approach this fight in the same way as, for example, Amnesty International. We must direct our action more specifically towards the promotion and the welfare of our liberal partners and friends.

[Urs Schoettli is Executive Vice-President of Liberal International.]

IS SHAKESPEARE STILL OUR CONTEMPORARY?

by John Elsom

FELIKS Topolski warned me about Polish paradoxes. They are complicated, hard to translate and Poles laugh at them. He gave me an example. After the first world war, Poland became independent for the first time in more than a century and in 1920, they defended their freedom recklessly, by taking on the Russian bolsheviks and driving them back to the suburbs of Kiev where 'they could water their horses in the Dnieper'. This unlikely victory was called 'the miracle of the Vistula', the Polish commander, Marshal Pilsudski, became a national hero and Poland itself received a new nickname, 'the revolving bulwark'.

The revolving bulwark? Well, in the distant past, Poland had been called a bulwark against barbarism, which came from the east in the form of the heathen hordes of Goths and Huns. In the brave new world of the 1920s, however, nobody was sure from which direction the next barbarism would come, Germany, Russia or even the far west, from returning transatlantic cousins spreading coco-cola, chewing gum and the ethics of Chicago during prohibition. And so, the new bulwark had to be a vast fortification, designed like a revolving door, a bizarre and witty image which could have been coined (although it wasn't) by Witkazy, the Polish father of the Absurd.

The title of Jan Kott's most famous book, *Shakespeare our Contemporary,* is also Polish quirky with nuances hard to pick up in English. For two centuries, since Lessing and the 18th century German romantics, Shakespeare had been called immortal. It was a critical cliché, Shakespeare describes in deathless language the eternal human verities of love, death, suffering and hope, true up to a point, of course, but after such romantic language had left its watermark on six generations of British critics from Hazlitt to Henn, there is a natural housekeeping desire to scrub out the bath and enquire whether that is all that needs to be said on the subject.

Kott doesn't say that Shakespeare is immortal. He goes one stage further apparently and asserts that Shakespeare is *so* immortal that he's actually writing upstairs, in our own houses, our own city states, a proposition which provokes an instant challenge — because, of course, it's not true. Even Shakespeare's imagination did not dream up the atom bomb, television, aspirins or all that conglomeration of details which constitute so large a part of our daily lives. And once we say no to that idea, we start to question whether Shakespeare is indeed immortal except in some curiously abstract (and romantic) sense.

Guessing that our instincts will be to deny Shakespeare's topicality, Kott proceeds to prove paradoxically that we're wrong, that there are some ways in which Shakespeare can be regarded as our contemporary — or could be so considered in 1961, when Kott wrote the book. By 1986,

or 1886, he could be out of date. In his very Polish title, Kott discreetly nudges us away from the idea that Shakespeare is for all time by insisting that he is for here and now — or rather then and there, that is, Warsaw in 1961.

In its time, this was a challenging thought. The history of modern European and North American theatre reveals how many writers and directors eagerly snatched it up and used Shakespeare's plays to comment on current political events. At a time when it was still dangerous to write about Stalinism in the Eastern bloc, a director could still produce *Richard III* with the hunchback sporting an Uncle Joe moustache. The play was a classic, Ministries of Culture could not object to it and yet it could convey a subversive, even a revolutionary, meaning. In the West, there were very free adaptations of Shakespearian plots — *Macbird* about Ladybird Johnson and the killing of John F. Kennedy, and *Dick Deterred*, David Edgar's extravaganza on Nixon and Watergate. Shakespeare became the stalking horse behind which you could shoot your darts against the state without fear of retaliation, even from the laws of libel.

It became commonplace for directors to shift the apparent meaning of Shakespeare's plays a little to the left or right, so that their productions were more topical. Jonathan Miller's *The Tempest* became a study of colonialism with Caliban as the oppressed savage, noble in his resentment. In *The Taming of the Shrew*, Katherine was portrayed not as a scold or nag, but as a feminist freedom fighter beaten and cowed into submission by a brutish Petruchio. An excellent recent RSC production of *Troilus and Cressida* offered a Cressida who was far from being the normal wanton who entices men to their deaths, rather a quick-witted street-wise girl struggling to survive among the chauvinisms of male war-games.

Shakespeare is an elastic writer. He can stretch to many meanings and with Kott's authority behind them, directors started to assert their freedom to interpret Shakespeare more or less as and how they liked. In Vienna, and at the Royal Court, the ghost of Hamlet's father never appears: it is a figment of Hamlet's oedipal imagination. Directors justified what to other generations would have been straight textual travesties by insisting (i) that we can never know the exact meanings of Shakespeare's plays, (ii) that to achieve the kind of contemporary impact that Shakespeare's plays must originally have had, we must not be afraid to modernise them, updating not just the dress but the content, and (iii) that a successful travesty has its own creative value, as both Charles Marowitz and Stephen Berkoff have demonstrated.

Jan Kott, of course, would not endorse these versions as to what Shakespeare might have said if he had indeed been our contemporary. It would offend his sense of academic discipline. In his original book, Kott drew back to the original text, not away into political or sociological fashions; and demonstrates that the plays themselves contain quite enough dynamite for our purposes. But having started the fashion to interpret Shakespeare freely in line with whatever happens to be in our headlines, Kott is in a good position to end it — or at least to warn us forcibly about

its pitfalls, which was why the International Association of Theatre Critics invited him — and other directors and critics — to contribute to a recently organised seminar on the subject at the Young Vic theatre in London.

Kott started by offering an example from *Hamlet*. There are, he said, two social polarities in that play — the scandal-prone, military city that Elsinore has become and the humanistic, free-thinking university of Wittemburg, where Hamlet and Horatio studied. In the 1960s, he argued, we interpreted *Hamlet* through the eyes of people who, in Warsaw at any rate, were living in Elsinore but desperately trying to remember the ideals of Wittemburg. Now, however, the situation is close to being reversed, and he cited a production of *Hamlet* from the Yugoslav seaside town of Dubrovnik, where the bronzed tourists, fresh from the beach and the lovemaking in holiday hotels, came to the castle to watch the ghost of old Hamlet crying out for 'Revenge'. But revenge for what? In Warsaw, audiences instantly knew, in Dubrovnik they did not — or rather, they had to use their imaginations to conjure up an oppressed state.

In that sense, the Yugoslav audiences were not so contemporary with Shakespeare. And a certain melodrama descends when directors try to pretend otherwise. Macbeth's gloomy castle is not a useful metaphor for Washington, 10 Downing Street or the Kremlin. Of course, certain imaginative links can still be sustained — such as between revenge tragedy and modern terrorism — but the quick connections between politics now and then, so much a feature of Shakespearian productions of the 1960s, are harder to recognise and more vulnerable to reason. Ronald Reagan is not a Richard III, nor a Lepidus, nor a Julius Caesar — and neither is Gorbachev.

Also we have lost the one vital, specific and testing sense in which Shakespeare seemed particularly to be our contemporary in the 1960s, his brand of agnosticism. Shakespeare lived in a time when the old beliefs had broken down and no new faiths had emerged to replace them. John Skelton, who died some 35 years before Shakespeare was born, wrote three morality plays of which only *Magnyfycence* has survived. It is steeped in a hard medieval Christianity, which abominated heretics and always gave these devils their due, and sent them to hell. Such fundamentalism is characteristic of other sixteenth and seventeenth century writers, who are certainly not *our* contemporaries, although they may be of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Shakespeare, however, is not a fundamentalist. Even when he is dealing with a hardened villain like Macbeth, he is as much concerned with motive and psychological disposition as he is in telling us that the man is wrong, so Macbeth is presented as a man much at odds with himself, whose hell is of his own devising.

In his bias against bigotry, in his reluctance to jump to easy moral conclusions, Shakespeare is as far removed from Skelton as he is from the easy hedonism of Restoration theatre. But he is not so distant from the anguished soul-searching of the early 1960s, for we too were surrounded by philosophies in which no intelligent person could believe, East

or West, not pure socialism, not pure capitalism, not born-again Christianity and not nineteenth-century scientism. And, as in Shakespeare's time, it was not always easy to admit these doubts out loud, for the daily routine of living often depended upon assumptions in which we had lost faith; and so, just as Shakespeare turned to Holinshed and the Roman writers for his modern parables, we turned to Shakespeare for ours.

There are, of course, agnostics in every age — but there are also times when doubt is a rare commodity. To opt out of the battles against fascism in the 1930s or '40s, or against Stalinism, would have been like trying to dodge life itself — 'Stop the world! I want to get off!' To that extent, agnosticism was out of fashion. There are also times when agnosticism is forced on you, perhaps by new discoveries, perhaps by the intolerable dilemmas of conflicting loyalties or perhaps by a spell of reflective calm. The 1960s, like the 1600s, were years when not to doubt was itself a kind of evasion.

We found ourselves surrounded by writers who were pushy, aggressive, sceptical and questioning, wanting in Howard Brenton's phrase, 'to disrupt the spectacle'. There were the angry young men, the new proletarians, the new radicals (Hare, Barker, Bond and Edgar) — and the new alternative theatres. As in Shakespeare's day, the changed content of the new plays called for new dramatic forms as well — and so many of the writers were technically inventive. There may not be the most incredible technical transformation such as that which separates Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* in 1585 from *Hamlet* in 1600, but an age which saw at one extreme Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* and at another Brook's production of Weiss's *The Marat/Sade* cannot be accused of lacking skill, courage, ambitiousness and fresh ideas.

The writers of the 1960s shared many of the doubts, fears and rebellious instincts as those of the 1600s. Like Shakespeare and his colleagues, they were ingenious at discovering new dramatic devices in which to express their meanings. And yet there is a gap between them, much wider than a few hundred years, and so deep that none of us even now can see the bottom of it.

Let me drop a stone.

Non- and not very good writers sometimes believe that it is easy to be contemporary, if censorship doesn't get in the way. The topics have almost been chosen for you — unemployment, the Falklands War, nuclear disarmament. It is not hard to observe the latest fashions or to guess at the new ones. Your job as a writer is to distinguish between the fresh and the faded, and then to use your technical skill to assemble a package of ideas and styles which reflect the contemporary mood, thus capturing an audience and perhaps expressing one or two ideas of your own. That's hard enough, but you can almost tick off the list of processes required to assemble a contemporary play and, from then on, it's a matter of keeping your concentration going during the hours of writing.

But to be truly contemporary, you have to understand where these

ideas come from which have suddenly surfaced in the daily papers, how the situations arose, in other words you have to know a little history. Many writers of so-called contemporary plays regard this as a matter of research, whereas in fact it is an endless self-questioning, for the very words in which we describe our impressions of today have deep historical roots and evoke ideas and customs probably alien to our own, if we did but examine them. To be contemporary is a struggle, a dangerous battle in which only the psychologically strong survive.

Between the contemporary writers of the 1960s and Shakespeare, there is a difference not just of quality but of toughness. Shakespeare handles his stories in such a way that he confronts us with questions which even now we fear to ask — the price of virginity, for example, in *Measure for Measure*, the rights and wrongs of bigotry in *The Merchant of Venice*. The sceptical writers of the 1960s too often duck away into liberal platitudes — prejudice is wrong, democracy is right, all men are created equal, death is the termination of life in the body. They did not have the guts to be contemporary, which is why some twenty years later, they are fading away, fading far, far away into that mothballed, curtained annex to which we confine our youths.

But Shakespeare cannot be shut away like that, we can only shut ourselves away from him and hope he will not disturb our solemnity, like some tough marauding cousin who invades our tea parties with his embarrassing observations and odd companions. He, not we, is in touch with what is happening now. He will be our contemporary again when we allow ourselves to catch up with him.

1987 marks the beginning of the end of the present decade and the run-up to one of the most closely contested General Elections in British political history. During the year *Contemporary Review* will cover this and many other important issues of the day such as Disarmament and Defence, the Population crisis, Education, Violence and Crime, the situation *vis-à-vis* the European Economic Community, the future funding of the Arts and, in the January issue, *Technology and the New Political Landscape* by the Rt. Hon. David Howell MP. Also in the January issue are *Small Pacific Islands and the Superpowers* by Stephen Chen, *Germany Counts her Children* by Peter Cripps and *The Stones* by A. L. Rowse.

HOLY LUMBINI'S AUTONOMOUS STATUS

by Buddhadasa P. Kirthisinghe

ONE of the main conditions working in the minds of the World Buddhists is to request the Nepal Government to grant by legislative action a 10 square mile area round the Asokan pillar at Lumbini, marking the spot where the Buddha was born, granting autonomous status and appointing an international committee of Hindus and Buddists to oversee the raising of the necessary finance and general administration of this holy place, sacred to World Buddhism. The Hindus could be drawn from Nepal and India and the Buddhists from around the world. Naturally, the committee should be dominated by Buddhists, as Lumbini is their sacred place. Besides, it is the Buddhists who are called upon to finance any future development plan.

There is controversy over the best method for the development of Lumbini. There is a plan evolved by U Thant, then Secretary General of the United Nations. At least $35 million is required to put up a huge complex of unnecessary buildings around the holy pillar. This plan would only cater for the commercial interests of Nepal and Bangkok and not in any way alleivate the poverty of the people who live in the Asokan pillar district; a situation to which Buddhists would strongly object. Besides, it does not reflect the debt we owe to the great Emperor Asoka for leaving a marker on the exact spot where the infant Buddha was born in the 6th century BC. It must also be noted that there is a Committee of diplomats at the UN headquarters in New York City yet there is no official UN project on Lumbini, as the United Nations is not prepared to spend money on man's religious welfare but only on his social and economic programme.

The U Thant plan would be very expensive and was evolved without consulting any of the world Buddhist leaders; and, as has been said, the UN in any case is not prepared to finance the building of it. The Buddhists can either accept or reject the plan, but there is a simple alternative. That is to honour not only the Buddha but also the great and noble Asoka, by laying out and maintaining a flower garden around the Asokan pillar and replanning the park as it existed at the time of the Sakya and Koliya Kingdoms. As Emperor Asoka saw fit to leave it undisturbed in the 3rd century BC, when he visited the birth spot of the Buddha, erected the pillar and planted an exquisite flower garden around it. He did not put up any buildings at Lumbini, as he did at Buddhagaya, Saranath and Kusinare.

Any new buildings should be at least a mile away from the Asokan pillar. There exist already Tibetan and Theravada temples, which could be enlarged and Japanese and Chinese temples added. A Post Office, a dispensary with a nurse and a visiting doctor should be considered, also pilgrim rest houses, restaurants, cooking facilities and meditation halls with an administrative buildings, all to be within walking distance and in

sight of the Asokan pillar. The Buddha's sense of compassion and loving kindness might be commemorated by plans for economic, social and spiritual advancement of the people of the region as a whole, including both India and Nepal, as these villages are very poor. A school for each sect, small hospitals with out-patient clinics and technical help to better their agricultural methods would be more Buddhistic than costly, grandiose buildings in a sea of poverty around the Asokan pillar.

These are essential ingredients for the progressive development of Lumbini. It would prevent fraud, as occurred in Bangkok where $30 to $50,000 were embezzled from international donations to Cambodian refugees at the height of the Cambodian crisis a few years back.

No donations for Lumbini ought to be collected by other than national committees appointed by the International Committee of Hindus and Buddhists governing Lumbini.

These are the main things to consider in the plans for rebuilding the area round the holy Asokan pillar and the park as it existed from the time of the Sakya and Koliya Kingdoms. All funds collected should be handed over to a central finance committee of the Governing International Hindu-Buddhist Board of Lumbini.

The whole area of Lumbini Autonomy plus a corridor to India could be maintained by this International Hindu-Buddhist Board of Managers. The road systems that run between India and Nepal to Lumbini are not at present worked by a cooperative; but with the Mother civilisation and the holy land of the Buddhists, namely India and Nepal. This is another reason why Holy Lumbini should be developed on the lines of the 'Holy See' of the Roman Catholics in Rome. It should be maintained free from local South Asian Nationalism; a visa-free travel to Lumbini should be arranged and maintained. At present, the high visa fees charged on poor Buddhist pilgrims to Lumbini from South and South East Asia have been a matter of deep concern to World Buddhists.

The present writer feels convinced that this plan would succeed, as it is humanistic and in keeping with the spirit of Buddhism. It is also inspiring with its simplicity and desire to observe social and economic justice whenever possible by helping the poverty-stricken people living around the Holy Asokan pillar. In the flower garden, water lilies and lotuses would raise their heads exemplifying the great symbol of Buddhism, the lotus flower. This may inspire men towards achieving their spiritual maturity which is the ultimate aim of Buddhas Dharma.

[Dr Buddhadasa P. Kirthisinghe, now living in Sri Lanka, is Representative of the Maha Bodeh Society of India, Representation of the World Fellowship of Buddhists as founded by Dr Malalasekera in 1958.]

'LET THEM SMASH TEACUPS' — WEIMAR CERAMICS 1919 - 1933

by Muriel Julius

TELL anyone under the age of forty that everyday plates, bowls and coffeepots were once designated 'Communist' and 'abnormal' and they will think one rather odd. Yet that was one such dictum of the Nazi regime at the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933.

Thousands of well made pieces, beautifully decorated with abstract or modern geometric designs were smashed to be replaced overnight by pale blue Aryan flowers, spots and stripes. 'German earthenware made from German clay' read a 1937 publicity slogan, confirming George Savage's statement in his book *18th-Century German Porcelain.* 'Porcelain,' he wrote, 'is not only an art, it is also a series of social documents of the first importance.'

Nazi destructive fervour did not find much satisfaction in dismembering inanimate objects when so many human targets were available: which is why we are able to admire four hundred and fifty examples of Weimar Ceramics at the Victoria & Albert Museum, South Kensington. They come as a surprise, those boldly constructed wares decorated in unending variations of pattern and neat, controlled colour tones applied with technical perfection.

The fact that they are available at all is the result of the perspicacity of a Mr. Tilmann Buddensieg who, wandering round a Berlin flea-market in 1978, recognized the Bauhaus influence and purchased a few pieces. Within six or seven years the collection numbered nearly 500 items, jugs, tea and coffee pots, cake plates, boxes, vases. It has been bought now by the National Museum in Nuremburg.

German porcelain, habitually in this country wrongly called 'Dresden china' has always had a peculiar fascination for the English. As long ago as the 1750's Nicholas Sprimont, the proprietor of the Chelsea factory, was petitioning against the importing of Meissen porcelain while at the same time asking the British Ambassador to the Court of Dresden to buy some pieces for him to copy.

It is beyond dispute that no people, not even the French, have produced more abundant or beautiful decorative and domestic porcelains than the various princelings, Electors and Kings who ruled the five kingdoms of Central Europe before a united Germany was proclaimed in 1871.

First among them was Augustus, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, who ruled from his Zwinger Palace in Dresden. Carlyle called him 'The ever-cheerful man of sin' because he kept a harem and left 354 bastards. One does not trifle with a man of such stamina, so when he determined to possess the secret of hard-paste porcelain, previously known only to the Chinese, he practically incarcerated a scientist, the unfortunate Bottger, until the necessary amalgam of clays was discovered. The factory he founded at Meissen, about 12 miles from Dresden, in 1710, produced

figures, groups, tableware and vases whose beauty has rarely been surpassed.

Not for want of trying, for apart from Meissen, German porcelain factories were established at Nymphenburg, Höchst, Frankenthal, Berlin, Furstenberg, Ludwigsburg, Ansbach and Fulda, to name but a few. All of them had princely patronage. To own a porcelain factory at that time was equivalent to having your personal jet aeroplane today.

In the 18th century some nine porcelain factories were founded in Thuringia, a heavily wooded eastern region that provided a ready source of fuel. Most of them were small and their work provincial. Almost all were owned by ambitious tradesmen; and it was in Thuringia, at Bunzlau, that the most important area of the German ceramic industry was situated before the Second World War. Today, Bunzlau is part of the National Republic of Poland, but in 1897 two significant ceramic schools were established there. They closed in 1945. They were of course, greatly influenced by the methods and ideas of the Bauhaus, the school of design founded in 1919 by Walter Gropius which functioned first in Weimar (the Thuringian Government having approved the name 'Bauhaus') and later, in 1925, after various upsets, in Dessau.

The Bauhaus only lasted 14 years yet even in its brief lifetime it became a legend. Today more than 50 years later, copies of many articles designed there — furniture, lamps, ceramics, and very recently silver tea and coffee services are being manufactured.

Gropius, an architect, whose Fagus shoe factory of 1911 anticipated building techniques and design still valid today, invited the services of avant garde artists such as Feininger, Klee, Kandinsky and Moholy-Nagy. Their attitudes to shape, colour, space and form had a profound influence on their pupils. Apart from painting and architecture students could learn theatre and furniture design, typesetting, silversmithing, ceramic and fabric design. Students were trained by two teachers, one an artist, the other a technician. Thus the barrier of arrogance between craftsman and artist was broken down.

At Bunzlau, under the tutelage of Artur Hennig, himself a brilliant designer, earthenware products for working class families were the order of the day. Even before the war, the strong, clean forms of the Bunzlau coffeepot became known in every countryside household in Russia and Poland as well as in Germany. The various items, plates, jugs and cups cost only between 30 and 90 pfenigs each, and could be purchased one piece at a time.

Bunzlau introduced the spray-gun as a means to apply their coloured decoration. Tin and lead stencils were hand-fitted onto vessels before spraying. In time, of course, many large factories introduced automatic spray machines which could decorate a couple of hundred items each hour to satisfy the mass market for which these objects were intended.

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

I HAVE had the rare pleasure lately of being at the National Film Theatre when a couple of directors came on stage to discuss the films we had seen. One was Oliver Stone, whose credits as a writer *(Midnight Express, Conan the Barbarian,* De Palma's *Scarface)* did not lead us to expect anything as good as *Salvador.* The other was Roland Joffé, and you all know that the man who made *The Killing Fields* has now come up with *The Mission.* Both are young — fortyish — or at least on the threshold of what may be brilliant careers; both are humanitarian film-makers anxious to say something about the world we live in — and that's not common in today's movies — but within a commercial framework; and from both came as much common sense and intellectual stimulus (yes, honestly) about their own work and the industry as I've heard in many a long day.

Oddly enough, the analogies don't stop there. *Salvador* has parallels with *The Killing Fields,* inasmuch as it's also based on a factual account by a journalist, in this case Stone's fellow writer Richard Boyle, played in the film by James Woods. It starts off in *Easy Rider* fashion, with Woods and James Belushi driving down to Salvador: but once there, there are the charred bodies and the burial piles, the preening young fascist rulers and a local population confused beyond all measure, the well-meaning American social workers and within the Embassy compound those frightening hawk mentalities. Stone cites *Dr Strangelove* as a model, using comedy to alleviate discussion of the unthinkable; he works fast, but with such wit and intelligence that he gets away with both the polemic and the Perils of Pauline thrills. Asked to criticise *The Killing Fields* he said he couldn't, but he did say that he thought the eternal triangle aspect of *Under Fire* detracted from its impact. In my opinion *Salvador* is even more effective than either, both as propaganda and as entertainment; and that is partly because of its indignation, outrageously eloquent as when a sequence of considerable horror is followed by a huge close-up of Reagan on television spouting platitudes to justify his Latin American policies.

Joffé had intended to follow *The Killing Fields* with a tale of a priest who takes up arms in El Salvador, but the script of *The Mission* came his way and he thought it would be interesting for us to draw our own conclusions about what is happening now South of the Border and the struggles of the Jesuit priests in the eighteenth century, when they sought to prevent the Christian Indian tribes from becoming slave labour. That is a simplification of the film's theme, but I'm afraid there isn't a lot more to the film than that. Fernando Ghia, the Italian producer, had long cherished a movie on Spanish/Portuguese colonisation, and he got Robert Bolt to write it. I'm sure both they and Joffé know more about Paraquay in the eighteenth century than I do, but they didn't seem to me to get inside the skins of either their subject or their characters. It is

epic all right and spectacular — and noisy, if you see it (as you should) with Dolby Stereo and those waterfalls are roaring all around you. But the script is undernourished. It plays with too many ideas — the uneasy rivalry between Portuguese and Spaniards, the intervention of the Pope — and always in modern fashion. It all comes down to 'If might is right', which is what Father Jeremy Irons says to Robert De Niro, conquistador turned priest who takes up arms again on behalf of the rather cherubic natives. These are considerable actors (and Irons does his best screen work yet), but De Niro has to play the same old inarticulate rebel who finds his cause that we've had from John Garfield through Brando to himself. To be fair, Joffé is aware of this, but he seemed to think it was a virtue. My sensitivities rebelled against De Niro carting his armour up and down cliffs in a sack as an act of retribution. Was that the way they punished fratricide? Certainly it comes across as a forerunner of an Army Endurance Test.

Another director not commenting on the work of another was Donna Deitch, when asked about John Sayles's *Lianna:* 'I don't want to say anything bad about anyone' she replied, 'Let's just say that I think you'll have a better time at my picture.' As it happened, I caught *Lianna* recently on television, and it stands high in that benighted genre, the gay movie.. It is one of the handful of films on homosexuality which is actually about something — about a housewife with two small children who finds herself in love with someone of her own sex. Love is the one reason the experience is not traumatic, but she finds herself having to cope with family, with this new sexual orientation and then the fact that the beloved only wanted a temporary association.

Ms Deitch's film, *Desert Hearts,* can't boast of an iota of struggle or conflict from start to finish. It's like a porn movie, inasmuch as all the women in it are either Lesbian or bisexual or if straight just darned keen to be converted from the moment we first glimpse them. 'Where did you learn to kiss like that?' asks Patricia Charbonneau after introducing Helen Shaver to the joys of gay sex. When Charbonneau explains to her mother why the latest in a long line of lovers is Extra Special she says 'She just reached in and put a string of lights round my heart.' By making the actress pause in the middle of this sentence Ms Deitch has turned a daft line into one of very dubious intent. Not that I feel any animosity against her: no, that's directed at those newspaper critics whose reviews directed me into wasting my time with this soppy piece in the first place. You are hereby warned not to do the same.

However, anyone seeking information on how American homosexuals manage their lives will find it in another low-budget independent production *Parting Glances,* written and directed by Bill Sherwood. The first twenty minutes are trying, not least because each new character seems unlikely to be good company for the next ninety minutes. Anyway, the initial illogicalities are easily explained; and the cast grows on its audience — at least, I began to like some members of it. There is no reason these days why an American (as opposed to a Russian) gay man should be

required to *manage* his life, but that is the film's subject — it's about a way of life, about a long-term partnership, casual pick-ups, about friends and acquaintances such as the flamboyant married queen whose wife *may* know, the jolly fag-hag, the ex-lover with AIDS. The audience with whom I saw the piece laughed knowingly at a rather obvious type making seen-but-not-heard advances at a party, but I think this is a film for anyone, and not just the gay community. Towards the end, though the plot nudges its way towards silliness, the director has more large statements to make about loving relationships. He does so boldly and surprisingly confidently for a tyro film-maker.

New York's night-life is also on display in *After Hours:* obviously, it would have to include several gays, but I'd link that less to the fact that they're more obvious and ubiquitous in the late hours than to the misogyny of the script by another debuting talent, Joseph Minion. His hero, however, is certainly nice and normal, as played by Griffin Dunne, who is also one of the film's producers. Hoping only for a quick role in the hay with a girl (Rosanna Arquette) met briefly in a bar, he finds himself involved in situations ever more nightmarish. This is the genre New York-is-hell, a natural successor to *Desperately Seeking Susan* — though it harks back rather to the German Silent *Die Strasse* or the Kafkaesque Eastern bloc films of the early 60s. Hollywood has always aped Europe and it's taken it a long time to throw out its old folksy Parson of Panamint idea of the US: New York became hell quite a long time ago, but only recently have Americans faced up to knowing that if you're out late in the big city you're liable to spend your time with junkies, perverts, wierdos. It was easier, twenty years ago, to find them out in the wide open spaces. Now, Easy Rider stays at home, giving Mr Dunne a bad time. Increasingly bad: the last parts of *After Hours* have spirit, wit and imagination. Humour, otherwise, was never Martin Scorsese's strong point, but this is his best film for years.

What Mr Dunne finds in New York, Bob Hoskins finds in London in *Mona Lisa.* No mild computer expert he, but an ex-con hired to chauffeur a black call girl, Cathy Tyson. As in old movies, bickering turns to love, at least on his part, and he starts to risk his life looking for a young prostitute she once befriended. Between the two of them and assorted others Neil Jordan's film contains a catalogue of aspects of the whores' trade, and unconvincingly; it is equally uneasy as a study of an *amour fou* and hopeless as a thriller, since the twists and turns of the plot neither arise one from the other nor carry the least logic. The result is still likeable, partly due to the two leading players, and Mr Jordan remains one of Britain's most promising film-makers. His unrealistic night time London has been justly praised. London is hell.

Back to New York for *Hannah and her Sisters* which does not, as some hacks would have us believe, establish Woody Allen as a twentieth century Shakespeare. It's hard to believe that this mild, pleasantly entertaining, easily forgotten minor movie was written up in some quarters as a masterpiece. It's a schizoid affair, trying on the one hand for *Fanny and*

Alexander like luxuriousness as it looks at one largish American family, and on the other the customary Woody Allen star vehicle, in which he quips away as a TV producer with an almost terminal case of hypochondria. The two sides collide in the flashback sequences establishing that the Allen character was once married to Hannah, played by Mia Farrow. Then, she couldn't conceive. 'Masturbation' she suggests as they leave the doctor. 'Don't knock my hobbies' replies Allen. Haven't we had that joke in every other Allen film since they started? The same old Allen opus as ever was, then, but if you were put off some six or seven films ago he is improving; and if I didn't praise *Broadway Danny Rose* in these columns I'd like to do so now.

Better an Allen than an Edwards, and Blake Edward's *A Fine Mess* is the latest of his disastrous attempts to revive screen slapstick. If the title recalls Laurel and Hardy that is deliberate, with a plot about a race-horse and a piano, with many a car chase thrown in. It has two amiable leads, Ted Danson and Howie Mandel, who don't strain, which may mean that they had some misplaced confidence in this material. There is an awful lot of it, i.e., the gags are non-stop. But not one of them works.

Why write about it? (it came and went in a week). Why write about the wretched *Desert Hearts*? Well, I do choose my movies with this column in mind, either because these are middle-to-upper brow entertainments or because you'll have read elsewhere much about them. I chose *Target* because it was directed by Arthur Penn, who made *Bonnie and Clyde* and *The Miracle Worker*. Tubthumping for his film over here, he was apologetic about the script, adding that it was just another spy yarn: 'The script needed some centre and I took out some redundant espionage chases and developed the father/son relationship.' In either case: not enough. Gene Hackman is fine as Dad and Matt Dillon okay as the boy, but as they chase over most of Europe this is just another thriller. There are enough untried talents turning out undistinguished movies without veterans getting in on the act. Penn claims that Hitchcock was his inspiration, which may be why he resorts to many avoidable cliches.

And that reminds me to ask whether readers saw the two-part BBC Omnibus on Hitchcock, which set out to prove, by example rather than statement, that he was a second-rate director working in a second-rate field? The compilers seem to have taken a delight in passing on the comments of others as his unpleasantness as a man, his unoriginality as a creator, but beyond that most of the clips — especially from his later work — showed him at his most inept. Extraordinary.

CORRESPONDENCE

WHAT TO DO IN SOUTH AFRICA

Dear Madam,

Those who push the regime in South Africa should consider the consequences.

Heinrich Quiring (1948) has shown that whites sent by Pharaoh Rameses III exploited mines in South Africa and Zaire. Credo Mutwa (1964) has told of the black reaction: a revolt and massacre of the whites. My research (1976) makes clear that whites built Zimbabwe after the Sheba kingdom fell in 590 A.D. The Shebans came in peace, and lasted much longer. Even so, the line at Zimbabwe was violently overthrown c.1090 A.D. In each of these cases, the skills of know-how were lost. To say nothing of the loss of life on both sides. Must history repeat itself? Or can the white intrusion this time be permanently beneficial? For that, there would need to be a plan, not only for majority rule, but also for a continued role for the whites. I submit such a plan:

1. Release Nelson Mandela and all other non-violent political prisoners.
2. Holland, Britain, U.S., and Australia should accept any South African whites who choose to emigrate.
3. Add 30 blacks to the South African parliament, from different tribes or regions — including Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana.
4. Re-draw the map of South Africa into anywhere from two to about eight cantons on the Swiss model. The federal government to be limited to issues of defence. Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and Namibia could become cantons if they opt for it. Policing to be turned over to the cantons and cities.
5. In re-drawing the map, the west, which can be called Capeland (Maasdorp's term), would be from Port Elizabeth westward. This would include half the country's land and a quarter of its GNP. Its three million people (of South Africa's 21 in 1971) are 48% Coloured (mixed white-black) and 27% white.

   The Kimberley diamond area is on the racial border. It would be assigned to a black canton, after a 10-year period to train blacks for management. During this time stock ownership and control generally would be transferred to the black canton at a rate of 5% per year, ending in black total rule after 10 years. The Rand would pass to black rule after a 10-year apprenticeship.
6. Voting should be 1-man 1-vote in all cantons.
7. All references to race must be deleted in federal laws.
8. Loans are already too heavy. But if any foreign country can afford it, a Marshall Plan of money given outright could help the new country, especially the black-controlled cantons.
9. Extend site-rating (land-value taxing). The tax should be at least 7%.

Your truly,

Berkeley, U.S.A. TERTIUS CHANDLER

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

HAROLD WILSON'S MEMOIRS

Harold Wilson. Memoirs 1916-1964. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £14.95.

These are the kindly memoirs of a kindly man. There are one or two palpable errors. The account of the Oxford bi-election of 1938 is as wrong as any account could be. But these are minor blemishes. The historian of the future will find much of value here in the light thrown on the first forty-eight years of a man who was twice Prime Minister. His admirng friends, of whom I count myself one, in these latter days, will be glad that the generous nature of the man emerges beyond question.

For me there is a special interest in the story of his relationship with Hugh Gaitskell. I shared rooms in Isis St. with Hugh Gaitskell during his last year at Oxford. He referred to me more than once as his oldest friend, but owing to absence from London at week-ends I could hardly be described as a member of 'The Hampstead Set'. Harold Wilson describes his decision to stand against Hugh Gaitskell for the leadership of the Labour Party in 1960 as 'the most miserable decision I have ever had to take'. Certainly it was a very awkward decision for him. He was no Gaitskellite but nor was he a true Bevanite. It took the so-called Gaitskellites a long time to forgive him. When he became Prime Minister his policies were closer to their ideas than to those of the left wing.

He was said by his critics to be very ambitious. The notion is confirmed by the photograph of him, aged eight, standing outside No. 10 Downing Street. But he has never seemed to me more ambitious than others who have made their way from near the bottom to the very top, for example Edward Heath, Jim Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher. Ambition is not confined to any one social class. Harold Wilson waxes almost lyrical about the merits of Harold Macmillan; he does not underestimate the stark ambition that led him to be 'first in' and 'first out' of Suez.

Harold Wilson has also been accused of deviousness, which in my view arises from a not unattractive desire to stand well with whomever he is talking to. There is nothing devious in these Memoirs. Harold Wilson is remarkably frank and frequently quite scathing about the many leading personalities he has worked with or against. But his own kindliness leads him to recognise kindliness even when he cannot approve of their statesmanship. Eden emerges a sorry figure from the Suez disaster, but Wilson restores the balance on the personal plane. 'I, for one, shall not forget that in 1976, when he was desperately ill and forbidden by his doctors to go to Windsor for the annual Garter Ceremony in which I received the honour, he wrote to me to say that although he would have to miss the investiture ceremony, he would be there for lunch and the installation in St. George's Chapel.'

He has a charming story of Sir Alec Home gatecrashing a party given by Labour friends on Wilson's entry into the House of Lords. I remember the occasion very well and the singular felicity of Alec Home's speech. Lady Home is mentioned as going out of her way 'to make things agreeable with the staff at No. 10 for the new incumbents' wife. Harold Wilson has never been lacking in humour: but this self-criticism rather surprised me!' 'Apart from acquiring

an entirely unwarranted reputation as a master of parliamentry procedure as a result of the rout of Rab Butler over his Finance Bill, I had for ten years been one of the dullest speakers in the House of Commons.' However, he soon put that right in competition with Harold Macmillan. Apart from a section on the Board of Trade, there is nothing dull and much that is sparkling in these Memoirs.

FRANK LONGFORD.

MONETARISM IN THE LABOUR MARKET

Monetarism and the Labour Market. Derek Robinson, Oxford University Press. £11.95

Derek Robinson is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics and Statistics, Oxford University and as a previous Senior Economic Advisor in the Department of Employment and Productivity he can reveal the actual, rather than the theoretical, effects of Monetarism on the labour market. In his view '... Monetarist analysis is misguided and fails to understand the nature of the economic activity it seeks to explain.' This is especially relevant in the labour market.

The opening chapters relate to us the central tenets of Monetarism and thereafter the demand and supply of labour using the traditional 'ratchet Keynesian downward inflexibility of wages' for the supply of labour. Here it is important also to pinpoint a major distinction between non-Monetarist (involuntary) and Monetarist (voluntary) definitions of unemployment. This distinction is critical if we are to use 'supply side solutions' for our problems in the labour market. At this stage, too, the Monetarists receive further criticism, particularly Minford, with the idea that employers need to offer higher wages to attract more labour in the unionised sector, where wages are already above the norm. Robinson notes, 'It seems odd that Monetarists who emphasise the distorting effects of Trade Unions in forcing up wages above their market clearing level should also assert that these employers have to increase real wages in order to recruit more workers'.

The long-run vertical Phillips curve with its Natural Rate of unemployment is also questioned since with an excess supply of labour at prevailing wage rates it is possible to increase employment without having disasterous effects on the price of labour. This is contrary to current Monetarist thinking. The Phillips Curve should be rejected as well as the theories attached to it, stresses Robinson. Furthermore, the Monetarist assertion that expectations of future inflation rates determine wages and employment decisions on both sides of the labour market and are independent of other factors, such as relative pay, is a mistake.

The lack of government control over its monetary targets and its decision to present a bundle of targeted monetary variables to the general public surely poses problems for agents forming proper 'Rational Expectations' as that school would have us believe. It follows that the impact of Monetary Policy on the labour market is also uncertain.

There are, however, 'discernible' themes running through the Thatcher Government Policies on the labour market; perhaps unlike other administrations, they affect either individual or collective reservation wage. But has the

labour market and its reservation wage been controlled by direct Monetarist Policies or has it responded to indirect pressure through the high level of unemployment. These questions are left unanswered. The labour market is a candidate for the second division in the eyes of monetarists, however. They rely on microeconomic policies to reduce reservation wages and the Natural Rate of unemployment but at a high cost. Whether this implies we should have an Incomes Policy as an alternative to obtain lower inflation but with higher levels of employment, as suggested by Robinson, is debatable. Nevertheless, the book itself, is one to read for the layman, particularly as it gives an overview of Monetarist Policies in the labour market without too much of the familiar dogmatic rhetoric.

MARK COOK

BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL WITHDRAWAL

Britain's Civil Wars: Counter-insurgency in the twentieth century by Charles Townsend. Faber & Faber. £14.95.

Charles Townsend's survey of Britain's trouble-spots is a fascinating handbook: it covers the origins of 'the Palestine problem,' the Indian withdrawal — and civil war — Malaya, the ex-colonies in Africa and, not least, the South African imbroglio. Those who want a brief reminder of the main features in the story of Imperial withdrawal will find the essential facts here, objectively set out. His assessment of the skills of individual British C-in-Cs is shrewd and frank.

Being factual and concise, a host of conclusions can be read into it. This is no tale of steady transition from colony to independence for each of these areas: it is an ugly story in which, in each patch being 'liberated', the 'natives' are driven by a leadership marked by bitterness, greed and ambition all-but-totally missing from the last of the imperial administrators. Devolution might be 'liberating', but it was ugly, brutal and violent in each instance. Why should British troops be killed not in open war but by guerrillas, by booby traps, by bandits using the language of 'nationalism' and 'self-determination' to cover their own personal or tribal vendettas?

In Ireland, in Palestine and Israel, in India and Pakistan, and north and south of the Zambesi, 'liberation' led to the passing of a super power and to violence, insecurity and all-but-endemic civil war. And the white man's burden was the harder to bear because the methods of barbarism, that are now 'normal' in our lives, have to be met by a state that has prided itself on the pre-eminence of civil law, on its unarmed police, and on a liberal and humane ethic that has been unmatched elsewhere. So that this is a useful but a disturbing book.

It would have been the more useful if there had been a greater analysis, case by case, of the intelligence services available to the British forces. When imported, as part of the British Army itself, they are all-but-invariably inferior to the locals: as the loss of the B Specials in Ulster, and the erosion of the old Indian 'politicals' or of the old 'Levant Consular' service all confirm. And we could do with better and more detailed maps than the simple outlines offered here.

ESMOND WRIGHT.

OXFORD'S DEBT TO EMPIRE

Oxford and Empire. The Last Lost Cause? Richard Symonds. Macmillan. £29.50.

Mr. Symonds has written an entertaining and well-researched book on a subject which from the bibliography, published source and several pages of 'notes' reveals a wealth of historical interest. The evolution of Empire into Commonwealth is naturally reflected in the attitude of Oxford at different periods in the last 200 years.

The influence of Cecil Rhodes, the Rhodes Trust, the Milner Kindergarten, the Round Table group, the Ralegh Club, Rhodes House and Rhodes Scholars is enormous, but only one aspect of a much wider and more complex relationship between Oxford and Empire. I happen to know more about this period. I knew most of the chief actors, some were friends or tutors. I was for a period Chairman of the undergraduate Ralegh Club and remember introducing Lord Ronaldshay (biographer of Curzon) and hearing for the first time Winston Churchill, talking vividly about Israel in 1922, when it was still Palestine and he was the Colonial Secretary.

But the Rhodes connexion, though very important, is reasonably modern. I knew about Bishop Heber because of his wonderful Hymns; little did I know either that he was Bishop of Calcutta or a Fellow of All Souls and won the Newdigate Prize for a poem on Jerusalem. In a chapter on the Missionaries, Mr. Symonds also mentions the Oxford Evangelists, 1894, of Bishop Gore and J. H. Oldham, whose names were still familiar in my day — first World War I 1918-23. He also writes of Oxford women and Colonial Education. But it is well known that much Colonial Education originated in mission schools. There were also well-known missions to Central Africa. Mr. Symonds aptly quotes from a Newdigate Prize Poem by John Ruskin, who strangely enough had an influence on two quite different personalities, Cecil Rhodes and Mahatma Gandhi.

"Truth calls and gladdened India hears the cry
Deserts the darkened path her fathers trod
And seeks redemption from the Incarnate God"

Twice as many graduates came from Oxford as from Cambridge in this African mission field.

It was well known that Oxford through its classical training prepared scores of candidates for the Indian, Sudan and later Colonial Service. Many of my friends pursued this course. Oxford sent five times as many successful candidates as Cambridge to the Indian and Sudan Civil Services. They came from all Colleges, but before my time the great Balliol period under Dr. Jowett produced three Indian Viceroys in succession and of course Milner himself. With the large annual influx of Rhodes Scholars, History, Law and P.P.E. tended to replace classics in the 1920-50 period.

At the head of one section of the book Mr. Symonds places this Disraeli quotation:— 'Professors and rhetoricians find a system for every contingency and a principle for every chance; but you are not going, I hope, to leave the destinies of the British Empire to prigs and pedants'. He then calls the chapter: *'Professors, Prigs and Pedants — the critics of Empire'*. Once again he confuses the picture by aligning Prof. Goldwin Smith, Sir William Crocker, the Mumbo-Jumbo Club at Wadham College and the positivist Frederick Harrison

'whose friendship with Morely gave him access to influential periodicals such as the *Fortnightly Review* and *Contemporary Review*' with an even more distinguished group that included for example the Manchester Guardian Circle, C. P. Scott, J. L. Hammond, Leonard Hobhouse, J. A. Hobson and the great Gilbert Murray and my very old friend Sir Alfred Zimmern. Once again he finds an apt quotation: — 'If Oxford ever became a self-conscious intellectual metropolis inculcating an Imperial culture, she would very quickly degenerate and stiffen into a cold and pedantic conceit as Athens suffered under the Romans, when men flocked thither for culture and Greece herself was dying'— from *The Third British Empire* by Sir Alfred Zimmern, 1926.

In a final chapter entitled *Conclusions* Mr. Symonds gives no personal verdict but allows a critic to do the job for him and of all people he chooses a certain Sir William Crocker, an Australian Rhodes Scholar who was at Balliol encouraged by Lionel Curtis and the Round Table group, had a chequered career in the Colonial Service, resigned and worked for the United Nations. He wrote a book entitled *Travelling Back* and Mr. Symonds quotes from his book as follows: — 'As I look back on my days as an undergraduate at Balliol, when Lionel Curtis captured me for the cause of Empire, what is clear now but was not clear then is how much those interested in, let alone concerned about Empire were in a minority and a small minority'.

End of book. I can only say, so what? Poor Lionel Curtis, champion of Federalism, was a saint. I must tell the author that the link and the romance of Oxford and Empire are hidden in a thousand names, but I will list just a few already mentioned in his book from Australia — Prof. Hancock, Prof. Wheare, Lord Florey, all Rhodes Scholars and Sir Zelman Cohen, now Provost of Oriel and once Governor-General of Australia; the distinguished Historian, Sir Ronald Syme from New Zealand; Prof. Wrong, his son Hume, Lester Pearson from Canada; Eric Williams and my contemporary at the Oxford Union Bandaranike from Ceylon — the last three Prime Ministers.

Mr. Symonds has collected a mass of interesting material about the influence of Oxford on the Empire and Commonwealth over the last 200 years. He has demonstrated that Oxford has been a superb centre for discussing the philosophy and the pros and cons of Empire. He observes the change of outlook, for example between my old general tutor P. E. Roberts of Worcester College and say Edward Thompson who held totally opposite views on India. But there is a bigger theme than the centre for discussion. There is what I have perhaps loosely called the Romantic link between Oxford and Empire. From one angle only, Lord Elton's book *The First Fifty Years of the Rhodes Trust and the Rhodes Scholarships* partly covers the field. Mr. Symonds would, I think, agree with me that the distinguished products of Oxford, many of them Rhodes Scholars, give high praise to what Oxford's tutorial and collegiate life have contributed to their professional success. But however great their praise, Oxford owes a great debt to the Empire and Commonwealth for enlarging its own horizon and broadening its offerings, as in Anthropology, Forestry and Science. Perhaps I would add — and broadening the provincial outlook of countless British students at Oxford. I write as one who took the first Oxford Union debating team with one Indian member to the United States, invited by a Rhodes Scholar. The following year 1924 Malcolm Macdonald accompanied a team to the Commonwealth. The links are legion as shown in this remarkable book.

KENNETH LINDSAY

SHORTER REVIEWS

M. S. Gorbachov, Speeches and Writings (Pergamon Press £19.95) Robert Maxwell has edited and introduced this valuable selection of pieces from the work of the General Secretary of the CPSU. Mikhail Gorbachov has himself written a short Preface. The passages range from his address to the British Parliament in December 1984 to his Report to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party on February 25, 1986. The main themes in these speeches and writings are social-economic growth within the Soviet Union, which he plans to improve to a new standard of quality and prosperity, and the pressing need for an end to the threat of nuclear war and for greater international co-operation by East and West. Since his election as General Secretary last March, Gorbachov has shown to the world a moderate friendly image, anxious for negotiations. He has not however diverged from the fundamental Soviet outlook towards world communism. In his Report to the 27th Congress, he states quite fairly 'we are firmly convinced that promoting revolutions from outside, and even more so by military means, is futile and inadmissable'. This does not, of course, exclude the fermenting of revolution within a victim state. It is this evil against which the free world must protect itself. This is a volume which should be available to all concerned with the development of Russian affairs.

Wealth and Inequality in Britain (Faber & Faber £3.95) 'This attempt', by the economic and social historian W. D. Rubinstein to chart the evolution of economic inequality in Britain, focusing centrally on inequalities in wealth and income' is both illuminating and controversial. The interpretation of inequality is itself a matter of wide differences. Nonetheless this analytical study arrives at valuable conclusions. For example, 'there seems no doubt at all that the period since the outbreak of the Second World War has seen a fairly steady levelling of income distribution compared with the inter-war era'. How far this is attributable to the Labour Government's welfare policy 1945-1951 is debateable. On the other hand, during the post war period, the thrust of wealth redistribution has been from the very wealthy to the affluent, and 'the bottom portions of the population have been relatively unaffected'. The growth of home ownership and savings will probably widen the spread in future years Dr. Rubinstein reaches, to many, a surprising conclusion in international terms. 'We have found in this discussion of economic equality in Britain — a marked improvement against all expectations, so that in relative terms Britain appears to have caught up with those comparable

countries which long boasted a higher standard of living'. There remains as the author recognises, the appalling degree of unemployment. This volume seems to confirm the oft repeated comment that economically we are still two distinct societies.

Edinburgh (Constable £6.95.) This 'travellers' Companion' to a historic appreciation of Scotland's superb capital is selected and introduced by David Daiches. 'Edinburgh is a city whose history is written on its face'. He has brought together 119 extracts from literary works since the seventeenth century, which relate to particular streets, buildings and areas of the city, and life, customs and morals, as well as to outstanding events. For example, it includes the trial of John Knox in 1563 and the coronation of Charles I in 1633. Dr. Johnson and Boswell are not forgotten. More recently the volume includes Erick Linklater's account of the first year of the Edinburgh Festival in 1947. There are numerous illustrations. It is a book which will appeal both to the visitor and to all devoted to the appreciation of Edinburgh.

How to be God. (Andre Deutsch. £6.95.) In the latest of George Mikes' profound and funny commentaries on *La Condition Humaine*, richly anecdotal, airily syllogistic, crackling with a Rabbinical wit, sinuous with a Jesuitical subtlety, he presents his *Argumentum* against the existence of God. Man created God, he says, not the other way round: Man needed God, who is, moreover, a projection of Man. George Mikes believes and elaborates these themes quite fiercely, but his more sophistical assertion that God is modelled on Man's first God — his mother — and that God must be a Woman, is more of a tongue-in-cheek presentation, and not unduly to be bridled at. He is a compassionate man, and he has many wise and comforting things to say — about mortality — or about the waste of a life sacrificed, even to a dependent despot in a wheelchair. His book should cause great and satisfying offence. The Kremlin won't like it — they don't like George Mikes, anyway. The Pope won't like it. But will he laugh? M.T.

From Ploughtail to Parliament (Hutchinson. Cresset Library. £5.95). This autobiography of Joseph Arch, 1826-1919, was written in 1897-8 at the behest of the Countess of Warwick who contributed the Preface. Born of a farm labourer, Arch through natural ability, determination and ambition made himself the leader of the down trodden farm workers and founded in 1872 the first union of agricultural labourers. It increased greatly their working conditions and played a considerable part in giving them the vote in 1884. The union thereafter declined and died in 1896. This was a bitter blow to Arch who would have nothing to do with the new agricultural union formed in 1906. He was a Liberal Member of Parliament from 1885-6 and 1892-1900, but was not a success. A mixture of achievement and defeat, of arrogance and bitterness, of self-satisfaction and disappointment pervade this biography. In his Introduction to this Edition, Alun Howkins points out that until recently, this book 'has dominated historical writing on the subject' of the labourers' movement and the formation of the unions, in the absence of much other material. In the result, many important local (and even national) figures have until recently not figured in accounts of the unions of the 1870s and 1880s. This biography needs to be read in the context of the full history.

HALF-YEAR INDEX—JULY-DECEMBER 1986

VOLUME 249

LS—Literary Supplement

ABEL, Betty: LS 53, 200, 276.
ANDREWS, Elmer: 'All the Realms of a Whisper', the Poetry of Seamus Heaney, 256.
ASHDOWN, Paddy M.P.: Creating the Partnership for Progress, 281.

BARNES, Dame Josephine: Childbirth in 1986, 245. Artificial Motherhood, 297.
BECK, Peter J.: Has History a Future? 261.
BHAMBRI, Kusum: Rising Muslim Consciousness, 127.
BIGGS-DAVISON, Sir John, M.P.: LS 163, 218.
BOBER, Philip P.: Rate Capping and 'Poplarism', 139.

CONSTANTINE, Pamela: (poems) A Trilogy, 197.
COOK, Donald: Dubai Notebook, 250.
COOK, Mark: Assisting the Tourist Boom, 153. LS 106, 330.
COTTRELL, Richard, M.E.P.: Turkey and the Long Hot Summer, 174.
COULING, Della: LS 222.
COX, Ted: With Accent on Youth and Animals, 30.

de MONTMORENCY, Sir Arnold: LS 54.

DURAN, Oyden Ortega: The Panama Canal and Panama's National Interests, 74.

EHTESHAMI, A.: South Asia after Afghanistan, 8.
ELSOM, John: Commitment as a Form of Privilege, 83. Mailing Lists, 198. Is Shakespeare still our Contemporary?, 315.

GEORGE, Alexander: Genocide in East Timor, 119.
GREEN, Laurence: Edinburgh Festival 1986, 208.

HAMM, Manfred R.: Moscow's Emerging Blitzkreig Operation, 232.
HARRIGAN, Anthony: The Limits of Modernisation, 113.
HAWKINS, Desmond: I remember, I remember, 94.
HOWELL, Ralph, M.P.: The Growing Problem of Unemployment: a Practical Solution, 1.
HUFTEL, Sheila: Reflections on a Tour Made in Scotland, August 1803, 89.

JULIUS, Muriel: 'Let Them Smash Tea cups' — Weimer Ceramics 1919-1933, 322.

KIRTHISINGE, Buddhadasa P.: Holy Lumbini's Autonomous Status, 320.

LAND, Thomas: Locust Outbreaks Prolong the Agony of Africa, 203.
LINDSAY, Kenneth: LS 110, 219, 332.
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT: 45, 105, 161, 213, 273, 329.
LONGFORD, Lord: LS 49, 105, 161, 273, 329.
LOWENSTEIN, L. F.: The Psychology of the Young Murderer, 97.
LUXMOORE, Jonathan: And so to Vienna . . . The CSCE Eleven Years on, 302.

MAITLAND, Lady Olga: Propaganda War in the Classroom, 131.
McCAULEY, Martin: Disaster at Chernobyl, 288.
MILLAR, T. B.: South Africa and its Neighbours, 225.
MULLEN, Richard: LS 53.
MUNSON, James: LS 107.

NARPATI, B.: International Banking, 124. Secrecy in Swiss Banking, 294.

ORR, Peter: Theatre Antique Orange, 205. Maggio Musicale in Florence 1986 and Sviatislav Richter in Venice, 268.

OXLEY, William: (poems) The Starcross Ferry, Remember Nature, 34.

PETTY, William: Parental Government, 71.
POEMS: 34, 197.
PYBUS, Richard: Swedish Politics: the Beginning of the End of an Era? Part 1. 34, Part 2. 240.

QUARTERLY REVIEWS: Cinema 157, Fiction, 45, 213.

ROBINSON, Richard: Perspectives on Spain, 1986, 57.
ROSE, Paul: LS 164.
ROWELL, Rev. Geoffrey: Anglican Anxieties; the Ministry of the Church and the Ordination of Women, 178.
ROWSE, A. L.: The Mandelstam Experience, 21.

SAVIGEAR, Peter: The French Elections, March 1986; Innovations and Traditions, 13.
SAWHNY, Karam: Sinhala — Tamil Negotiations, 184.
SCHOETTLI, Urs: Liberation Movements — The Liberal Prospective, 310.
SHIELDS, James G.: From Rule Book to Realpolitik, France's Constitutional Challenge, 78.
SHIPMAN, David: Cinema Review, 157, 324. LS 108.
SHORTER REVIEWS: 56, 111, 167, 224, 279, 334.
SVETIC, Filip: The Dilemma of Denationalisation, 236.

TANNER, Canon Laurence: LS 51, 221, 275.
TIBBS, Molly: LS 109, 278.
TOWLE, Philip: Korean Journey, 27.

UWAH, Godwin Okebaram: The Libyan Flap: a Watershed in the South African Situation, 64.

VANN, Philip: The Sketchbooks of Picasso, 270.
VILLIERS, Charles: Big Bang: the Opportunities and Responsibilities, 169.

WADE, Rosalind: Quarterly Fiction Reviews 45, 213.
WARD, J. T.: The Origins of Scottish Toryism, 35.
WHITTINGTON-EGAN, Richard: A New Assessment of Denton Welch. Part IV Sheila and Fishbones, 41; Part V The Dancing Mouse, 146. LS 55, 111, 166, 223.
WRIGHT, Prof Esmond: LS 50, 52, 162, 165, 166, 274, 331

ZELLICK, Graham: National Security, Official Information and the Law, 189.
ZUROWSKI, Andrzej: Beneficial Obstacles in the Polish Theatre, 142.

BACK ISSUES

For sale and wanted to buy

We receive continual demands for back issues of **CONTEMPORARY REVIEW** from individuals and libraries wanting to complete their collections. Copies are now available from 1939 onwards as well as some earlier issues. Contemporary Review is also willing to buy additional back numbers.

Please send for full details to:

The Finance Director, Contemporary Review Co. Ltd.,
61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG.

ORDER FORM

To: **The Subscription Manager,**

Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG

I enclose herewith my cheque for ....., for a year's subscription
[For rates, see inside front cover]

Name .....

Address .....

.....

COLLIN STREET BAKERY

L. WILLIAM McNUTT, JR, President
P.O. BOX 79, CORSICANA, TEXAS 75110, U.S.A.
Fax: 2148726879 Telex: 730730 Cable: 'Fruit Cakes'

. . . SINCE 1896

Yes, we've been around a long time! William McKinley was President of the United States, and Texas was still a frontier area when Collin Street Bakery was founded in 1896. Only 2¼ million people lived in Texas, 15 million today. Dallas was 39,000, 1¼ million today. A young baker named August Weidmann, newly arrived in America from Wiesbaden, Germany, found the financial backing of Tom McElwee, local cotton buyer and opera house owner, and Collin Street Bakery began business.

. . . NOW IN 1986

The De Luxe Fruit Cakes are sold all over the world. Please write by airmail or Telex orders and enquiries for direct postal delivery.

5 MAR 1987

Contemporary Literary Criticism

Gale Research Company are preparing several volumes of

CONTEMPORARY LITERARY CRITICISM (CLC),

edited by Daniel G. Marowski,
which will be published from **Spring, 1986** through **Spring, 1987.** Each volume will contain excerpted critical evaluations from various sources to give balanced overviews of the work of about 45 to 50 novelists, poets, playwrights, and other creative writers. CLC is published in a clothbound text edition of about 600 double-column pages. For further information please apply to:

Gale Research Co.

Penobscot Bldg. Detroit, Mich. 48226, USA.

THE THOMAS HARDY SOCIETY

Founded in 1968 as a non-profit-making cultural organisation devoted to 'education in the works of Thomas Hardy by promoting in every part of the World appreciation and study.'

The Society welcomes everyone interested in Hardy's writings, life, times and countryside. A Summer School is held alternate years and *The Thomas Hardy Journal* sent free to members thrice-yearly. There is an extensive range of publications and a full programme of events. For details of membership and list of publications send to:

The Thomas Hardy Society, Cranborne, Dorset BH21 5PU, England

or telephone Cranborne (07254) 313.

Short Story Competition

Dedicated to the memory of

DENYS VAL BAKER

(1917-1984)

Author and Editor

An appeal fund has been opened to establish an annual Short Story Competition as a memorial to the writer Denys Val Baker.

Donations and enquiries to the Denys Val Baker Memorial Fund: Martin Val Baker, Rainyday, Mabbots Yard, East Terrace, Penzance, Cornwall, U.K.

Printed by BRAZIER & NAISH LTD., 202-204 High Road, Benfleet, Essex SS7 5LD, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG Tel 01-242 3215. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.